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HARVARD  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 

PUBLISHED    UNDER  THE    DIRECTION    OF 
THE   DEPARTMENT  OF  ECONOMICS 

VOL.  IX 


THE  FRENCH 
GRAIN  TRADE 

1660-  1710 

LEGENDA 


Areas  from  which  Paris 
'was  supplied,  and 
Route*  by  which  outlying 
areas  were  tapped. 


5otable  Independent  market  areas: 

Lyons   and  its  sources  of  supply, 
Rouen     "    "        "        "       " 
+++  +  Orleans  "    "        "       "       *' 
Bordeaux  and  the  export  trade- 
oft  he  Upper  Garonne 
Marans  and  La  Rocbelle 


&&&ff  Small  Independent  market  areas: 
(a)  in  isolated  rural  districts 
enclaves  within  an  area 
of  active  trade     ' 
e.g.  Tours 
Blois 
Rheims 
Nevers 
La  Charite' 

Supply  areas  exploited  by 
two  or  mure  market  areas 


(a)  Route  of  the  export  trade 
from  L'pper  Languedoe 

(b)  Rouies  in  the 
Upper^Marne  Valley 


Spanish  frequent  the  Fairs 

at  Giront,  ft. Beat. 

Bagneret-de-Luch 

coming  for  grain 


Longitude    East  2*  from,   Paris 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE 
GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

1400-1710 


BY 

ABBOTT  PAYSON  USHER,  PH.D. 

INSTRUCTOR  IN  ECONOMICS  IN  CORNELL  UNIVERSITY 


CAMBRIDGE 
HARVARD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

1913 


COPYRIGHT,  1913 
BY  HARVARD   UNIVERSITY 


PATRI  DILECTO 
FILIUS  GRATUS 


PREFACE 

THE  history  of  the  grain  trade  acquired  great  prominence 
in  France  in  the  eighteenth  century.  The  Physiocrats  made  it 
one  of  the  issues  in  their  struggle  for  commercial  freedom,  and 
the  scandal  attached  to  the  King's  name  in  connection  with 
the  Pacte  de  Famine  still  furnishes  the  political  historian  with 
an  interesting  episode  in  pre-Revolutionary  history.  The 
earlier  history  of  the  grain  trade  does  not  appeal  to  the  same 
interests.  There  is  none  of  the  intensely  dramatic  tone  of  the 
great  episodes  of  the  eighteenth  century.  It  is  a  chapter  in 
the  history  of  social  evolution,  interesting  perhaps,  but  com- 
plicated and  difficult  because  it  involves  an  understanding  of 
conditions  so  strangely  different  from  those  of  our  own  day. 
Changes  in  the  mode  of  marketing  seem  to  be  relatively  unim- 
portant and  it  is  only  with  an  effort  that  we  bring  ourselves  to 
realize  how  closely  these  changes  are  associated  with  the  develop- 
ment of  economic  solidarity. 

The  increasing  complexity  of  the  division  of  labor  creates  a 
necessity  for  more  accurate  determinations  of  value.  Everyone 
is  concerned  either  as  a  producer  or  as  a  consumer.  Today 
there  is  a  high  degree  of  refinement  in  the  valuation  of  the  great 
staples,  and  the  achievement  of  this  success  is  one  of  the  triumphs 
of  modern  institutions.  Grain,  cotton,  wool,  oil,  iron  and  steel, 
beef,  and  some  other  products  are  valued  today  with  reference 
to  the  demand  of  the  world.  It  is  perhaps  the  greatest  novelty 
in  our  modern  economic  organization.  The  history  of  the  grain 
trade  is  significant  because  it  presents  most  clearly  some  of  the 
first  steps  in  the  evolution  of  these  new  modes  of  marketing. 
France  is  peculiarly  important,  not  because  the  general  develop- 
ment is  different  in  Germany  and  in  England,  but  because  the 
history  of  France  exhibits  more  clearly  some  of  the  stages  in 
the  process.  The  story  is  more  easily  read.  The  crises  leave 

vii 


Vlii  PREFACE 

a  deeper  impress  on  the  records.  The  great  dearths  of  the 
seventeenth  century  revealed  the  defects  of  the  local  market 
systems.  The  need  of  wholesale  markets  becomes  unmistakably 
clear.  Then,  too,  conditions  in  Burgundy  exhibit  the  strength 
of  the  old  system  and  make  it  possible  to  understand  the  extreme 
slowness  of  the  evolution. 

The  study  of  the  limitations  of  the  market  area  is  essential 
to  an  understanding  of  the  history  of  commerce,  though  other 
topics  ^usually  attract  more  attention.  The  importance  of 
foreign  trade  and  the  greater  volume  of  records  available  tend 
to  distort  our  views.  The  general  character  of  trade  between 
tropical  and  temperate  zones,  too,  creates  an  appearance  of 
world  marketing  that  is  somewhat  deceptive.  The  history 
of  the  great  stream  of  trade  that  flowed  through  Europe  from 
the  Mediterranean  countries  does  not  belie  the  conclusions 
reached  by  a  study  of  domestic  trade.  The  analysis  of  price- 
making,  the  characteristic  problem  of  domestic  trade,  merely 
emphasizes  the  need  of  a  more  careful  study  of  the  cosmopolitan 
trade  of  the  middle  ages.  This  stream  of  commerce,  which  we 
would  today  designate  as  foreign,  presents  as  its  characteristic 
problem  the  liquidation  of  trade  balances.  Development  in 
the  organization  of  domestic  trade  is  measured  in  terms  of  market 
organization;  the  changes  in  the  mechanism  of  the  general 
trade  of  Europe  can  best  be  appreciated  in  terms  of  the  growth 
of  financial  machinery  for  the  handling  of  commercial  credit. 
The  principal  topics  in  that  story  are  the  development  of  credit 
instruments,  the  history  of  banking,  and  the  development  of 
money  markets.  The  history  of  European  commerce  in  this 
sense  is  still  unwritten.  The  subject  is  gradually  taking  form, 
material  is  being  collected  and  rendered  available,  but  the  narra- 
tive is  still  incomplete.  As  yet  we  know  only  the  vague  out- 
lines of  the  history  of  the  bill  of  exchange.  Ehrenberg  has 
laid  the  foundations  for  an  understanding  of  the  money  markets 
of  the  transition  period,  but  much  remains  to  be  done.  The 
histories  of  banking  are  becoming  more  genetic;  there  is  less  of 
antiquarianism  and  a  deeper  sense  of  consistent  growth.  But 
the  history  of  financial  organization  is  truly  European  in  its 


PREFACE  IX 

scope.  It  is  a  story  that  begins  on  the  shores  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean, that  contains  many  intricate  chapters  on  the  trade 
and  commerce  of  Central  Europe,  and  that  is  finally  concluded 
only  in  the  Low  Countries  and  in  England.  The  breadth  of 
the  field  constitutes  a  serious  obstacle  to  adequate  research. 
It  is  not  enough  to  work  over  the  archives  of  any  single  country 
or  of  any  single  period,  in  the  end  the  historian  will  be  obliged 
to  follow  the  thread  of  the  narrative  wherever  it  leads  him. 

The  history  of  the  grain  trade  furnishes  only  a  chapter  in 
this  larger  history  of  commerce  and  trade,  but  this  episode  is 
sufficiently  independent  to  be  treated  separately. 

This  study  has  been  the  outcome  of  work  with  Prof.  E.  F. 
Gay,  and  in  a  two-fold  sense.  The  interest  in  these  problems 
of  economic  growth  was  first  kindled  by  his  lectures,  and  this 
particular  investigation,  begun  at  his  suggestion,  could  not  have 
been  carried  to  a  conclusion  without  the  assistance  he  has  so 
willingly  given  at  every  stage  of  the  work.  His  suggestions 
have  repeatedly  opened  up  new  aspects  of  the  problem  and 
made  the  study  more  comprehensive  than  would  otherwise 
have  been  possible,  and  his  criticisms  have  been  invaluable 
both  in  judgment  of  material  and  in  preparation  of  the  text. 

It  gives  me  great  pleasure  also  to  have  this  opportunity 
of  thanking  the  officials  of  the  various  libraries  and  archives 
for  their  courtesy  and  kindness.  The  staff  at  the  Archives 
Nationales  at  Paris,  M.  Rochez,  Archivist  at  Lyons,  and  the 
Archivists  at  Dijon  helped  me  through  many  difficulties  and 
saved  me  errors  and  much  loss  of  time.  In  other  libraries, 
too,  the  character  of  the  manuscripts  was  carefully  explained 
to  me  and  the  relation  of  the  deposit  to  my  work  made  clear. 

A.  P.  U. 

GRAFTON,  MASSACHUSETTS, 
September,  1912. 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS 

PART   I 
CHAPTER  I 

PAGE 

MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION 3 

I.  LOCAL  MARKETS  AND  METROPOLITAN  DEMAND.  —  Conditions  of 
efficient  price-making.    The  medieval  market  incapable  of  meeting  the 
requirements    of    inter-market    trade.     Depletion    of    the    producing 
regions  by  the  metropolis.    The  medieval  market  inherently  defective, 
but  seriously  inadequate  only  in  time  of  dearth. 

II.  TYPES    or    LOCAL    MARKETING.  —  Isolated   markets,    with   or 
without  blatters.    Small  market  systems  in  two  forms;    two  inter- 
dependent markets,  a  central  market  with  tributaries. 

III.  LOCAL  MARKETS  AND  WHOLESALE  TRADE.  —  "  Country  buy- 
ing "  and  the  disorganization  of  tributary  market  systems  supply- 
ing the  wholesale  trade.    The  passive  granary  trade'  of  the  river  towns. 
Tendency  of  the  wholesale  trade  to  become  independent  of  the  local 
markets.     Early  wholesale  markets  at  Bray  and  Vitry. 

CHAPTER  II 

THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS 45 

References  to  the  grain  trade  of  Paris  at  the  close  of  the  thirteenth 
century.  Types  of  merchant  and  sources  of  supply.  Character  of 
the  problems  in  the  history  of  the  Parisian  trade. 

I.  DELIMITATION  OF  THE  SUPPLY  AREA.  —  Fifteenth  century;  Pari- 
sian merchants  in  Normandy,  Rouenese  in  the  Oise  valley.    The  estab- 
lishment of  definite  trading  limits  in  the  sixteenth  century.    Extension 
of  Parisian  trade  in  the  seventeenth  century.    Parisian  merchants  in 
Normandy  and  on  the  Loire.    Break-down  of  the  old  market  systems. 

II.  THE  UPPER  SEINE  BASIN  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  MARKETING. — 
Abundance  of  supplies  in  the  Seine  Basin.     Relation  of  abundance 
to  the  development  of  new  modes  of  marketing.    The  wholesale  trade 
before  1660;    granaries  and  6/a//er-supplied  markets.    The  sixteenth 
century  a  period  of  slight  pressure  upon  supply.    Occasional  export  to 
foreign  countries  during  this  period.    Growth  of  Paris  in  the  early 
seventeenth     century.       New     tendencies.       Probable     chronology. 
"  Country  buying."    Selling  by  sample.    The  Beauce.     Soissonnais. 
Futile  attempts  to  check  these  new  practices  in  Soissonnais. 

xi 


xii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

III.  THE    FIRST    WHOLESALE    MARKET.  —  Changes  in  the  granary 
trade  along  the  Marne;   further  concentration  in  Chalons  and  Vitry. 
Blatiers  and  "  country  buying  "  in  the  Seine  valley.    The  market  at 
Bray.    The  Colmet  episode  in  1694.    Delamare  at  Vitry  in  1 709.    His 
market  ordinance.    Vitry  as  a  distributing  point. 

IV.  THE   PARISIAN  MARKETS.  —  The  Port  de  Greve.    The  Port  de 
Tficole.    The  Halle.    The  bakers  and  the  bread  markets.     Market 
Regulations.     Delays  in  transit  and  entrepots  near  Paris. 

CHAPTER  III 

THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  AND  THE  WHOLESALE 
MERCHANTS 126 

Character  of  trade  in  the  Rhone  valley.  Lyons  and  her  sources  of 
supply.  The  grain  trade  in  the  early  fifteenth  century.  The  Chambre 
d'Abondance  of  1481.  Growth  of  trade  in  Burgundy  and  Languedoc, 
1485-1500.  The  Chambre  d'Abondance  of  1500.  The  Commission  of 
1504.  Trade  in  Burgundy,  1500-1585.  Encouragement  of  the  mer- 
chants by  the  municipality.  Municipal  purchases  and  interference. 
The  meeting  of  May  13,  1586.  Absence  of  municipal  activity,  1586- 
1630.  The  Abondance  reestablished  and  made  perpetual,  1630-43. 
Policy  of  the  Abondance,  1643-60.  Development  of  wholesale  trade, 
1660-90.  Chaiz'in  Languedoc,  1693.  Reorganization  of  the  Abon- 
dance in  1694.  The  last  phase. 

CHAPTER  IV 

LYONESE    MERCHANTS    AND    DEARTH    IN    THE    PRODUCING 
REGIONS     180 

Acuteness  of  market  problems  in  Burgundy  and  Languedoc.  Signifi- 
cance of  the  years  1693  and  1709. 

I.  LANGUEDOC  AND  PROVENCE  IN  1693.  —  Purchases  by  the  Lyonese 
in  September  and  October.    Local  apprehension.     Baville's  reports  of 
distress  in  Upper  Languedoc. 

II.  BURGUNDY    IN    1708-09.  —  Local  apprehension  of  dearth.    The 
closing  of  the  granaries  in  anticipation  of  higher  prices.     Prohibitions 
by  the  Intendants.    Outbreaks  of  violence  in  March  and  April  1709. 
Extremes  of  distress.      Increased  disorder.      Letters  of  the  Bishop 
of  Chalons. 

III.  LANGUEDOC  IN   1708-09.  —  Good  harvests.     Prospects  of  heavy 
export.     Prohibition  of  foreign  export.     Restrictions  imposed  upon 
the  Lyonese.     Distress  in  Languedoc  in  March,  1709.     Cessation  of 
trade.    Baville  opens  the  granaries.    Negotiations  with  Toulouse. 

IV.  The  genesis  of  panics  in  the  grain  trade.     Conception  of  an  "  ade- 
quate supply."    Administrative  attempts  to  secure  a  steady  flow  of 
trade.    Invisibility  of  supply.     Crop  statistics  attempted.    Tendency 
of  granary  buying  to  foment  panic. 


TABLE  OF   CONTENTS  Xlli 

CHAPTER  V 

PAGE 

AREAS  OF  HIGHLY  LOCALIZED  MARKETS  AND  EXTREMES  OF 
MISERY 203 

Effect  of  dearth  on  relatively  isolated  markets.  Enclaves  in  the  larger 
market  systems.  Small  market  systems  in  the  back  country.  Election 
of  Brive.  Auvergne.  Size  of  villages  in  the  less  fertile  sections.  Sub- 
stitutes for  bread  in  time  of  famine.  Records  of  extreme  misery.  Re- 
lief of  distress  among  the  poor.  Administrative  purchases  in  Limousin. 
Difficulties  in  Dauphine. 


PART  II 

CHAPTER  I 
ROYAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE,  1500-1660  .   .   .   .223 

The  Physiocratic  interpretation  of  the  early  history  of  the  grain  trade. 
Sully  and  the  origin  of  the  Free  Trade  policy.  Error  of  this  view. 
Restricted  application  of  general  edicts.  Relation  of  the  general  edicts 
of  this  period  to  the  conditions  in  the  Seine  Basin. 

I.  EMPIRICAL  OPPORTUNISM,  1500-59.  —  Edicts  of  1507,  1515,  1535, 
J539>  I54Q,  1558.    The  freedom  of  the  inter-provincial  trade.     Attempts 
to  gather  information. 

II.  COMPREHENSIVE  ADMINISTRATIVE  REGULATION,   1550-71.  —  The 
Bureau  of  1559.     Activities  of  the  Bureau.     The  projects  of  1567  and 


III.  INERT  TRADITIONALISM,  1571-1660.  —  Edicts  of  1573,  1574,  1577, 
1587.  Policy  of  Henry  IV.  The  prefaces  and  the  Physiocratic  concep- 
tion of  Sully's  policy.  Seventeenth  century  edicts. 


CHAPTER  II 

LOCAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE,  1500-1660      .    .    .  240 

Conflict  of  interest  between  consuming  centers  and  producing  regions. 
Dread  of  dearth  in  Paris  and  Lyons.  Fear  of  the  wholesale  merchants 
in  the  producing  regions.  The  King  as  arbiter.  The  producing 
regions  usually  represented  by  provincial  officials;  governors  and  Parle- 
ments.  Officials  identified  with  Paris  and  Lyons.  Baillis  and  Sene- 
chaux  relatively  unimportant. 

BURGUNDY  AND  LYONS.  —  First  visits  of  the  Lyonese  to  Burgundy. 
Hostility  shown  the  Lyonese  in  Burgundy,  1528.  Royal  prohibitions  in 
Burgundy,  1539.  Countervailing  patents  granted  the  Lyonese.  Ne- 
gotiations with  Villefrancon  in  1556-57.  His  unwillingness  to  recog- 
nize royal  patents.  Later  episodes  of  a  similar  character. 


XIV  TABLE  OF   CONTENTS 

PAGE 

THE  SEINE  BASIN.  —  Regulation  of  grain  movements  in  the  vicinity  of 
Paris.  Prohibitions  in  Champagne  and  Picardy.  Importance  of  munic- 
ipal prohibitions. 

NORMANDY  AND  LANGUEDOC.  —  Regulation  of  foreign  export  by  local 
authorities. 


CHAPTER  III 
COLBERT'S  PLACE  IN  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE   .   .  268 

Colbert  and  the  traditions.  The  Intendants.  Their  correspondence 
with  the  Controleur  General.  Steps  toward  greater  freedom  of  trade. 
Colbert  at  once  a  "  free  trader "  and  a  "  protectionist."  General 
edicts.  The  inter-provincial  trade.  The  attempt  to  adjust  general 
measures  to  local  needs.  A  new  outlet  for  Burgundian  grain.  Difficul- 
ties arising  from  the  general  permission  of  export  in  1678.  Exemptions 
in  Picardy,  Champagne,  and  Normandy.  Special  privileges  claimed 
by  Bordeaux.  Bordeaux  and  Guienne.  Peculiarity  of  the  situation  of 
Languedoc.  Foreign  markets  and  the  needs  of  Provence.  Adminis- 
trative interference  with  the  trade  in  favor  of  Provence. 


CHAPTER  IV 

REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE,  1683-1709    .   .  295 

Necessity  of  more  careful  regulation  of  the  domestic  trade  after  the 
death  of  Colbert.  The  Intendants  and  the  old  traditions.  Significance 
of  the  great  dearths.  Increased  authority  of  the  Chatelet.  Policies 
of  the  Intendants:  laissez  faire  and  interference.  Constructive  at- 
tempts at  market  regulation.  Prohibitions  and  the  license  system. 
The  Seine  Basin  and  market  regulation.  The  license  system  in  Bur- 
gundy, Brittany,  and  Languedoc.  Special  administrative  problems 
at  Orleans. 

THE  SEINE  BASIN.  —  Preponderance  of  the  Chatelet  and  fichevinage. 
Jurisdiction  over  the  grain  trade.  The  dispute  over  the  incidental 
powers  of  the  Echevinage.  Establishment  of  the  claims  of  the  Chate- 
let. Its  policy.  The  old  market  regulations  and  new  commercial 
practices;  1660-63.  History  of  the  dearth  of  1693-94.  Attempt 
to  suppress  associations  among  the  merchants.  The  case  of  Jean  Roger. 
The  years  1698-99.  Delamare  at  Bray.  The  dearth  of  1709.  Dela- 
mare's  visit  to  Vitry.  Genesis  of  the  market  ordinance. 
BURGUNDY  AND  LYONS.  —  Importance  of  prohibitions  in  Burgundy. 
Estimates  of  supplies  in  1693  by  the  Intendants  in  Burgundy  and  at 
Lyons.  Criticism  of  the  Lyonese  by  the  Controleur  General.  Prob- 
ability that  the  Lyonese  over-estimated  the  supplies.  Strict  regulation 
of  the  trade  from  Burgundy  in  1698.  The  Intendant  supported  by  the 
Contrdleur  General.  Demand  for  export  licenses. 


TABLE  OF   CONTENTS  XV 

PACK 

LANGUEDOC,  PROVENCE,  AND  BRITTANY.  —  Control  of  the  trade  by 
Baville  in  1708-09.  Italians  and  Lyonese  excluded.  Granaries 
opened.  Lebret  and  the  trade  of  Provence.  Licenses  in  Brittany. 
ORLEANS.  —  Relation  of  Orleans  to  the  supplies  of  the  Loire  Valley. 
Through  traffic  and  intermediate  points.  Orleans  and  shipments  to 
Paris  in  1694. 

SUMMARY. 

CHAPTER  V 
CONCLUSION 346 

Conceptions  of  national  solidarity  implied  in  the  royal  edicts.  The 
"  real  "  world  reflected  in  the  policies  of  the  local  officials.  Ideals  and 
the  critical  interpretation  of  society.  Pragmatic  policies  and  institu- 
tional growth. 

I.  IDEALISTIC  POLICIES. — Conception  of  the  state  in  the  edict  of  1557. 
Christianity  and  early  conceptions  of  free  trade.    Beginnings  of  protec- 
tion.    Conception  of  the  state  as  an  economic  entity.    Laffemas. 
Montchretien.    Colbert's  conception  of  economic  solidarity.    Probable 
influence  of  these  idealistic  policies. 

II.  THE    PRAGMATIC    POLICIES.  —  Character  of  pragmatic  policies. 
Stages  of  development.    The  consciously  realized  conflict  of  interest. 
The  effort  to  secure  harmony.    Discovery  of  a  solution.    General 
application  of  the  solution.    Lyons  and  Burgundy.    Paris  and  Rouen. 
The  upper  Seine  Basin.     Freedom  of  the  will  and  social  evolution. 

FRENCH  DRY  MEASURES  OF  THE  OLD  REGIME 365 

GLOSSARY  OF  ADMINISTRATIVE  TERMS 369 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 374 

(a)  MANUSCRIPTS. 

(6)  PRINTED  LITERATURE. 

INDEX 385 


THE    HISTORY    OF   THE    GRAIN    TRADE 
IN    FRANCE 

PART   I 


THE    HISTORY   OF   THE   GRAIN 
TRADE   IN   FRANCE 

CHAPTER  I 

« 

MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION 


THE  transition  from  the  local  market  of  the  middle  ages  to 
the  wholesale  markets  of  the  nineteenth  century  presents  a 
difficult  problem  in  the  study  of  value.  The  theorist  is  content 
to  state  the  principle.  It  is  sufficient  for  his  purposes  to  recog- 
nize that  prices  are  approximations,  attempts  to  ascertain  values 
that  are  never  completely  successful.  The  historian  must 
study  the  relation  of  price  to  value  somewhat  more  closely,  if 
he  would  gain  insight  into  the  fundamental  factors  in  the 
development  of  new  forms  of  marketing.  Changes  in  the  form 
of  markets  imply  that  the  community  needed  more  accurate 
determinations  of  value.  The  simple  forms  of  market  were 
adequate  as  long  as  economic  interests  were  confined  to  a  small 
area.  The  expansion  of  trade  made  the  problem  more  com- 
plicated. New  factors  in  valuation  were  introduced,  to  which 
the  local  market  could  not  give  effect.  The  historian  is  con- 
cerned with  the  degree  of  approximation  between  prices  and 
values.  A  system  of  marketing  that  secures  a  close  approxima- 
tion is  efficient  and  good.  A  system  that  results  in  prices  which 
bear  no  close  relation  to  values  is  inefficient  and  in  need  of 
reorganization. 

A  market  is  an  assemblage  of  buyers  and  sellers,  but  any 
assemblage  of  buyers  and  sellers  does  not  constitute  a  good 
market.  A  market,  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term,  is  asso- 
ciated  with  a  territorial  area.  It  is  an  assemblage  of  buyers 
and  sellers  from  a  given  area.  What  then  is  an  efficient  market  ? 


:f    >  i?         G^7^  7^4£>£  ^  FRANCE 

Clearly,  a  market  which  gives  effect  in  its  prices  to  all  the  factors 
that  should  influence  the  value  of  the  commodity  within  that 
area.  Those  who  wish  to  buy  should  be  able  to  ascertain  the 
full  extent  of  the  demand  for  their  goods.  All  the  buyers  and 
all  the  sellers  from  the  area  concerned  should  be  present  on  the 
market,  and  no  buyers  or  sellers  from  any  othef  area  should  be 
there.  The  area  from  which  the  supply  is  drawn  must  corre- 
spond to  the  area  from  which  the  demand  comes.  A  local  supply 
can  be  efficiently  valued  only  with  reference  to  local  needs. 
Demand  that  can  be  satisfied  only  by  drawing  upon  the  supplies 
of  the  known  world  can  be  handled  only  on  markets  which  take 
cognizance  of  the  supply  available  in  the  known  world. 

The  medieval  market  was  in  form  self-sufficient  and  isolated; 
in  reality,  it  was  part  of  a  complex  system.  Market  regulations 
assumed  that  the  town  was  isolated,  and  municipal  authorities 
persistently  placed  the  interest  of  the  town  before  the  well-being 
of  the  community  as  a  whole.  Despite  the  recognized  impor- 
tance of  trade  with  neighboring  towns,  such  trade  had  no  definite 
status  nor  any  well  defined  organization.  It  was  illegal  in  France 
to  store  grain  except  for  one's  own  use,  but  granaries  were  formed 
in  town  and  country  which  were  important  sources  of  supply 
for  the  large  towns  and  for  the  export  trade.  This  grain  never 
appeared  on  the  local  market,  and  consequently  did  not  enter 
into  the  trading  system  that  was  recognized  by  law.  The 
granary  trade  existed  by  sufferance.  The  municipal  authorities 
and  their  friends  were  usually  engaged  in  the  trade,  so  that  they 
were  reasonably  secure  from  interference,  but  their  action  was 
illegal.  When  the  inter-market  trade  was  small  in  volume,  it 
was  usually  in  the  hands  of  Uatiers.  They  were  persons  with 
little  capital  who  carried  small  quantities  of  grain  from  one 
market  to  another.  They  were  tolerated  because  it  was  not 
supposed  that  they  would  be  a  factor  of  any  consequence  in 
the  local  market.  This  was  true  as  long  as  they  were  not  nu- 
merous, but  in  many  places  they  became  the  predominant  factor 
on  the  market.  The  old  form  remained,  but  the  essence  was 
gone.  The  blatier,  however,  had  no  right  to  attend  the  market. 
He  could  be  excluded  at  any  time  by  the  local  authorities. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  5 

The  central  problem  in  the  history  of  the  grain  trade  is  the  ' 
organization  of  this  inter-market  trade.  A  solution  involv 
two  changes;  the  creation  of  a  le^al  basis  for  the  wholesale 
trade,  the  recognition  of  the  predominance  of  general  over  local 
interests.  Reorganization  was  the  result  of  the  efforts  of  Paris 
and  Lyons  to  secure  an  adequate  and  assured  supply  of  grain. 
In  a  community  dominated  by  petty  municipal  selfishness, 
they  alone  represented  the  higher  ideal  of  interdependence  and 
solidarity.  In  their  advocacy  of  the  general  interest  there  was 
much  that  was  selfish.  A  public  spirited  policy  was  forced  upon 
them  by  their  necessities,  but  the  achievements  of  their  officials 
laid  the  foundations  of  our  modern  organization  of  distribution. 
The  small  towns  were  reactionary,  seeking  to  perpetuate  in 
law  an  isolation  that  had  ceased  to  exist.  The  large  towns 
endeavored  to  break  down  the  old  system  and  create  new  admin- 
istrative traditions  that  should  be  in  accord  with  the  needs 
of  the  time. 

The  element  of  selfishness  in  the  policy  of  the  large  towns 
was  important  historically.  They  were  interested  in  supplying 
their  own  wants.  They  were  not  concerned  with  the  necessities 
of  the  producing  regions,  and  many  of  the  reactionary  measures 
of  the  small  towns  were  an  attempt  at  self-preservation.  In 
time  of  dearth,  the  large  towns  might  secure  supplies  at  the 
expense  of  the  small  towns  and  villages  of  the  producing  regions. 
The  distress  was  likely  to  be  felt  most  intensely  in  the  small 
markets.  Each  local  market  affected  by  metropolitan  demand 
was  influenced  not  by  any  particular  part,  but  by  its  full  inten- 
sity. This  was  an  inevitable  consequence  of  the  independence  of 
the  markets,  and  it  was  the  perennial  source  of  complaints.  The 
market  was  designed  to  make  prices  with  reference  to  local 
conditions;  the  division  of  the  supply  between  the  town  and 
the  metropolis  was  not  one  of  its  normal  functions.  The  organ- 
ization of  this  inter-market  trade  was,  in  fact,  the  most  pressing 
necessity.  The  local  market  could  not  discharge  such  a  function, 
and  until  the  wholesale  markets  were  established  both  province 
and  metropolis  suffered.  There  was  no  means  of  giving  effect 
to  the  general  interest. 


6          THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

Consider  the  situation  in  a  local  market  with  a  surplus.  Pres- 
ent in  the  market  are  the  townsmen  buying  for  their  immediate 
needs,  wealthy  bourgeois  who  would  like  to  secure  grain  for 
hoards,  merchants  from  the  metropolitan  town.  Under  these 
circumstances,  it  is  clear  that  the  only  limit1  to  the  price  in 
such  a  market  is  the  price  that  can  be  obtained  in  the  metropoli- 
tan town.  As  long  as  the  metropolitan  merchant  can  be  rela- 
tively certain  of  getting  a  higher  price  at  home,  so  long  will  he 
bid  against  the  bourgeois,  unless  he  is  restrained  by  positive 
administrative  regulation.  Consequently,  the  equilibrium  of 
demand  and  supply  upon  such  a  market  cannot  be  described 
as  a  local  supply,  balanced  against  a  local  demand:  it  is  a  supply 
that  is  somewhat  in  excess  of  local  needs  pitted  against  the  full 
intensity  of  the  joint  demand  of  the  locality  and  of  the  metrop- 
olis. Such  a  concentration  of  demand  is  dangerous  as  it  tends 
to  carry  away  from  the  local  market  more  than  the  actual  excess 
of  supply  over  consumptive  wants. 

An  illustration  will  make  this  relation  between  local  and 
metropolitan  demand  somewhat  less  abstract.  To  represent 
the  local  market  let  us  take  the  little  village  of  Attichy  in  Sois- 
sonnais.  There  was  a  market  here  every  Saturday,  "  to  which 
come  the  inhabitants  of  the  villages  for  two  or  three  leagues  in 
the  vicinity.  They  buy  the  grain,  bread,  and  meat  which  they 
will  need  for  the  following  week."  2  It  is,  thus,  just  such  a 
market  as  we  have  had  in  mind  throughout  the  previous  dis- 
cussion. The  constant  export  of  grain  to  Paris  from  this  section 
introduces  the  other  factor  that  is  under  discussion,  —  the 
metropolitan  demand.  In  ordinary  seasons  there  was  little 
trouble;  but  a  severe  dearth  generally  revealed  all  the  dangers 
of  this  connection  with  the  metropolis.  In  May,  1709,  the  pur- 
chases for  Paris  were  so  heavy  that  no  grain  whatever  appeared 
on  the  market  at  Attichy.  "  There  was  a  great  tumult  in  the 
three  preceding  markets,  and  in  today's  market,"  writes  Maril- 
lac,  May  12,  "  the  officers  of  my  jurisdiction  appeased  the  first 

1  I  omit,  for  the  present,  the  effects  of  special  hours  at  the  opening  of  the  market 
reserved  for  bourgeois  buyers. 

2  G7.     1650.    Attichy,  12  Mai  1709.    Marillac. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  J 

troubles  by  compelling  the  steward  of  my  estates  to  expose 
some  of  my  grain  on  the  market,  though  I  really  have  none  to 
sell.  ...  I  then  wrote  to  d'Ormesson  to  have  him  cancel  my 
contracts  with  a  merchant  of  Soissons  named  Pannier,  who  had 
purchased  all  the  grain  that  I  had  for  several  years  received  as 
rent.  He  had  also  stored  in  my  granaries  grain  purchased  by 
him  of  several  farmers  of  this  vicinity.  In  all  there  are  about 
1 60  muids  (8,520  bushels)  and  I  urged  d'Ormesson  to  have  this 
merchant  bring  some  of  his  grain  to  the  market."  l  This  deple- 
tion of  the  local  supply  by  the  intensity  of  the  metropolitan 
demand  was  general  for  the  rural  parts  of  Soissonnais.  The 
Bishop  writes  on  May  4:  "I  see  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  pre- 
vent the  shipments  which  Sr.  Pannier  is  making  from  this  vicin- 
ity, but  it  must  not  be  carried  too  far.  .  .  .  The  situation 
is  most  serious  in  the  rural  districts  where  Pannier  has  made 
his  purchases.  All  the  markets  of  this  section,  Ferre-en-Tarlen- 
ois,  Braine,  Vailly,  Coucy,  and  the  rest  are  without  grain,  and 
it  is  because  there  is  none  in  the  region.  Paris  has  taken  so 
much  and  in  such  a  short  space  of  time.  There  is  a  gentleman 
living  near  Braine,  —  M.  le  Comte  d'Aumale  —  who  has  more 
than  100  muids  (5,200  bushels)  in  his  granaries.  This  would 
be  a  great  resource  for  all  this  countryside,  both  for  food  and  for 
seed.  .  .  .  Within  the  last  four  days,  all  that  grain  was  taken 
up  by  the  agents  of  this  Pannier,  and  yesterday  there  was  no 
grain  on  the  market  at  Braine.  There  was  a  very  considerable 
riot,  and,  if  these  little  markets  of  the  country  continue  to  lack 
supplies,  the  disorder  will  increase."  2 

In  these  particular  cases,  the  supplies  of  the  local  market 
had  been  carried  off  by  purchases  from  the  peasant  cultivators 3 
outside  the  market,  or  by  purchases  of  hoards  that  might  have 
supplied  the  region  even  if  all  the  year's  crop  had  been  taken  up 
by  merchants. 

1  G7.     1650.     Attichy,  12  Mai  1709.     Marillac. 

2  G7.     1650.    Soissons,  4  Mai  1709.     fiveque  de  Soissons.     See  also  the  letter 
of  25  April  1709.     fiveque  de  Soissons. 

3  The  French  word  is  "  laboureur,"  for  which  peasant  cultivator  is  perhaps  a 
more  exact  rendering  than  laborer. 


8  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

But  this  exhaustion  of  the  locality  is.  not  the  most  significant 
feature  of  these  disorders.  The  prices  paid  for  the  grain  are  the 
most  definite  indication  of  the  intensity  of  demand,  and  there  is 
fortunately  enough  evidence  to  indicate  the  tendency  of  the 
merchants  of  Paris  to  set  the  price  at  any  figure  necessary  to 
secure  the  grain.  Thus,  at  Provins,  in  1693-94,  one  Colmet 
purchased  100  muids,  paying  100  livres  per  muid  when  "  the 
highest  price  current  at  Provins  was  25-30  ecus".  (75-90 
livres).1  At  Bray,  the  peasants  said  that  it  was  well  known 
that  the  wife  of  Colmet  offered  2  sous  per  sack  above  the  current 
price  for  any  grain  that  they  would  bring  in  from  the  country.2 
Some  time  after  their  first  dealings  with  Colmet,  the  latter  told 
them  that  he  would  "  take  any  grain  they  could  buy  of  peasant 
proprietors  and  farmers,  paying  whatever  the  peasants  asked."  3 
Illustrations  can  be  multiplied,  but  these  few  references  are 
enough  to  bring  out  the  point  at  issue.  When  metropolitan 
demand  began  to  influence  a  local  market,  there  was  nothing  to 
protect  the  local  market  from  its  full  intensity.  The  only 
limit  to  prices  in  the  locality  was  the  highest  price  that  could 
be  had  at  the  metropolis.  Ignorance  on  the  part  of  the  peasants 
of  these  conditions,  their  inability  to  realize  how  high  prices 
could  rise  in  the  large  towns  enabled  the  merchants  to  secure 
the  local  grain  at  prices  which  were  high  perhaps  in  the  opinion 
of  the  peasants  and  townspeople,  but  still  much  lower  than  the 
prices  prevailing  in  the  great  markets  at  such  times  of  crisis. 

Under  the  pressure  of  dearth,  the  local  market  was  thus 
entirely  disorganized.  The  region  might  be  drained,  and  saved 
only  by  official  intervention,  or  it  might  merely  suffer  from 
high  prices.  In  any  event,  all  its  troubles  were  due  to  the 
metropolis,  and  to  the  inadequacy  of  local  market  machinery 
for  the  determination  of  the  actual  extent  of  the  surplus  of  the 
locality.  But  dearths  were  by  no  means  a  frequent  phenomenon, 
and  to  understand  the  local  market  it  must  be  studied  not  only 
in  time  of  dearth  but  in  time  of  plenty.  The  ordinary  function- 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.    320.     Deposition  de  Pierre  Brisard. 

2  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.     320  et  suiv.    Deposition  de  Fiacre  Pionnier,  Vigne- 
ron,  demeurant  a  Servan. 

3  Same  deposition. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  9 

ing  of  this  mechanism  is  quite  as  significant  as  its  disorders. 
In  normal  circumstances  the  surplus  available  for  export  might 
be  determined  in  two  ways,  without  in  the  least  disturbing  the 
efficiency  of  the  market.  The  metropolitan  demand  might  be 
supplied  with  grain  taken  from  iJie  granaries  of  landlords  and 
bourgeois,  which  had  never  appeared  on  the  local  market;  or 
the  surplus  of  each  market  day  might  be  purchased  by  small 
merchants  who  made  it  their  business  to  buy  on  the  less  impor- 
tant markets,  to  sell  on  the  larger  markets  where  the  metropoli- 
tan merchants  appeared.  We  know  of  the  existence  of  both 
of  these  forms  of  wholesale  supply,  but  their  effect  on  the  local 
market  is  necessarily  pure  conjecture.  The  reasoning  involved, 
however,  is  simple.  The  formation  of  hoards  in  regions  where 
there  was  an  excessive  supply  was  the  only  means  of  preventing 
such  an  overstocking  of  the  market  that  prices  would  fall  abnor- 
mally low.  Any  marked  tendency  to  form  hoards  is  indeed  the 
surest  indication  of  a  considerable  surplus.  Where  such  stores 
were  seen  to  be  essential,  the  large  land-owners  were  obviously 
the  best  fitted  to  forego  immediate  realization  on  the  crop.  The 
withdrawal  from  the  market  of  the  grain  received  as  rents  was 
thus  an  advantage  to  the  peasant,  as  it  protected  him  against 
excessively  low  prices.  Unless  there  was  an  obvious  likelihood 
of  dearth,  there  would  be  little  temptation  to  form  granaries 
by  purchases  on  the  market.  If  prices  were  lower  than  usual, 
such  hoards  might  be  formed.  In  such  a  contingency  there 
would  probably  be  purchases  on  the  market  until  prices  reached 
the  customary  level.  If  there  was  a  slight  scarcity,  the  gran- 
aries would  not  be  likely  to  afford  immediate  relief,  as  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  dearth  would  hold  out  such  prospects  of  gain  that 
the  doors  of  the  granaries  would  remain  closed.  The  hoard 
could  be  formed  in  ordinary  years  without  greatly  affecting  the 
market,  and  such  hoards  could  be  purchased  by  metropolitan 
merchants  without  disturbing  the  local  trade.  The  possibility 
of  dealing  in  large  quantities  was  eminently  satisfactory  to  both 
landlords  and  merchants,  and  the  granaries  played  a  prominent 
part  in  the  history  of  the  wholesale  trade.  These  granaries 
did  not  represent  a  very  exact  determination  of  the  surplus  of 


10         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

the  region,  but  when  there  was  no  pressure  minute  precision 
was  not  essential,  and  the  rough  and  ready  separation  of  the 
hoards  and  market  supply  was  quite  adequate. 

This  is  undoubtedly  the  most  important  and  most  wide-spread 
mode  of  satisfying  general  and  local  interests.  But  the  relation 
of  metropolitan  to  local  markets  takes  another  form.  Where 
a  market  was  situated  in  a  fertile  region,  it  was  quite  possible, 
and  in  many  cases  probable,  that  the  supply  offered  would  be 
in  excess  of  the  simple  consumptive  demand.  Several  things 
might  happen:  the  surplus  might  be  carried  home  again  by  the 
peasants;  prices  might  be  reduced  to  such  a  point  that  some 
of  the  townspeople  would  be  induced  to  buy  two  or  three  weeks' 
supply  instead  of  one;  or  the  surplus  might  be  sold  to  merchants. 
The  unwillingness  to  carry  the  grain  home  was  frequently  sup- 
plemented by  a  regulation  prohibiting  such  practices,  or  at  the 
most  permitting  the  storage  of  the  grain  in  some  public  place 
till  the  following  market  day.  A  great  reduction  of  price  was 
contrary  to  the  practice  of  the  time.1  The  prohibition  against 
removing  unsold  grain  from  the  market  led  regularly  to  a  market 
surplus  in  many  sections.  The  possibility  of  disposing  of  this 
grain  on  other  markets  created  a  class  of  small  itinerant  mer- 
chants known  as  blatiers.  They  were  occupied  in  buying  the 
surplus  on  the  small  markets,  carrying  the  grain  to  the  larger 
towns  in  the  vicinity  that  could  not  be  adequately  supplied 
by  the  peasants.  The  inter-market  trade  of  this  type  was  very 
considerable  in  the  total  amount,  though  the  dealings  of  any 
particular  blatier  were  conducted  on  a  very  small  scale.  Grain 
that  once  entered  the  trade  in  this  way  might  pass  through 
several  markets,  each  larger  than  the  last,  until  finally  it 
reached  a  market  frequented  by  metropolitan  merchants.  The 
striking  fact  here  is  the  relatively  accurate  determination  of 
the  excess  of  local  supply  above  local  needs.  The  blatiers  were 
not  allowed  to  buy  on  many  markets  until  after  a  fixed  hour 
and  in  that  event  the  surplus  would  be  determined  in  the  most 
convincing  manner  possible.  These  regulations,  however,  were 

1  This  I  infer  from  ordinances  about  speculative  dealing,  comments  on  the 
practices  of  merchants,  and  the  characteristic  speculation  on  hoarded  grain. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  II 

by  no  means  universal,  and  were  not  very  stringently  enforced, 
so  that  the  blatier  was  generally  able  to  enter  the  market  as 
freely  as  anyone.  Even  then  the  relation  of  the  blatier  trade  to 
the  market  is  not  essentially  altered.  The  exports  are  still  a 
real  surplus.  The  blatier  was  not  possessed  of  a  large  capital: 
he  must  needs  realize  what  little  profits  he  could  in  a  small  way, 
without  exposing  himself  to  large  risks.  He  could  not  under- 
take any  great  strokes:  recklessly  running  up  the  prices  in  one 
market  on  the  chance  of  selling  higher  elsewhere.  He  could 
not  purchase  in  large  enough  quantities  to  affect  the  market 
notably.  Every  aspect  of  his  position  confined  his  dealings  to 
conservative  purchases  at  the  current  market  price.  His  pres- 
ence merely  assured  the  maintenance  of  the  customary  price, 
and  obviated  the  inconvenience  of  a  surplus.  Even  if  he  was 
not  actually  forced  to  wait  until  the  bourgeois  and  peasants 
had  made  their  purchases,  he  represented  merely  a  contingent 
demand,  standing  ready  to  take  any  excess  at  current  rates. 

In  ordinary  years,  both  the  hoards  and  the  blatier  trade  pro- 
moted stability  and  tended  to  maintain  the  local  price  that  would 
be  made  if  there  were  no  excess  supply  and  no  metropolitan 
demand.  The  influence  of  the  metropolitan  trade  ruled  in 
times  of  dearth;  the  influence  of  local  stability  and  conservatism 
was  predominant  in  years  of  plenty.*^ In  the  lean  years,  the 
trade  was  disorganized  by  the  intensity  of  metropolitan  demand, 
and  prices  were  so  largely  dependent  upon  ignorance  and  fear 
that  they  represented  no  true  equilibrium  of  demand  and  supply. 
In  the  fat  years,  local  prices  governed.  The  trade  on  the  market, 
the  inter-market  trade,  and  the  dealings  of  landlords  and  mer- 
chants, everything  was  dominated  by  real  local  prices.  The 
local  surplus  was  taken  off  the  market  by  the  formation  of  hoards 
or  by  the  blatiers  buying  the  market  surplus,  so  that  the  conduct 
of  the  market  and  the  prices  were  made  practically  what  they 
would  have  been  if  the  market  were  completely  isolated.  The 
defects  of  the  medieval  market  organization,  though  serious, 
were,  thus,  for  the  most  part,  latent  defects.  Prices  did  not 
represent  a  very  exact  equilibrium  of  demand  and  supply;  the 
surplus  in  the  producing  regions  was  very  crudely  determined; 


12          THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

the  larger  towns  could  never  be  very  certain  where  they  would 
be  able  to  get  supplies.  But  ordinarily  no  degree  of  accuracy 
was  necessary  in  any  of  these  particulars.  Any  greater  elabora- 
tion of  market  machinery  would  generally  have  been  a  super- 
fluity. Today,  these  matters  have  acquired  an  importance 
that  renders  such  machinery  a  primary  necessity,  and  to  us 
the  medieval  system  is  difficult  to  understand  because  of  its 
ability  to  dispense  with  any  great  degree  of  nicety  of  adjustment. 
It  is  difficult  for  us  to  become  accustomed  to  a  system  that  is 
so  exclusively  adapted  to  normal  local  conditions  that  the  least 
departure  from  the  ordinary  disrupts  and  disorganizes  the 
whole.  Yet  this  is  the  most  fundamental  feature  of  medieval 
institutions.  The  State  drags  out  a  troubled  existence  even  in 
ordinary  times,  but  it  requires  very  little  to  dissolve  a  feudal 
kingdom  into  the  anarchy  of  Stephen's  reign  in  England,  or  the 
disorders  of  Louis  XI's  reign  in  France.  The  Church  maintains 
itself  for  centuries,  but  national  sentiments  in  the  College  of 
Cardinals  can  create  the  Great  Schism.  Heresy  was  dreaded 
with  a  fear  that  to  us  seems  unreasoning,  simply  because  the 
unusual  was  so  powerfully  associated  in  medieval  thought  with 
social  disintegration.  Disruption  under  pressure  of  extraordi- 
nary circumstances  was  so  common,  that  it  was  assumed  as  an 
axiom.  The  economic  organization  was  no  exception  to  the 
rule,  and  we  must  not  forget  either  the  tendency  to  disorganiza- 
tion under  stress  or  the  fairly  adequate  functioning  in  the  general 
routine  of  daily  life. 

It  would  not  be  just  to  suppose  that  the  bourgeois  of  the  med- 
ieval town  had  any  special  fancy  for  this  element  of  discon- 
tinuity in  the  economic  or  social  life.  It  was  no  "  parti  pris  " 
that  made  them  prefer  institutions  that  worked  most  of  the 
time  to  institutions  that  would  work  all  of  the  time ;  they  did 
not  see  how  institutions  could  be  given  the  desired  elasticity. 

II 

A  local  market  in  the  narrowest  sense  of  the  term  would  be 
an  isolated  market  in  which  producers  and  consumers  were 
brought  together  without  the  intervention  of  middlemen.  In 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  13 

most  of  our  thinking  about  the  middle  ages  we  assume  that  such 
local  markets  were  really  characteristic  of  the  period,  but  there 
is  reason  to  doubt  the  validity  of  the  conception.  Even  the 
smallest  of  the  organized  markets  were  not  entirely  isolated,  and 
the  existence  of  some  middlemen  is  at  least  possible.  We  must 
remember,  too,  that  many  towns  and  villages  did  not  possess 
organized  markets,  and  that  intense  isolation  would  probably 
be  evidenced  by  the  absence  of  definite  mercantile  organization. 
The  significance  of  a  market  can  be  essentially  local  even  if  it 
is  not  completely  isolated,  and  it  can  be  a  very  simple  mechanism 
even  if  some  middlemen  are  present.  These  qualifications  of 
the  abstract  conception  of  the  local  market  center  about  the 
blatier.  He  was  a  middleman,  sometimes  engaged  in  -trade 
between  two  markets,  sometimes  bringing  grain  from  the  farms 
to  the  town  market.  The  characterization  of  the  blatier,  how- 
ever, is  difficult.  Most  of  the  available  information  is  contem- 
porary with  trade  conditions  which  must  have  exerted  a  great 
influence  upon  even  the  most  backward  regions.  The  com- 
parative method  is  not  entirely  trustworthy,  and,  even  if  it 
were,  the  proper  sequence  of  the  various  functions  of  the  blatier 
would  necessarily  be  somewhat  conjectural.  Probably  the 
blatier  was  characteristically  engaged  in  inter-market  trade. 

If  the  evidence  from  the  Seine  basin  is  excluded,  as  repre- 
senting influences  of  metropolitan  "  country  buying "  which 
were  too  new  to  be  typical,  the  only  detailed  descriptions  of  the 
blatier  are  the  letters  from  Orleannais  and  Bourbonnais  in  1693 
and  1709.  These  are  contemporary  with  the  letters  from  the 
Seine  Basin,  but  conditions  were  not  so  far  advanced,  and  there 
was  less  likelihood  of  reflex  influences  from  "  country  buying." 

De  Seraucourt,  writing  from  Bourges  in  December,  1694, 
describes  the  operations  of  the  blatier.  The  grain  supplies  from 
the  vicinity  of  Bourges  are  small,  he  says,  and  do  not  appear  on 
the  market,  because  the  poorer  farmers  cannot  spare  any  and  the 
richer  farmers  are  holding  in  expectation  of  higher  prices.  "  The 
markets  of  this  town  (Bourges)  have  been  supplied  only  with 
such  grain  as  comes  from  Bourbonnais,  and  from  Vatan  and 
Gracay,  which  are  in  Orleannais.  This  trade  is  carried  on  by 


14          THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

the  poorest  peasants  of  those  provinces,  and  of  this  province. 
With  40 11.  or  50 11.  capital,  borrowed  from  their  masters,  and  four 
or  five  little  horses,  they  make  a  trip  every  week  and  bring 
20-22  bushels  of  grain  on  which  they  gain  5-6  sols  per  bushel 
above  expenses.  This  is  sufficient  to  support  their  families.  .  .  . 
It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  bad  roads  are  very  disadvantageous, 
as  these  petty  merchants  called  petons  1  do  not  come  so  often. 
They  load  their  horses  less  heavily  and  sell  more  dearly  in  order 
to  gain  the  usual  profit."  2  The  suggestion  of  Vatan  and  Gracay 
makes  it  difficult  to  avoid  interpreting  the  passage  as  a  descrip- 
tion of  an  inter-market  trade.  But  the  letter  is  really  too 
ambiguous  to  warrant  any  conclusion.  Letters  from  Romoran- 
tin  in  1709  say  much  about  market  purchases,  but  nothing 
sufficiently  definite  to  connect  these  purchases  with  blatier 
trade.  May  n,  Pronard  writes  to  Bouville  (Intendant  at 
Orleans) :  "  The  Intendant  at  Bourges  actually  prevents  the 
peasants  and  other  individuals  of  your  Generality  from  buying 
grain  in  the  markets  of  his  department,  either  for  food  or  to  sow. 
The  town  officials  here  are  obliged  to  have  the  markets  supplied 
"by  individuals,  even  when  it  trenches  on  the  provision  made  for 
their  own  households."  3  Later,  Pronard  repeats  much  of  this 
criticism  of  prohibitions.  New  towns  are  mentioned,  notably 
Vierzon,  Gracay,  and  Valencay.  "  For  more  than  two  months," 
he  says,  "  this  town  has  not  been  able  to  get  ten  muids  of  grain 
from  Gracay  or  Valencay,  on  account  of  the  obstacles  opposed 
by  Foulle."4  This  would  confirm  the  supposition  that  the 
blatier  trade  previously  referred  to  originated  on  the  markets 
and  not  on  the  farms. 

This  interpretation,  however,  is  very  seriously  affected  by 
a  letter  of  Creil  from  La  Charite,  in  October,  1693.  This  is  a 
report  on  the  edict  of  September,  1693,  in  regard  to  the  declara- 
tions of  grain,  and  the  bringing  of  grain  to  the  nearest  market. 
This  interfered  with  the  ordinary  course  of  trade  on  the  pro- 
vincial boundaries,  as  the  local  authorities  interpreted  the  edict 

1  Almost  the  only  reference  to  a  term  other  than  blatier. 

z  G7.     1634.     Bourges,  16  Dec.  1694.     De  Seraucourt. 

8  G7.     1646.    Romorantin,  n  Mai  1709.     Pronard  a  Bouville  (enclosed). 

4  G7.     1646.     Romorantin,  i  Juin  1709.    Pronard. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  IS 

to  mean  the  nearest  place  within  their  own  jurisdiction.  On 
these  grounds  "  several  judges  refused  to  furnish  any  grain  to 
inhabitants  of  Romorantin,  and  refused  to  permit  sales  to 
'  blatiers '  who  come  to  buy  grain  in  the  farms  (dans  les  lieux)  to 
carry  it  to  the  wool  workers  and  weavers"  l  This  is  a  fairly  clear 
statement  of  buying  in  the  farms,  as  the  phrase  "  dans  les  lieux  " 
is  nearly  always  used  in  such  a  sense.  But  there  certainly  is  not 
enough  evidence  to  permit  of  any  definite  statement.  Probably 
it  would  be  unwise  to  endeavor  to  draw  a  very  sharp  issue  on  the 
question.  It  is  quite  possible  that  there  should  have  been  some 
buying  in  farms,  even  if  the  characteristic  mode  of  purchase 
was  on  the  markets.  This  is  on  the  whole  the  safest  view.  The 
blatier  did  buy,  at  times,  of  the  peasants  for  a  rather  distant 
market,  but  before  1660  he  ordinarily  secured  his  supplies  on 
some  local  market,  and  this  aspect  of  his  trade  was  most  promi- 
nent. 

An  additional  difficulty  is  created  by  the  occasional  character 
of  the  blatier.  During  the  late  spring  and  summer  he  fre- 
quently seems  to  have  been  a  day  laborer.  When  the  har- 
vesting was  finished  and  his  summer  employment  was  at  an 
end,  he  earned  small  sums  by  turning  blatier  during  the  most 
active  period  of  trade.  He  is  in  a  sense  a  labour eur.  Can  we 
be  sure  that  the  blatier  is  'not  frequently  confused  with  farmers 
bringing  their  own  crops  to  market  ?  A  letter  from  Bar-sur- 
Seine  illustrates  the  difficulty.  If  "  particuliers  "  is  taken  to  mean 
farmers  and  proprietors,  the  letter  describes  a  purely  local  market 
supplied  entirely  by  the  peasants  of  the  countryside  and  having 
no  relations  with  other  grain  markets.  "  This  region,'*  write 
the  magistrates  collectively,  "  is  a  part  of  Burgundy.  It  is 
devoted  to  wine  culture,  and  produces  scarcely  enough  grain  to 
maintain  its  inhabitants  a  month.  Accordingly,  it  could  not 
subsist  without  the  aid  of  several  parishes  of  the  wheat  country, 
among  others  Magnan,  Fralignes,  Chefaine,  Villensade,  Court- 

1  G7.     1632.    LaCharite,  19  Oct.  1693. 

See  also  a  letter  of  Bouville,  17  July  1694.  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  I,  371,  1350.  But 
all  these  references  are  after  1660.  The  real  question  is  the  character  of  the  blatier 
before  1660.  Was  his  buying  hi  the  farms  an  imitation  of  merchants  buying 
wholesale  in  the  farms  ? 


1 6         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

enot,  Beure,  Briel,  Montreuil,  and  others,  in  the  province  of 
Champagne.  But  these  places  are  only  one  or  two  leagues 
distant  from  Bar.  The  inhabitants  of  those  parishes  bring 
hither  grain  for  the  maintenance  of  this  town."  1  The  distinc- 
tion between  a  purely  local  market  and  a  market  with  the 
minimum  inter-market  trade  must  not  be  pressed  too  far.  The 
distinction  is  doubly  difficult  if  the  question  is  considered  from 
the  general  point  of  view.  Bar-sur-Seine,  while  probably  pre- 
senting an  instance  of  a  purely  local  grain  market,  might  have 
been  the  seat  of  a  brisk  trade  in  wine.  But  with  all  these  quali- 
fications, we  can  regard  the  blatier  as  the  outward  sign  of  the 
transition  from  the  purely  local  market  to  a  market  engaged  in 
trade  with  other  markets. 

In  the  regions  where  the  inter-market  trade  is  long  established 
the  position  of  the  blatier  is  much  clearer.  With  possible  excep- 
tions, the  blatier  is  the  intermediary  in  this  trade  based  upon 
the  local  market.  Once  the  blatier  becomes  a  permanent  feature, 
too,  the  chief  difference  between  the  markets  lies  in  the  degree 
of  elaboration  of  the  net  work  of  inter-market  relations. 

One  of  the  simplest  cases  of  the  inter-market  trade  appears 
on  the  border  of  Provence  and  Dauphine.  Gap,  one  of  the 
principal  towns  of  lower  Dauphine,  received  much  of  its  food 
supply  from  the  market  of  Sisteron,  which  was  supplied  by 
peasants.  The  interruption  of  trade  at  Sisteron  "  causes  famine 
at  Gap  and  in  the  environs,  as  Sisteron  is  the  granary  of  this 
section."  "  This  interference  with  trade  has  another  result. 
The  merchants,  who  usually  form  granaries  there  with  the  inten- 
tion of  shipping  grain  to  Dauphine,  no  longer  send  out  any  grain. 
They  buy  no  more  on  the  market  at  Sisteron  and  that  affects 
Sisteron.  The  parishes  in  the  vicinity  which  have  grain  to  sell 
no  longer  carry  their  grain  thither,  as  the  merchants  have  ceased 
buying."  2 

This  trade  is  somewhat  distinct  from  the  ordinary  type  of 
simple  trade,  as  the  merchants  are  evidently  fairly  well-do-to. 

1  G7.     1641.    Bar-sur-Seine,  24  Nov.  1708.     Magistrals  de  Bar-sur-Seine. 
*  G7.    1634.    Gap,  (3)  Juin  1694.     L'fiveque  de  Gap  a  Lebret,  Intendant  en 
Provence. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  17 

The  Bishop  of  Gap  says  in  his  letter  that  the  merchants  at 
Sisteron  professed  themselves  ready  to  maintain  granaries  in 
the  town  sufficient  to  supply  all  its  needs  till  the  harvest,  if  the 
municipal  officials  would  leave  their  trade  free.  Merchants 
capable  of  making  such  an  offer  are  obviously  possessed  of 
considerable  capital. 

In  central  Provence  there  was  a  similar  trading  connection 
between  the  markets  of  Manosque  and  Pertuis,  and  between 
Aix  and  Marseilles.  The  details  are  not  very  full,  and  it  is 
impossible  to  say  whether  the  inter-market  trade  was  in  the 
hands  of  blatiers  or  merchants  of  greater  wealth.1  The  possi- 
bility of  a  change  in  the  direction  of  this  trade  indicates  signifi- 
cantly the  fluidity  of  medieval  supply.  In  1709,  Marseilles 
and  Aix  complain  because  the  supply  that  should  come  down 
from  Manosque  and  Pertuis  is  all  moving  north  to  Sisteron 
and  thence  to  Gap.2  The  difficulties  experienced  at  Aix  and 
Marseilles  disclose  the  weakness  of  this  market  system.  The 
larger  towns  could  never  be  sure  of  controlling  their  supply  area. 
Even  if  the  tributary  market  had  its  usual  excess,  very  little 
was  required  to  deflect  it  to  another  town  where  prices  were 
higher  and  gains  more  considerable. 

Other  cases  of  a  trade  between  a  single  local  market  and  the 
market  of  a  larger  town  appear  in  lower  Guienne  between  Mont- 
de-Marsan  and  Bayonne;  in  Poitou  between  Mirebeau  and 
Poitiers.  The  volume  of  trade  between  Mont-de-Marsan  and 
Bayonne  was  considerable;  as  much  as  100  wagon-loads  were 
sold  each  market  day.  Some  of  this  grain  was  exported;  most 
of  it,  however,  was  consumed  by  Bayonne.3  Apparently  the 
trade  was  controlled  by  merchants  of  means.  The  trade  between 
Poitiers  and  Mirebeau  is  merely  mentioned  incidentally;  it 
was  probably  in  the  hands  of  blatiers. 

The  curious  feature  of  this  trading  relation  between  two 
markets  is  the  presence  of  well-to-do  merchants  instead  of 

1  G7.  1648.    Aix,  18  Mars  1709.    Lebret.  *  Letters  cited  above. 

G7.  1648.    Aix,  17  Avril  1709.    Lebret. 

*  G7.  137.    Bordeaux,  2  Fev.  1697.    Bezons  au  C.  G. 

G7.  138.    Bordeaux,  26  Mai  1699.    Bezons  au  C.  G. 

G7.  1640.    Agen,  18  Avril  1709.    de  la  Bourdonnaye  au  C.  G. 


1 8  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

blatiers.  This  was  doubtless  the  result  of  the  volujne  of  trade. 
Where  there  was  only  one  tributary  market,  it  was  likely  to  be 
located  in  a  town  scarcely  inferior  in  size  to  the  town  supplied. 
The  concentration  of  trade  was  considerable  and  business  could 
be  done  on  a  scale  that  was  attractive  to  merchants  of  wealth. 
All  these  factors  were  present  both  at  Sisteron  and  Mont-de- 
Marsan. 

When  there  is  one  market  supplied  by  several  smaller  markets, 
the  trade  is  so  small  on  each  local  market  that  it  falls  to  the 
blatiers.  Fontainebleau  illustrates  this  type,  deriving  its  supplies 
from  the  markets  of  Melun,  Malesherbes,  Nemours,  and  Mon- 
tereau.1  This  suggests  a  complication  that  frequently  occurs. 
One  local  market  sends  supplies  in  two  or  even  three  directions, 
just  as  most  of  these  towns  sent  grain  both  to  Paris  and  to  Fon- 
tainebleau. But  the  clearest  and  simplest  case  of  this  type  of 
trade  is  Tours  and  its  subsidiary  markets.  The  officers  of  the 
Presidial  at  Tours  describe  the  market  arrangements.  "  Tours 
has  the  misfortune  of  possessing  no  granaries  within  its  walls 
or  even  within  six  leagues.  The  bourgeois  form  no  granaries 
for  their  own  use,  and  never  were  accustomed  to  make  such 
provision  for  the  future.  There  are  no  wealthy  merchants 
engaged  in  wholesale  grain  trade.  We  have  only  small  retail 
merchants  called  blatiers,  who  twice  a  week  bring  to  our  market 
the  grain  that  they  buy  in  the  neighboring  markets.  This  is 
a  kind  of  regrating  that  renders  the  market  at  Tours  absolutely 
dependent  upon  the  other  markets,  both  in  regard  to  price, 
and  in  regard  to  the  supply  of  grain.  .  .  .  The  neighboring 
towns,  such  as  Langeais,  Chinon,  Loches,  Cormery,  Sainte- 
Maure,  Richelieu,  Montbazon,  Chateau-Regnault,  close  all  the 
roads  from  which  we  might  procure  subsistence  from  Berry 
and  Poitou,  and  these  towns  themselves  draw  no  more  grain 
from  the  outside." 2  The  ordinary  supply  markets  are  not 
distinctly  mentioned,  but  probably  the  towns  named  are  usually 
supply  markets.  The  officials,  at  this  juncture,  desire  to  reach 
the  country  districts  from  which  the  local  markets  are  supplied, 

1  G7.     1647.     Fontainebleau,  23  Mai  1709.    Dorchemer. 
1  G7.     1651.    Tours,  Avril,  1709.     Les  Officiers  du  Presidial. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  19 

since  they  represent  the  action  of  these  towns  as  very  hostile  to 
Tours. 

The  trade  supplying  Rouen  combines  the  inter-market  blatier 
trade  with  inter-market  trade  in  the  hands  of  wholesale  mer- 
chants. There  were  two  groups  of  markets,  four  fairly  near  the 
town  which  were  frequented  by  the  wholesale  merchants,  and 
beyond  these,  smaller  markets  in  the  country  which  supplied 
the  wholesalers'  markets.  The  inner  markets  were  Elboeuf, 
Caudebec,  Duclair,  and  Les  Andelys.  In  addition  to  these 
supplies,  much  grain  was  brought  directly  to  the  Halle  at  Rouen 
by  peasants  and  land-owners.1  The  four  markets  were  supplied 
by  blatiers j  and  the  grain  was  brought  thence  to  the  market  at 
Rouen  by  ninety-nine  titular  grain  merchants,  licensed  by  the 
municipality.  "  They  are  under  contract  to  furnish  the  Halle 
with  such  quantities  of  grain  as  may  be  needed  for  the  sustenance 
of  the  inhabitants  of  the  town.  They  shall  procure  this  grain 
in  the  four  neighboring  markets,  Elboeuf,  Caudebec,  Duclair, 
and  Andelys,  where  they  shall  have  preference  over  all  other 
merchants."  2  The  market  of  Elboeuf  was  supplied  largely  by 
blatiers  coming  from  Neubourg  and  that  vicinity.3  Caudebec 
was  supplied  from  an  even  wider  range.  Much  came  thither 
from  Caen  and  the  markets  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Orne, 
Argences,  and  Troarn.  The  grain  was  carried  along  by  blatiers 
from  market  to  market; 4  grain  was  also  brought  to  Caudebec 
from  Bolbec  near  the  mouth  of  the  Seine,  but  the  people  there 
made  trouble  at  home.  "  The  inhabitants  of  Bolbec  are  nu- 
merous and  ill  disposed,  for  it  is  an  industrial  section,  where  there 
are  many  workmen  who  have  nothing  to  lose.  They  are  begin- 
ning (25  April  1709)  to  wish  to  prevent  the  blatiers  from  coming 
to  this  market  to  buy.  .  .  .  This  blatier  trade,  however,  is 
quite  necessary,  as  it  furnishes  the  market  at  Caudebec."  8 

1  G7.    496.     Rouen,  3  Juillet  1700;  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  216,  559;  G7.     1632. 
Rouen,  17  Avril  1693;  G7.    496.     5  Dec.  1698. 

2  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  216,  559,  letter  of  14  Sept.  1709. 
8  G7.    496.    Rouen,  5  Dec.  1698. 

4  G7.     1635.    Rouen,  i  Juillet  1694.      Montholon.      Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  Ill, 
129,  375.    Caen.     G7.     1642.    Caen,  23  Dec.  1709,  Me"moire. 
6  G7.     1650.    Rouen,  25  Avril  1709. 

fi7       -rfien       T.illphnrmp.  1*7  Tin'n  T7rw 


G7.     1650.    Rouen,  25  Avnl  1709. 
G7.     1650.    Lillebonne,  17  Juin  17059. 


20         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

The  market  of  Duclair  drew  its  supplies  from  markets  of  the 
pays  de  Caux,  which  are  not  clearly  indicated  in  the  corre- 
spondence; Andelys  was  furnished  from  Gisors,  Magny,  and 
Vernon.1  The  market  system  around  Rouen  was  the  most 
complicated  development  of  trade  based  entirely  upon  local 
markets.  It  represents  the  highest  achievement  of  what  we 
may  call  the  pure  medieval  system. 

Ill 

Wholesale  trade  developed  in  the  large  towns,  particularly 
Paris  and  Lyons,  and  in  regions  which  regularly  exported  grain 
to  foreign  ports:  notably,  parts  of  Touraine,  Brittany,  the  upper 
basin  of  the  Garonne,  and  a  district  on  the  borders  of  Poitou 
and  Saintonge.  In  all  these  districts,  the  local  markets  were 
affected  by  the  existence  of  this  trade  with  distant  points.  The 
relation  of  the  trade  to  the  markets  of  the  locality  varied.  In 
some  regions,  the  wholesale  trade  was  concentrated  in  towns 
which  were  supplied  by  a  system  of  markets  reaching  back 
into  the  country  districts.  The  trade  at  Saumur  and  Mont- 
soreau  is  one  of  the  best  instances  of  this  form  of  organization. 
Elsewhere,  the  wholesale  trade  was  usually  based  on  granaries, 
and  was  relatively  independent  of  the  markets  although  it 
frequently  exerted  an  unfortunate  influence  upon  them.  In  the 
upper  basin  of  the  Garonne  and  on  the  coasts  of  Brittany  trade 
was  of  this  type.  In  the  course  of  the  seventeenth  century  the 
market  systems  were  gradually  disorganized  by  canvass  of  the 
farms  and  the  formation  of  granaries  by  direct  purchase.  This 
occurred  in  Touraine  and  in  many  parts  of  the  Seine  Basin.  It 
was  illegal,  because  it  was  an  infringement  of  the  prohibitions 
against  the  purchase  of  grain  in  the  farms  or  on  the  way  to 
market;  its  prevalence  led  to  the  reiteration  of  the  old  ordinances, 
and  determined  efforts  were  made  to  suppress  these  practices. 
Buying  grain  outside  the  market  was  not  in  itself  a  new  phe- 
nomenon, but  it  was  a  great  break  with  the  past  when  merchants 

1  G7.  1650.  Rouen,  25  Mars  1709;  Rouen,  28  Avril  1709,  and  other  letters 
in  the  same  carton.  Pavilly  and  Bourgachard  are  noted  near  Duclair,  but  their 
relation  is  not  quite  clear. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  21 

and  their  agents  began  to  scour  the  whole  countryside,  paying 
practically  any  price  asked  and  buying  all  the  grain  in  sight. 
It  was  a  new  fact  because  different  persons  were  the  active  pur- 
chasers, and  because  the  object  of  their  purchases  was  different. 
This  practice  may  be  described  as  "  country  buying,"  and, 
although  the  words  might  be  applied  to  the  infrequent  extra- 
market  dealings  that  always  existed,  the  phrase  will  be  applied  in 
succeeding  chapters  only  to  that  late  development  which  was  the 
result  of  greater  activity  on  the  part  of  the  wholesale  merchants. 

"  Country  buying  "  was  not  the  primary  or  ordinary  means 
of  securing  grain  for  the  large  towns,  but  an  extraordinary 
device  to  secure  supplies  when  the  granaries  of  the  towns  ceased 
to  promise  all  that  could  be  sold  in  the  metropolis.  Then,  the 
merchant  must  buy  on  the  market  in  competition  with  the  towns- 
people, or  he  must  go  among  the  farms.  With  this  alternative 
before  him,  it  required  little  perspicacity  to  see  the  wisdom  of 
scouring  the  country  and  dealing  separately  with  each  individual. 
The  merchant  might,  indeed,  be  forced  to  pay  the  full  market 
price,  but  he  need  never  pay  more,  and  in  all  probability  he 
could  secure  the  grain  for  less.  This  work  was  at  first  under- 
taken by  the  chief  agents  of  the  metropolitan  merchants.  Later, 
they  pressed  blatiers  into  service,  and  many  bourgeois,  seeing 
the  possibility  of  gain,  profited  by  the  example.  Finally,  the 
blatiers  who  had  dealt  almost  exclusively  on  the  markets,  began 
to  buy  systematically  on  the  farms  as  well. 

The  effect  of  this  practice  upon  the  local  market  was  fatal. 
The  other  developments  of  wholesale  metropolitan  trade  had 
left  the  local  machinery  intact.  This  form  of  buying  tended 
to  destroy  the  local  market.  There  was  no  pretence  at  local 
price-making;  the  predominance  of  metropolitan  influence  was 
complete ;  it  was  the  first  manifestation  of  the  idea  that  prices 
could  most  adequately  be  made  with  reference  to  metropolitan 
interests. 

But  "  country  buying  "  is  significant  for  much  besides  a  mere 
destruction  of  old  customs,  and  of  old  forms  of  market  organiza- 
tion; it  also  indicates  a  new  attitude  toward  the  supply.  The 
local  market  had  been  passive.  No  attempt  was  made  to  get  the 


22  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

supply  out  into  sight.  The  peasants  were  left  to  themselves, 
and  when  they  chose  to  bring  grain  to  market,  it  would  be 
included  in  the  equilibrium  of  supply  and  demand.  If  no  grain 
came  to  market,  there  was  no  remedy  except  interference  by  the 
administrative  officials.  No  machinery,  formal  or  informal, 
existed  by  which  the  grain  was  brought  in  contact  with  the 
market,  until  each  individual  felt  moved  to  act.  The  initiative 
was  with  the  seller,  not  with  the  buyer,  —  largely  no  doubt 
because  the  buyer  was  not  a  professional  merchant.  Even 
the  wholesale  trade  was  relatively  passive  in  so  far  as  it  was 
limited  to  granaries.  The  merchants  had  to  rest  content  with 
what  they  could  find  in  such  granaries  as  the  owners  saw  fit  to 
open,  and  granaries  were  habitually  concealed.  "  Country 
buying  "  was  the  first  indication  of  an  active  mercantile  attempt 
to  hunt  out  the  whole  supply.  It  was  above  all  an  effort  to 
discover  how  much  grain  was  hidden  away  in  farms,  chateaux, 
and  tithe-barns,  how  much  secluded  in  little  villages,  guarded 
by  ultra-conservative  farmers  or  grasping  proprietors  waiting 
anxiously  to  secure  the  highest  possible  price.  This  endeavor, 
to  widen  the  scope  of  the  "  visible  "  supply  is  quite  as  significant 
as  the  destruction  of  the  local  price-making  machinery. 

The  wholesale  trade  assumed  three  forms:  the  system  of 
local  markets;  the  granary  trade  of  the  older  type,  in  which  the 
granaries  were  owned  by  residents  of  the  producing  region; 
the  granary  trade  of  the  newer  type,  in  which  the  granaries 
were  formed  by  merchants  coming  from  the  consuming  or  ship- 
ping center.  Until  the  latter  half  of  the  seventeenth  century  the 
older  type  of  granary  trade  was  doubtless  the  most  important. 
Where  the  trade  was  considerable,  it  was  based  on  such  granaries. 
The  systems  of  markets  contributed  relatively  small  quantities 
of  grain  to  the  metropolis  or  export  point.  In  regions  where 
the  surplus  was  large,  granaries  were  sure  to  be  formed.  The 
territorial  distribution  of  these  different  types  of  wholesale 
trade  was  thus  definitely  related  to  the  agricultural  character 
of  the  region,  and  to  the  extent  of  its  surplus. 

In  the  vicinity  of  Paris  there  were  many  tributary  market 
systems  of  varying  degrees  of  complexity.  The  simplest  of 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  23 

these  centered  about  the  market  of  Montdidier.  A  petition 
of  the  inhabitants  asserts  "  that  all  the  grain  sold  on  the  markets 
of  the  town  and  in  the  villages  of  the  election,  amounting  to 
2000  sacs  per  week,  comes  from  the  vicinity  of  Peronne,  Artois, 
and  Cambresis."  l  Much  grain  came  to  Paris  from  Montdidier, 
brought  overland  by  blatters,  doubtless  to  some  of  the  markets 
near  Paris,  though  we  have  no  details.  Another  line  of  trade 
of  the  same  type  begins  in  Soissonnais.  Blatiers  bought  gram 
in  the  markets  of  Crepy-en-Valois  and  the  vicinity,  bringing 
it  down  to  Dammar  tin  and  Gonesse,  markets  within  a  few  leagues 
of  Paris,  much  frequented  by  bakers.2  The  trade  from  the 
Beauce  on  the  south  side  of  the  city  and  from  Brie  on  the  east 
came  up  to  Paris  through  just  such  a  system  of  local  markets.3 
The  blatiers  were  everywhere  the  active  intermediaries  in  this 
inter-market  trade.  Where  this  trade  was  wholly  in  the  hands 
of  blatiers,  it  was  small  in  volume  and  passed  through  a  great 
number  of  markets. 

In  the  Loire  Valley  the  grain  trade  presents  a  degree  of  com- 
plexity unequalled  in  any  part  of  France.  The  demand  acting 
upon  the  local  markets  is  the  metropolitan  demand  of  Paris, 
the  demand  arising  in  connection  with  the  export  trade  from 
Nantes,  the  demand  of  cities  in  the  Loire  Valley,  notably  Nantes 
and  Orleans,  and  at  times  Blois,  Tours,  and  others  seeking  sup- 
plies here.  The  intensity  of  demand  concentrated  on  the  supply 
area  is  extraordinary  in  every  respect.  The  complexity  of  inter- 
market  relations  is  no  less  unusual.  The  merchants  from  Paris, 
Orleans,  or  Nantes  seldom  went  beyond  Saumur  and  Mont- 
soreau  where  the  grain  supply  of  the  valleys  of  the  Vienne  and 
Creuse  was  concentrated.  This  is  the  primary  division  of  the 
trade:  the  major  wholesale  trade  at  Saumur  and  Montsoreau; 
the  minor  wholesale  and  the  blatier  trade  engaged  in  collecting 
the  grain  in  the  back  country  and  in  conveying  it  to  the  Loire. 
Even  this  simple  statement  shows  that  the  system  is  more 

1  G7.  1634.  Montdidier,  Fev.  1694.  Placet  des  Habitants,  envoy6  par 
Chauvelin,  i  Mars  1694. 

8  G7.     513.    Soissons,  16  Mai  1700.     Sanson. 
1  See  infra  in  connection  with  "  country  buying." 


24  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

elaborate  than  any  yet  considered.  There  is  an  additional  group 
of  wholesale  merchants:  the  minor  wholesale  merchants  who 
help  the  blatters  bring  the  grain  to  the  Loire.  But  this  is  not  the 
most  serious  complication.  Trade  in  this  region  was  developing 
very  actively  in  the  latter  seventeenth  century.  The  minor 
wholesale  merchants  were  probably  a  relatively  recent  phe- 
nomenon. Besides  this  development  of  an  additional  group 
of  wholesalers,  the  trade  here  was  much  influenced  by  the  prac- 
tice of  "  country  buying."  In  the  Seine  Valley  the  new  mode 
of  purchase  was  extremely  significant.  There  its  effects  were  less 
far-reaching,  but  it  did  much  to  complicate  the  inter-market 
trade.  The  forms  of  trade  previously  considered  were  in  exis- 
tence before  1650  and  maintained  their  integrity  well  into  the 
seventeenth  century.  They  had  become  fixed,  either  from  lack 
of  capacity  of  further  growth  or  from  lack  of  necessity  for 
expansion. 

In  the  Loire  Valley,  the  activity  of  trade  required  more  efficient 
organization,  and  the  letters  from  Touraine  in  1693,  1698,  and 
1709  afford  interesting  insight  into  the  possibility  of  a  develop- 
ment of  trade  based  upon  blatier-supp\ied  wholesale  markets. 
The  main  line  of  trade  is  described  very  comprehensively  by  the 
Subdelegue  at  Thouars.  "  There  are  several  grain  merchants 
who  live  in  the  parishes  on  the  border  between  Anjou  and  Poitou. 
They  usually  have  a  very  extensive  trade  in  grain,  buying  much 
in  our  markets  in  this  town  and  much  in  the  country.  They 
ship  it  at  once  to  Montreuil  and  Saumur,  where  there  are  boats 
that  are  loaded  for  Paris  or  Nantes.  ...  The  grain  comes  to 
our  markets  from  Saint- Jouin,  Assais,  and  Airvault,  where  the 
merchants  buy.  The  Bureaux,  merchants  of  Doue,  and  other 
merchants  from  Montreuil-Bellay  buy  the  grain  here  and  carry 
it  to  Montreuil-Bellay  where  boats  are  waiting  to  carry  it  to 
Saumur."  1  Grain  also  came  to  Saumur  from  Doue  and  Lou- 
dun.2  With  the  omission  of  the  "country  buying"  referred 
to,  this  description  would  probably  represent  the  conditions  in 
this  region  before  the  changes  that  appear  in  1693.  The  grain 

1  G7.    451.    Thouars,  28  Dec.  1698.     M.  le  Subd61egu6  a  d'Ableiges. 

2  G7.     1651.     Saumur,  2  Fev.  1709.     Boisayrault. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  2$ 

passed  through  three  or  four  markets  successively  before  it 
started  on  its  journey  up  or  down  the  Loire.  Trade  was 
partly  in  the  hands  of  blatiers,  partly  in  the  control  of  mer- 
chants. 

The  changes  consist  primarily  in  the  development  of  "  country 
buying  "  both  in  farms  and  in  country  granaries,  and  hi  the 
simplification  of  machinery  between  the  farm  and  the  market 
at  Saumur.  The  merchants  send  out  agents  to  buy  directly 
for  them.  The  trade  falls  into  the  control  of  the  merchants; 
and  these  are  of  two  types,  the  local  dealers  who  propose  to  sell 
at  Saumur  or  Montsoreau  and  the  richer  merchants  from  Nantes 
and  Paris.  The  efforts  of  these  merchants  develop  new  sources 
of  supply  which  concentrate  at  Montsoreau. 

This  exploitation  of  the  valleys  of  the  Vienne  and  Creuse 
is  first  mentioned  in  1699.  "  Miromenil  was  informed  in  the 
month  of  July  that  merchants  and  commission  agents  from 
Saumur,  Chinon,  and  Isle-Bouchard  were  buying  standing 
grain  in  the  environs  of  Chatelleraud,  Le-Port-du-Pille,  and 
Sainte-Maure,  along  the  Creuze  and  the  Vienne.  They  pay 
five  sous  more  per  bushel  than  the  market  price  of  old  grain, 
and  take  up  all  the  grain  among  the  peasants  and  metayers."  * 

The  buying  in  the  farms  had  appeared  around  Thouars  in 
1693  and  continued  with  even  greater  disorders  in  1698-99  and 
1709.  "  The  Bureau  and  one  Trois  Cheminee  of  Doue  ...  go 
day  and  night  through  the  country  districts,  with  valets  and 
other  men,  buying  grain.  They  form  extensive  granaries  and 
raise  prices  on  the  markets;  so  that  the  poor  cannot  get  a  bushel 
of  grain  in  any  way  whatsoever.  A  few  days  ago  at  Argenton- 
Chateau  near  Bressuire,  the  common  people  rose  against  them 
saying  that  the  grain  was  sent  to  foreign  countries."  2  In  1698, 
d'Ableiges  writes:  "  There  are  persons  in  the  markets  who  force 
prices  up  by  leaps  and  bounds.  They  take  all  the  grain  so  that 
the  bourgeois  and  inhabitants  cannot  get  any.  This  has  hap- 
pened at  Thouars,  which  is  only  seven  leagues  from  Saumur,  .  .  . 

1  G7.  524.  Feuille  en  main  de  Secretaire.  Abre*ge  d'une  lettre  perdue.  Bois- 
lisle,  op.  tit.,  II,  4,  13,  10  Oct.  1699. 

8  G7.     1632.    Thouars,  9  Dec.  1693.    La  Veuve  Marie. 


26  THE  GRAIN   TRADE  IN   FRANCE 

and  at  Montaigu." x  The  same  abuses  appear  "  near  La  Have, 
Sainte-Maure,  and  in  all  Touraine."  "  The  merchants  buy  of 
the  peasants."  2 

In  1708-09  the  formation  of  country  granaries  appears  more 
clearly.  Before  the  dearth  became  generally  known,  the  mer- 
chants of  Saumur  were  eagerly  seeking  permits  to  export  grain. 
Granaries  had  been  formed  in  the  chateaux.  Turgot  said  that  he 
knew  personally  of  more  than  ten  chateaux  filled  with  grain  for 
export.  He  proposed  to  prohibit  export  and  thus  force  the 
merchants  to  sell  on  the  markets.3  The  Lieutenant  du  Roi 
at  Saumur  tells  the  same  story.  "  The  merchants  are  buying 
all  the  grain  in  the  province,  forming  stores  in  all  the  chateaux 
and  abbeys,  and  finally  shipping  to  Nantes.  ...  As  the 
merchants  take  up  practically  all  the  grain  in  the  back  country, 
little  or  none  comes  to  the  market  here.  Prices  are  excessively 
high,  and  the  people  are  restive  as  they  see  the  grain  going 
abroad." 

The  trade,  which  was  originally  carried  through  a  series  of 
markets,  gradually  left  the  markets  and  was  carried  on  entirely 
apart  from  the  market  system  of  the  locality.  The  trading 
was  conducted  without  any  formalities  and  without  organiza- 
tion. At  Saumur,  the  merchants  bid  against  each  other  in 
some  of  the  granaries  whose  owners  were  not  engaged  in  trade 
with  Nantes  or  Paris,4  but  many  of  the  merchants  were  shipping 
to  Nantes  or  Paris  from  country  granaries  of  their  own.  Much 
of  the  grain  stored  in  chateaux  and  abbeys  by  the  merchants 
never  came  in  contact  with  any  market.  The  intensity  of 
demand  had  been  too  great  for  the  market  system,  and  trade 
around  Saumur  had  become  completely  disorganized. 

The  export  trade  from  lower  Poitou  which  passed  through 
Marans  is  not  unlike  this  Saumur  trade  in  some  respects.  There 
were  wholesale  merchants  buying  directly  in  the  country,  per- 

1  G7.    451.    Poitiers,  8  Dec.  1698.  d'Ableiges. 

8  G7.  524.  Tours,  8  Juillet  1699.  Miromenil.  G7.  524.  Saumur,  5  Aout 
1699.  Dandenac. 

8  G7.  1651.  Tours,  17  Nov.  1708.  Turgot.  See  also  G7.  1651.  Tours,  6 
Fev.  1709.  Turgot. 

4  G7.    524.    Tours,  15  Juillet  1699.  Mirom£nil. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  2J 

sonally  or  through  agents.  Granaries  were  formed  in  the  country 
in  anticipation  of  this  demand.  The  gram  that  was  the  basis 
of  the  wholesale  trade  left  the  country  without  touching  the 
wholesale  market.  The  principal  difference  is  the  apparent 
relation  of  the  trade  to  the  market  at  Marans.  The  market 
was  supplied  by  peasants  and  blatiers  and  was  a  considerable 
feature  in  the  trade  of  the  vicinity.  But  all  the  trade  of  Marans 
did  not  pass  through  the  market.  The  larger  merchants,  who 
collected  in  Poitou  by  agents,  sold  at  Marans  in  the  granaries. 
There  were  thus  two  phases  of  the  Marans  trade:  one,  the  normal 
trade  of  the  ordinary  local  market;  the  other,  a  highly  systema- 
tized wholesale  trade  which  had  no  more  connection  with  the 
market  at  Marans  than  the  trade  at  Saumur  with  the  local 
country  markets  or  the  town  markets. 

This  curious  duality  of  the  Marans  trade  is  not  easily  per- 
ceived, and  the  descriptions  do  not  bring  it  out  clearly.  The 
practice  is  most  distinctly  indicated  in  a  memorial  drawn  up  by 
Roujault,  the  Intendant  at  Poitiers.  He  puts  the  case  in  dia- 
lectical form.  "  The  issue  between  the  inhabitants  of  Aunis 
and  Poitou  is  not  to  determine  whether  or  no  the  peasants  of 
Poitou  may  carry  grain  to  the  market  at  Marans,  as  they  do  to 
markets  in  Poitou.  The  real  question  is :  does  the  edict  permit 
the  merchants  of  Marans  to  buy  their  grain  at  wholesale  in  the 
granaries  of  Poitou  ?  Does  it  permit  them  to  sell  at  wholesale 
to  other  merchants  at  Marans  ?  Does  it  permit  them  to  ship 
ten,  twenty,  thirty  tons  of  grain  at  a  time  to  the  markets  at 
Marans,  under  the  pretext  of  selling  there  at  retail  ?  Can  this 
go  on,  without  our  being  able  to  force  them  to  carry  a  grain  of 
corn  to  the  markets  of  Poitou  ?  l 

'  Then,  too,  there  are  peasants  of  Poitou  who  have  granaries 
at  Marans,  although  they  live  far  from  that  town.  They  are 
all  registered  as  grain  merchants,  and,  under  pretext  of  carrying 
grain  to  the  market  at  Marans,  which  they  never  enter,  they  ship 
all  the  grain  from  their  farms  to  their  granaries  at  Marans."  2 

1  The  French  of  the  original  is  extremely  involved;  the  translation  is  free,  but 
reproduces  faithfully  the  ideas  of  the  text. 

2  G7.     1647.    Memoire  pour  le  Commerce  des  Bleds  entre  le  Poitou  et  PAunis, 
fait  par  Roujault  a  Poitiers,  6  Dec.  1709. 


28  THE  &RAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

This  is  couched  in  rather  rhetorical  form  but  it  is  evidently 
meant  to  be  a  concise  description  of  the  trade.  "  It  must  be 
admitted,"  he  says,  "  that  this  wholesale  trade  between  Poitou 
and  Marans  has  been  established  since  time  immemorial  (est 
estably  de  tout  temps)."  Then  he  describes  the  trade  in  more 
detail.  "  Rochelle  is  supplied  in  two  ways;  by  the  markets  of 
the  parishes  of  Aunis  and  Saintonge  which  send  grain  to  the 
market  at  Rochelle;  by  the  bakers  who  buy  at  wholesale  at 
Marans.  The  wholesale  trade  of  Poitou  is  thus  merely  con- 
centrated at  Marans  f<pr  further  sale.  .  .  .  The  trade  is  also 
important  for  the  maritime  undertakings  and  the  provision  of 
merchant-men  setting  out  from  La  Rochelle."  l 

Many  of  the  assertions  of  Roujault  are  confirmed  by  a  memoir 
of  d'Ableiges  drawn  up  in  1699.  This  inquiry  was  primarily 
concerned  with  the  mode  of  purchasing  in  Poitou  and  the  grana- 
ries at  Marans.  The  tone  of  the  letter  suggests  the  separation 
between  the  wholesale  trade  and  the  market  trade.  "  I  have 
secretly  made  a  very  exact  investigation  of  the  grain  trade  from 
Poitou.  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  a  memoir  by  which  you 
will  perceive  that  Marans  is  the  principal  depot.  Some  grain, 
however,  passes  through  the  Isle  de  Re  and  Rochelle.  The 
memoir  contains  all  the  details  and  you  can  trust  it.  .  .  ." 
The  memoir  then  continues:  "  The  principal  merchants  at 
Marans  are  Large,  Grignon,  and  Aurard  who  say  they  have 
commissions  to  buy  grain.  They  have  agents  and  merchants 
in  Poitou  who  buy  for  them.  Sr.  Clereau,  formerly  Grefner  at 
the  Cour  des  Aides,  has  a  lease  of  the  abbey  of  Neuil.  He  has 
his  steward  buy  for  him  and  carries  on  a  great  trade.  He  has 
the  grain  delivered  at  Marans,  La  Rochelle,  and  Isle  de  Re. 
Martineau  de  Brilhouet  and  his  son-in-law  buy  extensively. 
It  is  supposed  that  they  are  agents  for  Sr.  Jouet,  Receiver  of 
the  Taille  at  Fontenay.  One  La  Fontaine,  agent  of  this  Mar- 
tineau, says  that  Martineau  has  three  granaries  at  Lugon. 
According  to  his  mother-in-law  he  has  also  three  granaries  at 
Marans.  Boutet  de  Nailliers  also  buys  incessantly  and  ships 

1  See  in  this  respect  the  letters  of  Colbert  de  Terron.  Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Colb., 
101,  85.  Ibid.,  86,  222. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  29 

to  Marans.  He  is  agent  for  the  said  Jouet,  Receiver  of  the 
Taille  at  Fontenay.  .  .  ." l  The  memoir  continues  in  this 
fashion  giving  a  detailed  account  of  all  the  merchants.  It  is 
quite  clear  that  the  buying  in  Poitou  is  very  extensive.  Mer- 
chants, agents,  granaries  in  the  country  and  at  Marans,  we  have 
here  all  the  ^machinery  for  an  invisible  wholesale  trade  that  we 
found  at  Saumur.  But  while  this  trade  in  lower  Poitou  is 
essentially  a  wholesale  trade  entirely  independent  of  markets, 
the  appearance  of  connection  with  the  local  market  at  Marans 
must  not  be  forgotten. 

A  more  ordinary  type  of  wholesale  trade  is  based  on  granaries 
formed  in  river  towns  by  residents,  who  sell  to  merchants  from 
the  large  towns.  This  form  suggests  a  rather  passive  trade  at 
every  stage,  presenting  a  sharp  contrast  to  the  feverish  energy 
that  appears  in  the  Saumur  district  and  at  Marans.  The  per- 
sons forming  granaries  make  no  energetic  canvass  of  the  country 
to  secure  grain.  They  wait  passively  for  the  arrival  of  the 
merchants  from  the  larger  town.  The  latter  rest  content  with 
the  supplies  in  the  granaries.  This  form  is  prevalent  in  the 
Saone  and  Marne  Valleys  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
centuries,  in  the  Upper  Loire  in  the  latter  seventeenth  century 
and  possibly  earlier,  and  in  the  Upper  Garonne. 

Conditions  in  the  valleys  of  the  Marne  and  Saone  will  be 
considered  in  detail  later,  and  as  the  general  aspects  of  this 
type  of  trade  appear  sufficiently  well  in  the  Garonne  Valley 
and  on  the  Upper  Loire,  it  will  be  most  expedient  to  confine 
our  attention  to  these  cases. 

The  trade  of  the  Garonne  was  devoted  only  in  part  to  supply- 
ing Bordeaux.  Grain  was  frequently  sent  abroad,  although 
Bordeaux  was  also  an  importing  region.  The  organization 
of  the  wholesale  trade  was  designed  to  cover  both  means  of 
disposing  of  the  surplus  of  the  Upper  Garonne.  The  character- 
istic feature  in  the  producing  regions  is  the  formation  of  grana- 
ries in  the  principal  towns,  especially,  but  not  necessarily,  river 

1  G7.  457.  Poitiers,  22  Jan.  1699.  d'Ableiges.  For  additional  details  see 
G7.  1645.  Memoire  sur  le  Commerce  des  Bleds  en  Poitou  et  Aunis,  envoyee  par 
les  Maire  et  fichevins  de  la  Rochelle,  2-5  Nov.  1709. 


30         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

towns.  "  The  election  of  Riviereverdieu  of  which  Grenade  is 
the  capital,"  writes  Foucault  in  1681,  "  is  the  most  fertile  section 
of  the  .Generalite  of  Montauban.  In  almost  all  the  towns  of 
this  election  I  find  that  the  principal  inhabitants  have  large 
stores."  1  De  Ris  reports,  in  1683,  that  there  are  rumors  "  of 
many  granaries,  made  by  individuals,  who  hope  to  double  their 
money  in  a  very  short  time."  2  In  1701,  de  la  Bourdonnaye 
says,  "  the  inhabitants  around  Agen  and  above  are  already 
1(io  Sept.)  beginning  to  form  granaries,  in  the  hope  that  war 
or  inclement  weather  will  prevent  Bordeaux  from  procuring 
grain  from  abroad,  so  that  they  can  sell  at  their  own  prices." 
In  1709,  the  granary  trade  was  recognized  and  regulated  by 
local  ordinances.  All  wholesale  merchants  were  required  to 
give  statements  of  the  quantities  of  grain  they  bought,  with 
the  name  and  residence  of  the  sellers.3  The  principal  depots  of 
this  granary  trade  were  Montauban,  L'Isle-en-Jourdain,  Grenade, 
Verdun,  Beaumont,  Gimont,  Gaillac,  Magistere,  Agen,  and 
Port-Sainte-Marie.4 

In  bringing  the  grain  from  the  granaries  to  Bordeaux  two  sets 
of  merchants  found  occupation;  merchants  resident  in  the  pro- 
ducing regions  and  merchants  resident  at  Bordeaux.  The  former 

1  G7.    390.     Grenade,  6  Mai  1681.     Foucault. 

2  G7.     132.    Bordeaux,  30  Avril  1683.    de  Ris. 
8  G7.     1646.    Montauban,  17  Aout  1709. 

4  The  most  detailed  indications  of  the  sources  of  supply  are  found  in  a  group  of 
notices  of  grain  arrivals  at  the  port  of  Bordeaux.  G7.  132.  23  Dec.  1682- 
2  Jan.  1683.  10  Mars  1683-5  Jum  1683.  The  names  mentioned  are  Magistere, 
Montaigne,  Agen,  Mast,  Boue,  Verdun,  Villemur,  Saint-Surin-de-Mortaigne, 
Moissac,  Laspeyres,  Gaillac,  Saint-Christolly,  Castelmoron,  Couserans,  Conac, 
Calonges,  Clayrac,  Montauban,  Saula.  The  relative  importance  is  indicated  in 
part  by  frequency  of  appearance  but  more  accurately  by  a  report  of  the  amount  of 
grain  in  store  in  the  Gen6ralite  of  Montauban  in  September,  1684. 

Estat  des  Bleds  qui  sont  dans  les  magazins  des  elections  de  Montauban. 
Montauban 21,600  sacks  Le  Burgaud 750  sacks 


Anconville 2,050 

Le-Mat-en-Verdun 2,250 

Merville 1,300 

L'Isle-en-Jourdain 25,300 

Verdun 7,000 

Bouret 1,450 


Grenade 13,650    ' 

Beaumont   7,350    ' 

Saint-Sardos   .^. 1,200     ' 

Colonger 900    ' 

Gimont 9,300    ' 

Total,  96,600  sacks. 


G7.    390.    Montauban,  28  Sept.  1684.     Bois  du  Baillet  (enclosed  in  letter). 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  31 

were  called  marchands  forains  and  sold  their  grain  through 
agents  called  courtiers.  These  courtiers  or  brokers  were  not 
supposed  to  engage  in  trade  on  their  own  account,  but  com- 
plaints indicate  that  abuses  were  numerous.  "  These  agents 
frequently  have  grain  of  their  own  to  sell,  so  that  they  take 
pains  not  to  execute  the  orders  of  foreign  merchants  immediately, 
for  fear  of  causing  prices  to  fall,  or  of  selling  less  of  their  own 
grain.  Nor  is  this  their  only  interest  in  delaying  the  sale  of 
grain  addressed  to  them.  After  gram  has  been  exposed  three 
days,  they  are  allowed  to  unload  the  boats  and  to  store  the  grain 
in  warehouses  which  they  own.  The  agents  store  the  grain  and 
charge  the  foreign  merchants  rent  for  the  use  of  the  granary."  l 

But  this  is  not  the  only  source  of  abuses  in  the  wholesale 
trade.  "  There  was  no  regulated  market.  All  the  gram  came 
down  the  river,  and,  when  a  boat  came  in,  it  was  straightway 
sold.  The  only  persons  who  bought  were  bakers,  as  the  well- 
to-do  bourgeois  provided  for  their  own  needs  and  the  poor  were 
not  able  to  buy  except  at  retail."  2  In  short,  there  was  no  market 
and  the  bakers  were  the  principal  buyers  on  the  port.  These 
conditions  invited  underhanded  practices,  and  Courson  felt 
assured  that  the  bakers  acted  in  concert  to^maintain  prices  by 
controlling  the  trade.  Some  were  engaged  in  the  grain  trade. 
"  They  would  have  grain  sent  down  to  Bordeaux,  and  when  it 
arrived  they  would  feign  to  buy  it  at  a  price  much  higher  than 
they  paid."  It  was  impossible  to  remedy  this  abuse  at  once, 
as  there  was  no  grain  in  Bordeaux  except  what  was  in  the  hands 
of  the  bakers,  who  took  care  not  to  have  much  in  their  grana- 
ries. ...  "I  thought  it  most  expedient  to  engage  several 
merchants  to  buy  grain  on  their  own  account  so  I  inquired  after 
merchants  while  touring  the  department  to  levy  the  taille,  and 
I  had  them  promise  to  send  grain  down  to  Bordeaux  giving 
them  names  of  agents  whom  they  could  trust.  In  the  end  I 
secured  in  this  way  20-25,000  bushels,  including  what  was  in 
individual  granaries  in  the  town.  Then  it  was  no  longer  possible 

1  G7.  139.  Avril,  1702.  Memoire  des  Jurats  de  Bordeaux  concernant  le 
placet  presente  au  Roy  pour  le  Courtage  des  Grains. 

*  G7.     1641.    Bordeaux,  8  Fev.  1710.     Lamoignon  de  Courson. 


32          THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

to  doubt  the  combination  of  the  bakers.  Only  the  grain  in 
the  boats  of  men  we  did  not  know  was  bought.  Nothing  was 
offered  for  the  grain  which  my  merchants  placed  on  sale,  though 
it  was  quite  as  good,  and  they  were  willing  to  sell  it  cheaper.  .  .  . 
This  induced  me  to  speak  to  the  bakers,  and  to  let  them  know 
that  I  understood  their  game.  I  told  them  I  would  make  trouble 
for  them  if  the  price  of  grain  at  Bordeaux  did  not  fall  to  the  level 
of  prices  in  the  Generalite.  It  was  hard  for  them  to  make  up 
their  minds,  but  when  they  saw  that  I  was  prepared  to  execute 
my  threats,  2,500  bushels  of  grain  suddenly  appeared  on  the 
ports  from  some  unknown  source.  It  was  sold  at  a  considerable 
reduction."  1 

It  is  not  of  great  consequence  to  know  whether  all  Courson's 
suspicions  were  justified,  for  the  significance  of  the  incident 
does  not  depend  on  the  truth  of  Courson's  allegations.  The 
important  fact  to  note  is  the  complete  invisibility  of  the  whole- 
sale trade.  The  bakers  may  or  may  not  have  had  a  controlling 
influence,  but  this  much  is  certain,  —  the  trade  was  entirely 
independent  of  any  formal  market  both  in  the  producing  regions 
and  in  the  town.  Under  such  circumstances  wholesale  prices 
were  practically  guess  work:  there  was  not  enough  competitive 
dealing  to  make  a*  satisfactory  price. 

Such  little  wholesale  trade  as  existed  on  the  Upper  Loire  was 
based  primarily  upon  granaries.  In  1693,  d'Ableiges  writes: 
"It  is  true  that  merchants  in  the  vicinity  of  Aigueperse  and 
Cusset  formed  granaries  last  year.  This  year  too  they  are  again 
at  work."  2  Other  letters  report  "  that  Sanson  and  Levassor 
(merchants  from  the  lower  river)  have  purchased,  directly  or 
through  agents,  all  the  grain  in  the  large  farms  and  in  the  grana- 
ries in  the  vicinity  of  Aigueperse." 3  Evidently  there  was 
some  active  work  on  the  part  of  the  metropolitan  wholesalers, 
but  the  more  usual  local  trade  was  also  in  evidence.  "  Several 
persons  of  quality  in  the  province,  Dallegre  de  St.  Herent, 
Du  Terrail,  d'Estain  Ribeyre,  have  boats  ready  to  ship  down 

1  Letter  cited  previously. 

2  G7.     1630.    Clermont,  15  Sept.  1693.    d'Ableiges  au  C.  G. 

8  G7.     1630.     Aigueperse,  3  (?)  Nov.  1693.     Grimaudet  a  d'Ableiges. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  33 

stream.  Besides  these,  the  "  Receveurs  Generaux,"  the  lessees 
of  the  coal  mines  in  Nivernais,  and  other  individuals  are  engaged 
in  the  same  business."  l 

This  trade  in  the  Upper  Loire  was  part  of  the  supply  of  Orleans 
and  Paris.  In  Brittany  there  was  a  considerable  wholesale 
trade  for  foreign  export.  Some  of  this  grain  went  to  Bor- 
deaux, occasionally  grain  was  shipped  to  Paris  by  way  of  the 
Loire  through  Nantes,  or  by  sea  through  Rouen.  Most  of  the 
Breton  grain  was  sent  to  Spain  or  Portugal.  The  trade  was  not 
a  general  provincial  trade  in  the  sense  of  being  comprehended 
in  one  trading  system,  but  conditions  were  essentially  the  same 
throughout  the  province.  On  the  south  coast,  the  trade  fell 
into  two  general  classes:  it  was  in  part  concentrated  at  Nantes 
and  shipped  thence  up  the  Loire,  or  to  Spain  and  Portgual;  in 
part  the  grain  was  shipped  directly  from  the  coast  ports,  Vannes, 
Quimper,  Auray,  and  Hennebont.  On  the  north  coast,  there 
were  two  or  three  rather  distinct  trading  systems,  notably 
centered  around  Saint-Brieuc  and  Saint-Malo.  A  small  coast- 
ing trade  was  carried  on  by  many  of  the  small  ports:  little 
places  that  now  scarcely  afford  anchorage  for  light  pleasure 
craft  were  then  considered  favorable  for  trade. 

Apart  from  these  geographical  aspects  of  the  trade  there  is  a 
more  significant  difference  between  conditions  in  Brittany  and 
conditions  in  the  producing  regions  which  were  tributary  to 
some  domestic  consuming  center.  In  the  Garonne  Valley,  on 
the  Upper  Loire,  on  the  Marne,  the  merchants  who  bought  in 
the  granaries  came  from  the  metropolis.  There  was  a  sharp 
differentiation  between  resident  and  foreign  merchants.  In 
Brittany  there  was  no  distinction  of  this  type.  The  merchants 
who  handled  the  export  trade  resided,  in  a  general  way,  in  the 
district  from  which  they  drew  their  supplies.  But  these  Breton 
merchants  amassed  large  resources  and  gradually  developed 
extensive  systems  of  correspondents  and  agents. 

1  G7.  1630.  Clermont,  4  Nov.  1693.  d'Ableiges  a  Pussort.  See  also  G7. 
1632.  Ord.  du  Lieu.  G£n.  d'Aigueperse,  23  Nov.  1693.  G7.  1635.  Letter  of 
24Fev.  1694.  Boutz,  Marchand  d'Orleans.  G7.  1630.  3(?)  Nov.  1693.  Grimaudet 
a  d'Ableiges,  enclosed  in  a  letter  of  d'Ableiges  to  Pussort. 


34  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

The  wholesale  trade  here  was  primarily  based  on  the  rents 
of  the  province.  "  All  the  rents  are  paid  in  grain,  very  rarely 
in  money.  Consequently  little  grain  is  to  be  found  in  the  country 
as  elsewhere.  Almost  all  of  it  is  carried  to  the  granaries  of  per- 
sons in  easy  circumstances  and  landed  proprietors.  The  rest 
is  used  for  seed,  and  for  the  maintenance  of  towns  and  communi- 
ties. All  the  (wholesale)  purchases  are  made  in  these  granaries, 
which  are  closed  whenever  the  proprietors  please.  Most  of 
them,  indeed,  sell  only  when  grain  is  high."  1  As  another  writer 
says  almost  twenty  years  earlier:  "  Brittany  waits  to  sell  her 
grain  not  only  until  there  is  a  light  harvest  in  the  province  and 
the  adjoining  provinces,  but  until  there  is  a  general  dearth 
throughout  Europe.  All  the  granaries  are  near  the  coast, 
shipments  are  easily  made,  and  the  profits  are  large.  It  is 
worthy  of  note  that  the  wealthiest  men  in  the  province  are 
engaged  in  the  trade,  and  these  companies  buy  large  quantities 
of  grain  when  prices  are  low."  2  In  ordinary  seasons,  therefore, 
the  separation  of  wholesale  and  retail  trade  was  based  on  these 
rents  in  kind.  A  definite  portion  of  the  crop  was,  of  course, 
applied  to  these  payments  and  in  a  rough  way  the  division 
doubtless  represented  the  proportion  actually  available  for 
export. 

As  the  Due  de  Chaulnes  suggests,  the  merchants  engaged  in 
this  trade  were  men  of  means.  Royal  projects  bring  us  in  touch 
with  one  St.  Vast  Foliot,  who  describes  himself  as  a  "  native 
of  Saint-L6,  engaged  in  this  wholesale  trade  for  the  last  twenty 
years."  Replying  to  the  proposals  made  by  the  administra- 
tive authorities,  he  says:  "  As  our  means  are  not  large,  we  cannot 
undertake  to  secure  more  than  two  or  three  hundred  tons  of 
grain.  Grain  is  high  at  present  and  we  would  be  obliged  to 
form  associations  with  our  friends.  ...  I  have  correspondents 
at  Quimperle,  Hennebont,  Auray,  and  Vannes,  which  are  cantons 
where  the  harvest  promises  to  be  fine.  I  could  give  orders  to 
correspondents  to  buy  what  grain  they  can."  3  Similar  indica- 

1  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  96,  298.     6  Fev.  1709.     Ferrand. 

2  Ibid.,  I,  166-167, 638.     6  Dec.  1688.     Due  de  Chaulnes,  Gouv.  de  Bretagne. 

3  G7.    1641.    Quimper,  12  Juillet  1709.     St.  Vast  Foliot,  Marchand  a  Quimper. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  35 

tions  of  the  scale  of  operations,  and  of  the  associations,  are 
furnished  in  a  letter  from  Desgrassieres,  a  royal  official  in  Brit- 
tany. "  Falconneau,  who  is  employed  to  buy  in  the  Bishoprics 
of  Vannes  and  Quimper,  has  received  word  from  Hennebont  that 
M.  Coetmadeu  has  delivered  to  one  Le  Sage  and  his  associates 
150  tons  of  wheat  and  150  tons  of  rye.  These  merchants  are 
forming  large  granaries.  Billy  and  Mercier,  merchants  of  Vannes, 
have  1 20  tons  of  grain  in  their  granaries.  It  is  reported  that  one 
Rallet,  buying  in  the  Bishoprics  of  Saint-Brieuc  and  Treguier, 
has  already  taken  up  6-7,000  bushels  (103  tons)."  l 

In  general  there  was  probably  little  interference  with  the 
markets,  but  in  1693  and  1709  troubles  appeared  here  as  else- 
where. The  merchants  persisted  in  scouring  the  country  and 
in  buying  in  the  markets  to  the  exclusion  of  the  peasants.  The 
purchases  of  Rallet  just  mentioned  were  made  with  such  indif- 
ference to  local  needs  that  there  were  riots,  notably  at  Paimpol. 
The  market  there  was  completely  drained  of  supplies,  and  to 
quiet  the  people  the  senechal  forced  him  to  place  some  of  his 
grain  on  sale.  At  Quimper,  in  1709,  the  wholesale  merchants 
bought  grain  "  at  the  gates  of  the  town  and  on  the  highways 
without  higgling  at  all  over  prices.  They  gave  the  peasants 
what  they  asked."  2 

In  the  Oise  Valley,  we  find  wholesale  trade  that  is  based  in 
part  on  granaries  of  rentiers,  and  in  part  on  granaries  formed  by 
bourgeois  who  buy  on  the  market.  The  wholesale  merchants 
also  buy  directly  on  the  market.  The  evidence  is  so  contradic- 
tory that  it  is  difficult  to  be  at  all  certain  of  details.  It  was 
apparently  most  usual  for  the  wholesale  merchants  to  buy  on 
the  market  or  in  the  granaries  of  bourgeois  who  had  bought  on 
the  market.  The  Lieutenant  Civil,  who  was  examined  in  1660, 
comments  particularly  on  the  quantity  of  grain  brought  to  the 
market  to  supply  the  wholesale  trade.  It  was  then  early  in 
November,  so  that  the  new  grain  was  coming  rapidly  to  market, 

1  G7.  1641.  18-19  Juillet  1709.  Desgrassieres  et  Barclay,  copie,  avec  apos- 
tilles  par  Nointel. 

*  G7.    1641.    Quimper,  30  Sept.  1709.     Le  Proc.  du  Roy  a  Quimper. 
See  also  G7.    1630.    Memoire  sur  les  Bleds.     Bretagne,  1693. 


36  THE  GRAIN   TRADE  IN  FRANCE    ' 

and  the  arrivals  were  probably  greater  than  usual  as  the  trade 
had  attracted  particular  attention.  He  thought  that  "  there 
was  an  unusual  quantity  of  wheat  and  oats  in  the  town,  for  much 
had  been  coming  in  from  Saint-Quentin,  Santerre,  Bapaume, 
Arras,  Brussels.  The  blatiers  arrived  daily  from  Monday  to 
Saturday  when  the  market  was  held,  so  that  the  market-place 
was  completely  filled.  For  some  time,  eighty,  ninety,  or  one 
hundred  muids  (Parisian  measure)  had  come  daily  to  the  mar- 
ket and  had  been  sold.  It  was  bought  by  merchants  trading 
with  Paris  and  by  the  bourgeois  of  Noyon.  Most  of  the  resi- 
dents were  accustomed  to  form  granaries  which  they  sold  ulti- 
mately to  merchants  of  Paris."  l  This  movement  of  grain  to 
the  market  of  Noyon  is  also  indicated  by  the  complaint  that  some 
merchants  had  been  buying  at  the  sources  of  the  supply  so  that 
grain  which  should  have  come  to  Noyon  failed  to  appear.  This 
complaint  is  made  by  Valentin  Meniole,  Charles  le  Brun, 
Toussaint,  and  La  Maire,  merchants  resident  at  Noyon  trading 
with  Paris.  "  Every  week  boats  come  up  from  Beaumont, 
Creil,  Pont-Sainte-Maxence,  and  Compiegne,  which  take  loads 
not  only  of  grain  bought  at  Noyon,  but  also  of  grain  purchased 
at  Nesle  and  Peronne.  All  this  grain  should  come  to  the  market 
at  Noyon.  Furthermore,  certain  merchants  of  Gonesse  and 
Saint-Denis  go  even  as  far  as  Peronne,  where  they  buy  grain 
which  they  carry  on  horses  to  Pont-1'Eveque  near  Noyon, 
where  they  load  it  on  boats."  But  they  had  been  doing  the 
same  thing  themselves.  "  Within  the  last  three  months  they 
had  bought  grain  at  Ham  where  there  is  much  to  be  had  both 
on  the  markets  and  in  granaries.  But  when  they  wished  to  carry 
the  grain  to  Noyon,  the  pack  trains  were  robbed." 2  The 
merchants  at  Chaulny  were  also  buying  directly  in  the  towns 
of  Picardy  whence  the  blatiers  came.  They  frequented  Saint- 
Quentin.3  The  land-owners  also  played  a  considerable  part  in 
the  trade,  although  they  are  not  so  much  in  evidence.4 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.     240.    Noyon,  4  Nov.  1660.     Proems  Verbal. 

2  Ibid.     245v.     Noyon,  4  Nov.  1660.     Proems  Verbal. 
8  Ibid.     247.     Chaulny,  4  Nov.  1660.     Proces  Verbal. 

4  Ibid .    245V-6.     Noyon,  4  Nov.  1660.     Proces  Verbal. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  37 

The  buying  on  the  market,  and  the  independent  buying  in 
the  country  continues  after  1660.  Le  Vayer  in  1682  speaks  of 
the  great  quantity  of  grain  coming  to  the  markets  at  Noyon 
from  Cambresis,  Vermandois,  Artois,  and  Santerre.  He  also 
speaks  of  grain  brought  by  the  merchants  of  Noyon  to  Pont- 
1'Eveque  and  shipped  thence  to  Paris.1  On  the  whole  this 
seems  to  have  been  the  characteristic  form  of  the  wholesale 
trade  at  Noyon :  —  a  combination  of  buying  on  a  &/a/w-supplied 
market  with  buying  in  granaries  formed  by  well-to-do  bourgeois 
and  land-owners.  The  different  modes  of  purchase  are  not 
always  equally  important.  Some  years  the  merchants  from 
Paris  are  active,  buying  extensively  in  the  towns  of  Picardy. 
Then,  when  the  harvests  have  been  plentiful,  the  Uatier  supply 
on  the  market  becomes  so  considerable  that  the  wholesale  trade 
is  largely  supplied  from  this  source.  The  general  appearance 
of  the  trade  at  Noyon  was  thus  likely  to  change  somewhat, 
although  the  essential  features  remained  unaltered. 

This  description  has  possibly  failed  to  suggest  the  great 
variety  in  the  forms  of  market  organization,  for  the  common 
principles  that  can  be  traced  and  above  all  the  universal  inade- 
quacy efface  the  impression  of  diversity  that  is  most  apparent 
when  the  analysis  is  not. carried  so  far.  The  market  systems 
fall  into  three  general  classes:  those  based  entirely  on  town 
markets;  wholesale  trade  based  on  Wa^er-supplied  markets; 
wholesale  trade  based  on  granaries  in  the  producing  regions. 
The  inter-market  relations  based  on  the  town  markets  present 
by  far  the  greatest  variety  of  individual  forms.  They  vary 
both  in  the  different  degree  of  the  dependence  and  in  the  number 
of  markets  brought  together  in  one  system.  Every  possible 
combination  can  be  found.  One  consuming  market  trading 
with  one  supply  market,  or  a  great  town  market  like  that  of 
Rouen  with  an  elaborate  system  of  small  local  markets  passing 
the  grain  along  from  remote  sections  of  the  back  country.  In  the 
second  general  group,  the  variety  of  form  is  not  so  great.  There 

1  G7.  510.  Memoire  de  Le  Vayer  sur  L'filection  de  Noyon,  23  Mai  1682. 
See  also  G7.  512.  Soissons,  1 1  Juin  1 69  7 .  de  la  Houssaye.  The  granaries  formed 
by  residents  of  Noyon. 


38  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

is  the  large  town  market  supplied  by  smaller  markets.  Noyon 
was  supplied  in  this  way  from  Flanders.  The  wholesale  mer- 
chants appear  on  the  market  and  buy  for  the  metropolitan 
town.  Differences  in  this  group  are  largely  confined  to  the 
relations  between  the  town  market  and  tributary  markets. 
The  conduct  of  the  merchants  and  their  relations  to  the  metro- 
politan and  local  markets  are  very  much  the  same  in  all  places. 
In  the  last  general  group  of  trading  systems,  the  differences 
are  very  slight  and  seldom  significant  or  essential. 

All  the  forms  of  the  inter-market  relation  were  inadequate. 
The  machinery  for  price-making  and  distribution  did  not  assure 
a  competitive  price.  The  system  that  is  based  throughout  on 
the  local  markets  over-emphasizes  local  interests.  It  inverts 
the  relation  between  central  and  local  market.  The  demand 
of  the  central  market  is  sure  to  control  in  the  end,  but  this 
system  of  market  organization  persistently  endeavors  to  ignore 
the  presence,  or  at  any  rate,  the  importance  of  the  demand  of 
the  central  market.  It  represents  an  effort  to  transact  wholesale 
business  on  the  basis  of  local  prices.  The  combination  of  whole- 
sale trade  with  blatier-supplied  markets  introduces  no  factor 
that  overcomes  the  deficiencies  of  the  simple  town  market 
system.  The  preponderance  of  the  local  market  is  still  assured. 
The  only  new  feature  is  the  emancipation  from  the  market  of 
the  later  stages  of  the  trade.  This  affords  opportunities  for 
deals  and  combinations  among  the  merchants,  it  decreases  com- 
petition, and  renders  the  supply  more  invisible  than  if  the  ftrade 
were  more  closely  connected  with  the  markets.  The  wholesale 
trade  that  is  entirely  independent  of  the  markets  is  the  most 
dangerous  of  all.  It  is  in  a  sense  the  most  advanced  form  of 
trade  organization,  but  in  respect  to  price-making  it  is  certainly 
the  least  efficient.  There  is  no  organized  market  in  the  granary 
towns.  There  is  no  strictly  regulated  market  on  the  ports  of 
the  metropolis.  In  most  places  the  merchants  were  required 
to  fix  a  price  on  each  boat-load  when  it  was  first  placed  on  sale,1 

1  KK.  1014.  Ms.  "  Le  Commerce  d'Eau  a  Paris."  G7.  132.  Reports  of 
grain  arrivals  at  Bordeaux,  1683,  with  the  prices  set  for  each  boat-load.  H.  1837. 
Reg.  du  Bureau,  404.  31  Juillet  1677.  Statuts  et  RSglements  des  Jurez  Mesu- 
reurs,  Art.  24. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  39 

and  that  price  could  not  be  increased.    As  the  boats  were  fre- 
quently large,  the  grain  might  not  be  sold  within  a  fortnight 
of  its  arrival.    Prices  would  naturally  change,  but  the  old  grain 
must  be  sold  at  the  first  price  or  at  a  reduction.    There  was 
little  competition  in  the  ports  in  any  event,  and  the  natural 
tendency  was  much  restrained  by  the  limitations  imposed  in 
imitation  of  the  town  market  regulations.     In  addition  to  the 
defects  in  price-making,  the  supply  coming  from  this  wholesale 
granary  trade  was  almost  completely  invisible.    The  extent 
of  such  supplies  could  never  be  estimated  in  advance.     In  short, 
every  form  of  market  that  appears  before  1680  is  inadequate 
and  inefficient:    all  types  involving  wholesale  trade  are  more 
inefficient  than  the  simpler  types  based  on  the  old  town  markets. 
The  process  of  evolution  is  in  an  inverse  direction.     Exten- 
sion of  any  one  of  these  three  forms  of  organization  merely  made 
matters  worse,  emphasizing  all  the  latent  defects  of  the  primitive 
system.    All  three  forms  had  been  developed  as  far  as  possible, 
and  any  further  effort  to  widen  their  scope  or  secure  additional 
supplies  would  result  in  a  complete  destruction  of  the  market 
system.    The  dearths  of  1693,  1698,  1708-09  created  this  need 
for  additional  supplies;  greater  efficiency  in  marketing  became 
necessary,  and  reorganization  of  the  trade  was  inevitable. 

Reform  of  the  market  system  could  only  be  based  on  some 
type  of  market  different  from  any  that  had  existed  and  unlike 
any  of  the  varieties  that  were  the  outcome  of  the  three  general 
forms  that  had  developed  more  or  less  logically  on  the  basis  of 
the  local  markets,  wholesale  merchants,  and  granaries.  The 
new  variety  of  market  that  was  so  sorely  needed  appeared  at 
Bray.  It  was  first  noticed  in  1693  by  Delamare,  but  its  full 
significance  was  not  perceived  till  1709.  The  investigation  of 
1693,  however,  showed  conclusively  that  the  new  type  of  market 
had  developed  at  Bray  shortly  after  1680.  No  exact  dates  can 
be  determined  since  the  new  departure  was  at  first  merely  an 
informal  commercial  usage. 

The  appearance  of  this  new  variant  at  such  a  crucial  time  was 
by  no  means  pure  accident,  neither  was  it  a  natural  development 
out  of  any  of  the  three  general  forms  of  market  organization. 


40  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

It  combined  features  of  the  blatier-supp]ied  market  with  the 
independence  of  local  markets  that  characterized  the  granary 
trade.  The  traits  that  had  been  fundamental  in  the  old  blatier- 
supplied  market  do  not  appear  at  all  in  the  new  form.  What 
had  been  incidental  in  the  old  local  market  is  alone  adopted. 
Similarly  in  the  selection  of  features  from  the  wholesale  granary 
trade,  the  independence  of  the  local  market  system  is  preserved, 
but  the  complete  absence  of  organization  is  not  retained.  The 
market  at  Bray  was,  indeed,  a  natural  product  of  all  the  circum- 
stances of  the  time,  but  it  is  more  than  a  mere  progressive  modi- 
fication of  any  one  of  the  three  general  types  of  market.  The 
curiously  felicitous  blending  of  old  elements  in  a  new  combination 
was  made  possible  by  the  breaking-down  of  many  of  the  sharper 
distinctions  that  had  previously  differentiated  the  primary  types. 
All  the  lines  became  blurred  so  that  new  combinations  were  not 
only  probable  but  almost  inevitable. 

The  character  of  this  period  has  already  been  suggested  in 
the  description  of  the  various  types.  In  the  Saumur  system 
we  have  already  noted  the  efficiency  of  the  active  canvass  for 
the  old  blatier-supp\ied  market.  In  Brittany,  the  wholesale 
merchants  tended  to  encroach  on  the  local  markets  and  the 
supplies  held  by  peasants  for  local  needs.  The  blatter  trade 
was  developing  new  affiliations  with  the  country  and  with  the 
wholesale  merchants.  The  wholesale  trade  was  coming  into 
closer  contact  with  the  markets.  The  blatiers  acquired  a  new 
freedom  and  independence;  the  wholesale  merchants  became 
more  visible,  and  were  less  inclined  to  keep  their  trading  secret. 
All  these  changes  were  the  result  of  the  practice  of  "  country 
buying." 

The  form  of  the  market  at  Bray  prior  to  1660  is  largely  a 
matter  of  conjecture.1  The  wholesale  trade  at  Provins,  Nogent, 
Pont-Sainte-Maxence,  and  Mery  was  primarily  based  upon 
granary  supplies.  The  Parisian  merchants  bought  in  local 
granaries  formed  by  rent-owners,  and,  to  a  very  limited  extent, 
by  persons  purchasing  on  the  markets.  Probably  conditions 
at  Bray  were  not  very  different.  Possibly  it  was  not  then  as 

1  Full  details  will  be  given  in  the  following  chapter. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  41 

important  as  it  became  later.  The  trade  of  this  region  was  very 
much  affected  in  1660  by  the  "country  buying,"  and  the  trans- 
formation of  the  market  system  under  the  influence  of  this  new 
ferment  is  the  most  significant  incident  in  the  history  of  the  grain 
trade  in  this  period. 

Buying  in  granaries  was  advantageous  to  the  merchants,  but 
only  part  of  the  supply  of  the  region  was  accessible  in  that  form. 
Consequently,  the  pressure  of  a  dearth  would  impel  the  mer- 
chants to  seek  additional  supplies  either  in  the  farms  or  on  the 
markets.  It  is  a  natural  development  of  the  increased  needs  of 
the  consuming  center.  Profits  rose  so  high  that  the  merchant 
was  not  content  to  limit  his  trade  to  the  granary  supply.  .  The 
dearth  of  1662  in  the  Seine  Basin  was  the  first  occasion  when 
these  conditions  became  sufficiently  intense  to  render  them 
significant.  Already  there  had  been  indications  that  such 
troubles  were  possible,  but  they  became  serious  only  in  that  year. 
The  energy  of  the  merchants  is  most  notable  in  the  sections  near 
Paris  especially  at  Montereau,  where  they  invaded  the  markets 
in  addition  to  buying  in  the  farms.  One  Nepveu,  agent  of  the 
Widow  Rousseau,  "  was  in  the  granaries  at  Montereau  and  in 
the  environs,  buying  all  the  grain  there,  so  that  no  grain  came  to 
market  on  the  following  market  day."  1  According  to  another 
account,  this  same  Nepveu  "  visited  the  peasants  within  six 
leagues  of  Montereau,  raising  the  price  and  buying  of  everyone."  2 
"  Lavalle,  a  servant  of  the  Widow  Rousseau,  has  also  been  in 
this  section  running  around  among  the  farms  where  he  has 
bought  all  the  grain  held  by  the  peasants."  Louise  Martin 
heard  that  several  merchants  of  Paris  were  scouring  the  country 
in  the  vicinity  of  Provins,  especially  Rebigois,  and  one  Le  Brie, 
agent  of  the  Widow  Rousseau.3  Three  years  later,  a  Parisian 
merchant  declared  in  court  that  all  the  grain  he  shipped  from 
Bray  was  bought  in  the  farms  and  villages  of  the  vicinity.  None 
was  bought  on  the  market  at  Bray.  "  This,"  he  says,  "  is  the 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.  261.  Procfcs  Verbal.  31  Juillet  1660.  Marie 
Coudray. 

8  Ibid.     216.    Louise  Pigre. 
8  Same  Proces  Verbal. 


42  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

practice  of  most  of  the  Parisian  merchants  at  Bray."  1  Ap- 
parently the  commercial  customs  of  the  region  had  been  con- 
siderably modified. 

The  natural  result  of  this  energetic  canvass  of  the  country 
districts  was  to  call  attention  to  the  intensity  of  the  demand 
for  grain.  The  apathetic  peasantry  would  be  roused  to  a  realiza- 
tion of  the  possibilities  of  trade.  They  saw  that  the  Parisian 
merchants  would  take  all  the  grain  they  carried  to  Bray,  and 
would  pay  good  prices.  It  was  no  longer  merely  the  quiet 
local  trade  of  a  small  town,  doubly  dull  because  of  the  large 
excess  of  local  supplies  over  local  needs.  The  feverish  restless- 
ness of  the  metropolis,  the  stimulus  of  feeling  that  the  demand 
was  limitless,  the  assurance  of  high  prices  to  be  had  for  the  asking: 
all  this  combined  to  give  a  different  tone  to  the  trade  of  the 
region.  The  stimulus  of  the  suggestions  of  1660  worked  power- 
fully, and  produced  a  marked  flow  of  trade  to  Bray. 

No  contrast  could  be  more  striking  than  that  presented  by 
Bray  in  1663  and  the  same  town  forty  years  later.  In  1663, 
as  we  have  seen,  trade  was  dead,  confined  to  granaries  and  to 
the  shipment  of  additional  supplies  purchased  in  the  country. 
After  the  change,  the  town  was  the  scene  of  an  active  and  steady 
trade.  "  The  peasants  and  blatiers  have  begun  to  bring  grain 
to  town  daily.  They  expose  it  at  the  Halle  so  that  it  is  a  sort 
of  continuous  market.  .  .  .  The  fertility  of  the  country  around 
Bray  and  the  facilities  for  shipment  to  Paris  attract  such  a 
volume  of  trade  that  the  spacious  Halle  of  the  town  could  not 
contain  the  whole  supply,  if  it  were  all  brought  in  the  same  day. 
The  peasants  and  blatiers  come  from  Champagne,  Burgundy, 
and  other  distant  places.  This  extension  of  the  market  is  not 
authorized  by  any  ordinance.  It  is  a  mere  custom,  but  the 
municipal  officials  and  the  principal  inhabitants  say  that  their 
experience  proves  that  the  practice  is  advantageous.  The 
blatiers  from  a  distance  could  not  arrange  to  arrive  each  time 
on  Friday,  the  regular  market  day,  and  if  they  were  obliged  to 
stay  in  town  until  the  market  day,  it  would  increase  their  expenses 
and  cause  them  to  sell  at  higher  prices.  In  Brie  the  roads  are 

1  H.  1817.  Reg.  du  Bureau,  vciiii.  13  Juillet  1663. 


MARKETS  AND  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  43 

so  rough  and  difficult  that  in  winter  the  country  folk  could  not 
be  sure  of  arriving  on  the  day  prescribed.  Liberty  to  sell  at 
any  time  attracts  them  and  produces  abundance.  Notwith- 
standing this  freedom,  the  Halle  is  always  well  supplied  on 
Friday,  and  the  ordinary  market  day  sees  a  greater  quantity 
on  hand  than  the  other  days  of  the  week.  This  liberty  to  sell 
grain  every  week-day  gives  the  Parisian  merchants  greater 
facilities.  They  can  ship  daily  to  Paris."  * 

This  is  a  real  wholesale  market.  The  supply  flows  into  the 
town  in  anticipation  of'  a  metropolitan  demand,  and  the  antic- 
ipation is  so  keen  that  practically  all  the  available  supply  comes 
to  market  without  any  special  canvassing.  The  purpose  of 
the  market  is  frankly  avowed,  and  no  pretence  is  made  of  con- 
trolling the  trade  from  the  point  of  view  of  local  interests.  The 
local  market  has  been  completely  engulfed  in  a  wholesale  market. 
The  new  practice  was  not  very  firmly  fixed.  There  was  no  legal 
basis  for  the  system,  and  the  habits  were  not  firmly  settled. 
But  the  idea  of  a  wholesale  market  had  taken  visible  form.  The 
conception  was  so  new  that  Delamare  did  not  sympathize  with 
such  a  complete  departure  from  the  ordinary  market  regulations. 
The  practical  efficiency  of  the  idea,  however,  commended  it,  and 
it  was  allowed  to  survive. 

It  was  long  before  the  full  significance  of  this  new  market 
was  impressed  upon  the  administrative  officials.  Even  more 
time  was  required  before  the  new  form  supplemented  completely 
the  older  modes  of  handling  the  wholesale  trade.  But  this  was 
destined  to  be  the  solution  of  all  the  difficulties.  The  wholesale 
organization  was  defective  in  two  respects:  lack  of  real  whole- 
sale price;  invisibility  of  supply.  Both  of  these  defects  would 
be  remedied  by  the  application  of  the  new  principle.  The 
assembling  of  the  wholesale  merchants  and  the  concentration 
of  the  available  supply  obviated  the  most  distressing  feature 
of  the  old  system  in  the  producing  regions.  Metropolitan 
demand  was  no  longer  pressing  upon  a  supply  that  was  assembled 
primarily  with  reference  to  local  conditions.  This  concentration 

1  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  981.  The  order  of  the  paragraphs  has  been  altered  to 
give  the  description  more  continuity. 


44         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

of  trade  had  made  the  supply  visible.  The  purchases  of  grain 
merchants  could  no  longer  be  secret.  The  market  in  the  pro- 
ducing region  was  public,  and  if  each  producing  region  had  a 
•public  wholesale  market  of  this  type,  the  available  metropolitan 
supply  would  be  definitely  known  long  before  it  appeared  at 
Paris.  Then  it  would  no  longer  be  possible  to  play  upon  the 
apprehensions  of  the  Parisians  by  forming  subsidiary  granaries 
or  by  delaying  grain  in  transit.  The  supply  would  be  visible. 
The  price  would  represent  a  serious  attempt  to  meet  the  condi- 
tions of  the  wholesale  trade. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS 

• 
THE  changes  that  took  place  in  the  market  systems  of  Paris 

were  important  and  considerable,  but  the  development  is  not 
obvious  since  the  outward  appearance  of  the  grain  trade  was 
only  slightly  affected.  When  the  trade  appears  in  the  records 
of  the  late  thirteenth  century,  it  is  already  highly  organized  and 
acquainted  with  distant  sources  of  supply.  Some  grain  came 
to  Paris  overland,  much  came  by  water.1  There  were  wholesale 
merchants,  some  residents  of  Paris,  some  from  the  provinces; 
there  were  retail  dealers,  called  blatiers,  and  the  usual  peasants 
and  tithe  owners.  The  market  system  of  Paris  in  1300  was 
quite  as  highly  developed  as  the  system  of  Bordeaux  in  1700. 
But  the  trade  of  Paris  in  1300  was  not  quite  what  a  general 
description  might  lead  us  to  expect:  there  were  merchants 
indeed,  but  doing  a  very  small  business;  supplies  from  a  wide 
area,  but  they  were  very  occasional  and  they  did  not  represent 
any  attempt  to  exploit  the  region  systematically.  The  native 
merchants  leave  no  trace  in  the  records,  but  the  bourgeois  for  ains 
were  required  to  enter  into  partnership  with  some  native  mer- 
chant, whenever  they  wished  to  trade  at  Paris,  and  this  formality 
gave  them  a  place  on  the  registers  of  the  municipality.  Michel 
Dean,  who  had  brought  fourteen  muids  of  grain  to  the  city  in 
1293,  without  forming  any  association  with  a  native  of  Paris, 
was  fined.2  Other  merchants  complied  with  the  regulations 
and  are  duly  recorded.  "  Maci  de  Gigors  brought  ten  muids 
of  grain  from  Noyon,  the  Thursday  after  Saint  Honore.  It  was 
put  in  a  granary.  Geoffroi  of  Dammar  tin  brought  four  muids, 

1  Livre  des  Metiers  d'fitienne  Boileau,  p.  21.      "Si  Mesureur  mesure  aucun 
grain  quelqu'  il  soit,  soil  en  granier,  sail  en  nef  il  aura  de  chascun  muid  IV  deniers." 

*  Le  Roux  de  Lincy,  Eistoire  de  V Hotel  de  Ville.    Sentences  du  Parloir  des 
Bourgeois,  p.  120. 

45 


46  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

which  was  put  in  a  granary.  Symon  Dandin  brought  four 
muids."  l  The  merchants  are  thus  much  less  important  than 
they  became  later,  if  these  figures  are  at  all  representative  of  the 
ordinary  amounts  of  their  purchases.  In  the  seventeenth 
century,  the  larger  merchants  handled  several  hundred  muids, 
and  frequently  had  several  boats  (20-30  muids  each)  on  the  ports 
at  one  time. 

The  Livre  des  Metiers  of  Etienne  Boileau  mentions  the  mer- 
chants, but  without  revealing  any  essential  feature.  The 
resident  and  non-resident  merchants  are  clearly  distinguished. 
The  principal  interest  of  the  Livre  des  Metiers,  however,  is  the 
establishment  of  the  dues  to  be  paid  by  the  various  dealers 
in  grain.  The  wholesale  merchants  seem  to  enjoy  the  privilege 
of  exemption  from  the  obligation  to  employ  the  official  meas- 
urers. This  was  the  most  marked  difference  between  the 
obligations  of  the  merchants  and  the  blatiers.  "  Buyers  and 
purchasers  are  not  required  to  pay  the  two  deniers  per  mine,  if 
they  do  not  have  the  grain  measured.  They  are  not  required 
to  have  the  grain  measured  unless  they  are  blatiers." 2  The 
blatier  was  not  allowed  to  sell  more  than  one  setier  without 
having  it  measured  by  the  sworn  measurer. 

This  blatier  was  evidently  quite  a  different  person  from  the 
small  inter-market  trader  known  by  that  name  later.  The 
Livre  des  Metiers  is  explicit.  "  Whoever  wishes  to  be  a  blatier, 
that  is,  a  buyer  and  seller  of  grain  at  Paris,  may  engage  freely  in 
that  occupation  on  paying  the  tonlieu  and  the  other  dues  that 
are  levied  on  grain.  Whoever  is  a  blatier  at  Paris  may  have  as 
many  journeymen  and  apprentices  as  he  desires.  He  may  have 
a  measure,  sealed  with  the  royal  seal,  and  may  measure  up  to 
a  setier."  3  The  distinction  between  the  blatiers  and  the  tale- 
malers  is  not  very  clear ;  both  were  retail  dealers,  but  the  blatiers 

1  Le  Roux  de  Lincy,  Histoire  de  VHdtel  de  Ville.  Sentences  du  Parloir  des 
Bourgeois,  p.  176. 

8  Livre  des  Metiers  d'fitienne  Boileau,  p.  312.  But  compare  p.  21.  "  Nus 
marchans  de  grain,  c'est  asavoir  vendeur  ou  achateur  de  grain  quelqu'il  soit, 
dedanz  la  Ville  de  Paris  ne  puet  ne  ne  doit  mesurer  chose  qu'il  vende,  plus  haut 
d'un  sextier  a  une  fois."  This  must  refer  to  the  blatier. 

8  Livre  des  Metiers  d'fitienne  Boileau,  p.  20. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS          47 

seem  to  have  dealt  in  grain  only,  while  the  talemalers  might 
deal  in  other  commodities. 

The  inter-market  blatier  does-  not  appear  in  any  of  these  early 
sources.  He  is  probably  confused  with  the  peasants,  possibly 
with  the  blatiers  mentioned  by  Etienne  Boileau.  It  is  hardly 
conceivable  that  there  were  no  middlemen  of  the  type  of  the 
blatier  of  the  seventeenth  century. 

This  supposition  is  strengthened  by  the  indication  of  a  widely 
extended  trade  that  appears  in  the  Sentences  du  Parloir  des 
Bourgeois  in  1304.  It  was  a  year  of  dearth,  and  commissioners 
were  sent  out  to  discover  how  much  grain  was  available  in  the 
producing  regions.  Two  groups  of  agents  were  sent  out:  some, 
with  royal  commissions  to  the  Baillis  of  Sens,  Tours,  Orleans, 
Gizors,  Troyes,  Senlis,  Vermandois,  Vitry,  Chaumont-en- 
Bassigny,  and  Amiens;  others,  with  commissions  from  the 
Provost  of  Paris,  to  the  towns  in  the  vicinity  of  Paris,  Gonesse, 
Saint-Cloud,  Chateaufort,  Claye,  Montgay,  Dammartin,  Poissy, 
and  Marly.1  Two  years  later,  Robert  Ausgans  and  Matthew 
of  Gisors  were  sent  out  to  the  environs  to  stimulate  shipments 
of  gram  to  Paris.  Instead  of  discharging  their  commission 
they  bought  grain  and  shipped  to  Rouen.2  Then,  too,  we  must 
remember  the  shipments  from  Noyon  to  Paris  that  are  noted  in 
another  passage  of  the  Sentences.  The  exact  significance  of 
these  obscure  references  cannot  be  determined,  but  it  is  clear 
that  we  must  not  conceive  this  early  Parisian  trade  to  be  highly 
concentrated  in  a  small  region  close  to  the  city.  The  land  trade 
with  the  immediate  environs  certainly  existed  and  doubtless 
constituted  the  principal  part  of  the  supply.  If  we  may  draw 
inferences  from  the  commissions  of  1304,  the  plains  to  the  north 
and  west  of  Paris  were  at  that  time  a  more  important  source  of 

1  Leroux  de  Lincy,  op.  at.,  Livre  des  Sentences  du  Parloir  des  Bourgeois,  161, 
anno  1304,  Mardi  avant  Pasques. 

It  is  impossible  to  decide  which  Marly  is  intended.  There  is  a  Marly  la  Ville 
not  far  from  Dammartin.  The  other  and  more  famous  Marly  is  between  Versailles 
and  Saint-Germain-en-Laye.  Poissy  is  on  the  Seine  northwest  of  Saint-Germain. 
Chateaufort  is  south  of  Versailles  on  the  upper  border  of  the  Beauce. 

1  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  339.  Les  Olim,  III,  193-194.  1306,  Mercredy  avant 
St.  Andre". 


48  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

supply  than  the  Beauce  and  Brie,  which  became  the  principal 
sources  of  the  overland  trade  in  the  seventeenth  century.  The 
markets  of  Gonesse,  Dammar  tin,  and  Claye  drew  from  the  north 
and  sent  the  "grain  on  to  Paris.  On  the  west  side  of  the  city, 
Poissy  and  Chateaufort  served  as  tributary  markets.  The 
location  of  Chateaufort,  on  the  northern  edge  of  the  Beauce, 
suggests  that  trade  was  soon  likely  to  push  farther  into  that  fertile 
region.  But  none  of  the  later  markets  of  the  Beauce  or  of  Brie 
are  mentioned.  Besides  this  land  trade,  there  was  a  river  trade 
that  reached  well  up  the  Oise,  the  Seine,  and  the  Marne.  Prob- 
ably this  river  trade  was  very  irregular,  carried  on  by  merchants 
to  whom  a  shipment  of  grain  was  incidental  to  other  commercial 
ventures  which  occupied  most  of  their  attention.  The  general 
trading  relations  between  Paris  and  the  towns  of  the  Upper 
Seine  Basin  were  intimate.  The  fairs  of  Champagne  carried 
many  traders  to  Provins,  Bray,  and  Troyes.  The  textiles  of 
Chalons  and  Rheims  attracted  merchants  from  Paris.  Ship- 
ments of  grain  were  an  occasional  source  of  profit.  This  early 
acquaintance  with  the  possible  sources  of  supply,  however,  is  a 
noteworthy  feature  of  the  Parisian  trade. 

The  fourteenth  century  leaves  almost  no  record  of  the  grain 
trade.  The  lacuna  is  in  part  due  to  lack  of  material,  but  there 
is  good  reason  to  suppose  that  little  notable  change  occurred. 
The  marked  institutional  advance  of  the  later  thirteenth  century 
was  a  crisis,  which  was  followed  in  the  grain  trade,  as  in  other 
matters,  by  a  period  of  relative  stagnation. 

I 
Delimitation  of  the  Supply  Area 

The  late  thirteenth  and  the  fourteenth  centuries  are  notable 
for  the  evident  acquaintance  with  a  wide  supply  area;  the 
fifteenth  century  affords  the  first  definite  indication  of  a  serious 
effort  to  utilize  more  completely  the  great  resources  that  lay  so 
close  to  the  city.  The  Parisian  merchants  extended  their 
operations  in  the  Upper  Beauce,  and  most  especially  in  the  Seine 
Valley  between  Mantes  and  Rouen.  Some  of  this  grain  was 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS          49 

brought  to  Paris  overland  but  the  larger  part  came  by  water. 
The  development  of  the  Upper  Basin,  curiously  enough,  was 
primarily  the  work  of  merchants  of  Rouen,  while  the  Parisians 
developed  what  would  seem  to  be  properly  a  source  of  supply 
for  Rouen.  Here  we  find  a  confusion  of  commercial  relations 
that  is  thoroughly  typical  of  medieval  trade.  But  such  crudity 
of  organization  could  not  continue  permanently.  Paris  and 
Rouen  had  distinct  market  systems,  and  it  was  practically  neces- 
sary to  bring  about  some  close  connection  between  the  market 
systems  and  the  territorial  areas  from  which  the  markets  were 
to  be  supplied.  Each  market  would  work  most  efficiently  if  it 
had  the  assurance  that  its  supplies  would  not  be  taken  by  mer- 
chants from  other  towns.  In  the  latter  part  of  our  period  the 
acceptance  of  this  policy  is  evident.  Each  market  town  had  a 
fairly  well  denned  sphere  of  influence,  and  any  encroachment 
upon  the  supplies  of  this  area  was  keenly  resented.  The  develop- 
ment of  this  aspect  of  the  Parisian  and  Rouenese  markets  is  the 
principal  episode  in  the  history  of  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth 
centuries. 

When  all  the  possible  sources  of  supply  are  considered,  it  is 
singular  that  the  extension  of  the  Parisian  trade  should  first 
proceed  westward  to  Rouen.  Probably  there  was  then  an 
exportable  surplus  in  Normandy  that  was  not  needed  by  Rouen 
herself  until  later.  Doubtless  the  intimacy  of  general  trading 
relations  tended  to  draw  the  grain  trade  in  that  direction. 
Whatever  the  reason,  the  first  considerable  movement  does  take 
that  direction;  the  trade  pushes  down  the  river  from  Poissy 
to  Mantes,  from  Mantes  to  Andelys,  from  Andelys  to  Elboeuf, 
and  even  to  Rouen  itself.  The  merchants  also  work  into  the 
back  country. 

These  movements  are  somewhat  obscure  and  the  paucity  of 
information  renders  great  caution  necessary  in  drawing  inferences ; 
it  is  above  all  essential  to  avoid  minute  conclusions  in  regard  to 
dates.  There  is  a  lacuna  of  more  than  thirty  years  (1411-47) 
in  the  registers  of  Rouen  from  which  much  of  the  evidence  is 
drawn,  and  the  records  of  the  Compagnies  Francises  for  the 
succeeding  generation  show  that  many  aspects  of  the  trade  are 


SO  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

very  inadequately  indicated  by  the  municipal  registers.  The 
dates  of  the  available  evidence  are  probably  of  no  significance; 
the  movements  indicated  are  general  for  at  least  the  first  half 
of  the  fifteenth  century.  At  the  beginning  of  the  century  Rouen 
was  deriving  her  supplies  from  the  Vexin  and  the  "  pays  de 
Neubourg"  which  were  the  most  important  sources  of  supply 
in  the  seventeenth  century.1  The  markets  of  Andelys,  Gisors, 
Elboeuf,  and  Neubourg  are  not  definitely  mentioned,  but  the 
relation  of  the  markets  to  each  other  was  probably  approxi- 
mately the  same  as  it  was  later. 

The  appearance  of  Parisian  merchants  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  Rouen  naturally  caused  some  apprehension,  but  in 
this  period  it  spent  itself  in  deliberation  and  discussion.  In 
1457,  we  find  the  Echevins  considering  "  the  great  export  of 
grain  that  is  taking  place  daily,  from  Andelys,  from  the  farms  of 
the  Vexin,  from  Elboeuf,  from  the  vicinity  of  Neubourg,  from 
Rouen  itself,  and  from  other  parts  of  the  duchy.  This  grain 
is  carried  up  the  Seine  to  '  France ' 2  or  down  to  the  sea."  3 
Some  Parisian  merchants  were  frequently  engaged  in  such 
ventures.  In  1430,  a  group  of  merchants  had  been  operating 
more  or  less  independently  beyond  Rouen,  in  the  parts  of  Nor- 
mandy that  were  not  at  that  time  very  closely  bound  to  the 
.  Rouenese  market.  "  The  Cotentin,  Bessin,  Pays  de  Caux, 
and  other  places  "  furnished  a  very  considerable  field  for  opera- 
tions.4 The  ports  from  which  the  grain  was  shipped  are  not 
indicated,  and  it  is  quite  possible  that  the  frequent  shipments 
from  Rouen  and  Elboeuf  were  purchased  in  this  back  country 
to  the  west  of  Rouen.  The  registers  of  the  Compagnies  Fran- 
Daises  give  nothing  beyond  categorical  statements  of  quantity, 
place,  and  price.5  The  proposition  to  execute  prohibitions  at 

1  Arch.  Som.  de  Rouen,  Reg.  Consulates,  p.  28.     8  Jan.  1406-07. 

2  "  France  "  is  applied  to  the  district  along  the  Maine  from  its  confluence 
with  the  Seine  to  the  border  of  Champagne. 

8  Arch.  Som.  de  Rouen,  Reg.  Consulaires,  p.  60.  27  Dec.  1457.  They  conclude 
that  prohibitions  would  be  expedient. 

4  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  345. 

6  Bib.  Nat.,  Col.  Moreau,  1062,  ff.  28v,  21  Fev.  1455;  45>  24  Mars  1457;  47, 
29  Mai  1458;  47,  5  Juillet  1458;  4?v,  9  Juillet  1458;  4?v,  n  Juillet  1458;  48, 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS  51 

Bouille,  Caumont,  La  Poterie,  Quilleboeuf,  and  Pont-Audemer 
would  confirm  the  inference  that  exports  by  Parisian  merchants, 
at  this  time,  were  from  the  plains  west  of  Rouen.1  But  the 
merchants  might  at  any  time  invade  the  regions  on  the  east 
which  generally  supplied  Rouen,  and  complaints  in  1460  would 
indicate  that  extensive  purchases  were  made  there.  "  Ever 
since  August  there  have  been  heavy  shipments  from  the  Vexin, 
and  from  the  environs  of  Neubourg.  Wheat  and  other  kinds 
of  grain  have  been  purchased  and  sent  up  the  Seine. "  The 
merchants  were  said  to  have  "  purchased  much  in  the  farms  and 
in  the  villages,"  2  and  if  the  rumours  were  true  there  would  be 
added  reason  for  supposing  that  the  purchases  in  the  back  coun- 
try were  shipped  from  Rouen  and  Elboeuf . 

But  the  movement  was  not  all  in  one  direction.  Almost 
contemporaneously  with  the  trade  from  Normandy  to  Paris 
there  was  an  equally  extensive  trade  from  the  Oise  Valley  to 
Rouen.  Less  frequently  there  were  shipments  from  the  Seine 
or  Marne  Valleys  to  Rouen.  There  are  few  instances  in  which 
the  movements  take  place  in  both  directions  in  the  same  year, 
but  some  cases  of  this  do  appear  even  in  the  scanty  material 
available.  The  year  1459  was  rnost  notable  for  the  shipment 
of  grain  from  the  vicinity  of  Rouen  to  Paris,  but  Jean  de  Bilain, 
a  merchant  of  Rouen,  enters  into  Compagnie  Franqaise,  23  June 
1459,  m  order  to  ship  thirty  muids  of  grain  to  Rouen  from  some 
place  in  the  commercial  jurisdiction  of  Paris.3  In  the  following 
year  there  is  a  similar  instance  of  cross-trade.4  Throughout 
the  fall  of  1460  there  were  shipments  from  Rouen,  Elboeuf,  and 
Neubourg  to  Paris.  In  the  spring,  the  trade  turned ;  merchants 
of  Caen,  Elboeuf,  and  Rouen  bought  in  the  Oise  Valley,  shipping 

17  Aout  1458;  49,  2  Sept.  1458;  63,  21  Juin  1459;  66v>  24  Nov.  1459;  72,  7  Fev. 
1459;  72,  5  Dec.  1459;  7&v,  18  Juin  1460;  98v,  21  Dec.  1461;  all  these  cases,  Rouen 
or  Elboeuf  to  Paris,  f.  29,  i  Mars  1455,  Saint-Clere  to  Paris. 

1  Arch.  Som.  de  Rouen,  Reg.  Consulates,  p.  60.     15  Jan.  1457-58. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  61.     16  Dec.  1460.     The  reference  to  "country  buying"  at  this 
date  shows  the  impossibility  of  making  any  rigid  classifications.     Even  if  the 
practice  were  relatively  common,  it  does  not  have  the  significance  that  it  acquires 
later. 

*  Bib.  Nat.,  Col.  Moreau,  1062.     f.  63,  23  Juin  1459. 
4  Ibid.    f.  78,  5  Juin  1460. 


52          THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

to  Rouen  and  Elboeuf.  Possibly  supplies  in  the  vicinity  of 
Rouen  were  exhausted  and  all  the  wholesale  merchants  were 
obliged  to  transfer  their  activity  to  a  new  source  of  supply. 
Additional  color  is  lent  to  this  explanation  by  the  shipments 
from  the  Oise  Valley  to  Paris  in  the  spring  of  1462.  In  short, 
everything  points  to  the  conclusion  that  Paris  and  Rouen  drew 
supplies  from  Normandy  up  to  the  last  of  December,  1461,  or 
even  through  January  and  February,  and  then  perforce  turned 
to  Noyon  and  Compiegne  till  the  following  harvest.1  There  is 
doubtless  some  truth  in  such  an  interpretation  but  the  Rouenese 
trade  from  the  Oise  Valley  is  so  considerable  that  it  is  probably 
an  export  trade.  The  quantities  mentioned  in  the  registers 
are:  "  60  muids,  260  muids,  155  muids,  136  muids,  mesure  de 
Compiegne "  ;  "  68  muids,  87  muids,  31  muids,  18  muids, 
mesure  de  Rouen;  205  muids,  mesure  de  Crepy.  100  muids, 
mesure  de  Paris.'7  The  measures  differ  considerably,  those  of 
Compiegne  and  Crepy  are  only  a  fourth  or  a  fifth  of  the  Parisian 
or  Rouenese  measure.  But  even  with  all  allowance  for  this 
factor,  the  trade  is  much  more  considerable  than  the  trade  from 
Rouen,  which  generally  consisted  of  consignments  of  less  than 
ten  muids.  Furthermore,  the  registers  of  Compagnies  Franqaises 
give  us  only  a  part  of  the  whole  commercial  movement,  as  the 
trade  by  resident  Parisian  merchants  does  not  appear.  For  this 
reason  it  is  not  safe  to  conclude  that  the  turn  of  the  trade  took 
place  in  February  and  March,  1462  as  the  records  of  trade  of 
non-resident  merchants  seem  to  indicate.  Even  if  the  exact 
character  of  the  episode  could  be  established,  the  successive 
exploitation  of  Normandy  and  Santerre  is  not  the  significant 
feature.  It  gives  an  impression  that  can  easily  be  misinter- 
preted in  the  light  of  modern  commercial  practice.  It  looks 
too  much  like  the  well-directed  buying  that  characterizes  the 
modern  metropolitan  market.  In  reality  the  whole  incident 
is  strikingly  medieval.  Paris  and  Rouen  are  distinct  markets, 
each  supplied  by  different  groups  of  merchants.  Their  opera- 
tions are  relatively  short-sighted.  The  Parisian  merchants 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Col.  Moreau,  1062.    ff.  102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 15  Mars  1461-2 
Aotit  1462. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS          S3 

buy  in  the  vicinity  of  Rouen  where  they  come  into  competition 
indirectly  with  the  merchants  of  Rouen.  As  much  of  the  trading 
is  done  in  granaries  and  farms,  this  competition  amounts  to 
little.  But  the  supply  available  for  export  is  not  as  considerable 
as  the  supply  in  the  Oise  Valley ;  the  latter  is  somewhat  more 
difficult  to  reach  and  consequently  is  not  touched  except  in  last 
resort.  The  merchants  of  Rouen  perceived  the  activity  of  the 
Parisians,  and  bought  in  distant  places  for  the  supply  of  the  town 
or  for  export;  but  there  was  no  determined  effort  to  drive  the 
Parisians  out  of  the  neighborhood  in  order  to  preserve  the  supply 
for  the  town  and  its  export  trade.  Two  entirely  distinct  trades 
cross  each  other,  leading  to  much  unnecessary  transportation 
and  to  a  confusion  of  trading  relations  that  is  hardly  compre- 
hensible. There  are  indications  in  1458  and  1460  that  the 
Echevins  of  Rouen  were  beginning  to  feel  strongly  on  the  ques- 
tion. They  resented  the  intrusion  of  the  Parisians  and  endeavored 
to  prevent  export  from  the  duchy.  The  activity  of  the  mer- 
chants, however,  shows  that  the  idea  was  not  carried  out.  Great 
latitude  in  all  these  matters  apparently  prevailed  throughout  the 
fifteenth  century.1 

In  the  early  sixteenth  century  the  effort  to  secure  a  sharp 
limitation  of  areas  becomes  insistent  and  finally  triumphs.  The 
Parisians  cease  to  buy  in  Normandy  except  with  permission; 
the  Rouenese  no  longer  buy  in  the  Oise  Valley  unless  they  have 
been  granted  special  licenses. 

An  important  factor  in  the  new  development  of  policy  and 
organization  was  the  necessity  for  a  wider  area  to  supply  Rouen. 
In  the  fourteenth  century,  the  Vexin  and  Pays  de  Neubourg  had 
sufficed.  In  1520,  the  agents  of  the  town  work  up  into  the 
Beauce  to  Nogent-le-Roy  and  Chartres.2  The  efforts  of  the 
municipality  to  secure  grain  are  in  themselves  significant.  This 
edge  of  the  Beauce  gradually  came  to  be  considered  a  regular 
source  of  additional  supply.3  In  1528,  the  Echevins  speak  of  the 

1  This  is  inference.  There  is  a  serious  lacuna  in  the  Registers  of  Rouen  from 
1472-90. 

*  Deux  Chroniques  de  Rouen,  pp.  124-125.     1521-22. 

*  Arch.  Som.  de  Rouen,  Reg.  Consulates,  pp.  124-125.     18  Avril  1522. 


54          THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

Beauce  as  the  region  which  has  "  always  been  our  principal 
resource  in  time  of  necessity."  1 

The  pressure  was  in  part  due  to  the  growth  of  the  city,  but  it 
was  primarily  caused  by  the  closing  of  the  Valley  of  the  Oise  to 
Rouen.  There  is  a  striking  contrast  between  the  brisk  trade  on 
the  Oise  in  1462,  and  the  humble  petition  of  the  Echevins  in 
1528,  craving  permision  to  buy  grain  along  the  Oise.  "  We 
believe  that  you  are  informed  of  the  great  distress  which  we  have 
suffered  twice  in  the  last  seven  years  from  dearth  of  grain, 
and  inasmuch  as  we  apprehend  similar  trouble  in  this  current 
year  we  have  commissioned  Gilles  des  Froisses,  a  merchant  of 
this  town,  to  go  to  Santerre,  where  we  have  been  advised  of  the 
existence  of  considerable  quantities  of  grain.  He  was  instructed 
to  buy  one  or  two  hundred  muids.  He  has  made  his  purchases 
and  engaged  to  place  the  grain  on  sale  at  Rouen.  .  .  .  Dear 
brothers  and  friends,  you  know  that  we  have  always  freely 
permitted  the  passage  of  all  the  goods  that  you  have  found 
necessary,  raising  no  obstacles.  So  we  beg  you  to  assist  us  in 
this  affair  of  ours,  and  to  permit  that  the  grain  be  transported 
incontinent  to  Rouen."  2  Such  complete  acknowledgment  of 
the  power  of  Paris  is  an  interesting  commentary  on  the  change 
that  had  taken  place  since  1462.  The  Oise  had  been  closed  to 
the  merchants  of  Rouen,  except  under  special  permission.  For 
foreign  export  and  for  maintenance  Rouen  was  ordinarily  depen- 
dent on  Norman  grain.  As  in  this  case,  the  permission  was 
generally  granted  but  under  strict  limitations  and  subject  to 
much  formality.  "  Gilles  des  Froyses,"  declare  the  Echevins 
of  Paris,  "  is  given  leave  to  export  100  muids  of  grain  to  Rouen, 
upon  furnishing  security  not  to  export  in  excess  of  that  quantity. 
On  condition  also  that  he  will  within  six  weeks  certify  that  the 
grain  has  been  sold  and  distributed  at  the  markets  of  Rouen." 3 
Besides  this  consignment  secured  directly  by  the  intervention 
of  the  Echevins  of  Rouen,  merchants  of  Paris  made  some  ship- 
ments to  Rouen  on  their  own  initiative.  But  they  were  required 

1  Reg.  du  Bureau,  II,  16.     20  Mars  1528. 

2  Ibid.,  II,  16.     20  Mars  1528. 

3  Ibid.,  II,  16-17.    24  Mars  1528. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS  55 

by  the  Provost  of  Paris  to  obtain  special  permits  from  him. 
Even  this  degree  of  intercourse  seemed  dangerous  to  the  Provost 
of  Merchants,  who  represented  the  authority  of  the  municipality, 
and  partly  to  protect  the  supplies  of  the  city,  partly  to  assert 
his  power  over  the  royal  official,  a  very  vigorous  protest  was 
entered  against  the  assumption  of  this  jurisdiction  by  the  Pro- 
vost. The  case  was  laid  before  the  Council  and  decision  ren- 
dered in  favor  of  the  Provost  of  the  Merchants.1  The  policy 
of  Paris  was  thus  clearly  asserted.  The  Seine  Basin  outside 
of  Normandy  was  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Provost  of 
Merchants  of  Paris.  No  towns  in  other  parts  of  France  could 
make  purchases  in  this  region  without  first  securing  permission.2 
Permits  would  be  issued  under  certain  conditions,  but  such 
exports  were  closely  watched.  Thus,  in  April,  1536,  permission 
to  export  was  cancelled  on  account  of  "  the  great  shipments 
of  grain  by  the  river  Seme  to  Rouen,  and  because  the  merchants 
of  Normandy  make  great  exports  from  divers  places,  which  they 
have  amassed  at  Rouen  and  other  places  in  Normandy,  so  that 
grain  is  cheaper  at  Rouen  than  at  Paris."  3  The  movement 
of  grain  from  the  Parisian  sphere  of  influence  was  thus  forcibly 
stopped  in  the  first  half  of  the  century. 

The  trade  from  Rouen  to  Paris  leaves  little  trace.  There 
seems  to  be  little  effort  at  Rouen  to  stop  such  movements  of 
grain,  but  despite  this  apparent  indifference  there  is  nothing 
to  suggest  the  continuance  of  the  extensive  operations  of  Parisian 
merchants  in  Normandy.  What  the  Normands  gave  up  un- 
willingly and  under  pressure,  the  Parisians  abandoned  volun- 
tarily. The  development  of  the  Upper  Seine,  of  the  Marne, 
of  the  Oise,  of  parts  of  the  Beauce,  all  probably  took  place 
in  this  century,  though  the  evidence  is  not  very  definite.  The 
full  possibilities  of  the  Upper  Seine  Basin  seem  to  have  been 
realized  for  the  first  time.  The  perception  of  the  value  and 
richness  of  these  sources  of  supply  rendered  the  city  jealous  of 

1  Reg.  du  Bureau,  II,  28.     26  Juin  1528. 
1  At  times,  Lyons  seeks  grain  in  the  Beauce. 

8  Reg.  du  Bureau,  II,  218.  27  Avril  1536.  See  also  ibid.,  II,  225.  30  Juin 
1536. 


5  6  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

any  encroachment  from  outside,  and  the  great  resources  of  the 
area  made  the  city  quite  independent.  The  renunciation  of 
the  exploitation  of  Normandy  cost  little,  when  greater  abun- 
dance was  to  be  had  nearer  Paris  in  the  upper  waters  of  the 
Seine,  even  more  advantageously  situated  for  water  transport. 

The  abandonment  of  trade  with  Rouen  was  not  absolute.  The 
dearth  of  1563,  more  severe  in  the  Seine  Basin  than  in  Nor- 
mandy, sent  Parisian  merchants  down  stream  to  make  purchases 
for  the  town.1  In  1596,  also,  purchases  were  made  at  Rouen 
in  behalf  of  the  Echevins  of  Paris.2 

The  extension  of  Parisian  influence,  which  took  the  form  of 
excluding  the  competition  of  other  towns  from  the  Upper  Seine 
Basin,  assumes  in  the  seventeenth  century  an  entirely  different 
character.  After  a  moderate  degree  of  consolidation  of  trade 
within  the  sixteenth  century  area,  the  capital  town  begins  to 
reach  out  still  farther.  There  is  a  real  attack  upon  the-  supply 
areas  of  other  towns.  The  old  Norman  trade  is  revived ;  Pari- 
sian merchants  again  invade  the  vicinity  of  Rouen,  as  in  the 
fifteenth  century,  but  in  a  very  different  manner.  Aspects  of 
modern  metropolitanism  appear.  Then,  too,  the  trading  system 
of  the  Loire  Valley  is  invaded.  A  supply  area  in  Touraine  that 
had  been  developed  by  Nantes  for  export  trade  is  entered  by 
Parisian  merchants  who  carry  off  a  continually  increasing  portion 
of  the  supply.  From  Saumur,  the  ubiquitous  merchants  pass 
on  to  Nantes ;  from  Nantes,  they  are  led  on  to  the  other  source 
of  her  export  trade  —  Brittany.  The  larger  history  of  the  export 
trade  in  the  seventeenth  century  is  thus  concerned  with  a  remark- 
able extension  of  Parisian  influence.  The  Rouenese  market 
area  is  invaded;  the  Loire  Valley  is  tapped;  the  Breton  granaries 
pour  their  supplies  into  the  boats  of  Parisian  merchants.  It  is 
all  a  great  movement  towards  a  centralization  of  the  northern 
grain  trade  in  Paris,  a  revelation  of  the  growing  tendency  of 
Paris  to  dominate  the  commercial  life  of  northern  France. 

The  new  phase  of  the  relation  between  Rouen  and  Paris 
appears  as  early  as  1626.  The  municipality  of  Rouen  issued 

1  Reg.  du  Bureau,  V,  221.     10  Mai  1563. 

2  Ibid.,  XI,.  221.     21-22  Fev.  1596. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS  57 

prohibitions  against  exports  from  its  jurisdiction  by  Parisian 
merchants.1  In  1629  and  1630,  the  Parlement  of  Normandy 
undertook  the  defence  of  the  Rouenese  area  Against  the  en- 
croachments of  Paris.  The  apprehensions  of  the  authorities 
were  amply  justified  by  the  facts.  In  1643  the  Parisians  had 
organized  the  trade  in  Normandy.  We  find  one  Pierre  Pinon 
of  Paris,  in  partnership  with  Jean  Renault  of  Elboeuf,  engaged 
in  trade  from  Rouen  to  Paris.  Pierre  Pinon  describes  the 
condition  of  their  trade  to  the  officials  at  Paris:  "  They  have  a 
boat  on  the  Port  de  1'Ecole  charged  with  100  muids  of  grain, 
none  of  which  has  yet  been  sold.  Besides  this  they  have  300 
muids  of  grain  in  their  possession,  in  the  Beauce,  at  Pont-de- 
1'Arche,  Elboeuf,  and  at  Rouen:  —  all  destined  for  Paris.  But 
it  must  pass  Pont-de-1'Arche,  Andelys,  and  Vernon,  which  are 
all  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Parlement  of  Rouen^  The 
Parlement,  however,  has  prohibited  the  export  of  grain  from  the 
province.  These  arrets  must  be  annulled  by  the  Council,  and 
the  officers  of  Pont-de-1'Arche,  Andelys,  and  Vernon  must  be 
summoned  to  give  account  of  their  conduct.  A  distinction  is 
drawn  between  the  upper  and  lower  Beauce.  All  the  grain  of 
the  Upper  Beauce  is  sent  to  Paris  from  Etampes  where  no  diffi- 
culties are  placed  in  the  way  of  the  merchants.  But  the  grain  of 
the  Lower  Beauce  is  brought  ordinarily  to  Nogent-le-Roy, 
where  the  merchants  of  Paris  and  of  Normandy  go  to  buy.  Pur- 
chases for  Rouen  in  the  Lower  Beauce  should  be  stopped  in 
retaliation  against  the  prohibitions  made  by  the  Parlement  of 
Rouen  against  exports  from  the  province.  The  prohibitions  in 
Normandy  ought  not  to  apply  to  grain  purchased  by  merchants 
of  Paris  within  the  jurisdiction  of  Paris  and  passed  through  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Parlement  of  Rouen  merely  for  the  con- 
venience in  shipping.  The  30x5  muids,  which  the  said  Pinon 
and  Regnault  have  declared,  can  reach  Paris  only  by  way  of 
Pont-de-1'Arche,  Andely,  and  Vernon." 2  Pierre  de  Vaux, 

1  H.  1802.     Reg.  du  Bureau,  viii^tii.     25  Avril  1626. 

2  H.  1806.     Reg.  du  Bureau,  iiicxl.     Enquete  par  les  Prevost  des  Marchands 
et  fichevins,  28  Mars  1643.     There  is  a  copy  of  this  at  the  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  16741. 
f.  9.     The  name  of  the  merchant  is  there  given  "  Pierre  Simon." 


58          THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

another  merchant,  declares  that  he  has  a  boat-load  of  25  muids  of 
grain  at  Elboeuf ,  about  80  muids  arrested  at  Oudan  below  Pont- 
de-1'Arche,  and  about  200  muids  at  Chartres,  Nogent-le-Roy, 
Elboeuf,  and  Rouen.1  The  encroachment  is  thus  obscured  in  some 
degree  by  the  legal  dispute  over  jurisdiction.  There  is  a  tacit 
admission  of  the  legal  independence  of  each  area,  but  the  Parisian 
merchants  propose  nevertheless  to  restrict  the  sphere  of  influence 
of  Rouen.  The  right  to  carry  grain  through  the  Rouenese  area 
would  have  opened  endless  opportunities  for  the  shipment  of  grain 
purchased  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Parlement  of  Rouen. 

In  1649,  the  municipality  of  Paris  was  again  seeking  to  annul 
the  prohibitions  in  Normandy,2  and  without  great  success.  But 
despite  the  opposition  of  the  Parlement  of  Rouen,  the  trade  to 
Paris  continued  from  this  period  to  1693,  when  the  aggressive- 
ness of  the  Parisian  merchants  became  more  marked.  The 
apparent  lacuna  in  the  evidence  is  bridged  by  the  history  of 
Jean  Roger,  in  1694  one  of  the  wealthiest  grain  merchants  of 
Paris.  His  father  was  a  merchant  of  Rouen  engaged  inci- 
dentally, if  not  principally,  in  the  grain  trade  with  Paris.  Jean 
began  his  career  as  a  clerk  under  his  father.  In  1650,  Jean 
moved  to  Paris  and  acted  as  Parisian  agent  for  the  house  until 
1656,  when  he  set  up  in  business  for  himself.  His  father  con- 
tinued his  business,  and  a  few  years  later,  when  his  son  lost 
heavily  on  certain  ventures,  the  elder  Roger  took  him  into 
partnership  again  on  some  consignments  from  Normandy. 
Between  1662  and  1693,  Jean  changed  the  basis  of  his  operations 
to  Soissons.3  Jean  Regnault  and  the  widow  of  Pierre  Simon, 
of  whom  we  first  hear  in  1643,  are  engaged  in  the  Rouenese 
grain  trade  as  late  as  1661,  though  the  partnership  has  apparently 
been  dissolved.4  The  Parisian  encroachment  thus  persists 
without  intermission. 

1  H.  1806.     Reg.  du  Bureau,  iiiexl.     Enquete  par  les  Prevost  des  Marchands 
et  fichevins,  28  Mars  1843.     There  is  a  copy  of  this  at  the  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  16741. 
f.  9.     The  name  of  the  merchant  is  there  given  "  Pierre  Simon." 

2  H.  1809.     Reg.  du  Bureau,  iiicxlv.     13  Oct.  1649. 

3  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21642.  368.  Factum  pour  Jean  Roger.  Paris,  Juillet-Aout,  1693. 

4  H.  1816.     Reg.  du  Bureau,  cli.     10  Juin  1661. 
Ibid.,  cxxviii.  7  Mai  1661. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS  59 

Towards  the  close  of  the  century  the  movement  becomes 
more  aggressive.  It  is  no  longer  an  attempt  to  carry  grain 
from  the  edges  of  the  Rouen  market  area,  but  a  deliberate 
invasion  of  the  whole  region  from  which  Rouen  drew  supplies. 
Beuvron  writes  from  La  Mailleraye,  3  January  1694:  "A 
great  quantity  of  oats  has  been  shipped  to  Paris  from  Caudebec, 
and  from  the  country  round  about  within  a  radius  of  seven  or 
eight  leagues.  Oats  have  become  dear  and  very  scarce,  so  that 
many  have  been  impelled  to  form  partnerships  to  engage  in 
trade.  .  .  .  They  are  constantly  shipping  and  buying.  They 
take  up  all  that  is  to  be  had  of  the  peasants,  forming  granaries 
at  Caudebec  and  other  places,  so  that  very  little  is  available 
for  the  markets.  In  a  short  time  there  will  be  absolute  dearth 
in  this  section." l  Three  months  later  Montholon  writes: 
"  Elboeuf,  which  ordinarily  furnished  the  market  at  Rouen 
with  60-80  muids  of  grain  per  week,  brings  now  only  14  or  15 
muids.  The  day  before  yesterday  only  4  muids  came  from 
Elboeuf.  The  blatiers  carry  everything  off  to  Magny  and  thence 
to  Paris.  They  buy  even  on  the  market  to  Rouen."2  In  July, 
the  Parisian  merchants  were  still  active.  "  The  market  of 
Elboeuf  furnishes  nothing,  all  its  supplies  go  to  Paris.  Caudebec 
has  been  supplied  from  Caen  and  has  sent  considerable  quantities 
to  Rouen."  3  The  local  authorities  made  some  futile  attempts 
to  oppose  this  encroachment  of  Parisian  merchants,  but  neither 
the  Parlement  nor  the  Echevins  of  Rouen  dared  take  the  drastic 
measures  that  would  have  been  effective.  In  1698  and  1699 
the  same  problem  confronted  Rouen.4  "  There  is  always  a 
swarm  of  blatiers  in  the  markets  of  Elboeuf,  Du  Clere,  Caudebec, 
and  Andelys,  buying  up  the  grain  that  should  come  to  Rouen,  so 
that  little  comes  to  town.  The  grain  of  Neubourg  and  of  that 
whole  section  is  carried  off  without  even  passing  through  the 
market  at  Elboeuf."  5  Then,  in  the  following  year  we  find 

1  G7.  1635.    La  Mailleraye,  3  Jan.  1694.     Beuvron. 

2  G7.  1635.    Rouen,  6  Mars  1694.    Montholon. 

3  G7.  1635.    Rouen,  i  Juillet  1694. 

4  G7.  495.     1697,  Placet  envoy6  par  Jean  Patty  et  Jean  Mulheau. 

*  G7.  496.  Rouen,  5  Dec.  1698.  Also  letters  of  16  and  22  Nov.  1698;  15 
and  19  Dec.  1698. 


60         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

similar  reports.  "  Several  millers,  peasant  proprietors,  and 
farmers  of  the  elections  of  Mantes,  Chaumont,  and  Pontoise, 
especially  in  those  parts  of  the  elections  which  are  in  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Parlement  of  Normandy,  buy  grain  on  the  local 
markets,  convert  it  into  flour,  and  ship  to  Paris."  1  "At  Magny, 
Gisors,  Vernon,  and  other  places  the  merchants  who  declared 
their  intention  of  selling  at  Paris,  Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 
Mantes,  and  other  places  bring  back  no  certificates  of  sale. 
They  assert  that  the  local  officials  refuse  to  issue  the  certifi- 
cates." 2 

During  the  great  dearth  of  1709  every  aspect  of  this  invasion 
of  the  supply  area  of  Rouen  appears  in  clearer  outline.  In  a 
letter  of  April  10,  1709,  the  Intendant  says:  "  I  fear  that  the 
blatiers  who  are  shipping  to  Paris  will  cause  a  rise  in  prices.  They 
have  already  invaded  the  market  of  Du  Clere,  three  leagues 
northwest  of  Rouen,  buying  at  any  price  that  is  asked  without 
stopping  to  haggle."  3  Two  days  later  he  writes:  "  they  have 
reached  Louviers  and  Neubourg  on  the  south  side  of  Rouen. 
I  am  afraid  they  will  go  next  to  Bourgachard,  and  in  that  way 
drain  all  the  local  markets.  It  would  bring  Rouen  to  the  verge 
of  famine."  4  A  fortnight  later  his  fears  were  realized.  "  The 
blatiers  have  surrounded  us.  They  have  invaded  the  markets 
of  Routot,  Bourgachard,  and  Caudebec,  where  they  are  buying 
at  any  price  that  is  asked."  8 

The  careful  delimitation  of  supply  areas  so  gradually  worked 
out  in  the  course  of  the  sixteenth  century  was  thus  completely 
broken  down.  The  metropolitan  importance  of  Paris  was 
asserted.  The  idea  that  a  supply  should  be  reserved  for  a 
particular  city  was  abandoned.  The  grain  trade  acquired  a 
ubiquitous  character  that  is  distinctly  modern:  the  supply  of 
Paris,  like  that  of  the  modern  metropolitan  market,  was  re- 
cruited freely  wherever  a  merchant  from  Paris  could  find  grain. 

G7.    430.     26  Aout  1699. 
G7.    496.    Rouen,  i  Dec.  1699. 
G7.     1650.    Rouen,  10  Avril  1709. 
G7.     1650.    Rouen,  12  Avril  1709.     Courson  au  C.  G. 
G7.    1650.    Rouen,  28  Avril  1709.     See  also  letters  of  29  Avril,   15  Jinn, 
7  Juin,  14  Sept.  1709,  all  in  the  same  carton. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS          6 1 

But  while  the  Parisian  market  was  metropolitan  in  its  far- 
reaching  canvass  for  supplies,  it  was  itself  distinctly  medieval 
in  regard  to  distribution  of  supply.  It  was  a  consumptive 
rather  than  a  distributive  market.  Supplies  were  poured  in 
from  every  quarter  of  northern  France ;  nothing  was  sent  out. 

The  same  general  features  were  disclosed  in  the  extension  of 
Parisian  trade  in  the  Loire  Valley.  In  this  way,  Paris  acquired 
control  of  the  only  important  source  of  supply  in  northern 
France  not  previously  tributary  to  the  growing  capital.  The 
date  of  this  movement  is  obscure.  Indications  of  Parisian 
trade  in  the  Loire  Valley  do  not  appear  in  the  Parisian  sources 
before  1650,  but  it  is  quite  possible  that  local  material  would 
carry  the  date  back  to  a  more  remote  period.  The  approxi- 
mate coincidence  with  the  encroachment  upon  the  Rouenese 
area,  however,  might  suggest  that  the  Loire  Valley  trade  with 
Paris  really  began  in  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century. 

Previous  to  this  connection  with  Paris,  the  trade  of  the  Loire 
Valley  was  dominated  by  Nantes  and  by  Lyons.  The  supplies 
available  in  Touraine,  coming  to  Saumur  from  the  back  country, 
were  purchased  by  merchants  from  Nantes  who  were  engaged 
in  foreign  export  trades  in  addition  to  the  local  trade  of  the  town. 
Nantes  was  engaged  in  a  considerable  trade  with  Spain  and 
Portugal  in  which  grain  played  a  subsidiary  but  significant 
part.  The  possibility  of  foreign  export  attracted  to  Nantes  a 
quantity  of  grain  far  in  excess  of  the  needs  of  the  town,  and  this 
is  doubtless  the  primary  factor  in  the  sixteenth  century  trade 
of  the  Lower  Loire.1  On  the  upper  reaches  of  the  river  the 
surplus  was  small  and  trade  was  irregular.  The  principal 
sources  of  supply  were  in  the  vicinity  of  Clermont-Ferrand  and 
Aigueperse.  In  the  sixteenth  century  Lyons  drew  supplies 
from  the  region  through  Roanne.2  The  appearance  of  Parisian 
merchants  on  the  Loire  led  to  a  complete  reorganization  of  trade 
throughout  the  valley.  The  grain  from  the  upper  river  was 

1  See  Arch.  Communales  de  Nantes,  ff.  176,  180,  186,  187,  188,  189.  It  was 
impossible  for  me  to  see  this  material,  but  the  printed  inventory  indicates  its 
general  character,  and  the  conclusions  stated  above. 

*  Archives  Municipales  de  Lyon.     See  ch.  iii  for  details. 


62          THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

deflected  from  Lyons  and  came  down  to  Orleans,  passing  thence 
to  Paris.  From  Saumur  a  large  portion  of  the  available  supply 
came  up  stream  to  Orleans  and  Paris.  The  trade  of  the  river 
converged  on  Orleans,  and  proceeded  to  Paris,  either  by  way 
of  the  Canal  de  Briare  or  overland. 

The  Loire  Valley  trade,  however,  was  tending  to  assume  this 
form  quite  independently  of  Parisian  influence.  At  an  early 
date  Lyons  ceased  to  purchase  grain  in  Auvergne,  and,  as  the 
grain  of  the  Beauce  went  primarily  to  Paris,  Orleans  found  it 
necessary  to  seek  supplies  both  in  Auvergne  and  in  Touraine. 
In  years  of  dearth,  too,  Blois  and  Tours  frequently  needed 
supplies  beyond  what  could  be  secured  in  the  immediate  vicinity. 
The  similarity  of  the  development  of  the  trade  of  Orleans  and 
of  Paris  renders  the  history  of  the  Loire  Valley  curiously  com- 
plicated. There  are  three  distinct  lines  of  trade:  to  Paris, 
to  Orleans,  and  to  Nantes.  The  first  two  draw  both  from  the 
upper  and  lower  river,  the  latter  derives  its  supplies  wholly  from 
Touraine.  The  distance  of  the  sources  of  supply  from  the  con- 
suming towns  makes  the  encroachment  upon  these  areas  less 
distinct  than  in  the  case  of  Rouen  where  the  Parisian  merchants 
bought  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  city.  There  is  less 
feeling  of  exclusive  right  to  the  supply  here  in  the  Loire.  The 
local  officials  have  the  same  feeling  towards  all  wholesale  mer- 
chants; the  merchants  feel  a  certain  community  of  interest. 
Orleans  and  Nantes,  whose  interests  are  most  seriously  threat- 
ened, have  no  jurisdiction  over  the  producing  regions,  though 
the  position  of  Orleans  enables  her  to  exert  some  control  over 
the  grain  passing  to  Paris.  The  appearance  is  somewhat  dif- 
ferent; the  movements  are  essentially  the  same.  Both  in  Nor- 
mandy and  on  the  Loire  the  larger  towns  suffered  from  the 
competition  with  Paris  for  supplies  previously  left  to  them  with- 
out external  interference. 

In  1662,  Parisian  merchants  were  buying  in  Auvergne.1 
Their  operations  were  based  on  purchases  in  the  granaries, 
but  the  resources  of  the  region  were  not  considerable  and  no 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Mel  Colb.,  107  bis.  Riom,  3  Jan.  1662.  De  la  Barre.  Ibid.,  107 
bis.  632.  Riom,  24  Jan.  1662.  De  la  Barre  a  Colbert. 


TEE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS          63 

great  quantity  could  be  obtained.  De  la  Barre  says  in  his  letter 
of  January  3,  that  1200-1500  setiers  might  be  obtained  tor  Paris, 
and  this  probably  represents  about  the  proportion  that  could  be 
secured  by  Parisian  merchants.  March  n,  he  reported  that 
5000-6000  setiers  had  gone  down  the  river  to  Orleans,  Blois, 
and  Tours.1  May  30,  he  writes:  "  I  have  just  returned  from 
the  ports  of  the  Allier  where  more  than  eighty  boats,  loaded  with 
13-14,000  setiers  of  wheat  are  waiting  for  the  river  to  rise.  It 
is  extremely  low  just  at  present,  but  the  weather  has  been  very 
wet  lately  and  the  river  will  soon  become  navigable."  2  But 
the  boats  did  not  get  off  at  once,  and  by  the  time  the  river  had 
risen  the  grain  fleet  had  increased  remarkably.  June  19,  he 
writes:  "  I  have  left  the  ports  of  the  Allier  only  after  having 
sent  off  a  fleet  of  two  hundred  boats,  charged  with  more  than 
20.000  setiers  of  grain.  ...  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  fleet 
will  relieve  the  misery  throughout  the  Loire  Valley."  3  The 
ambiguities  here  are  typical.  The  Parisian  merchants  are 
mentioned.  De  la  Barre  is  himself  possibly  buying  on  royal 
account  for  Paris;  but  there  is  no  means  of  distinguishing  the 
activities  of  Parisian  merchants  from  those  of  merchants  of 
Orleans  or  of  Auvergne  and  Bourbonnais.  All  are  mentioned, 
but  the  fleet  of  two  hundred  boats  goes  down  the  river  "  en 
masse." 

In  1693  the  Parisian  merchants  do  not  appear.  "  Several 
individuals  proposed  to  ship  oats  to  Paris,"  but  d'Ableiges, 
the  Intendant,  refused  to  grant  the  necessary  permits.4  In  the 
fall  of  1698,  several  Parisian  merchants,  who  generally  made 
their  purchases  in  Champagne,  were  forced  to  seek  supplies 
elsewhere.  They  went  to  Auvergne,  Nivernais,  and  Nor- 
mandy.5 In  January  there  were  considerable  arrivals  of  grain 
from  the  Upper  Loire,  presumably  the  result  of  the  purchases 
made  in  November.  On  the  third  of  January,  eight  boats 

Bib.  Nat.,  M61.  Colb.,  107,  275.     Memoire  sur  Auvergne,  n  Mars  1662. 
Ibid.,  108,  833.     Clermont,  30  Mai  1662. 

Ibid.,  109,  352.     Clermont,  19  Juin  1662.     See  also  ibid.,  109  bis.     696. 
Orleans,  7  Juillet  1662.     Brachet,  Maire  a  Orleans. 

G7.     1630.     Clermont,  4  Nov.  1693.    d'Ableiges  a  Pussort. 
G7.    428.     (Paris),  7  Nov.  1698.    Dubois. 


64  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

arrived  at  the  Port  de  Greve  from  Bourbonnais.  Ten  days 
later,  d'Argenson  writes  that "  the  Port  de  Greve  is  well  supplied. 
There  are  at  least  thirty  boats  with  grain  from  Auvergne  and 
Brittany,  in  all  about  five  hundred  muids."  l 

On  the  Lower  Loire  the  operations  of  the  Parisian  merchants 
are  quite  as  completely  lost  in  the  general  trade.  The  officials 
make  no  attempt  to  distinguish.  It  is  likely  that  the  Parisians 
went  down  to  Saumur  as  early  as  they  went  up  to  Auvergne, 
but  in  1662  they  could  have  found  little  incentive  to  seek  grain 
in  Touraine  as  the  dearth  was  more  extreme  there  than  in  most 
parts  of  the  Seine  Basin.  In  1693,  1698,  and  1709,2  the  mer- 
chants of  Paris  are  referred  to,  but  it  is  impossible  to  form  any 
idea  of  the  extent  of  their  dealings  except  through  the  measures 
taken  by  the  officials  at  Orleans  to  prevent  complete  exhaustion 
of  the  supplies  of  their  town.  This  is  indeed  the  curious  feature 
of  the  Loire  Valley  trade  —  its  elusiveness  in  the  producing 
regions,  its  volume  when  it  passes  Orleans. 

The  position  of  Orleans  was  peculiar;  situated  on  one  side  of 
the  Beauce,  the  most  fertile  plain  of  all  France,  placed  in  a 
commanding  location  on  the  Loire  with  the  possibility  of  receiv- 
ing grain  from  either  Auvergne  or  Touraine,  it  was  nevertheless 
in  constant  dread  of  dearth.  The  grain,  which  seemed  to  be 
at  hand  on  every  side,  had  a  tendency  to  move  towards  Paris. 
Orleans  was  in  the  center  of  a  brisk  trade,  but  it  moved  around 
the  city,  without  affecting  the  market.  Bouville's  letter  of 
November  14,  1699,  gives  the  most  complete  description  of  the 
situation  of  the  town.  "  The  individuals  who  have  previously 
carried  on  a  great  business  have  ceased  entirely.  All  the  grain 
they  could  get  hold  of  has  been  shipped  to  Paris,  so  that  Orleans 
is  without  resource.  Every  week  the  town  consumes  12-1400 
muids  of  grain  (mesure  d'Orleans).  There  are  only  two  markets, 
in  each  of  which  there  is  generally  about  four  hundred  muids, 
so  that  even  when  the  markets  are  well  supplied  quite  as  much 

1  G7.    430.    Paris,  4-14  Jan.  1698.    d'Argenson. 

*  G7.  1635.  Estat  des  bleds  qui  sont  entre"  dans  le  Canal  de  Briare.  Sept., 
i6g3-Juillet,  1694.  G7.  524.  Divers  Estats  des  bleds  sorties  par  les  Bureaux  de 
Touraine  pour  Orleans  et  Paris,  1698,  etc. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS          65 

must  come  by  river.  The  water  trade,  however,  has  ceased, 
as  only  the  poor  bourgeois  are  still  engaged  in  the  grain  trade. 
Consequently,  there  is  every  reason  to  fear  a  dearth.  Paris 
will  carry  off  all  the  grain  in  the  Beauce,  and,  if  the  ice  forms 
soon,  the  river  will  be  so  low  that  no  aid  can  be  expected  from 
that  source."  l  Creil,  the  predecessor  of  Bouville,  had  been 
similarly  struck  by  the  tendency  of  the  grain  of  the  Beauce  to 
go  to  Paris.  He  thought  "  it  would  be  expedient  to  prevent 
the  peasants  from  carrying  to  Etampes,  Dourdan,  and  Mont- 
Ihery  grain  which  they  could  sell  for  almost  as  much  here  at 
Orleans."2  In  years  when  there  was  any  trouble, 'Orleans  was 
always  on  the  point  of  suffering  from  dearth  in  the  midst  of 
abundance. 

The  volume  of  trade  passing  Orleans  on  its  way  to  Paris  is 
best  indicated  by  the  figures  giving  the  monthly  shipments 
through  the  Canal  d'Orleans  for  Paris,  between  September, 
1693  and  July,  1694.  This  does  not  include  the  overland  trade, 
or  the  trade  passing  through  the  Canal  de  Briare,  which  were 
both  considerable : 

Wheat  Oats  Rice 

muids  muids  Ibs. 

1693  November   453s  280                    .... 

December 1,452  583                     .... 

1694  January   -. . . .  103  139^                   

February   60  400                    

March 1,242  308  300,00x3 

April 4,162^  2,3155  420,240 

May   1,099  i?5s                  QWS 

June   3,462  960                    

July 1,311  920*                   

In  1699  the  volume  of  trade  must  have  been  greater.  Bouville 
writes,  January  15:  "  within  the  last  three  months  more  than 
eight  thousand  muids  has  entered  the  Canal  d'Orleans  alone. 
There  is  much  on  the  river  and  there  is  no  accurate  measure 
of  the  great  quantity  that  has  been  shipped  overland."  4 

1  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  II,  n,  42.     14  Nov.  1699.     Bouville. 
1  Ibid.,  I,  304,  1146.     8  Dec.  1692. 

8  G7.  1635.  Estat  des  Bleds  qui  sont  entr6  dans  le  Canal  d'Orleans  pour 
estre  porte"  a  Paris.  Sept.,  i693-Juillet,  1694. 

4  G7.    419.    Origans,  15  Jan.  1699.     Bouville.     There  are  some  figures  from 


66         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

Orleans  had  good  cause  for  serious  apprehension  many  times, 
but  the  much-dreaded  dearth  never  arrived.  The  appearance 
was  deceptive.  The  Intendant  understood  this  situation  and 
never  lost  confidence  in  the  liberal  policy  of  permitting  this 
trade  to  continue  without  restriction.  Orleans  was  never 
assisted  by  grain  destined  originally  for  Paris,  but  the  inde- 
pendent efforts  of  the  merchants  were  generally  successful  in 
supplying  the  city.  In  December,  1698,  prices  were  rising 
despite  the  abundance  of  grain  on  the  markets.  Shipments 
were  made  to  Paris  from  all  sides.  Speculation  had  developed 
to  such  an  extent  that  the  same  lot  of  grain  would  pass  through 
five  or  six  hands  without  leaving  the  granary,  rising  in  price 
from  250  fL  to  360  ff.1  Despite  all  this,  Bouville  could  write, 
two  days  later:  "  I  know  that  prices  cannot  fall  in  the  provinces, 
especially  in  this  province,  until  prices  have  gone  down  in  Paris, 
which  must  be  supplied  by  the  provinces.  I  can  assure  you  that 
I  leave  no  stone  unturned  to  secure  safety  for  the  transportation 
of  grain.  I  am  convinced,  also,  that  the  merchants,  of  Paris 
and  the  bakers  should  be  allowed  to  buy  in  the  markets."  2 
Why  should  he  adopt  such  a  policy  ?  Because  Orleans  could 
secure  supplies  in  the  lower  river.  The  Parisian  trade  floating 
by  the  town  was  not  to  be  reckoned  upon.  It  could  not  be 
touched,  because  that  would  call  in  question  the  privileges 
needed  to  bring  grain  up  the  river  past  Blois  and  Tours.  It  was 
easier  to  stimulate  the  independent  trade  of  Orleans  than-  to 
stop  the  Parisian  grain  boats.  Bouville  states  this  as  his  policy. 
"  At  the  beginning  of  1694,  I  found  the  city  much  less  ade- 
quately supplied  than  it  is  today,  but  it  did  not  suffer.  I  even 
permitted  shipments  to  Paris,  because  a  number  of  wealthy  mer- 
chants, grocers,  and  others,  on  the  strength  of  my  promises,  were 
willing  to  make  large  purchases  in  Brittany"*  Orleans  was  in 
reality  seriously  menaced  by  the  extraordinary  development 

Touraine  for  December,  1698.  They  purport  to  distinguish  between  the  shipments 
for  Paris  and  the  shipments  for  Orleans,  but  they  must  be  based  on  false  declara- 
tions by  the  merchants.  G7.  524.  22  Dec.  1698-7  Jan.  1699. 

1  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  I,  508,  1800.     4  Dec.  1698.     Bouville. 

2  Ibid.,  I,  508,  1800.     6  Dec.  1698. 
8  Ibid.,  II,  n,  42.     14  Nov.  1699. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS          67 

of  Parisian  trade,  but  no  consequences  were  felt,  as  the  burden 
could  be  shifted  to  the  producing  regions,  Auvergne,  Touraine, 
or  Brittany.  The  principal  effect  upon  Orleans  of  the  extension 
of  Parisian  influence  in  the  Loire  was  an  increased  emphasis  on 
the  river  trade.  Orleans  could  count  less  on  the  Beauce,  and 
became  more  dependent  upon  Auvergne,  Touraine,  and  Brittany. 
The  spectacle  of  Parisian  exports  was  tantalizing  but  not  serious. 
The  sources  of  supply  were  somewhat  different  and  the  market 
of  Orleans  was  left  relatively  intact. 

Below  Orleans,  the  influence  of  the  intrusion  of  Parisian 
demand  was  more  serious,  both  in  the  region  supplying  the  whole- 
sale trade  at  Saumur  and  Montsoreau,  and  in  the  independent 
river  towns.  These  places,  like  Orleans,  saw  the  Parisian  trade 
passing  by,  but  they  had  neither  the  energy  to  procure  supplies 
independently  nor  the  patience  to  permit  the  shipments  for 
Paris  and  Orleans  to  pass  unmolested.  In  November,  1693, 
the  boats  coming  to  Orleans  were  stopped  at  Blois.  The  mer- 
chants were  obliged  to  sell  at  prices  fixed  by  the  officials  although 
this  was  less  than  the  grain  cost  in  Brittany.  This  continued 
despite  ordinances,  and  despite  the  passports  carried  by  the 
merchants.1  In  April,  1694,  the  disturbances  were  quite  as 
frequent.2  Boats  were  stopped  at  Saumur,  Amboise,  and 
Tours.3  The  merchants  feared  that  scarcely  one-tenth  of  the 
quantity  shipped  would  arrive  at  Orleans.  They  were  even 
inclined  to  countermand  their  orders.  The  Echevins  of  Lorris, 
a  little  town  on  the  Canal  d'Orleans,  described  the  popular 
feeling  in  most  detail:  "  The  people  of  our  town  and  of  the 
neighboring  parishes,"  they  say,  "  are  without  bread  and  without 
grain.  They  are  on  the  point  of  mutiny,  and  there  is  little 
security  for  the  boats  passing  on  the  Canal.  Threats  of  pillage 
are  rife,  and  we  have  been  obliged  to  go  twice  to  the  Canal  to 
maintain  order.  Three  boats  were  stopped  at  Coudrey,  and 
we  were  obliged  to  withdraw.  We  have  just  come  from  the 

1  G7.  1632.  Orleans,  12  Nov.  1693.  de  Creil.  G7.  1632.  Vend6me,  19 
Nov.  1693.  Bertin. 

8  G7.     1635.    Origans,  30  Avril  1694.    Bouville. 
1  G7.     1635.    Tours,  18  Mai  1694.    Huot. 


68  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

Canal,  where  we  had  the  boats  released  on  account  of  their 
passports,  issued  by  Pontchar train,  on  behalf  of  the  Hospital 
at  Paris.  All  the  merchants  who  pass  on  the  Canal  have  similar 
passports,  so  that  we  do  not  know  what  to  do.  We  are  even 
resolved  to  leave  town,  in  order  to  escape  the  violence  that  may 
appear.  The  people  wish  us  to  procure  bread  for  them  from  the 
boats  passing  on  the  Canal,  but  we  do  not  dare  to  do  so,  although 
the  people  are  literally  starving."  l 

The  larger  towns  could  secure  material  relief  only  by  making 
special  efforts  to  stimulate  trade.  The  amounts  secured  from 
passing  merchants  were  generally  too  small  to  afford  more  than 
temporary  respite.  Angers,  in  1709,  formed  a  public  fund  for 
the  purchase  of  grain.2  Other  towns  frequently  did  likewise. 
At  Tours  the  Intendants  often  made  purchases  on  the  royal 
account.3  At  times  very  considerable  royal  purchases  were 
made,  and  distributed  at  less  than  cost.  Such  supplies  generally 
came  from  a  distance,  as  the  vicinity  was  either  exhausted  or 
the  people  so  much  incensed  at  the  conduct  of  the  merchants 
that  no  grain  could  be  taken  from  the  towns  in  the  producing 
regions. 

At  La-Ferte-Bernard,  the  Maire  says:  "  I  have  found  it 
impossible  to  furnish  the  markets,  as  there  is  no  grain  in  the 
parishes  of  my  jurisdiction."  The  other  sources  of  trouble 
were  more  frequent.  Tours  was  often  menaced  by  the  closing 
of  Poitou  and  Berry.  May  i,  1709,  an  inhabitant  of  Tours 
writes:  "  the  city  cannot  subsist  fifteen  days  unless  Berry, 
Brittany,  and  Poitou  permit  exports.  The  merchants  and 
millers  who  take  the  risk  of  going  to  buy  there  are  robbed. 
Famine  will  be  upon  us  before  the  end  of  the  month."  4  A 
description  of  a  market  at  Chatillon  tells  the  same  story  in 
more  detail:  "  The  person  that  I  sent  to  the  market  at  Chatillon 
yesterday  reported  that  there  was  great  disorder.  The  inhabi- 
tants would  not  permit  any  grain  to  leave  the  town  for  Touraine; 

1  G7.  1635.  Lorris,  26-28  Avril  1694.     fichevins  de  Lorris. 

*  G7.  1651.  Angers,  27  Mars  1709.    Autichamp,  Lieu,  du  Roi. 

8  G7.  1651.  Tours,  30  Avril  1 709.    Turgot. 

4  G7.  1647.  i  Mai  1709.    Anon. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS          69 

not  even  barley.  More  than  two  hundred  persons  were  obliged 
to  return  home  without  any  grain.  Barley  is  needed  for  seed, 
and  the  markets  of  Tours,  Cormery,  Loches,  and  Eseville  are 
all  inadequately  furnished."  1 

The  effect  of  the  Parisian  trade  upon  the  markets  of  the 
producing  regions  has  already  been  considered.2  The  chain 
of  blatier-suppMed  markets  was  disorganized.  Buying  in  the 
farms  and  in  granaries  spread  throughout  the  region.  The 
agents  of  the  large  wholesale  merchants,  the  resident  mer- 
chants, and  even  the  blatiers  scoured  the  countryside  over  a 
considerable  area.  The  grain  in  the  Valley  of  the  Vienne  was 
collected  at  Montsoreau  without  corning  in  contact  with  any 
markets.  On  the  Thouet,  the  markets  of  Montr euil-Bellay 
and  Thouars  were  seriously  affected,  but  not  completely  dis- 
organized. The  bulk  of  the  trade,  however,  was  quite  inde- 
pendent of  the  market  system.  To  attribute  all  these  disorders 
to  the  appearance  of  the  Parisian  merchants  is  perhaps  unjusti- 
fiable, but  there  is  much  to  warrant  such  a  severe  judgment. 
These  abuses  appear  only  where  the  demand  becomes  very 
intense,  and  it  is  hardly  probable  that  the  trade  of  the  Loire 
Valley  itself  would  have  been  sufficient  to  develop  the  requisite 
pressure  to  lead  to  such  practices.  The  Parisian  merchants 
increased  the  demand  in  the  producing  regions,  indirectly  as 
well  as  directly;  it  was  not  only  what  they  bought  that  influenced 
prices  and  modes  of  buying,  but  also  what  the  depletion  of  the 
supplies  of  Orleans  made  it  necessary  for  Orleans  to  buy.  The 
addition  of  Parisian  demand  in  times  of  dearth  was  practically 
certain  to  create  an  intensity  of  demand  that  far  exceeded  the 
supplies  available.  Such  pressure  was  sure  to  develop  the  new 
practices  that  would  disorganize  the  local  markets. 

The  invasion  of  Normandy  and  of  the  Loire  Valley  by  Parisian 
trade  was  a  step  towards  the  formation  of  a  metropolitan  area; 
but  it  was  only  the  prelude  to  the  great  change  that  finally 
completed  the  fabric  of  the  new  organization.  The  overthrow 
of  the  system  of  relatively  limited  supply  areas  was  the  purely 

1  G7.     1651.    Loches,  8  Mai  1709.    Puiguibaut. 
»  See  ch.  i. 


70  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

destructive  aspect  of  the  new  tendencies.  In  the  Loire  Valley 
this  destructive  element  does  not  appear  as  clearly  as  in  the 
invasion  of  Normandy.  On  the  Loire,  the  independent  supply 
areas  were  transformed  rather  than  destroyed.  The  depletion 
of  the  supply  affected  the  rural  districts  and  the  small  towns, 
rather  than  the  large  towns  of  the  region.  But  here,  as  in  Nor- 
mandy, the  breaking-down  of  old  customs,  the  formation  of 
new  commercial  habits,  the  intrusion  of  a  ubiquitous  metro- 
politan demand  created  new  problems.  Questions  were  raised 
which  led  to  the  development  of  new  forms  of  commercial 
organization.  The  fundamental  importance  of  problems  of 
marketing  was  emphasized.  Beneath  all  these  difficulties  lay 
the  question  of  the  relation  between  the  local  market  and  the 
wholesale  trade,  or  between  the  wholesale  trade  and  the  metrop- 
olis. The  local  markets  needed  protection  against  the  intensity 
of  metropolitan  demand;  the  metropolitan  market  needed 
some  means  of  rendering  its  supplies  more  completely  visible. 

II 

The  Upper  Seine  Basin  and  Problems  of  Marketing 

The  evolution  of  market  machinery  in  the  Seine  Basin  is  one 
of  the  most  important  and  most  interesting  aspects  of  the  com- 
mercial history  of  Paris.  In  no  other  section  of  France  are  the 
difficulties  inherent  in  the  old  market  system  and  the  transition 
to  the  freer  modern  system  more  clearly  revealed.  The  basic 
factor  in  the  Parisian  area  is  the  presence  of  a  large  and  easily 
available  food  supply.  By  no  means  the  only  foundation  for 
the  predominance  of  a  commercial  center,  it  is  none  the  less 
the  most  important  consideration  in  the  development  of  a  great 
inland  capital  like  Paris. 

The  influence  of  abundance  upon  the  development  of  trading 
organization  will  be  more  apparent  after  the  subsequent  study 
of  the  grain  trade  in  the  Rhone  basin.  There,  the  constant 
dread  of  dearth,  the  prohibitions  in  the  producing  regions,  the 
elaborate  negotiations  in  regard  to  the  trade,  everything  mili- 
tated against  a  free  development  of  commercial  machinery. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS  ^\ 

In  the  Seine  Basin,  the  abundance  of  the  supply  reduced  super- 
vision to  a  minimum  and  rendered  the  crudity  of  the  market 
organization  less  serious.  The  merchants  were  not  forced  to 
make  so  many  concessions  to  the  medieval  system,  and  in  time 
of  dearth  the  supplies  were  sufficiently  great  to  make  trade 
possible.  The  distribution  of  the  supply  was  no  easy  matter, 
but  it  was  seldom  necessary  to  prohibit  trade  entirely.  This 
was  of  the  utmost  importance,  for  it  was  in  such  times  of  stress 
that  significant  changes  most  frequently  occurred.  In  the  less 
fertile  regions,  where  trade  was  completely  disorganized  in  time 
of  crisis  and  discontinued  for  an  interval,  the  trade  was  resumed 
without  any  considerable  alteration.  In  the  Seine  Basin,  where 
trade  continued  despite  dearths,  innovations  of  far-reaching 
consequences  were  at  times  made  under  the  pressure  of  the  crisis. 
The  dearths  of  1693-94,  1698-99, 1708-09  are  for  this  reason 
more  interesting  in  the  Seine  Basin  than  in  Burgundy.  Condi- 
tions there  became  so  serious  that  trade  was  suspended  during 
the  crisis  of  the  dearths.  In  the  Seine  Basin,  the  trade  was 
maintained  upon  an  organized  basis  though  with  difficulty. 
The  tendency  to  break  down  under  stress  was  the  primary 
defect  of  the  medieval  market  system.  No  solution  could  be 
found  unless  there  was  enough  grain  in  the  region  to  make  con- 
tinuous trade  a  possibility.  The  dearth  must  not  be  so  severe 
that  the  dreaded  famine  could  become  an  actuality.  The  market 
could  develop  only  in  a  region  where  the  difficulties  were  due 
not  to  lack  of  grain  but  to  inefficient  markets;  where  it  was 
not  a  question  of  getting  grain,  but  of  distributing  a  supply 
that  was  barely  adequate. 

The  character  and  the  extent  of  the  available  supply  is  most 
evident  in  the  latter  part  of  the  seventeenth  century,  when  it 
was  more  completely  utilized  than  previously.  The  supply 
falls  into  two  classes:  the  overland  grain  from  the  Beauce, 
Brie,  and  France;  the  water-borne  grain  from  the  Valleys  of 
the  Oise,  Marne,  and  Seine.  The  most  valuable  figures  appear 
in  a  few  reports  of  the  year  1700.  Quantities  are  given  in  the 
Parisian  muid,  which  is  equivalent  to  51.4  bushels  English. 
Some  of  the  headings  are  ambiguous,  but  I  have  used  the  classi- 


THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 


1700 

Ch§,lons  & 
Vitry 

France 
&Brie 

Unspecified 
Seine  and 
Marne 

Oise 

Total  by 
Water 

Halle 

22  Sept.-2  Oct  

muids 
4M 

muids 
360 

muids 
368 

muids 
2O 

muids 
I  161 

muids 
181 

2—  20  Oct 

I  d.l6 

O2 

8s 

22—27  Nov  

•3  CQ 

80 

4OO 

3O 

J»593 

Qfio 

*3a 

1  3  C 

4,  18-22  Dec  

250 

250 

800 

64 

1,364* 

LOJ 
222 

fications  of  the  reports.  "  France  and  Brie  "  means,  primarily, 
the  region  shipping  from  Bray,  Nogent-sur-Seine,  and  Mary. 
The  significant  feature  is  the  proportion  between  the  water- 
borne  grain  and  the  grain  coming  overland  to  the  Halle.  The 
figures  for  the  Halle  should  be  increased  somewhat  as  only  wheat 
is  reported  regularly  in  the  letters.  Other  kinds  of  grain  amounted 
to  half  as  much  again.  Then,  too,  flour  came  in  considerable 
quantity,  but  the  flour  frequently  represented  water-borne 
grain.  In  all  probability,  the  overland  grain  constituted  in 
1700  about  one-fourth  or  one- third  of  the  supply.  The  propor- 
tion between  the  various  branches  of  the  water  trade  is  probably 
indicated  justly,  but  as  the  reports  are  not  comprehensive  the 
total  quantities  received  do  not  appear.  There  are  compre- 
hensive reports  of  shipments  from  the  ports  of  the  Oise  for  nine 
months  of  1700  and  for  January,  1702.  These  are  based  on 
the  declarations  of  the  merchants  and  seem  to  be  accurate  in 
every  respect.  The  Parisian  figures  for  1700  happen  to  include 
only  the  less  considerable  arrivals  so  that  the  Oise  figures  are  low. 
From  March,  1709,  to  December,  1710,  we  have  very  careful 
reports  of  arrivals  at  Paris.  The  water-borne  trade  is  at  times 

EXPORTS  FROM  THE  GENERALITY  OF  SOISSONS  TO  PARIS.  2 

muids  muids 

1700  April 801                       1700  September 102 

May   139                                 October  210 

June    345                                 November 181 

July 212                                 December   206 

August   23                        1702  January 397 

1  G7.    431.    Reports  of  different  dates,  22  Sept.-22  Dec.  1700. 
1  G7.    513.    Letters  of  16  Mai,  7  Juin,  6  Juillet,  6  Aout,  8  Sept.,  8  Oct.,  7  Nov., 
5  Dec.  1700.     5  Jan.  1701  to  n  Fev.  1702. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS 


73 


GRAIN  ARRIVALS  ON  THE  PORTS  AND  ON  THE  HALLE,  AT  PARIS  l 
In  Muids,  Mesure  de  Paris 


Vitry  & 
Chalons 

Bray  & 
Provins 

France  & 
Brie 

Noyon  & 
Soissons 

Total  by 
Water 

Halle 

1709  March   

I<X 

2QO 

34O 

190 

1,175 

1,160 

April    

140 

400 

1  2O 

1,  060 

605 

May     

78 

2Q  c 

875 

26 

2,074 

853 

June 

22Q 

34-O 

4.6O 

lie 

1,688 

1,186 

July   . 

137 

2^O 

760 

1,487 

1,220 

August  

7O 

128 

IQC 

838 

1,253 

September  

76 

68 

26l 

7?c 

882 

October 

216 

1  20 

158 

I,O64 

I,C76 

November 

20 

6<; 

<6* 

CQ 

I  OOO 

961 

December   
1710  January  
February 

24 

227 
80 

108 
142 

I4."r 

161 
280 
281 

30 
4 
84 

323 
673 

^QO 

1,025 
1,293 
825 

March 

7O 

178 

28<C 

A  A 

607 

1,018 

April  

2O 

270 

4O 

1,  2  "?O 

854 

May               .    . 

2Cf 

271 

2C 

701 

003 

June 

2fA 

283 

641 

7Q 

I,2IO 

1,098 

July   . 

l8s 

2^7 

SQO 

832 

1,056 

August  

1  2O 

IOO 

4.C7 

677 

1,108 

September    .... 

80 

40 

4.72 

847 

I,AQ7 

October 

iqr 

70 

688 

803 

1,441 

November  
December    

60 

345 

140 
25 

475 
470 

48 

2 

1,263 
I,OO2 

i,  080 

1,211 

described  only  as  so  many  boats,  but  the  load  of  the  boats  was 
sufficiently  uniform  to  admit  of  satisfactory  estimates  of  the 
quantity.  The  abnormal  condition  of  the  trade  makes  it  neces- 
sary to  refrain  from  any  precise  deductions,  but  the  statistics 
are  suggestive.  The  arrivals  on  the  Halle  are  extraordinarily 
large,  on  the  whole  equal  to  the  total  arrivals  by  water.  This 
is  partly  due  to  overland  trade  from  Orleans,  and  to  arrivals 
from  a  wider  area  in  the  Beauce  than  usual.  Much  of  the  trade 
from  Normandy  was  doubtless  overland.  In  part,  too,  the 
dearth  in  the  Upper  Seine  Basin  reduced  the  shipments  from 
those  sections.  This  interpretation  of  the  effect  of  the  dearth 
is  supported  by  the  comparison  of  the  average  semi-weekly 


1  G7.     1654  and  1655.     Semi-weekly  reports  of  d'Argenson. 


74         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

arrivals  in  1709.  For  the  thirteen  weeks  reported  in  1700,  the 
highest  figure  is  87  muids;  the  average  is  45-50  muids.  In 
1709-10,  the  highest  figures  are  500  muids,  260  and  228  muids. 
These  unusual  arrivals  are  ascribed  in  the  reports  to  the  ship- 
ments overland  from  Orleans.  The  lowest  figures  are  45  and 
53  muids.  Scattering  reports  from  1708,  which  are  not  included 
in  the  table,  confirm  the  impression  that  the  normal  semi-weekly 
market  seldom  saw  more  than  60-70  muids  on  the  Halle.1  The 
dearth  of  1709  reduced  the  water-borne  supply  and  the  deficiency 
was  made  up  in  part  by  a  more  intense  exploitation  of  the 
Beauce,  France,  and  Brie.  The  continuity  of  the  trade  with  the 
Seine  and  Marne  Valleys  is  really  the  most  significant  fact  in 
these  reports.  Despite  the  severity  of  the  dearth,  despite  the 
heavy  drain  caused  by  the  campaign  of  1709  in  the  Low  Countries, 
trade  .with  Paris  continued  with  no  serious  interruption. 

The  abundance  of  grain  in  the  distant  river  valleys  which 
made  such  continuous  trade  possible,  even  in  time  of  dearth, 
freed  the  merchants  from  any  serious  interference  from  the 
officials  in  those  regions.  The  abundance  of  grain  in  the  imme- 
diate vicinity  of  Paris  freed  the  merchants  from  harassing 
regulation  by  the  Parisian  authorities.  The  blatier  trade  to  the 
Halle  was  very  steady,  and,  as  it  brought  nearly  one-fourth 
of  the  total  supply,  the  irregularities  of  the  river  trade  were  not 
of  moment.  At  Lyons,  where  there  was  no  such  volume  of 
land  trade,  the  municipality  was  obliged  to  play  an  important 
part  in  the  grain  trade,  largely  to  secure  some  guarantee  against 
the  irregularity  of  water-borne  supply.  Ice  on  the  river,  low 
water,  intentional  delays  in  shipment  combined  to  render  the 
river  trade  singularly  erratic.  In  April,  1710,  nine  hundred 
muids  arrived  at  the  Port  de  Greve  during  the  first  two  weeks. 
From  the  sixteenth  to  the  twenty-sixth  of  April,  only  ninety 
muids  came  in.  From  April  thirtieth  to  May  twentieth  only 
one  hundred  and  fifty-five  muids  arrived;  on  May  twenty-first, 
two  hundred  and  fifty  muids  arrived.2  But  this  uncertainty 

1  G7.     1654.      7  Avril,  5  Mai,  2  Juin,  4  Juillet,  5  Sept.,  3  Nov.,  i  Dec.  1708, 
2  Jan.,  6  Fev.  1709.     Reports  of  d'Argenson. 

2  G7.     1655.    Letters  of  d'Argenson.    Dates  indicated. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS  J$ 

was  not  serious.  The  Halle  sufficed  to  tide  the  city  over  the 
intervals  between  arrivals  of  grain  on  the  Ports.  The  wholesale 
merchants  of  Paris  were  thus  subjected  to  the  minimum  amount 
of  regulation  and  the  trade  was  allowed  to  develop  naturally. 

The  absence  of  energetic  administrative  supervision  involves 
the  history  of  the  Parisian  trade  in  considerable  obscurity. 
Official  regulation  and  interference  are  responsible  for  nearly 
all  our  information  about  the  trade,  so  that  the  relative  freedom 
of  the  trade  appreciably  diminishes  the  bulk  of  our  evidence. 
This  difficulty  of  obtaining  information  is  further  enhanced  by 
the  destruction  of  the  Municipal  Archives  of  Paris  during  the 
Commune.  The  Registers  of  the  city  which  had  been  trans- 
ferred to  the  Archiyes  Nationales  are  now  the  only  considerable 
extant  record  of  the  activities  of  the  municipality.  These 
circumstances  make  it  impossible  to  treat  the  sixteenth  century 
with  much  certainty,  but  the  main  features  of  the  period  can 
be  reconstructed  by  reading  the  scanty  material  available  in 
the  light  of  seventeenth  century  evidence. 

The  abundance  of  supply  made  very  simple  modes  of  trading 
practical.  The  early  systems  of  marketing  continued  with 
little  apparent  change  in  all  the  producing  regions  until  the 
seventeenth  century.  Consequently,  the  investigations  that 
were  made  when  the  active  development  began  disclosed  not 
only  the  new  conditions  and  the  innovations,  but  also  the  old 
trading  system  that  was  soon  to  be  supplanted.  The  differences 
in  the  market  systems  of  the  three  valleys  of  the  Upper  Seine 
Basin  were  not  great,  and  no  distinction  can  safely  be  drawn 
before  1660.  Trade  in  granaries  and  wholesale  buying  upon 
the  market  are  found  on  the  Marne,  Seine,  and  Oise.  There 
are  differences  in  the  emphasis  placed  upon  these  modes  of 
buying,  but  it  is  practically  certain  that  both  forms  existed 
throughout  the  sixteenth  century.  In  1649,  the  concentration 
of  the  trade  in  the  towns  appears  clearly  in  an  examination  of 
gram  merchants  at  Paris.  Charles  Ferre  says  there  are  six 
thousand  muids  of  grain  at  Soissons;  and  other  merchants  also 
testify  to  the  existence  of  hoards  in  Soissons.1  Louis  Presle 

1  H.  1809.     Reg.  du  Bureau,  iHiii  xrvi.     20  Aout  1649. 


76  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

declares  that  there  are  twelve  thousand  muids  at  Chalons, 
and  four  thousand  muids  at  Vitry.1  But  the  details  of  this 
granary  trade  do  not  come  fully  to  light  till  1660.  Inquests  in 
October  and  November  of  that  year  brought  out  the  real  char- 
acter of  the  trade.  "  Louis  Lallement  and  Pierre  Coq  depose 
that  there  are  great  quantities  of  grain  at  Vitry  and  Chalons 
in  the  houses  of  divers  individuals."  2  "  Charles  Appert,  grain 
porter  at  Chalons,  said  he  acts  as  grain  factor  at  Chalons;  that 
is  to  say  he  buys  for  the  merchants  of  Paris  in  accordance  with 
the  orders  given  by  Farez  of  Chalons,.  Lallement,  and  others 
who  are  agents  of  Parisian  merchants.  In  the  month  of  July, 
the  present  witness,  together  with  Hemary  and  Lambert,  bought 
two  thousand  setiers  of  grain  in  different  houses.  The  witness 
believes  that  there  are  200,000  muids  of  grain  in  different  houses 
where  it  has  been  stored  for  five  or  six  years."  3  "  Pierre  Chalons, 
merchant  of  Chalons,  says  that  he  acts  as  agent  for  merchants 
of  Paris,  and  that  he  buys  ordinarily  in  the  granaries."  4  In 
1660,  the  granaries  of  Chalons  were  supplied  in  part  by  the 
Uatier  trade  from  Lorraine  and  from  the  region  south  of  the 
Marne,5  but  the  general  form  of  the  trade  was  not  changed, 
as  this  grain  was  purchased  by  resident  merchants  and  bour- 
geois who  hoarded  it  until  it  suited  their  interest  to  sell  to  the 
Parisian  merchants  who  came  to  their  granaries.  The  simpler 
form  of  the  trade  appeared  at  La-Ferte- Gaudier  and  Coulom- 
miers.  The  commissioners  felt  that  many  persons  in  these 
towns  falsified  their  testimony,  but  the  witnesses  summoned 
declared  on  oath  that  the  grain  they  handled  came  from  their 
estates.  At  the  house  of  Jean  Montguillon,  at  La-Ferte- Gaucher, 
the  commissioners  "  found  9-10  muids  of  wheat  which  Mont- 
guillon declared  to  be  the  product  of  the  payments  made  by 
his  tenants.  He  affirmed  that  he  had  no  more  than  20-25 
muids  of  grain  which  he  had  collected  in  the  course  of  seven  or 
eight  years.  He  has  sold  much  to  merchants  who  have  come 

1.H.  1809.     Reg.  du  Bureau,  ii^ii  xxvi.     20  Aout  1649. 

a  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.    357.     4  Nov.  1660.     Proces  Verbaux  a  Chalons.     De- 
positions de  Louis  Lallement  et  Pierre  le  Coq. 

1  Ibid.     4  Nov.  1660.     Proces  Verbal  a  Chalons. 

4  Ibid.  5  Ibid.    Magdelaine  Goudouin. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS          77 

to  buy,  and  he  is  ready  to  sell  whenever  merchants  offer  to 
buy."  1  This  passive  attitude  of  the  landlord  is  one  of  the  most 
interesting  features  of  the  granary  trade.  There  is  no  effort  to 
find  a  market.  The  landlord  waits  patiently  year  after  year 
till  the  merchants  come  to  buy.  At  Coulommiers  the  com- 
missioners found  105  muids  of  wheat  and  20  muids  of  rye  in 
granaries.  "  There  was  much  more  in  the  town,"  they  say, 
"  but  we  are  not  able  to  make  a  more  comprehensive  report 
because  the  municipal  officials  and  the  officials  of  the  election 
are  all  engaged  in  this  trade.  They  have  stores  in  their  granaries 
and  in  their  country  houses."  "  Most  of  the  witnesses  deposed 
that  Lambert  and  his  associates  had  more  than  400  muids  of 
grain  at  Coulommiers  and  in  the  environs." 2  D'Alengon, 
the  Lieutenant  General,  who  was  accused,  of  participating 
in  this  trade,  declared  that  "  he  carried  on  no  trade,  that  he 
hoarded  only  the  grain  coming  from  his  estates,  and  that  he 
sold  daily  to  such  as  presented  themselves.  He  had  about 
twenty-six  muids.  He  showed  us  also  another  granary  of  wheat, 
belonging  to  Sr.  Barbe,  an  Attorney  at  the  Court.  This  grain 
comes  from  his  estates."3  no  muids  of  grain  was  found  at 
Trillebardou;  one- third  of  this  came  from  Chalons  and  Vitry, 
the  rest  belonged  to  residents.4  At  Meaux,  similar  conditions 
prevailed. 

In  the  Seine  Valley,  the  principal  resident  grain  dealers 
affirm  persistently  that  the  grain  they  handle  comes  from  their 
farms.  "  Sansoy  of  Provins  said  that  he  was  not  a  merchant, 
that  he  had  not  purchased  the  grain  in  his  possession,  it  was  the 
product  of  his  estates  for  several  seasons.  He  declared  that  he 
had  refused  no  offer  made  by  the  factors  of  merchants  of  Paris. 
Since  the  preceding  harvest  he  said  that  he  had  sold  about  one 
hundred  muids,  Paris  measure,  and  that  he  still  had  about 
150  muids."  5  In  this  vicinity,  too,  there  was  a  gentleman  named 

Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.     30  Oct.  1660.     La-Ferte"-Gaucher. 
Ibid.     190.    Oct.  1660. 
Ibid.     204.    30  Oct.  1660.     Proc£s  Verbaux. 
Ibid.     190.    Oct.  1660. 

Ibid.    210.     2  Nov.  1660.    Provins.    Many  other  affirmations  that  the  grain 
comes  from  their  own  estates. 


78          THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

Chenoist,  who  had  500-600  muids  in  his  chateau.1  At  Provins, 
there  were  three  or  four  individuals  engaged  in  a  regular  granary 
trade,  but  the  transition  was  becoming  marked  even  in  1660, 
and  it  is  difficult  to  disentangle  the  old  and  the  new.  It  is 
evident,  however,  that  the  granary  trade  had  been  considerable, 
and  it  must  have  been  the  characteristic  form  of  trade  in  the 
sixteenth  century. 

In  the  Valley  of  the  Oise  the  commissaries  found  conditions 
somewhat  different.  The  essential  feature  is  indicated  by  their 
mode  of  stating  the  quantity  of  grain  found.  "  In  the  granaries 
of  Noyon,  belonging  to  merchants  trading  with  Paris,  was  found 
2180  muids  of  wheat  and  meteil."2  In  the  Marne  and  Seine 
towns  the  granaries  generally  belonged  to  the  residents  who 
sold  in  the  granaries  to  merchants  of  Paris.  Here  at  Noyon 
the  merchants  bought  on  the  market,  and  then  stored  the  grain 
until  it  was  advantageous  to  ship.  The  market  was  supplied 
with  reference  to  this  demand.  "  Each  market  day  grain 
came  in  from  Santerre,  Vermandois,  Artois,  and  Flanders, 
especially  from  Brussels,  Arras,  Bapaume,  Perronne,  Saint- 
Quentin,  Ham,  and  other  places.  More  than  one  hundred 
muids  arrived  for  each  market." 3  This  estimate  seems  high, 
but  it  is  confirmed  by  figures  of  1700,  giving  the  arrivals  at 
Noyon  of  grain  from  other  generalities.4 

GRAIN  ARRIVING  AT  NOYON  FROM  OTHER  GENERALITIES 

Quantities  Generality 

Paris  muids  of  export 

1700  May 182  Haynault,  Flanders,  Amiens. 

June 131  Amiens. 

July   142  Amiens,  Flanders. 

August    62  Amiens. 

September 79  Amiens. 

October  80^  Amiens. 

November 62  Flanders,  Picardy. 

December   69  Picardy,  Flanders. 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.     210.     2  Nov.  1660.    Provins. 

2  A  mixture  of  wheat  and  rye,  or  wheat  and  barley.    Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.   190. 
Noyon. 

*  Ibid.     190. 

*  G7.     513.    Estat  des  Bleds  arrives  dans  la  G6n.  de  Soissons.     Letters  of  San- 
son,  7*Juin,  6  Juillet,  8  Sept.,  8  Oct.,  7  Nov.,  5  Dec.  170x3,  5  Jan.  1701. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS  79 

Besides  this  foreign  grain,  much  would  come  to  the  market 
from  the  immediate  vicinity,  so  that  we  may  accept  the  figures 
of  the  Lieutenant  General.  Pont-Sainte-Maxence  was  another 
important  shipping  point  on  the  Oise,  and  there  the  trade  was 
carried  on  in  much  the  same  manner  as  at  Noyon.  The  com- 
missioners report  that  "  they  summoned  one  Pierre  Carabin, 
a  grain  porter.  He  said  that  some  of  the  bourgeois  and  resi- 
dents of  the  town  bought  grain  on  the  market  to  sell  to  mer- 
chants who  had  granaries  and  engaged  in  trade  with  the  town. 
At  times,  too,  the  bourgeois  sold  to  persons  of  Beaumont,  Creil, 
or  other  places.  The  Widow  Chevalier  and  one  of  her  sons 
are  engaged  in  this  trade  at  Pont-Sainte-Maxence.  They 
buy  daily  at  Pont,  and  in  the  environs,  to  sell  again  later.  They 
have  long  had  great  quantities  stored  in  their  houses  and  gran- 
aries. The  dearth  at  Pont  was  caused  by  the  purchases  made 
by  the  Widow  Chevalier  and  others.  They  took  up  all  the 
grain  exposed  on  the  market  to  hoard  it  and  sell  later."  l  The 
prosecuting  attorney  of  the  town  (Le  Procureur  du  Roi)  con- 
firmed this  statement.  Most  of  the  grain  coming  to  market 
was  purchased  by  merchants  resident  in  the  town  or  coming 
from  Beaumont,  Creil,  and  other  places.2  There  is  reason  to 
believe  that  the  trade  at  Soissons  was  conducted  on  a  similar 
basis  before  1660,  but  there  is  little  precise  evidence.  The 
market  was  completely  disorganized  by  the  new  commercial 
practices,  but  the  merchants  had  apparently  been  buying  on 
the  market  up  to  that  time. 

The  evidence  that  these  conditions  had  existed  throughout 
the  sixteenth  century  is  not  very  considerable.  The  most 
definite  statement  is  made  by  the  Lieutenant  Civil  of  the  Chate- 
let  of  Paris.  '  At  a  general  assembly  at  the  Hotel  de  Ville,  Sep- 
tember 13,  1565,  he  says  "  that  he  has  been  in  Champagne 
recently  and  knows  that  there  are  large  quantities  of  grain 
stored  in  the  chateaux,  and  in  some  of  the  towns."  3  This 
does  not  state  definitely  that  the  granaries  were  the  usual  source 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.     235.     2  Nov.  1660.     Pont-Sainte-Maxence. 

2  Ibid.,  eod.  loc. 

8  Reg.  du  Bureau,  V,  510-520.     13  Sept.  1565. 


80  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

of  supply,  but  it  indicates  that  the  granaries  of  landlords  and 
tithe  owners  were  even  then  a  considerable  factor  in  the  trade. 
Aside  from  this  statement,  there  is  evidence  that  the  sixteenth 
century  trade  was  very  closely  associated  with  a  few  of  the 
river  towns.  In  1565,  the  Parlement  of  Paris  issued  a  special 
ordinance  authorizing  "  all  persons  to  buy  grain  in  the  towns 
and  villages  of  the  vicinity:  even  in  Chalons,  Chateau-Thierry, 
Meaux,  Provins,  Melun,  Etampes,  and  others."  l  In  September 
of  the  same  year,  the  Provost  of  Merchants  sent  H.  Simon  to 
Nogent,  Pont-sur-Seine,  Troyes,  Vitry,  Chalons,  Epernay, 
Chatelnaudry,  Meaux,  and  other  towns  in  Champagne  and 
Brie.  The  exact  character  of  the  mission  does  not  appear, 
but  it  was  primarily  an  effort  to  secure  permission  to  buy  grain 
in  these  towns.2  In  1585,  commissioners  were  sent  up  the 
Seine  to  Pontz,  Bray,  and  Montereau-sur-Yonne,  to  have 
grain  shipped  to  Paris. 3  Two  years  later  the  municipal  officials 
ask  the  King  to  write  to  the  Governor  of  Champagne  and  Brie, 
bidding  him  "  to  permit  the  shipment  of  grain  from  Chalons 
and  Vitry,  where  it  is  abundant." 4  The  concentration  of 
trade  in  the  towns  and  the  occasional  statements  that  great 
quantities  were  to  be  found  in  the  towns,  both  point  to  the 
granary  trade. 

This  was  the  simplest  form  of  wholesale  trade.  In  the  Saone 
Valley,  whence  we  have  abundant  evidence  for  the  sixteenth 
century,  the  granary  trade  was  the  characteristic  form.  It 
was  transformed  there  somewhat  earlier  than  in  the  Seine  Basin, 
as  the  supplies  were  not  so  large  and  better  ways  of  bringing 
the  supply  to  market  had  to  be  found.  This  granary  trade  was 
essentially  passive;  the  owners  made  no  effort  to  seek  the 
market;  if  the  merchants  did  not  discover  them,  they  could 
wait  until  dearth  came.  Prices  would  rise,  and  the  effort  to 
secure  supplies  would  bring  merchants  to  the  doors  of  the  granary, 
prepared  to  pay  good  prices.  The  abundance  of  the  total  avail- 

1  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  1007. 

2  Reg.  du  Bureau,  V,  517-518.     10  Sept.  1565. 
1  Ibid.,  VIII,  437.     2  Avril  1585. 

4  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  ion.     3  Juillet  1587. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS          8 1 

able  supply  in  the  Seine  Basin  was  so  great  that  even  this  cum- 
bersome and  crude  system  was  adequate  for  a  century  and  a 
half.  It  is  this  relation  to  the  fundamental  feature  of  trade  in 
the  Seine  Basin  that  affords  the  best  ground  for  our  surmise. 
Long  continuance  of  the  granary  trade  would  be  possible  only 
in  a  region  where  supplies  were,  on  the  whole,  somewhat  in  excess 
of  demand.  This  granary  system  was  still  perceptible  in  1660; 
the  whole  of  the  preceding  period  was  characterized  by  lack 
of  pressure  on  the  supply;  so  it  is  by  no  means  too  much  to 
infer  that  the  granary  system,  which  would  have  been  so  well 
adapted  to  the  conditions  of  the  sixteenth  century,  was  in  fact 
the  characteristic  mode  of  marketing. 

The  absence  of  real  pressure  upon  the  supply  of  the  Seine 
Basin  is  most  clearly  indicated  by  the  existence  of  a  sporadic 
export  trade  to  foreign  countries.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
the  surplus  of  the  Seine  Basin  during  the  fifteenth  century 
went  to  Rouen  or  to  foreign  ports  through  Rouen.  The  six- 
teenth century  witnessed  the  delimitation  of  supply  areas  for 
Rouen  and  Paris.  The  most  unfortunate  effect  of  this  upon 
the  producing  regions  of  the  Parisian  area  was  the  reduction 
of  the  demand,  and  so  considerable  a  reduction  that  there  was 
apparently  a  real  surplus.  This  could  find  a  market  only  on 
the  Lower  Seine  at  Rouen,  or  at  the  coast  ports  on  the  Somme, 
particularly  Saint-Valery. 

In  February,  1501,  a  general  assembly  was  held  at  Paris. 
The  whole  subject  was  canvassed,  and  the  meeting  finally 
decided  "  that  action  should  be  taken  to  prevent  the  exhaustion 
of  Santois,  Beauvoisis,  and  neighboring  provinces,  by  foreign 
export  down  the  Somme."  Then  the  Echevins  ask  the  Parle- 
ment  to  issue  letters  to  the  Baillis  of  Senlis,  Amiens,  Vermandois, 
and  to  the  Senechal  of  Ponthieu,  ordering  them  to  prevent 
the  export  of  grain  abroad  by  way  of  the  Somme.1  In  1508 
we  hear  that  "  the  merchants  go  up  to  Santerre  to  buy  all  the 
grain  they  can,  and  then  ship  to  Rouen  by  way  of  the  Seine."  2 
A  month  later  the  merchants  complain  of  the  prohibitions  at 

1  Reg.  du  Bureau,  I,  53-54.     20-27  Fev.  1501. 

2  Ibid.,  I,  148.     23  Fev.  1508. 


82  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

Paris.  They  say  that  there  is  no  more  danger  and  that  the 
prohibitions  should  be  removed.  The  Echevins  finally  decide 
to  allow  the  merchants  to  export  grain  up  or  down  the  river, 
if  they  agree  to  place  half  of  their  grain  on  sale  at  Paris.1  There 
are  other  indications  of  this  foreign  trade  which  will  be  noted  in 
another  connection ;  it  is  sufficient  here  to  note  the  movement. 
There  is  this  elusive  trade  to  foreign  parts,  generally  causing 
apprehension  and  restrictive  regulation  at  Paris.  It  continues 
spasmodically  despite  prohibitions,  because  the  Parisian  demand 
was  not  great  enough  to  carry  off  the  whole  supply. 

The  possession  of  this  abundant  supply  renders  the  history 
of  the  Parisian  trade  in  the  sixteenth  century  dull  and  unin- 
teresting. There  is  no  active  development  of  organization, 
no  serious  difficulty  in  time  of  dearth,  so  that  even  in  the  sources 
the  trade  leaves  little  trace.  The  second  quarter  of  the  following 
century,  however,  sees  the  beginning  of  a  change.  The  surplus 
supply  was  then  required  by  the  growing  needs  of  the  city. 
The  merchants  were  extending  their  commercial  connections. 
New  means  of  securing  supplies  were  needed.  The  old  passive 
granary  trade,  which  had  maintained  itself  during  the  quiet 
years  of  the  preceding  century,  was  now  beginning  to  prove 
inadequate  for  the  demands  of  the  growing  trade.  The  grain 
trade  acquired  new  vitality,  new  importance,  and  new  interest. 
A  period  of  active  development  begins,  which  carries  us  rapidly 
from  conditions  that  are  purely  medieval  to  conditions  that  are 
almost  modern. 

What  then  was  the  occasion  of  this  pressure  upon  the  supplies 
of  the  Seine  Basin  that  changes  the  appearance  of  the  trade 
so  fundamentally  ?  There  are  two  factors  that  might  increase 
the  pressure  on  the  mercantile  grain  supply:  actual  growth  of 
population;  dependence  upon  the  markets  of  sections  of  the 
metropolitan  population  that  had  formerly  secured  grain  inde- 
pendently of  the  markets. 

The  growth  of  Paris  previous  to  1789  cannot  be  accurately 
traced.  The  population  of  the  city  seems  never  to  have  been 

1  Reg.  du  Bureau,  I,  150.  23  Mars  1508.  In  this  connection  the  loss  of  the 
municipal  records  of  Paris  is  a  real  misfortune. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS  83 

accurately  known.  The  conventional  figure  of  600,000  persons 
appears  in  the  documents  throughout  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries.  It  is  not  the  highest  figure  given  at  the 
close  of  the  eighteenth  century,  but  it  is  accepted  even  then  as 
the  conservative  estimate.  In  short,  the  statistical  attempts 
are  worse  than  useless,  they  suggest  a  stationary  condition 
that  certainly  did  not  exist  at  any  time  in  the  course  of  those 
two  centuries.  No  conception  of  the  rate  of  growth  can  be 
formed  from  the  data  now  available,  but  in  many  respects  this 
numerical  side  of  the  question  is  by  no  means  its  most  significant 
aspect.  The  periods  of  most  active  growth  are  of  most  con- 
siderable importance,  and  these  can  probably  be  inferred  from 
the  material  expansion  of  the  city.  Maps  of  the  city  are  extant 
which  exhibit  the  gradual  extension  of  habitation,  and  the  studies 
of  the  topography  of  the  old  city  inaugurated  by  Baron  Hauss- 
mann  supplement  the  evidence  afforded  by  the  contemporary 
maps.1 

Until  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century  the  city  was  con- 
tained within  the  walls:  on  the  right  bank  these  followed  the 
line  of  the  Grands  Boulevards  of  today;  on  the  left  bank  the 
walls  began  at  what  is  now  the  Bibliotheque  Mazarin,  then 
the  Porte  de  Nesle,  and  formed  a  rather  narrow  circuit  which 
included  the  University  quarter.  The  Porte  Saint-Michel, 
which  was  the  point  in  the  circuit  most  distant  from  the  river, 
was  only  a  little  beyond  the  Sorbonne,  on  the  street  which  is 
now  the  Boulevard  Saint-Michel.  After  1550  there  was  a 
distinct  tendency  to  build  outside  the  walls.  Three  faubourgs 
developed:  the  industrial  faubourgs  on  the  right  bank,  out- 
side the  Porte  Saint  Denis,  and  the  Porte  Saint  Antoine:  the 
fashionable  Faubourg  Saint  Germain,  on  the  left  bank.  Edicts 
were  issued  in  1554, 1587,  and  in  1627, 1632,  and  1648,  forbidding 
the  erection  of  buildings  outside  the  walls  without  special  per- 
mits; but  the  movement  continued  in  ever-increasing  volume. 
The  close  of  the  sixteenth  century  witnessed  a  rapid  extension 

1  Histoire  Monumentale  de  Paris.  Topographic  du  Vieux  Paris,  6  vols.  See 
especially  vols.  iii-vi.  The  general  account  given  here  is  based  on  material 
in  vol.  iii,  pp.  7,  127  ff. 


84          THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

of  the  faubourgs.  New  streets  were  cut,  roads  were  declared 
to  be  streets,  and  the  corner  lots  were  quickly  taken  for  building 
sites.  The  movement  in  the  industrial  suburbs  is  not  traced 
in  detail,  but  the  development  of  the  Faubourg  Saint  Germain 
can  be  followed  as  closely  as  the  most  ardent  antiquarian  could 
desire.  The  first  generation  of  the  seventeenth  century  brought 
ten  religious  houses  to  Paris  from  various  provincial  towns.1 
All  the  new  congregations  established  themselves  in  the  Fau- 
bourg Saint  Germain.  Nobles  who  had  formerly  remained 
on  their  estates  came  to  Paris  and  built  in  the  Faubourg.  Dur- 
ing the  reign  of  Louis  XIV  this  growth  of  the  city  continued. 
Saint-Sulpice,  the  largest  parish  church  in  the  city,  was  begun 
in  1643, to  provide  adequate  facilities  for  the  constantly  increas- 
ing number  of  parishioners  established  in  this  new  quarter 
outside  the  walls.  The  nobles  and  higher  clergy  came  to  Paris 
in  greater  numbers,  attracted  by  the  court  and  the  intellectual 
fascination  of  the  great  capital.  The  industrial  development 
of  the  city  is  less  easily  followed,  but  the  growing  commercial 
importance  of  Paris  in  the  seventeenth  century  suggests  that 
the  concentration  of  the  special  industries  of  the  capital  was 
increasing.  The  city  seems  to  have  begun  to  expand  in  the 
middle  of  the  sixteenth  century,  growing  slowly  until  the  death 
of  Louis  XIII  and  then  increasing  more  rapidly,  until  in  1715 
it  was  unquestionably  the  first  city  in  the  kingdom. 

The  other  factor  in  the  development  of  pressure  upon  the 
commercial  supply  will  be  suggested  by  an  estimate  of  the  con- 
sumption of  Paris  in  1637.  According  to  this  account  1600 
muids  of  grain  were  consumed  each  week.  800  muids  were 
brought  to  the  markets  of  the  city  as  bread;  450  muids  came 
to  the  Ports  and  Halle  as  grain;  350  muids  were  used  by  the 
religious  houses,  who  received  it  from  their  farms  or  purchased 
it  privately  outside  of  Paris.2  Almost  one-fourth  of  the  supply 

1  Topographie  de  Paris,  III,  135.     1602,  Freres  de  la  Charite;  1605,  Petits 
Augustins;   1622,  Benedictins  de  Calvaire;   1626,  Maison  des  Jeunes  Filles;   1630, 
Monastere  du  Precieux  Sang;   1633,  Jacobins,  Augustins  de  Laon;   1634,  fitablisse* 
ment  Hospitalier;    1635,  Chanoinesses  de  Saint-Sepulcre;    1636,  Benedictins  de 
Saint-Liesse;  Religieuses  de  Saint  Nicholas  de  Tulle,  etc. 

2  Memoires  des  Intendants  sur  Us  Generality:  Paris,  p.  657. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS  85 

of  the  city  did  not  enter  into  the  trade  at  all.  Besides  the 
religious  houses,  many  of  the  nobles  and  the  wealthy  bourgeois 
procured  their  own  supplies  in  the  country  without  any  contact 
with  the  trade.  Obviously  a  change  in  these  habits,  an  aban- 
donment of  this  private  buying  would  swell  the  volume  of  trade 
in  the  hands  of  the  merchants.  If  the  merchants  were  to  buy 
in  the  same  place  as  the  private  individuals  or  the  religious 
houses,  it  would  affect  the  trade  slightly,  but  they  would  prob- 
ably buy  where  they  were  accustomed  to,  and  the  change  in 
the  trade  might  be  of  importance.  An  increase  in  the  volume 
of  the  trade  handled  by  the  merchants  would  tend  to  develop 
new  forms  of  commercial  organization  even  if  the  actual  demand 
of  Paris  remained  stationary. 

After  1625-30  the  Parisian  grain  trade  begins  to  develop  new 
practices  which  are  largely  the  outgrowth  of  the  increased 
pressure  upon  the  supply.  The  changes  are  not  especially 
significant  in  years  of  abundance,  but  the  dearths  of  the  period 
seem  to  exert  some  influence  upon  the  organization  of  the  trade. 
Even  the  moderate  scarcity  of  the  years  1626,  1630-31,  1643, 
and  1649  was  probably  not  without  effect.  The  full  extent  of 
the  changes  cannot  be  measured.  There  were  official  inquiries, 
but  such  papers  as  survive  afford  little  information,  and,  in  the 
absence  of  the  full  reports  of  the  commissaries,  it  is  idle  to 
speculate  upon  the  conditions  of  that  period.1  Some  of  the 
Proces  Verbaux  of  these  numerous  commissions  might  be  found 
among  the  papers  of  the  Chatelet;  those  submitted  to  the 
municipality  were  destroyed  with  the  Hotel  de  Ville.  The 
evidence  available  thus  represents  but  a  small  part  of  the  testi- 
mony actually  taken,  and  under  these  circumstances  it  is  neces- 
sary to  avoid  definite  conclusions.  There  is,  however,  a  little 
evidence  of  "  country  buying."  At  a  general  assembly  at 
Paris  in  1630,  Sr.  Perrot  says  that  "  the  merchants  have  created 

1  See  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  372  and  1020.  Comm.  of  14  Dec.  1630.  Bib. 
Nat.,  Fr.  21641.  145.  12  Jan.  1631.  Commissions.  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21635.  38. 
Arret  du  Parl.  6  Mai  1626.  Commissioners  sent  to  Chartres,  Soissons,  and  other 
places.  H.  1803.  iii=lx;  H.  1806.  1;  H.  1806.  iiiicxlvii  and  vicxi.  Reg.  du 
Bureau.  Commissions  of  the  fichevins,  1631,  1643.  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21635.  46. 
26  Jan.  1649.  Comm.  by  Parlement  of  Paris. 


86  THE  GRAIN   TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

the  high  prices,  by  going  among  the  farms  and  paying  more  than 
the  peasants  expected."  l 

The  testimony  of  various  grain  merchants  taken  at  Paris 
shows  clearly  that  the  granary  purchases  were  still  the  basis 
of  the  trade.  Nicolle  Eucheve  says  that  her  husband  is  "at 
Vitry-le-Frangois  shipping  oats  and  rye  that  he  bought  there  of 
merchants  of  Chalons."2  Louise  Duquesnoy  says  that  "she 
has  at  Chalons  500  se tiers  of  wheat  and  250  setiers  of  rye,  which 
was  bought  for  her  by  Husson  Ruche,  her  agent  at  Chalons." 
Hughes  de  Cloos  "  has  a  boat-load  at  Noyon,  ready  to  be  shipped, 
and  400-500  setiers  of  rye  at  Chalons.  All  this  grain  was  pur- 
chased by  his  factor,  Pierre  Marchand,  who  lives  at  Chalons." 
Bissart  Tirant  "  has  sixty  muids  in  granaries  at  Fimes  and 
Soissons.  It  has  all  been  bought  within  the  last  three  weeks  by 
Combray,  his  factor  at  Fimes."  "  Pierre  de  Clerc  has  600  setiers 
of  grain  at  Chalons  that  was  purchased  for  him  by  Arras,  his 
factor  at  Chalons."  All  the  principal  merchants  buy  through 
resident  agents,  and  apparently  most  of  the  purchases  are  made 
in  granaries.  But  some  of  the  merchants  were  probably  buying 
in  the  country.  "  Nicolle  Regnault  says  that  her  husband 
is  in  France3  to  ship  grain  that  he  has  bought  there  within 
the  last  three  days."  "  Isabelle  Labbe  says  that  her  husband 
has  a  boat-load  of  grain  on  the  Marne.  She  does  not  know 
the  quantity,  but  her  husband  bought  it  in  France."  Similarly, 
"  Marguerite  Froissart  says  that  her  husband  has  a  boat-load 
of  grain  on  the  Aube,  about  sixty  muids  in  all.  Her  husband 
bought  part  at  Soissons,  but  she  does  not  know  where  he  bought 
the  rest.  He  has  some  grain  at  Lizy."  4  The  vagueness  of  this 
information  is  suspicious;  when  the  towns  are  not  clearly  indi- 
cated it  generally  means  that  the  purchases  are  made  in  the 
country.  It  is  quite  possible,  too,  that  the  resident  factors 
should  have  sought  supplies  outside  the  town  granaries.  Later, 

1  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  368.     12  Dec.  1630. 

2  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.      136-142.     All  the  testimony  is  from  this  document. 
"  Assemblee  en  la  Chambre  Saint-Louis  pour  les  Bleds."     The  witnesses  are  grain 
merchants. 

3  /.  e.  the  Marne  towns  below  Meaux. 

4  All  citations  from  the  same  Proces  Verbal. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS  87 

the  resident  factor  is  generally  engaged  in  systematic  "  country 
buying,"  so  that  it  is  possible  that  the  merchants  were  cover- 
ing up  unpopular  practices  by  feigning  ignorance  of  where 
the  factors  made  their  purchases.  The  subject  is  hopelessly 
obscure. 

In  1660,  doubt  is  no  longer  possible.  The  merchants  began 
to  buy  extensively  in  the  country,  and  by  their  energetic  can- 
vass of  the  farms  the  loca.1  markets  were  seriously  affected. 
An  anonymous  memoir  describes  these  practices.  "  One  Godet, 
merchant  at  Chalons,  first  made  prices  rise  by  his  canvass  of  all 
the  granaries  in  the  town,  and  by  his  trips  in  the  environs  among 
the  laborers.  He  spread  false  rumors,  and  also  bought  large 
quantities.  At  the  same  time,  Tixerand  senior,  merchant 
and  Elu  of  Vitry-le-Frangois,  made  a  circuit  of  the  granaries 
of  the  town  and  scoured  the  surrounding  country.  He  forced 
prices  up  to  such  a  point  that  the  municipal  officers  have  pro- 
hibited exports.  Four  merchants  of  Paris  have  gone  to  La 
Ferte-sous-Jouarre  where  they  made  their  agreements.  The 
same  day  they  left  the  place  and  spread  through  the  country, 
making  prices  rise  without  buying  very  large  quantities." 1 
Around  Soissons  this  "  country  buying  "  was  not  regarded  as  a 
novelty,  so  that  our  surmises  in  regard  to  the  "  country  buying  " 
after  1630  would  be  confirmed.  "  Nicole  Gigue,  laborer  at 
Soissons,  said  that  the  merchants  and  inhabitants  of  Soissons 
always  (de  tout  temps)  bought  grain  in  the  country,  up  as  far 
as  Pontavert.  They  ship  the  grain  down  to  Soissons  in  boats, 
unload  the  grain,  and  store  it  in  their  houses  or  granaries." 
Henriette  Violette,  widow  of  a  miller  at  Soissons,  testifies  to  the 
same  facts.2  At  Mary-sur-Seine,  one  Lefavre  showed  the 
commissaries  a  granary  containing  twenty  muids.  "  He  said 
that  he  sent  a  boat  to  Paris  every  week.  The  last  went  the  pre- 
ceding Saturday.  The  grain  we  saw  had  been  bought  of  peas- 
ants within  eight  or  ten  leagues.  It  was  brought  to  Mary  in 
carts."  They  visited  the  house  of  Romain  Gray,  the  factor  of 
Audiger  of  Paris.  Gray  was  not  at  home.  "  His  daughter 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.     173.     Memoire,  1660. 

2  Ibid.     363.     Proces  Verbal,  7  Oct.  1660. 


88          THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

said  that  he  had  been  in  the  back  country  for  three  days,  buying 
grain,  and  that  he  was  likely  to  be  away  another  week."  1  Along 
the  Seine,  at  Montereau  and  in  the  back  country  between  the 
Seine  and  the  Marne,  there  was  much  "  country  buying." 
Louise  Pigre,  widow  of  the  notary  of  Montereau,  said  "  that 
Nepveu,  who  is  the  agent  of  the  Widow  Rousseau,  buys  in  the 
market  at  Montereau  and  of  the  peasants  for  six  leagues  around." 
Another  witness  says:  "  He  has  been  buying  among  the  peasants 
for  the  last  month,  so  that  he  has  affected  all  the  markets. 
Almost  nothing  comes  to  market.  One  Lavalle  has  also  been 
among  the  peasants  buying  their  grain." 2  The  Courier  of 
Champagne  reports  "  that  five  or  six  merchants  of  Paris  are 
riding  post  through  the  country."  3 

This  development  of  energetic  canvassing  was  fatal  to  the 
local  markets.  Their  supplies  were  sapped.  The  peasants 
sold  to  the  wholesale  merchants  in  the  farms,  without  taking 
the  trouble  to  bring  the  grain  to  market.  The  market-place 
was  bare.  When  grain  still  came  to  the  local  market  the  whole- 
sale merchants  appeared  and  bought  it  up,  if  a  popular  revolt 
did  not  force  them  to  beat  a  hasty  retreat.  The  full  signifi- 
cance of  the  "  country  buying  "  is  revealed  only  in  the  dearths 
of  1693,  1698,  and  1709.  The  practice  did  not  affect  all  regions 
alike  but  everywhere  the  old  modes  of  marketing  were  seriously 
disturbed.  This  opened  the  way  to  reorganization  which  in 
some  places  was  significant,  in  other  places,  of  little  moment. 

The  destructive  aspect  of  this  new  phase  of  the  grain  trade 
was  most  conspicuous  in  the  Beauce.  There  the  result  was 
disorganization  of  the  many  little  markets  and  a  gradual  con- 
centration of  the  trade.  In  the  early  seventeenth  century  the 
trade  from  the  Beauce  fell  into  two  general  divisions;  Etampes 
was  the  principal  market  on  the  eastern  side,  and  on  the  western 
side  Chartres  was  most  important.  "  Some  of  the  grain  from 
Etampes  was  sent  to  Paris  in  small  boats  as  late  as  1670,  but 
the  completion  of  the  paved  road  from  Etampes  to  Paris  ren- 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.     197.     10  Oct.  1660.     Proces  Verbal. 

2  Ibid.     261.     31  Juillet  1660.     Proces  Verbal. 

8  Ibid.,  Testimony  of  Francoise  Viaret  and  of  Louise  Martin. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS  89 

dered  the  land  route  superior.1  In  those  days  there  were  thirty 
to  forty  boats  in  the  port  of  Etampes,  especially  adapted  for 
the  navigation  of  that  river.  They  carried  ten  muids  each, 
and  scarcely  sufficed  to  handle  the  trade  with  Paris.  .  .  .  Some 
grain  was  sent  to  Paris  by  the  carters."  2  But  although  Chartres 
and  Etampes  were  the  principal  markets  of  these  sections 
many  other  markets  were  in  direct  connection  with  Paris.  In 
the  direction  of  Chartres,  we  hear  especially  of  Dourdan,  Houdan, 
Montfort-1'Amaury,  Rambouillet,  Epernon,  and  Nogent-le- 
Roy.3  In  the  direction  of  Etampes,  Corbeil,  Melun,  and  Mont- 
ereau  were  most  important.  "  In  those  days,  no  merchant  of 
Etampes  sent  grain  to  the  market  of  Montlhery,  nor  to  other 
markets.  They  shipped  directly  and  uniquely  to  Paris.  The 
towns  of  Sens,  Montereau,  Melun,  and  Corbeil  likewise  shipped 
directly  to  Paris.  Now  all  the  merchants  of  Etampes  have  two 
or  three  granaries  at  Montlhery,  and  the  merchants  of  the 
other  towns  have  recognized  that  the  markets  of  the  towns 
near  Paris  are  most  advantageous  because  of  the  presence 
of  the  bakers.  Latterly,  the  bakers  have  been  possessed  of 
more  capital,  and  have  canvassed  the  markets,  buying  at  any 
price.  They  do  not  make  much  profit  on  their  bread  unless 
grain  is  dear,  so  they  do  not  higgle  over  prices.  ...  In  these 
markets  of  the  country  there  are  great  numbers  of  men  called 
blatters,  who  bring  in  grain  on  horses  and  mules.  On  market 
days  there  are  400-500  of  these  animals  at  Montlhery,  all  loaded 
with  wheat,  oats,  and  barley.  The  blatiers  are  villagers  who 
cultivate  no  land  but  spend  all  their  time  in  scouring  the  coun- 
try." 4  This  concentration  of  trade  at  Montlhery  was  not 
only  bringing  together  the  grain  from  the  eastern  side  of  the 
Beauce,  it  was  also  drawing  from  the  vicinity  of  Chartres,  thus 
tending  to  bring  to  one  market  the  whole  trade  of  the  Beauce 

1  G7.    425.     5  Sept.  1685.     Memoire  de  Menars  sur  1'filection  d'fitampes. 

2  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.     354.     8  Sept.  (1698).     Memoire  sur  les  desordres  qui 
se  commettent  es  environs  de  Paris. 

8  Memoires  des  Intendants  sur  les  Generalites:  Paris,  p.  659.  Notices  sur  les 
marches  dans  les  environs  de  Paris.  1686. 

4  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.  354.  8  Sept.  (1698).  Memoire  sur  les  desordres  qui 
se  commettent  es  environs  de  Paris. 


90         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

with  Paris.  "  The  market  at  Montlhery  is  one  of  the  most 
important  for  thirty  leagues  around.  The  farmers  of  Yenville 
(Janville)  and  of  Chartres  bring  in  such  great  quantity  every 
Monday  that  there  are  actually  as  much  as  four  or  five  hundred 
muids  on  the  market."  *  The  market  at  Montlhery,  in  1699, 
thus  handled  about  twice  as  much  grain  as  the  Halle  at  Paris, 
a  striking  development  for  a  market  that  is  not  even  mentioned 
in  the  memoir  of  1686  on  the  grain  markets  supplying  Paris. 
Much  grain  still  went  to  Paris  direct  from  the  minor  market 
towns,  but  there  is  clearly  a  significant  concentration  of  the 
trade.2 

The  volume  of  trade  passing  through  Montlhery,  the  number 
of  bakers,  merchants,  and  Uatiers  buying  and  selling,  led  to 
speculative  purchases.  The  grain  trade  attracted  all  types  of 
speculators;  some  sought  to  gain  by  scouring  the  country, 
buying  outside  the  markets,  others  confined  their  attention 
to  operations  in  the  town.  In  all  this  ferment  of  speculation 
the  markets  fared  badly,  Montlhery  no  less  than  the  minor  local 
markets.  At  times,  the  distress  took  the  form  of  inexplicably 
high  prices;  at  times,  the  markets  were  ill  supplied  with  grain. 
Then,  quite  frequently,  the  markets  were  unusually  well  sup- 
plied. This  extraordinary  confusion  makes  the  trade  of  the 
Beauce  very  difficult  to  understand,  but  despite  the  great 
variety  of  reports,  it  is  quite  evident  that  the  system  of  marketing 
was  changing  rapidly. 

The  canvass  of  the  farms  by  merchants  and  Uatiers  is  reported 
from  all  sides.  "  The  merchants  of  Paris  .  .  .  have  been  to 
Janville  and  Chartres  among  many  of  the  farms.  They  have 
bought  or  contracted  to  take  all  the  grain  of  that  section,  so 
that  only  20-30  muids  has  come  to  Montlhery  since  29  January 
(1699). "3  Desperrieres  writes  from  Chartres,  "it  is  necessary 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21644.     6.     Memoire  sur  les  Bleds.  —  Undated  (1699). 

2  Desperrieres,  in  a  letter  of  18  Dec.  1698,  from  Chartres  (G7.     419)  comments 
on  the  old  trade  from  the  Pays  Chartrain.     He  speaks  of  the  movement  from 
Nogent  and- Chartres  to  Houdan  and  thence  to  Mantes.     He  does  not  feel  quite 
sure  of  the  destination  of  the  grain,  however,  and  seems  inclined  to  think  that  it 
goes  down  the  Seine  to  Rouen. 

3  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21644.     6.     Memoire  sur  les  Bleds.     (1699.) 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS  9! 

to  prevent  the  merchants  from  buying  in  the  farms  and  houses 
of  the  peasants."  l  From  Melun,  we  hear  that  all  classes  "  are 
engaged  in  the  gram  trade :  magistrates,  all  kinds  of  merchants, 
and  even  artisans.  Some,  doubtless  the  well-to-do,  or  the 
most  avaricious,  buy  in  the  barns  of  the  peasants."  2  Bouville 
says  that  he  is  informed  that  "  many  of  the  merchants  are  buy- 
ing of  the  metayers."  3  In  the  vicinity  of  Limours  there  are 
rumors  of  the  same  practice.  The  collector  of  that  town  is 
said  to  be  forming  granaries:  "  for  the  last  two  weeks  carts 
loaded  with  grain  have  been  met  at  night  on  all  the  roads  leading 
to  Limours  and  Chevreuse.  Several  persons  of  Rambouillet 
are  doing  likewise,  and  it  is  said  that  they  buy  of  the  peasants 
on  the  farms."  4 

But  this  "  country  buying  "  was  only  one  of  the  changes 
in  the  Beauce.  The  larger  market  towns  witnessed  an  appear- 
ance of  speculative  buying  that  caused  much  apprehension. 
The  officials  were  at  a  loss  to  know  how  this  new  phenomenon 
should  be  treated,  but  they  were  thoroughly  convinced  that  it 
was  dangerous.  "  I  have  been  told,"  writes  one  De  Poix, 
"  that  three-quarters  of  the  1 200  setiers  brought  to  Paris  in  the 
last  fortnight  from  the  Beauce  was  not  sold  on  the  markets, 
at  market  prices  in  accordance  with  the  ordinances.  It  is 
sold  at  prices  made  outside  the  markets,  at  the  inns  and  cafes. 
The  peasants  exhibit  samples  in  their  handkerchiefs  or  in  their 
pockets,  and  higgle  with  the  merchants  over  their  cups.  The 
prices  are  concluded,  then  they  separate  to  go  to  the  market, 
where  they  meet  again.  They  open  the  sacks  and  make  believe  to 
run  the  price  up  to  the  figure  agreed  upon.  The  grain  is  meas- 
ured and  is  then  carried  off  in  carts,  or  on  the  horses  and  mules 
brought  to  town  by  the  buyers  and  the  millers.  The  bourgeois 
and  the  peasantry  who  come  to  buy  are  seriously  inconvenienced, 
as  they  cannot  secure  grain  and  are  forced  to  return  to  their 
homes  empty-handed.  Meanwhile  these  buyers  and  market 

\  G7.     419.     Chartres,  18  Dec.  1698.     Desperrieres  a  Bouville. 

*  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.     457.     Melun,  16  Dec.  1698.     Parry  a  (Delamare). 

8  G7.     419.     Orleans,  4  Dec.  1698.     Bouville  au  C.  G. 

4  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21645.     88.     Extrait  d'une  lettre  ecrite  de  Villepreaux.     (1699.) 


92  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

speculators  send  out  into  the  farms,  and  carry  away  stealthily 
grain  for  which  they  have  contracted  on  the  basis  of  samples, 
in  addition  to  what  they  have  bought  on  the  market.'' l  In 
this  manner  the  wholesale  traders  managed  to  secure  the  larger 
part  of  the  supplies  of  the  region  without  entering  into  public 
competition  with  each  other  or  with  the  local  demand.  Inci- 
dentally, an  important  departure  from  the  old  system  appeared 
in  the  buying  by  sample. 

At  Montlhery,  this  type  of  extra-market  dealing  is  found  in 
conjunction  with  other  irregularities  whose  character  is  not  very 
clear.  "  When  the  farmers  see  that  grain  is  dear,  they  carry 
samples  of  grain  to  market  in  their  pockets.  They  show  these 
samples  to  the  bakers  from  Paris,  and  make  their  sales  on  this 
basis.  The  bakers  then  send  their  millers  to  the  farms  and 
carry  off  the  grain  at  their  convenience.  One  miller  at  Juvisy, 
named  Conart,  has  shipped  as  much  as  fifty  muids  of  grain  in 
one  day,  on  behalf  of  bakers  of  Paris."  2  At  Montlhery,  also, 
the  bakers  at  times  engaged  in  curious  speculative  attempts 
to  manipulate  the  market.  "  The  bakers  of  Montlhery  and 
Linas  go  every  Saturday  to  the  market  at  Dourdan,  but  instead 
of  buying  what  they  need  for  a  week  or  two  they  form  granaries 
there.  They  ship  from  these  granaries  to  Montlhery,  where 
prices  are  high.  To  further  their  ends  they  make  heavy  pur- 
chases at  Dourdan  on  Saturday,  the  market  day,  making  prices 
rise  by  their  operations,  and  as  the  market  at  Montlhery  on 
Monday  is  influenced  by  that  at  Dourdan,  the  bakers  are  able 
to  dispose  of  their  grain  at  Montlhery  at  a  considerable  advance 
in  price.  Then,  too,  the  wealthier  farmers  of  the  environs  of 
Montlhery,  for  three  or  four  leagues  around,  come  regularly 
to  market  on  Monday  without  bringing  a  single  bag  of  grain. 
They  watch  the  course  of  the  market,  and  almost  every  time 
they  buy  grain  of  the  farmers  of  the  environs  who  cannot  hold 
their  grain,  but  are  forced  to  sell  even  before  it  is  threshed. 
These  sales  are  made  on  the  basis  of  samples,  which  the  farmers 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21644.     301.     Paris,  13  Jan.  1699.     De  Poix. 

2  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.     356.     8  Sept.  1698.     Memoire  qui  marque  les  dSsordres 
qui  se  commettent  es  environs  de  Paris. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS  93 

carry  in  their  pockets.  The  sellers  agree  to  deliver  the  grain 
as  soon  as  it  is  threshed.  This  goes  on  every  market  day,  and 
it  contributes  much  to  cause  high  prices,  because  the  grain  is 
not  brought  to  market  by  the  owners  as  soon  as  it  is  threshed, 
but  is  diverted  into  granaries.  Many  farmers  have  thus  come 
to  market  regularly  without  bringing  any  grain  to  be  sold."  * 

At  Chartres,  the  other  considerable  market  in  the  Beauce, 
the  same  intensity  of  speculative  buying  appeared,  but  the 
accounts  are  not  so  detailed.  There  was  much  canvassing  of 
the  farms  in  the  neighborhood,  and  in  the  town  itself  every  one 
was  engaged  in  the  trade;  "  from  the  richest  to  the  poorest," 
all  had  caught  the  fever,  even  "  the  porters  of  the  market-place 
and  their  wives.  They  are  all  buying  and  selling.  The  well-to- 
do  peasants,  who  have  grain  of  their  awn  still  un threshed,  buy 
daily  on  the  market.  They  form  granaries  and  trade  both  on 
the  markets  of  the  neighborhood  and  on  the  town  market. 
I  have  been  assured  that  among  all  the  traders  there  are  no 
more  than  three  or  four  hundred  muids  of  grain."  2 

At  Nemours,  everything  was  on  a  smaller  scale,  but  the 
general  aspects  of  the  situation  were  the  same.  "  Several  mer- 
chants," writes  an  anonymous  correspondent,  "  have  purchases 
made  for  them  by  secret  agents  and  then  they  sell  again  imme- 
diately at  higher  prices.  Most  of  the  merchants  come  to  market 
before  the  appointed  hour  and  make  secret  agreements  in  regard 
to  prices  with  the  carters  who  have  grain  to  sell.  The  latter 
keep  their  sacks  closed  all  through  the  market,  and  when  it  is 
over  they  deliver  the  grain  to  the  merchants.  Some  merchants 
stop  the  peasants  in  the  streets  before  their  houses;  others 
seek  them  in  the  cafes  and  inns;  others  go  among  the  farms, 
scouring  the  rural  districts."  3  In  short,  there  was  no  longer 
any  organized  market  at  Nemours. 

In  this  confused  picture  of  the  destruction  of  the  old  market 
system  in  the  Beauce  is  revealed  the  full  meaning  of  the  pressure 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.     356.     8  Sept.  1698.     Memoire  qui  marque  tous  les 
d6sordres  qui  se  commettent  es  environs  de  Paris. 

2  G7.     419.     Chartres,  18  Dec.  1698.     Desperrieres  a  Bouville. 

8  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21645.     333.     Extrait  d'une  lettre  e"crite  de  Nemours,  1699. 


94  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

which  began  in  the  last  years  of  Louis  XIII.  The  increased 
intensity  of  commercial  demand  destroyed  the  traditions  of  a 
century  and  a  half.  The  transition  is  difficult  to  follow  because 
it  leads  to  so  little  that  is  definite.  There  is  a  concentration 
of  trade  at  Montlhery  that  is  really  significant,  but  the  new 
market  is  not  based  on  any  definite  regulations.  It  is  the  crea- 
tion of  commercial  convenience,  and  disappears  in  a  large  meas- 
ure amidst  the  confusion  of  the  period.  The  trade  flows 
through  Montlhery,  indeed,  but  there  is  no  well-organized 
market.  The  inadequacy  of  the  old  system  is  proved,  but 
nothing  new  supplants  it.  The  markets  exist  in  form,  without 
any  of  the  regularity  that  secured  for  the  buyers  and  sellers  the 
comprehensive  competition  that  should  be  found  on  a  market. 
The  merchants  buy  freely  in  the  cafes  and  inns;  supplies  no 
longer  appear  in  full  on  the  market;  the  farmers  are  content 
to  bring  samples  to  market;  the  merchants,  too,  scour  the  coun- 
tryside, buying  in  the  farms,  so  that  the  peasants  no  longer 
come  to  market  with  their  wonted  regularity.  In  short,  the 
problem  of  marketing  appeared  in  all  its  complexity;  all  the 
dangers  and  disadvantages  of  the  chaos  were  perceived  more 
or  less  clearly  by  the  administrative  officials;  the  solution 
of  the  difficulty  was,  however,  beyond  them.  They  were  natu- 
rally inclined  to  enforce  the  old  regulations,  but  the  inexpediency 
of  such  measures  was  quickly  revealed  and  the  attempt  was 
abandoned.  In  this  section  of  the  Seine  Basin  the  disorganiza- 
tion of  the  markets  produced  no  helpful  results;  no  new  forms 
were  developed  that  promised  any  improvement  in  price-making 
and  distribution. 

In  the  Valley  of  the  Oise  the  disadvantages  of  the  prevailing 
methods  of  the  wholesale  marketing  appeared,  but  not  in  such 
an  exaggerated  form  that  thorough  reorganization  of  the  system 
became  necessary.  Nothing  could  better  illustrate  the  inertia 
of  institutions.  No  far-reaching  change  took  place  until  the 
old  system  became  impossible.  The  old  market  was  seriously 
affected;  the  wholesale  trade  became  quite  independent  of  the 
town  market,  and  finally  encroached  upon  the  supply  coming 
to  the  town,  but  despite  all  the  difficulties  of  the  case,  nothing 


'THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS       95 

was  done  to  organize  the  trade  on  a  new  basis.  The  general 
aspects  of  the  trade  at  Soissons  underwent  little  change  in  the 
course  of  the  latter  half  of  the  seventeenth  century;  the  character 
of  the  marketing  in  1660  is  typical.  Conditions  in  the  town 
itself  are  described  by  the  Procureur  du  Roi.  "  The  merchants 
trading  with  Paris  and  other  inhabitants  do  not  allow  the  grain 
to  come  into  town  for  the  market,  but  go  out  to  meet  the  carters. 
They  buy  secretly  not  only  outside  the  town  but  even  in  the 
streets.  This  impairs  the  market  so  that  generally  only  three 
or  four  muids  are  offered  for  sale."  l  But  much  grain  was 
bought  in  the  country,  either  on  the  farms  or  in  granaries  of 
landlords.  Thus,  Claude  Archin  had  eighty  muids  of  grain 
"  which  he  had  bought  from  day  to  day  of  the  peasants  of  the 
country  and  others."  2  Another  merchant  has  300  muids  in 
the  granaries  of  the  Abbey  of  Saint  Jean  des  Vignes,3  part  of 
which  was  probably  bought  of  the  Abbey.  In  another  granary 
eighty  muids  were  found:  the  product  of  the  dues  of  "  Lest- 
rage,"  which  had  been  farmed  out  by  the  Lieutenant  Particulier 
of  Soissons.4  Another  granary  had  been  filled  with  grain  brought 
in  within  the  last  three  weeks  from  Fer-en-Tretenois.5  Antoine 
1'Eveque  had  240  muids  of-  wheat,  66  muids  of  mixed  grain, 
40  muids  of  rye,  30  muids  of  oats,  which  he  had  bought  from  time 
to  time  in  the  town  of  Soissons  or  in  the  neighborhood.  In 
partnership  with  Audiger  and  Le  Vaux,  he  had  bought  about 
900  muids  of  grain  of  the  Marechal  d'Estrees.  Part  of  this 
was  in  the  Chateau  at  Soissons,  part  at  Crevecoeur;  and  what 
had  not  already  been  shipped  to  Paris  was  still  in  the  Chateau.6 
The  wholesale  trade  had  thus  taken  control  of  practically 
all  the  supplies  of  the  region;  what  the  merchants  did  not 
themselves  buy  in  the  country  was  bought  by  them  or  by  bour- 
geois as  soon  as  it  reached  the  town.  The  town  was  necessarily 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.     250  and  254.    6  Nov.  1660.     Depositions  du  Procureur 
du  Roi  and  du  Sr.  Martinet. 

2  Ibid.,  sous  nom  "  Claude  Archin." 

3  Ibid.,  deposition  de  la  femme  de  Danre". 

4  Ibid.,  deposition  d' Antoine  Martinet. 

5  Ibid.    250  ff.     7  Nov.  1660. 

6  Ibid.,  testimony  of  Antoine  L'fiveque. 


96          THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

dependent  upon  the  wholesale  merchants,  since  its  supplies  were 
largely  derived  from  their  granaries.  The  position  of  the  town 
was  insecure,  but  the  consequences  of  the  domination  of  the 
trade  by  the  wholesalers  were  not  necessarily  serious.  The 
merchants  were  left  to  do  very  much  as  they  pleased  for  long 
periods.  In  1660,  there  was  some  complaint  about  the  failure 
to  enforce  the  ordinances.  The  principal  judicial  officers  were 
said  to  be  interested  in  the  trade,  so  that  they  purposely  re- 
frained from  enforcing  the  regulations.1  At  all  events,  the  trade 
continued  on  this  illegal  basis  throughout  the  remaining  years 
of  the  century.  In  1670,  the  merchants  even  had  the  courage 
to  claim  exemption  from  market  dues  on  the  ground  that  their 
trade  did  not  pass  through  the  town  market.  They  declared 
that  20,000  muids  were  shipped  annually  to  Paris,  and  they 
implied  that  most  of  the  grain  was  bought  outside  the  town.2 

The  danger  of  this  domination  of  the  wholesale  trade  appeared 
in  1684,  when  the  intensity  of  the  Parisian  demand  caused  an 
extraordinary  rise  in  prices.  Soissons  was  threatened  with 
dearth  by  the  extent  of  the  shipments  to  Paris.  The  Intendant 
writes:  "  Wheat,  which  was  worth  only  20-22  ecus  per  muid 
last  year,  rose  to  38  ecus  in  June  and  July,  and  now,  September 
ist,  grain  is  worth  46  ecus,  —  a  figure  never  before  reached  at 
this  season  of  the  year.  These  high  prices  have  caused  general 
consternation,  and  the  common  people  murmur.  ...  I  have 
just  sent  the  Echevins  an  ordinance,  which  requires  the  mer- 
chants to  take  turns  in  supplying  the  markets.  Measures 
have  also  been  taken  to  prevent  prices  from  exceeding  prices 
at  Paris.  No  sales  may  be  made  to  merchants  of  Paris,  so  long 
as  any  individuals  desire  to  buy  at  retail  to  supply  their  wants."  3 
The  principle  involved  in  this  ordinance  was  important  but  no 
reorganization  of  the  trade  was  effected.  The  town  of  Soissons 
was  protected;  the  proper  relation  between  the  wholesale  and 
the  local  trade  was  established  by  an  administrative  order,  and 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.     250  ff.     6  Nov.  1660. 

2  H.  1822.     Reg.  du  Bureau,  clxii.     1670. 

3  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  I,  28,  107.     i  Sept.  1684.     Le  Vayer.     G7.     510.     i  Sept. 
1684.     Text  of  the  Ordinance  enclosed  with  letter.     Godard:  Pouvoirs  des  Inten- 
dants,  p.  313  n.,  cites  the  Ordinance. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS  97 

yet  there  was  no  progress  toward  the  development  of  machinery 
to  do  automatically  what  Le  Vayer  was  obliged  to  compass  by 
ordinance.  The  Intendant  had  to  act  as  "  Deus  ex  machina  "; 
fortunately,  his  discretion  and  insight  enabled  him  to  conduct 
himself  creditably.  The  adequacy  ^of  the  expedient  as  a  safe- 
guard against  the  disorders  of  the  chaotic  wholesale  trade 
assured  the  persistence  of  the  old  conditions. 

In  1693-94,  there  was  a  repetition  of  the  experiences  of  1684. 
The  point  of  view  of  the  Parisian  authorities  was  altered  by  their 
interest  in  purchases  made  for  the  government  in  Soissons. 
The  correspondence  is  largely  filled  with  this  affair,  but  the 
general  conditions  do  not  appear  in  the  letters.  Incidental 
information,  however,  shows  that  the  wholesale  merchants  were 
engaged  in  the  usual  operations.  Delamare  writes:  "Twenty 
merchants  of  Neuilly-Saint-Front  are  buying  up  all  the  grain, 
forming  granaries,  and  selling  to  merchants  of  Paris."  l  An 
anonymous  correspondent  writes  from  Compiegne,  one  "  France 
bought  on  the  market  through  secret  agents,  but  he  was  dis- 
covered, and  the  two  women  buying  for  him  were  arrested.  .  .  . 
The  merchant  then  went  to  Gillecourt,  a  village  near  Crepy, 
buying  there  in  the  farms,  for  twenty  sous  per  sack  more  than 
the  market  price.  Since  that  time,  all  the  farmers  for  five  leagues 
around  take  their  grain  to  him.  He  has  relatives  here  who 
receive  his  purchases  and  declare  that  it  is  from  rents."  2  At 
Soissons  there  was  much  apprehension,  and  Bossuet  admits 
that  the  supplies  of  the  province  are  small.  He  feels  that  it 
will  be  necessary  to  control  the  trade  with  care,  if  exhaustion 
is  to  be  avoided.3  On  the  whole  it  is  probable  that  the  conditions 
were  the  same  as  in  1684.  This  much  at  least  is  certain;  the 
wholesale  merchants  were  again  made  responsible  for  furnishing 
the  local  market.  Bossuet  says:  "  according  to  an  old  regula- 
tion the  maire  and  echevins  for  the  last  two  months  have  re- 
quired the  merchants  to  place  a  fixed  quantity  of  grain  on  sale 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.     270.     Note  by  Delamare,  1684. 

2  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21642.    275.    Lettre  anonyme  de  Compiegne  a  Mme.  1'Abbesse 
de  1'Hotel  Dieu  de  Paris,  1693-94. 

*  G7.     1632.     Soissons,  13  Juin  1693.     Bossuet. 


98          THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

in  a  specified  place.  They  set  the  price  at  some  figure  slightly 
below  the  current  price,  and  the  grain  is  sold  to  the  poor  artisans 
in  the  presence  of  echevins."  1  The  measure  of  Le  Vayer  was 
not  reproduced  in  its  fulness,  although  the  practical  effect  of 
the  ordinances  may  well  have  been  similar.  The  wholesale 
trade  amassed  such  quantities  of  grain  in  the  town  that  it  was 
hardly  possible  for  the  town  to  suffer  serious  inconvenience. 
The  rural  districts  were  much  more  likely  to  feel  the  pressure 
of  the  dearth,  and  they  were  not  assisted  by  the  supply  brought 
to  the  market  at  Soissons  by  the  wholesale  merchants.  The 
peasants  and  villagers  had  no  means  of  protecting  their  interests 
except  open  violence,  and  the  stopping  of  carts  and  of  grain 
boats  was  not  an  efficient  means  of  securing  reorganization  of 
the  trade.  The  comparative  security  of  the  town  made  the 
officials  indifferent,  except  in  times  of  crisis  when  their  empirical 
expedients  remedied  the  trouble  that  lay  at  their  door,  without 
in  the  least  removing  the  fundamental  cause  of  the  disorders. 

This  intensification  of  the  distress  in  the  rural  sections  ap- 
peared strongly  in  1697  and  1709.  Apprehension  was  aroused 
by  heavy  shipments  towards  the  north,  in  part  designed  for  the 
army,  but  in  part  private  trading  ventures.  The  incident  is 
not  described  clearly  by  the  Intendant  and  most  of  the  details 
are  not  relevant.  It  is  worthy  of  note,  however,  that  the  vio- 
lence was  most  considerable  in  the  smaller  towns,  Genvry, 
La  Fere,  Haut,  Marie,  and  Chaulny.  There  was  trouble  at 
Noyon,  also,  but  less  violence.2  In  1709  the  difference  between 
the  distress  in  the  towns  and  in  the  country  is  still  more  clearly 
marked.  At  Soissons  it  was  primarily  a  matter  of  high  prices, 
extraordinary  prices,  to  be  sure,  but  grain  could  be  bought. 
"  Prices  went  up  a  pistole  per  muid  at  the  last  market,"  writes 
d'Ormesson,  March  i,  1709,  "  and  merchants  who  have  come 
up  from  Paris  this  last  week  have  bought  in  the  granaries  of 
bourgeois  at  52  ecus  per  muid  of  Soissons.3  In  the  next  five 

1  G7.     1632.     Soissons,  3  Oct.  1693.     Bossuet,  avec  reponse  du  Sr.  du  Pile 
en  marge. 

2  G7.     572.     Soissons,  u,  12,  13,  15  Juin  1697.     De  la  Houssaye. 

8  Twenty-two  ecus  was  an  ordinary  price,  see  supra.  G7.  1650.  Soissons,  I 
Mars  1709.  d'Ormesson. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS  99 

weeks,  805  muids  of  wheat  and  57  muids  of  oats  were  sent  down 
to  Paris,  notwithstanding  the  high  prices.1  In  the  six  weeks 
preceding  April  18,  nearly  2000  muids  were  shipped  to  Paris 
from  Soissons,  without  counting  other  ports  on  the  river.  Evi- 
dently the  rate  of  export  increased  rather  than  diminished. 
But  no  word  of  distress  in  Soissons.  D'Ormesson  fears  for  the 
province  as  a  whole,  and  declares  that  any  attempt  to  draw 
grain  from  Soissons  for  the  army  is  likely  to  provoke  popular 
violence.  The  Bishop  writes  that  the  village  markets  of  the 
back  country  are  in  many  places  entirely  without  supplies  and 
without  hope  of  securing  any  grain,  unless  the  grain  purchased 
by  merchants  of  Paris  is  placed  on  sale.  Fere-en-Tarlenois, 
Braine,  Vailly,  Coucy,  and  Attichy  are  mentioned  particularly, 
but  the  distress  was  probably  not  confined  to  those  villages.2 
The  country  districts  thus  suffered  most  severely  from  the  dis- 
orders of  the  wholesale  trade,  but  the  relative  indifference  of 
Soissons  left  the  trade  unreformed. 

As  in  the  Beauce,  there  was  much  distress  and  chaos,  but  it 
did  not  happen  to  take  a  form  that  led  to  practical  results. 
Empirical  expedients  and  the  comparative  security  in  the  larger 
towns  on  account  of  the  swelling  volume  of  the  trade  made  it 
possible  for  the  towns  to  tolerate  the  informality  of  trade  that 
was  contrary  to  the  interests  of  the  back  country  and  of  Paris. 
At  Noyon,  circumstances  were  tending  towards  the  establish- 
ment of  a  wholesale  market,  but  the  tendencies  fell  just  short 
of  definite  results.  The  stream  of  blatters  coming  into  town 
from  day  to  day  might  easily  have  led  to  the  development  of 
an  informal  wholesale  market  such  as  appeared  at  Bray.  But 
something  was  lacking.  The  volume  of  trade  was  not  great 
enough.  The  opportunity  of  selling  privately  to  the  merchants 
and  bourgeois  was  too  alluring.  The  trade  may  have  been 
too  irregular.  At  all  events,  the  apparently  significant  ten- 
dencies at  Noyon  came  to  nothing.  Unquestionably  an  impor- 

1  G7.  1647.      Bleds  charges  a  Soissons  pour  Paris  depuis  le  6  Mars  jusqu'au 
13  Avril  1709. 

2  G7.     1650.     Soissons,  25  Avril  et  4  Mai  1709.     £v£que  de  Soissons:  Attichy, 
12  Mai  1709.    Marillac. 


100         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

tant  factor  was  the  absence  of  severe  pressure  of  Parisian  demand. 
Supplies  could  be  secured  elsewhere  in  case  of  need,  and  the 
dependence  upon  Soissonnais  was  never  very  great.  It  was  an 
occasional  source  upon  which  little  reliance  was  placed.  Con- 
sequently, purchases  in  Soissons  were  generally  curtailed  before 
the  region  was  very  seriously  affected.  The  metropolitan 
demand  was  sufficiently  intense  to  exhibit  the  possibilities, 
but  it  never  pressed  beyond  that  point.  The  history  of  the  trade 
there  is  for  this  reason  peculiarly  tantalizing;  it  presents  the 
problem,  but  the  problem  never  seems  to  need  a  complete 
solution. 

Ill 

The  First  Wholesale  Market 

In  the  Valleys  of  the  Marne  and  Seine,  the  history  of  the 
trade  is  more  significant.  The  general  forms  of  market  organiza- 
tion in  1660  were  very  similar  to  the  forms  in  the  Oise  Valley. 
The  larger  towns  were  quite  as  indifferent  to  the  welfare  of  the 
back  country.  But  these  regions  were  the  primary  source  of 
water-borne  supply,  the  reliance  of  Paris;  Paris  was  conse- 
quently ready  to  take  an  active  part  in  the  regulation  of  the 
trade  throughout  this  section.  The  interest  of  Paris,  too, 
was  never  asserted  without  regard  to  local  conditions.  The 
efforts  of  Parisian  officials  were  ever  directed  towards  finding 
some  means  of  reconciling  all  the  conflicting  necessities.  The 
pressure  upon  the  sources  of  supply,  was  more  persistent  in 
time  of  stress,  and  there  was  a  distinct  attempt  to  regulate  the 
trade  from  the  broad  standpoint  of  the  general  welfare  of  all 
.sections.  The  pressure  led  to  new  forms  of  market  organiza- 
tion; the  far-sighted  administrative  officials  were  alert  and 
ready  to  seize  upon  a  solution  of  the  ever-present  problem.  The 
history  of  the  trade  on  the  Marne  and  Seine  consequently  led 
to  definite  results.  The  first  wholesale  markets  appeared. 

In  the  Valley  of  the  Marne,  the  abundance  of  the  available 
supply  rendered  administrative  control  relatively  infrequent. 
Information  is  inadequate,  and  there  is  every  indication  that 
the  market  system  developed  less  rapidly  than  in  the  other  parts 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS'       ici: 

of  the  Seine  Basin.  The  indifference  of  the  resident  merchants 
persisted  longer  than  elsewhere,  both  in  their  dealings  with  the 
wholesale  merchants  and  with  the  blatters.  At  Chalons,  the 
granaries  were  doubtless  the  basis  of  the  wholesale  trade,  as 
has  been  stated  in  a  previous  chapter,  but  the  mode  in  which 
these  granaries  were  rilled  is  a  matter  of  importance.  In  the 
early  period,  rents  in  kind  were  the  most  important  source  of 
supply.  In  1660,  this  was  no  longer  true.  Magdelaine  Gou- 
douin  says  that  blatiers  from  Lorraine  brought  great  quantities 
of  grain  to  the  town.1  Probably  this  blatier  trade  was  quite 
extensive  even  then,  so  that  grain  came  to  the  town  in  that 
way  from  the  vicinity  as  well  as  from  Lorraine.  The  blatiers 
doubtless  sold  their  grain  on  the  market  to  the  bourgeois,  and 
the  well-to-do  had  an  opportunity  to  increase  their  stores  by 
judicious  purchases  on  the  market.  Trade  on  the  Marne  was 
thus  very  considerable  even  in  those  years  which  mark  the 
beginning  of  active  development  in  the  Oise  Valley  or  on  the 
Upper  Seine.  But  both  at  Chalons  and  at  Vitry  it  was  the  dull 
granary  trade,  —  apathetic,  inert,  manifesting  none  of  the 
feverish  effort  to  secure  the  maximum  profit  that  characterizes 
modern  trade. 

The  "  country  buying  "  that  was  so  wide-spread  in  the  Seine 
Valley  in  1660  did  not  appear  on  the  Upper  Marne  until  1694. 
That  great  dearth  indeed  marked  the  beginning  of  the  transition 
from  the  old  market  system  to  the  new.  The  merchants  of 
Chalons  began  to  devote  more  attention  to  the  business ;  instead 
of  waiting  for  the  grain  to  come  to  them,  they  made  an  active 
canvass  of  the  country.  The  region  between  the  Marne  and  the 
Seine  offered  the  greatest  supplies,  and  although  there  was 
some  competition  with  merchants  who  worked  up  from  the 
Seine,  the  traders  penetrated  to  Arcis-sur-Seine.  In  January, 
1694,  "  Lorinet  and  Clement,  merchants  at  Chalons,  came  to 
Arcis  four  or  five  times.  They  bought  and  shipped  great  quan- 
tities of  grain  which  they  said  were  destined  for  the  king's 
store  houses.  After  the  grain  had  been  measured  and  put  in 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.  357.  4  Nov.  1660.  Testimony  of  Magdelaine  Gou- 
douin. 


ID2  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

sacks,  it  was  left  for  6-8  weeks  in  the  granaries  at  Arcis."  The 
witness,  a  measurer,  said  that  "  he  had  no.  idea  of  'the  quantity 
secured  by  the  merchants,  but  every  trip  occasioned  the  ship- 
ment of  20-30  wagon-loads."  l 

Some  grain  went  to  Vitry  from  Arcis,  most  particularly  grain 
purchased  by  one  Guidor,  a  merchant  of  Nogent-sur-Seine. 
He  shipped  ordinarily  to  the  Seine  ports,  but  at  times  sold  grain 
to  merchants  at  Vitry.2  Roger,  a  merchant  of  Vitry,  also  made 
purchases  in  this  vicinity,  notably  "  of  a  couple  of  Uatiers  who 
lived  at  Aunay.  These  blatiers  bought  of  the  peasants  in  the 
farms,  and  sold  to  the  various  wholesale  merchants  at  Arcis."  3 

But  the  direct  buying  in  the  distant  villages  by  merchants 
of  Chalons  and  Vitry  was  relatively  unusual.  There  was  con- 
siderable trade  in  the  hands  of  blatiers  who  bought  on  the  Aube 
and  sold  at  the  Marne  ports.  This  was  quite  as  new  as  the  direct 
"  country  buying,"  and  much  more  important.  In  1630,  the 
Aube  Valley  sent  its  grain  directly  to  Paris; 4  in  1694,  the  direct 
trade  with  Paris  was  Astill  notable.  The  commissioners  said 
that  there  were  three  classes  of  merchants  at  Arcis-sur-Aube, 
"  the  merchants  who  traded  directly  with  Paris,  Piot  and  Thomas; 
merchants  limiting  their  operations  to  Arcis  itself,  buying  and 
selling  in  the  town;  persons  who  acted  as  agents  of  Parisian 
merchants." 5  But  the  blatier  trade  with  the  Marne  ports 
tended  to  carry  the  grain  to  the  larger  entrepots.  "  Blatiers 
who  come  from  neighboring  towns  buy  a  considerable  portion 
of  the  grain  on  the  market,  and  even  buy  of  the  merchants  of 
Arcis.  They  sell  later  in  the  markets  of  La-Fere- Champenoise, 
Vitry,  Chalons,  and  other  places  where  wholesale  merchants 
buy." 6  Jean  Barbaron,  one  of  the  witnesses,  describes  the 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.     239.     i  Aout  1694.    Arcy-sur-Aube.    Testimony  of 
Jean  Barbaron. 

2  Ibid.     239.     i  Aout  1694.     Charles  Dedet. 

3  Ibid.     248v.     2  Aout  1694.     Pierre  Hughes.    Ibid.,  247.     Marion,  factor  of 
Faure,  testifies  to  the  same  facts. 

4  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.      136.     Testimony  of  Marguerite  Froissart,   16  Dec. 
1630. 

6  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.     194.     30  Juillet  1694. 

6  Ibid.  194.  30  Juillet  1694.  Proces  Verbal,  Arcis.  General  statement  of 
the  result  of  the  inquest. 


TEE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS         103 

operations  of  Plot  and  Thomas  in  detail.  He  speaks  of  their 
shipments  to  Paris,  "  they  -shipped  four  or  five  boat-loads  of 
grain  to  Paris  during  the  last  year.  Under  this  pretext  they 
scoured  the  country,  buying  in  all  the  farms  and  villages  around 
Arcis.  They  brought  this  grain  to  their  granaries  in  the  town. 
But  he  has  observed,  of  late,  that  they  sold  to  blatters  of  Epernay, 
La-Fere-Champenois  and  other  places,  instead  of  shipping  to 
Paris." 1  The  smaller  resident  merchants  were  even  more 
dependent  upon  the  blatiers,  if  we  may  trust  the  report  of  Claude 
d'Osse,  the  Surgeon.  "  The  merchants  who  have  less  capital 
than  Piot  and  Thomas  buy  the  grain  that  is  brought  to  the 
market  at  Arcis  by  the  peasants.  This  they  store  in  granaries 
and  sell  later  to  blatiers  who  come  to  buy."  2  The  Aube  Valley 
trade  was  gradually  drawn  towards  the  larger  shipping  ports 
of  the  Marne.  The  resident  merchants  who  had  previously 
been  engaged  in  trade  with  Paris  were  assuming  the  functions 
of  collectors  for  the  Marne  towns,  assisted  by  the  numerous 
blatiers  who  were  carrying  grain  from  market  to  market.  The 
growing  volume  of  this  blatter  trade  rendered  unnecessary 
special  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  merchants  of  the  Marne 
towns.  The  passive  attitude  toward  supply  was,  on  their 
part,  the  more  characteristic  even  in  these  closing  years  of  the 
century. 

There  was  some  "  country  buying  "  in  this  region  in  1697- 
1700  and  in  1709,  but  it  was  quite  inconsiderable  in  comparison 
with  the  extent  of  the  granary  trade,  and  it  was  largely  the  work 
of  Parisian  merchants  or  local  merchants  who  resided  in  the 
small  towns.  The  merchants  of  Chalons  and  Vitry  remained 
indifferent  to  the  trade  outside  the  town. 

In  1697,  Larcher  speaks  of  trouble  from  "  country  buying  " 
on  the  frontier  of  Champagne.  "  There  are  many  merchants 
and  blatiers  in  these  cantons,  who  are  carrying  grain  away  from 
the  villages  by  night  as  well  as  by  day."  But  this  was  for  export 
over  the  frontier  at  Mezieres.3  In  1699,  we  hear  that  Sr.  Peraud, 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.     239.     i  Aout  1694.     Jean  Barbaron. 

8  Ibid.    239.     i  Aout  1694. 

3  G7.    227.    Chalons,  17  Nov.  1697.    Larcher. 


104         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

Procureur  at  the  Baillage  of  Chalons,  had  formed  several  grana- 
ries, at  Pontavert,  Chalons,  and  other  places.  He  was  said  to 
have  scoured  the  whole  countryside  for  grain.1  In  1 700,  Pomereu 
made  a  careful  investigation  and  reports  "  that  some  of  the 
merchants  of  Chalons  who  trade  with  Paris  are  suspected  of 
buying  grain  in  the  farms  instead  of  on  the  markets."  2  In 
regard  to  merchants  of  Vitry,  he  is  even  more  doubtful  of  the 
reliability  of  general  reports:  "  there  are  some  who  are  suspected 
of  taking  up  grain  in  the  country  districts,  but  these  accounts 
are  vague  rumors  without  any  proof." 3  But  there  were 
instances,  particularly  on  the  frontier,  in  Rethelois,  where  an 
anonymous  correspondent  complained  of  the  practices  of  one 
Mme.  Perart  of  Chalons,  apparently  with  real  foundation. 
Of  this  woman  Pomereu  writes:  "  she  and  her  husband  who  live 
here,  together  with  a  brother-in-law  at  Charleville,  have  been 
engaged  in  a  very  considerable  grain  trade  for  several  years. 
They  buy  everywhere  and  most  of  the  shipments  are  said  to 
be  destined  for  Paris."  4  With  due  allowance  for  these  individual 
exceptions,  it  is  evident  that  the  trade  was  characteristically 
centered  in  the  towns,  Vitry  and  Chalons. 

Detailed  evidence  of  the  handling  of  grain  at  Chalons  does 
not  appear.  The  one  precise  statement  in  regard  to  the  mode 
of  buying  is  found  in  the  declarations  of  a  number  of  grain  mer- 
chants in  1698.  De  Vige,  one  of  the  principal  merchants,  says 
that  in  the  course  of  the  preceding  month  he  bought  150  setiers 
of  grain  of  blatiers  who  brought  it  to  his  door.5  Very  likely 
this  was  a  typical  mode  of  buying.  It  is  in  keeping  with  the 
character  of  the  trade,  an  outcome  of  the  apathy  of  the  merchants 
and  of  the  desire  of  the  blatiers  to  sell  their  grain  without  waiting 
for  the  regular  market  day. 

At  Vitry,  the  trade  was  certainly  of  this  type.  The  granary 
was  the  basis  of  all  trading,  both  of  buying  and  of  selling.  There 

1  H.  1837.    Reg.  du  Bureau,  202.     9  Mars  1699. 

2  G7.     229.     Chalons,  13  Nov.  1700.    Pomereu. 

3  G7.     229.     Chalons,  18  Nov.  1700,  Pomereu. 

4  G7.      229.     Chalons,  22  Aout  1700.     Pomereu  and  enclosure  from  Rethel, 
1 8  Aout  1700.     See  also  G7.     1642.     Chalons.     13  Fev.  1709.     Harouys. 

6  G7.     228.    Chalons,  2  Oct.  1698.    Larcher. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS        IOS 

was  some  "  country  buying,"  but  it  was  not  very  wide-spread.1 
In  1694,  we  get  brief  indications  of  the  character  of  the  trade 
in  the  town.  The  Provost  says:  "  the  country  people  are 
accustomed  to  carry  their  grain  directly  to  the  merchants  to 
whom  they  sell,  and  from  whom  they  frequently  receive  loans."  2 
These  customs  were  rudely  disturbed  by  the  agent  of  the  Provost 
of  Paris  who  endeavored  to  enforce  the  old  market  regulations, 
requiring  that  all  grain  be  sold  on  the  market.3  The  result  of 
this  was  a  complete  cessation  of  trade  at  Vitry.  "  In  two  months, 
scarcely  enough  grain  came  into  town  to  load  one  boat  .  .  . 
the  peasants  and  blatiers  went  to  Chalons  or  to  Troyes  where 
the  trade  was  free."  4  Trade  was  reestablished  at  Vitry  only 
by  the  publication  of  an  ordinance  permitting  "  peasants  and 
country  people  to  bring  their  grain  to  town,  and  to  dispose  of 
it  as  they  see  fit,  permitting  merchants  to  buy  freely,  except 
from  twelve  o'clock  of  the  day  before  market  day  to  noon  of 
the  following  day."  5  Nothing  could  show  more  clearly  that 
the  blatier  trade  had  grown  to  such  an  extent  that  grain  was 
coming  every  day  and  that  the  blatiers  were  selling  to  the  mer- 
chants in  their  houses.  The  old  market  regulations  could  no 
longer  be  enforced.  The  wholesale  trade  had  become  concen- 
trated in  the  town;  there  was  little  "  country  buying,"  but 
there  was  no  organized  wholesale  market. 

Fortunately,  however,  we  are  not  obliged  to  depend  solely 
upon  these  inferences.  The  trade  of  Vitry  is  comprehensively 
described  in  a  letter  from  Pomereu  that  leaves  nothing  to  be 
desired.  "  There  are  ninety- two  grain  merchants  who  have 
registered  in  the  Baillage  of  Vitry.  Only  thirty  ordinarily 
trade  personally  with  Paris,  the  others  assist  them  when  they 
have  not  enough  to  fill  a  boat,  for  it  is  always  possible  to  buy 

1  In  addition  to  the  statement  of  Pomereu  in  his  letter  of  18  Nov.  1700,  see  G7. 
1630.     Vitry,  ii  Nov.  1693,  where  three  women  are  accused  of  buying  in  the 
farms. 

2  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.     48.     Vitry,  19  Dec.  1694.     Le  Bel,  PreV6t  a  Vitry. 

3  G7.     1635.     Also  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.     I9.     19  Oct.  1694.    Ord.  de  Le  Blanc, 
Comm.  des  Prevot  des  March,  et  Echevins  de  Paris. 

4  Letter  of  Le  Bel,  see  note  (2). 

6  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.     26.     Vitry,  15  Dec.  1694.     Ord.  du  PreVdt. 


106         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

enough  in  their  granaries  to  complete  the  consignment.  They 
all  buy  part  of  their  grain  in  the  markets,  but  they  are  also 
accustomed  to  receive  at  their  houses  the  peasants  and  other 
people  who  bring  them  samples  of  grain.  They  trade  on  the 
basis  of  these  samples  and  fix  the  price.  Then  the  peasants 
deliver  at  the  granaries  the  quantity  agreed  upon  without 
bringing  the  grain  to  market.  This  is  not  strictly  in  accordance 
with  the  ordinances,  but  the  usual  regulations  are  very  properly 
suspended,  as  the  grain  purchased  in  this  manner  is  destined 
for  the  provision  of  Paris."  l  Clearly  the  general  conditions 
of  trade  were  what  they  had  been  in  1694.  The  town  was 
frequented  by  the  peasants  and  blatiers  of  the  immediate  neigh- 
borhood and  from  Lorraine.  The  volume  of  trade  thus  con- 
centrated in  the  town  was  considerable.  In  its  general  aspect 
it  was  the  same  tendency  that  appeared  in  the  Beauce,  in  Santerre 
and  Soissonnais,  in  Touraine,  but  the  effect  on  the  organization 
of  the  trade  was  somewhat  different.  At  Montlhery,  the  trade 
was  confined  primarily  to  the  market  days,  there  was  selling  by 
sample  in  the  cafes  as  well  as  on  the  market,  but  in  some  form 
or  other  there  was  a  concourse  of  buyers  and  sellers,  competing 
with  each  other.  At  Noyon,  for  a  time,  the  blatiers  flocked 
into  town  not  only  on  market  day  but  on  other  days  of  the  week. 
The  merchants  bought  on  the  market,  and  there  seemed  to  be  a 
possibility  of  the  establishment  of  a  wholesale  market.  But  the 
merchants  did  not  rest  content  with  waiting  until  grain  came  to 
Noyon ;  they  persisted  in  working  up  into  the  supply  regions  to 
buy  on  the  tributary  markets.  Whatever  came  to  Noyon 
was  quickly  purchased,  but  there  was  no  reliance  upon  the 
blatier  supply.  Here  at  Vitry,  and  probably  at  Chalons,  the 
abundance  of  the  available  supply  rendered  the  merchants 
less  enterprising.  They  were  quite  willing  to  wait  for  supplies 
to  be  brought  to  town,  but  the  combination  of  general  sluggish- 
ness and  the  long-established  custom  of  buying  in  granaries 

1  G7.  229.  Chalons,  18  Nov.  170x3.  Pomereu.  This  letter  is  in  unusually 
bad  condition.  It  has  suffered  from  book-worms,  dampness,  and  dirt,  so  that  some 
words  are  entirely  missing.  The  last  line  or  two  of  my  citation  is  somewhat  con- 
jectural, though  the  general  meaning  of  the  original  is  clear. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS         IOJ 

resulted  in  informal  dealing  in  the  houses  of  the  merchants. 
The  concentration  of  trade  needed  for  the  establishment  of  a 
market  was  present,  but  the  assembling  of  buyers  and  seUers 
did  not  accompany  the  other  feature  of  the  market. 

In  the  Seine  Valley,  the  combination  of  circumstances  was 
more  felicitous.  The  trade  of  the  region  was 'remarkable,  even 
in  1660,  for  the  enterprise  and  vigor  displayed  by  the  merchants. 
If  the  available  supply  was  not  as  great  as  that  of  the  Marne, 
the  inherent  difficulties  merely  served  to  stimulate  the  mer- 
chants to  greater  efforts.  This  feverish  energy  of  the  wholesale 
merchants  was  communicated  to  the  blatiers,  and  the  wide- 
spread endeavor  to  realize  the  anticipated  profits  of  the  trade 
gave  it  a  briskness  that  is  very  modern.  This  difference  in  the 
temper  of  the  traders,  combined  with  the  gradual  tendency 
towards  concentration,  led  to  the  formation  of  a  real  wholesale 
market  at  Bray. 

The  early  appearance  of  "  country  buying  "  in  this  region 
has  already  led  to  some  study  of  conditions  in  1660.  The  activity 
of  the  merchants  in  these  districts  has  received  considerable 
attention.  The  "  country  buying  "  around  Montereau  by 
Nepveu,  Lavalle,  Le  Brie,  and  other  factors  of  Parisian  mer- 
chants, the  formation  of  granaries  in  the  towns  for  convenience 
in  shipping,  the  legal  recognition  of  this  irregularity,  by  the 
acknowledgment  that  grain  passing  through  a  town  in  such  a 
manner  need  not  pay  market  dues,  all  this  has  been  discussed. 
The  significance  of  the  change  is  somewhat  concealed  by  the 
persistence  of  the  granaries  in  the  shipping  towns.  There 
is  a  wide  difference  between  the  granary  formed  in  the  town 
by  purchases  on  the  market,  and  the  granary  formed  by  grain 
purchased  in  the  country. 

When  the  trade  quieted  down  after  the  dearth  of  1663,  the 
merchants  became  less  active  in  their  operations  in  the  country; 
the  blatiers  were  able  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity 
left  by  the  merchants.  The  Seine  towns  witnessed  an  increase 
of  the  market  trade,  especially  at  Bray.  There  was  an  approxi- 
mation to  conditions  on  the  Marne.  The  town  granaries  of 
merchants  and  bourgeois  were  filled  by  this  blatier  trade,  but 


108  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

the  enterprise  of  the  merchants  led  to  active  buying  from  the 
Uatiers.  They  sought  out  the  Uatiers  instead  of  waiting  for 
the  Uatiers  to  come  to  their  houses.  This  resulted  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  wholesale  market.  The  Uatiers  naturally  came 
to  the  Halle,  the  merchants  sought  them  there,  and  bought 
freely  every  week-day,  whether  it  was  a  market  day  or  not. 
There  was  thus  a  concourse  of  buyers  and  sellers,  who  were 
assembled  not  for  local  but  for  wholesale  trade.  The  limitations 
of  the  local  market  regulations  were  no  longer  in  force,  and  the 
trade  was  continuous  instead  of  being  intermittent. 

The  date  of  the  change  cannot  be  ascertained  with  accuracy. 
The  first  descriptions  of  this  custom  come  from  the  year  1694, 
when  the  practice  is  said  to  be  the  customary  form  of  the  trade, 
interrupted  for  the  two  years  preceding  by  the  "  country  buy- 
ing "  of  Jean  Roger  and  his  factors.  Doubtless  the  custom 
took  form  gradually  between  1680  and  1690.  Even  in  1692, 
the  market  at  Bray  can  hardly  have  presented  the  definite  form 
suggested  by  Delamare's  account,  in  the  Traite  de  la  Police. 
The  careful  statement  of  Pierre  Philipon  presents  all  the  irregu- 
larities and  qualifications  that  must  be  added  to  the  sharp, 
clear-cut  description  of  Delamare:  "  Every  Friday,"  says 
Philipon,  "  the  grain  market  is  held  at  Bray.  It  opens  at 
eight  o'clock  for  the  bourgeois  and  for  the  bakers,  and  when 
they  are  all  supplied  the  merchants  are  allowed  to  buy.  Be- 
tween Martinmas  and  Easter  the  peasants  bring  grain  to  Bray 
every  day,  whether  it  is  market  day  or  not.  They  carry  their 
grain  to  the  Halle  or  to  the  houses  of  individual  merchants, 
and  sell  to  such  persons  as  present  themselves.  In  years  of 
plenty,  the  peasants  brought  such  a  great  quantity  that  all  who 
were  engaged  in  the  trade  could  buy  what  they  wished,  but 
for  the  last  two  years  grain  has  been  dear.  Much  less  has  come 
to  the  market,  as  the  peasants  of  Brie  have  become  accustomed 
to  carry  their  grain  elsewEere.  Almost  no  one  has  come  to 
Bray  save  the  peasants  and  Uatiers  from  Burgundy  who  have 
continued  to  come  every  day  of  the  week."  l  Thus  we  must 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21642.  311  ff.  20  Juillet  1694.  Inquest  at  Bray,  testimony 
of  Pierre  Philipon. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS         109 

not  think  of  this  informal  wholesale  market  at  Bray  as  a  definite, 
comprehensive  system;  much  of  this  blatier  grain  was  sold  to 
the  merchants  at  their  granaries  just  as  at  Vitry.  Possibly 
the  proportion  of  grain  sold  in  that  manner  was  really  con- 
siderable. At  all  events,  the  trade  was  very  unstable,  changing 
its  form  considerably  under  the  pressure  of  rather  slight  cir- 
cumstances. 

In  1693-94,  the  customary  mode  of  buying  was  completely 
disorganized,  primarily  by  the  energetic  efforts  of  Roger  and 
his  partners  to  secure  control  of  the  grain  in  the  Seine  Valley. 
With  agents  in  most  of  the  important  ports  and  what  was  then 
a  rather  large  capital,  Roger  had  his  agents  buy  extensively 
in  the  farms  and  in  the  towns,  urging  them  to  secure  the  grain 
at  any  cost.  "  Colmet,  the  Receiver  of  the  Domain,  was  Roger's 
agent  at  Bray.  He  had  acquired  control  of  practically  all  the 
grain  brought  to  Bray.  His  wife,  who  was  engaged  in  collecting 
the  tolls  at  the  bridge,  combined  this  task  with  the  grain  trade. 
She  stopped  all  the  peasants'  carts  bringing  grain  to  town,  talked 
with  the  drivers  and  told  them  to  carry  the  grain  to  her  house. 
When  it  was  market  day  and  the  peasants  were  obliged  to  go 
to  the  Halle,  Colmet's  wife  would  come  and  outbid  all  the  other 
merchants,  so  that  she  secured  the  greater  part  of  the  grain, 
although  she  paid  more  than  the  other  merchants  had  decided 
to  offer.  Colmet  himself  rarely  appeared  on  the  market  at 
Bray.  He  went  off  on  horseback.  The  witness  did  not  know 
where  he  went,  but  last  year,  between  Martinmas  and  Christmas, 
many  cart-loads  of  grain  came  to  Bray  in  sacks  bearing  Roger's 
mark,  so  that  he  supposed  it  was  grain  that  Colmet  had  pur- 
chased in  the  farms."  1  Other  witnesses  said  confidently  that 
Colmet  bought  extensively  in  the  country.  The  resident 
merchants  were  equally  guilty  of  this  "  country  buying."  Etienne 
Musseau  says:  "  the  merchants  of  Paris  buy  in  the  farms  when- 
ever they  are  in  the  region.  The  merchants  of  Bray  do  likewise, 
especially  Gaillard,  who  is  factor  of  Thomas  Viard  of  Paris. 
He  has  never  seen  Gaillard  buy  grain  on  the  market,  although 
he  carries  on  a  very  large  trade  in  the  neighborhood,  and  has 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21642.    -311.     20  Juillet  1694.     Pierre  Philipon. 


IIO         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

granaries  at  Donne-Marie  and  at  Vimpelles.  Colmet,  agent 
of  Roger,  also  buys  in  the  country  of  the  peasants,  so  that  very 
little  grain  comes  to  market."  l  The  Notary  gives  a  more 
detailed  account.  "  The  officials  at  Bray  wished  to  stop  these 
abuses.  They  ordered  the  peasants  to  bring  their  grain  to  the 
market,  and  required  the  merchants  to  buy  there,  but  this 
regulation  was  not  observed  for  more  than  six  or  eight  markets. 
The  merchants  began  to  scour  the  country  again,  asserting  that 
they  had  received  permission  to  buy  in  the  farms.  ...  In  the 
streets  of  the  towns,  Colmet's  wife'  and  other  merchants  stopped 
the  peasants  on  their  way  to  market,  prevented  them  from 
proceeding  to  the  Halle,  and  even  forced  them  to  sell  their 
grain  on  the  spot.  After  such  purchases  the  merchants  fre- 
quently divided  the  grain  between  them,  and  at  times  with 
much  heat  and  quarreling.  Each  tried  to  out-bid  the  other, 
and  the  peasants  said  that  they  could  sell  their  grain  for  whatever 
they  wished,  so  great  was  the  eagerness  of  the  merchants  to 
secure  it."  2 

The  incipient  wholesale  market  was  thus  disorganized  shortly 
after  the  custom  had  become  established.  Even  after  1694, 
the  old  custom  did  not  reassert  itself  at  once.  The  disorder 
continued  through  1699.  "  For  five  or  six  years,"  says  Louis 
Cajon,  "  the  peasants  have  ceased  to  bring  their  grain  to  town 
for  the  regular  market.  They  also  have  ceased  to  unload  at 
the  Halle.  Instead,  they  carry  the  grain  directly  to  the  mer- 
chants, who  buy  on  the  bridge  or  in  the  streets  and  have  the 
grain  delivered  at  their  houses.  Pierre  Blot,  Lamy,  Cottereau, 
de  la  Noue,  the  widow  Chaillot,  and  Philippe  de  Billy,  grain 
merchants,  stop  the  carts  of  the  peasants  on  the  bridge,  examine 
the  samples,  bargain,  bid  against  each  other,  quarreling  and 
becoming  so  excited  that  they  are  almost  ready  to  fight."3 
Nicolas  Amant  tells  the  same  story.  "  The  peasants  frequently 
bring  grain  to  town  on  all  days  of  the  week  except  feast  days. 
They  have  come  more  frequently  for  the  last  six  weeks  than 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21642.     311.     20  Juillet  1694.     fitienne  Musseau. 

2  Ibid.     Edme  Mercier. 

8  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.     317.     3  Jan.  1699.    Louis  Cajon. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS         III 

previously.  At  the  same  time,  la  Noue,  Jacques  Sennene, 
Cottereau,  Lamy,  Philippe  de  Billy,  and  the  widow  Chaillot  go 
out  to  meet  them  at  the  bridge.  They  stop  them,  examine 
the  samples,  and  bid  against  each  other."  l  If  this  were  all, 
the  tendency  towards  a  definite  wholesale  market  would  be 
very  clear.  We  have  a  real  competition  among  the  merchants, 
and  it  is  of  little  moment  whether  they  meet  the  grain  at  the 
Halle  or  on  the  bridge.  There  is  a  concourse  of  buyers  and 
sellers.  Bidding  on  the  lots  of  grain  is  animated.  Speculation 
is  rife.  Prices  rise  beyond  the  usual  local  figures,  so  that  this 
active  wholesale  trade  causes  great  apprehension.  Doubtless 
the  existence  of  this  trade  in  the  town  induced  Delamare  to 
insert  in  his  Traite  de  la  Police  the  description  of  the  daily  mar- 
ket at  Bray.  His  knowledge  of  the  facts  was  extensive,  since 
these  inquests  were  made  by  him  personally,  or  by  officials 
in  close  touch  with  him.  But  it  is  necessary  to  recognize 
clearly  the  qualifications  that  must  be  added.  The  trade 
which  still  comes  to  town  during  these  years  is  only  part  of 
the  trade. 

A  remarkable  change  had  taken  place  in  the  attitude  of  the 
blatters  and  country  people.  Colmet  says  that  "  for  four  years 
or  more  the  peasants  in  the  vicinity  of  the  town,  who  became 
wealthy  during  the  dearth,  have  no  longer  brought  their  grain 
to  the  Halle  at  Bray,  but  have  waited  for  the  merchants  to  come 
to  them.  They  even  refuse  to  sell  except  in  the  late  season, 
and  then  only  if  the  season  offers  special  advantages.  If  the 
merchants  do  not  offer  the  prices  they  expect,  these  peasants 
hold  the  grain  over  until  the  following  year.  This  avarice 
reduces  the  market  of  Bray  to  a  few  muids  of  grain,  although 
formerly  the  peasants  brought  in  40-50  muids."  2  At  all  events 
the  merchants  of  Bray  bought  freely  in  the  farms.  La  Noue 
had  "  an  agent  at  Goix,  named  Rizon,  another  at  Vimpelle, 
and  two  or  three  others  in  different  places.  They  do  nothing 
but  run  from  farm  to  farm,  buying  up  all  the  grain  they  can  lay 
their  hands  on.  When  one  of  them  has  five  or  six  cart-loads, 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.     317.     3  Jan.  1699.     Nicolas  Amant. 

2  Ibid.    317.    3  Jan.  1699.    Jean  Colmet. 


112         TEE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

he  sends  it  to  de  la  Noue  at  Bray  or  to  a  granary  that  de  la  Noue 
hasatPort-Moutain."  1 

Granaries  were  formed  even  in  the  back  country.  At  Plessis- 
Saint-Jean,  one  Chatelain  bought  extensively  of  peasants, 
personally  and  by  agents.  An  inn  keeper  at  Montigny  acted 
as  agent.  All  the  grain  was  amassed  in  granaries.  Chatelain 
sold  only  by  sample,  and  in  the  late  season  when  prices  were 
high.2 

In  this  chaos  of  speculation  it  is  difficult  to  see  anything 
sufficiently  precise  and  permanent  to  be  of  significance.  Even 
our  wholesale  market  is  pretty  elusive.  But  it  was  its  appear- 
ance, even  with  this  extreme  disorder,  that  gave  Delamare 
the  idea  of  a  legally  established  wholesale  market,  which  he 
applied  at  Vitry  with  such  success  in  1709.  The  zeal  of  the 
merchants  in  the  Seine  Basin  was  too  keen  to  enable  any  regula- 
tion to  survive  a  period  of  dearth,  but  the  relative  quiet  in  the 
Upper  Marne  Valley  gave  administrative  regulations  a  better 
chance  of  survival.  In  all  probability  the  tendencies  towards 
order  would  establish  themselves  in  the  ordinary  years,  even 
at  Bray,  but  the  real  significance  of  the  wholesale  market  is 
in  our  period  limited  to  Vitry. 

The  conditions  of  trade  there  previous  to  1709  have  already 
been  described.  The  history  of  the  year  1709  turns  upon 
the  experience  of  Delamare  in  the  Seine  Valley  in  1694  and 
1699,  when  he  drew  up  the  inquests  which  we  have  just  con- 
sidered. 

The  marked  contrast  between  the  trade  at  Vitry  and  Chalons 
and  the  trade  at  Bray  is  explained  by  Delamare's  letter  of 
August  14,  practically  the  first  report  sent  back  to  Paris:  "  I 
perceive  that  most  of  the  grain  in  this  province  is  in  the  hands 
of  the  wealthy  bourgeois  and  officials.  The  resident  grain 
merchants  are  well-to-do,  but  few  of  the  merchants  from  Paris 
are  rich  or  capable  of  carrying  on  a  large  trade.  They  buy  here 
on  credit.  The  sellers  are  not  under  any  necessity  of  selling, 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.   21643.      317.      3  Jan.   1699.      Louis  Cajon,  also  Nicolas 
Bridon. 

2  Ibid.     Several  depositions  following  the  deposition  of  Jean  Colmet. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS         113 

and  do  so  only  when  they  find  it  convenient.  The  buyers 
have  little  ready  money,  but  they  pay  what  the  residents  ask. 
The  credit  they  are  obliged  to  give  forces  them  to  increase  the 
price  enough  to  give  them  interest  on  their  money.  Would 
to  God  that  they  might  cease  to  give  credit!  If  they  came 
themselves  to  Paris,  we  would  have  our  grain  cheaper.  It 
would  pass  through  two  hands,  whereas  now  it  passes  through 
three  or  four  hands."  l  The  extraordinary  feature  of  the  trade 
of  Vitry,  however,  is  the  importance  of  the  granaries  formed 
from  rents.  "  The  officers  and  notable  bourgeois  who  live  on 
their  rents,  even  the  farmers  of  the  ecclesiastical  estates  and 
others  who  receive  rents  in  kind,  have  always  had  complete 
freedom  to  form  granaries.  In  many  cases  their  tenants  are 
required  by  their  leases  to  deliver  at  Vitry  the  grain  turned 
over  in  payment  of  rent."  2  But  most  of  these  persons  were 
not  very  wealthy.  "  All  the  property  of  the  residents  of  Vitry 
is  land,  and  their  income  is  paid  in  kind.  What  they  now  have 
in  their  granaries  is  the  product  of  seven  or  eight  years'  rents 
on  which  they  had  realized  nothing.  Lately,  most  of  them  have 
been  selling,  but  there  are  only  five  or  six  families  that  could 
really  be  called  rich.  The  others  have  very  moderate  fortunes 
or  are  actually  poor.  All  have  some  domains,  however,  both 
rich  and  poor,  so  that  the  grain  is  distributed  among  such  a 
number  of  families  that  no  individual  has  been  able  to  secure 
large  profits."  3 

But  the  trade  of  Vitry  was  not  entirely  based  on  these 
rents.  The  situation  of  the  town,  practically  at  the  head  of 
navigation  on  the  Marne,  attracted  a  considerable  volume  of 
trade;  not  only  the  grain  of  the  neighborhood  came  thither, 
but  even  grain  from  distant  sections  outside  the  Baillage, 
especially  Lorraine  and  Bar.  This  grain  was  purchased  by 
the  resident  merchants  or  by  the  bourgeois.  It  is  the  trade 
that  is  described  by  Pomereu  in  1700.  Since  that  time,  how- 
ever, some  merchants  had  moved  out  to  the  suburbs  so  that 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21647.     62.     Vitry-le-Francois,  14  Aout  1709.     Delamare. 

2  Ibid.  21650.     246.     Observations  pour  la  police  des  grains  a  Vitry. 

3  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  267,  693.     5  Fev.  1710.     Delamare. 


114        THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

they  might  the   more  easily  secure  the  grain  brought  in  by 
peasants.1 

The  trouble  at  Vitry  was  not  lack  of  grain.  Delamare  had 
been  sent  up  from  Paris  to  prevent  the  merchants  from  holding 
back  their  shipments.  He  began  by  visiting  the  granaries 
and  by  urging  the  merchants  to  forward  considerable  consign- 
ments to  Paris.  "  These  shipments,"  he  says,  "  stimulated 
trade,  and  divers  foreigners  arrived  at  Vitry  with  grain  in  carts 
or  on  pack  horses.  I  spoke  with  them  and  assured  them  of  my 
protection,  I  even  permitted  them  to  sell  daily  in  the  public 
square,  which  had  never  before  been  done."  2  These  foreigners 
were  the  Lorraine  blatiers  who  had  formerly  sold  their  grain 
to  the  merchants  in  their  houses.  In  1709,  the  merchants 
had  begun  to  stop  these  blatiers  in  the  streets  or  on  the  roads 
outside  the  city,  so  that  Delamare  had  granted  them  full  per- 
mission to  sell  on  the  public  square.  This  provision  attracted 
more  trade,  and  "  prices  fell.  .  .  .  The  people  were  very  much 
pleased,  but  the  rich  bourgeois  and  merchants  were  much  put 
out.  They  endeavored  to  harass  the  Lorrainers  and  other 
foreigners,  refusing  to  make  any  offers  for  their  grain.  The 
foreigners  came  to  find  me,  and  I  enabled  them  to  sell  their 
grain  at  a  satisfactory  price.  They  are  coming  in  daily.  It 
is  one  continual  stream  of  convoys  from  Lorraine,  Bar,  the 
Bishoprics  of  Toul  and  Verdun,  some  from  Alsace,  and  I  have 
even  been  told  that  some  are  en  route  from  Franche  Comte."3 
The  increasing  volume  of  trade  spread  dismay  among  the  mer- 
chants, who  had  expected  prices  to  rise  from  a  continually  increas- 
ing scarcity.  Delamare  feared  intrigues  and  was  anxious  to 
establish  trade  on  a  basis  that  should  be  so  satisfactory  to  the 
blatiers  that  they  would  continue  to  come.  To  this  end,  he 
issued  the  ordinance  of  21  October  1709.  "All  grain  which 
has  been  despatched  to  Vitry  and  all  grain  en  route  shall  be 
brought  to  town  and  placed  on  sale  in  accordance  with  the 
ordinances  and  police  regulations.  Peasants  and  other  persons 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21650.     246.     Observations  sur  la  police  des  Bleds  a  Vitry. 

2  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  ad  ed.,  Ill,  Supp.  p.  39. 

3  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21647.     i2gv.     Vitry,  20  Oct.  1709.     Delamare. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS         115 

living  within  three  leagues  of  the  town  shall  expose  and  sell 
their  grain  at  the  Halle  on  Mondays,  Thursdays,  and  Saturdays. 
All  other  persons  shall  expose  and  sell  their  grain  on  the  Square 
in  the  center  of  the  town  on  all  days  of  the  week  save  Sundays 
and  feast  days.  No  one  shall  go  out  to  meet  the  grain  entering 
the  town." 

"  No  one  shall  sell  grain  except  at  the  Halle  or  on  the  Public 
Square." 

"  The  market  at  the  Square,  which  is  to  be  held  daily  except 
on  feast  days,  shall  be  open  to  peasants  and  foreigners,  who 
may  expose  their  grain  as  soon  as  they  arrive,  and  sell  at  all 
hours  of  the  day.  On  the  Square,  all  persons  may  buy:  the 
people,  the  bourgeois,  the  bakers,  and  merchants,  save  that 
the  first  hour  shall  be  for  the  bourgeois  and  country  people 
who  have  need."  l 

This  is  the  first  attempt  to  organize  a  regular  wholesale 
grain  market.  The  local  demand  is  legally  given  the  freedom 
of  the  wholesale  market,  but  in  practice  it  is  not  likely  that 
many  local  purchases  were  made  on  the  Square.  The  habit 
of  marketing  on  fixed  days  was  too  inveterate  to  be  quickly 
supplanted  by  new  modes  of  buying.  The  market  on  the  Square 
with  its  wholesale  supply  was  devoted  almost  exclusively  to 
the  wholesale  trade.  Even  on  market  days,  the  wholesale 
market  was  independent  of  the  town  market  at  the  Halle. 
The  wholesale  trade,  which  had  existed  so  long  without  any 
definite  organization,  the  haphazard  buying  in  granaries,  the 
energetic  scouring  of  the  country,  the  disorderly  bargaining 
with  the  carters  outside  the  town  gates  or  in  the  streets,  —  all 
this  chaos  had  at  last  been  supplanted  by  an  orderly  daily  market 
with  a  steady  inflow  of  supply  and  a  comprehensive  representa- 
tion of  the  wholesale  demand. 

Another  feature  of  improved  market  organization  appeared 
at  Vitry  in  these  years  of  dearth.  There  was  a  striking  tendency 
towards  the  distributing  market,  the  market  that  does  not 
collect  merely  for  itself  and  a  single  line  of  export  trade,  but 
gathers  together  the  supply  of  a  whole  region  and  then  dis- 

1  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  2d  ed.,  Ill,  Supp.  pp.  39-40. 


Il6  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

tributes  the  abundance  of  one  section  among  the  towns  and 
villages  that  are  inadequately  supplied.  An  illustration  will 
make  this  distinction  clearer.  The  characteristic  feature  of 
medieval  trade  was  the  independent  exploitation  of  the  supply 
region  by  all  the  towns  whose  provision  was  not  assured  near 
at  hand.  In  the  neighborhood  of  Vitry  the  conduct  of  the 
Lorraine  blatiers  illustrates  the  point.  In  1660  some  of  these 
Lorraine  blatiers  were  not  satisfied  with  prices  at  Vitry  and  passed 
on  to  Chalons.1  They  endeavored  themselves  to  find  the 
most  advantageous  market  in  the  whole  region,  rather  than  to 
sell  at  a  central  market  whence  the  surplus  was  sent  to  the 
localities  in  need.  In  1710,  a  similar  incident  occurs;  a  group 
of  Lorrainers  passes  on  to  Rheims  instead  of  selling  at  Vitry. 
Delamare  was  disturbed  by  this  tendency,  but  he  wrote  with 
great  satisfaction  a  few  days  later:  "  The  blatiers  passed  through 
Vitry  last  Monday,  on  their  way  back  from  Rheims,  and  one 
of  them  came  to  see  me.  He  confessed  that  they  had  sold  their 
grain  for  less  than  they  were  offered  here."  2 

But  this  manner  of  supplying  the  towns  of  Champagne  was 
not  at  all  general  in  1708-09.  For  the  most  part  the  grain  came 
direct  to  Vitry  and  was  then  distributed  according  to  the  needs 
of  the  Parisian  or  of  the  local  trade.  The  combination  of 
metropolitan  and  local  trade  at  Vitry  is  not  as  striking  as  it 
might  be,  because  the  towns  of  Champagne  were  seeking  barley, 
which  did  not  enter  very  considerably  into  the  Parisian  trade. 
It  is  nevertheless  significant  that  much  of  the  barley  consumed 
in  Champagne  in  1709  came  from  Lorraine  to  Vitry,  where  it 
was  purchased  by  agents  and  merchants  of  the  neighboring 
towns.  This  movement  had  begun  in  December,  1709,  when 
Delamare  arrived  at  Vitry.  The  deputies  of  Rheims  had  bought 
wheat  and  barley  in  large  quantities,  but  he  forbade  the  shipment 
of  the  grain.  They  would  have  had  a  right  to  carry  off  this 
grain  if  they  had  bought  on  the  markets,  but  they  had  bought  in 
the  granaries,  and  in  granaries  of  Parisian  merchants.  "  Such 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.     357.     Chalons,  4  Nov.  1660.      Magdalaine  Goudouin. 

2  Ibid.  21647.      156.      Vitry,  19  Jan.  1710.     Delamare.     See  also  Fr.  21648. 
79.     Vitry,  17  Jan.  1710.     Delamare. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS         llj 

grain  constitutes  a  part  of  the  supply  of  Paris  and  may  not  be 
diverted  to  any  other  destination."  1  Later,  Delamare  was 
less  disposed  to  enforce  the  strict  regulations  in  regard  to  the 
Parisian  supply.  In  May,  1710,  he  writes:  "  The  great  exports 
from  this  province  for  the  army  in  the  Low  Countries  and  for 
the  fortresses,  and  the  continual  passage  of  troops  have  created 
more  or  less  dearth,  especially  in  Upper  Champagne  where  the 
harvest  was  light.  A  prodigious  crowd  of  poor  people  comes  to 
town  every  market  day  to  purchase  barley  and  bread.  The 
townspeople  regard  this  with  apprehension,  but  the  Lorraine 
blatters  are  just  now  bringing  more  barley  than  wheat  so  that 
they  have  been  a  great  assistance  to  us."  2  A  couple  of  weeks 
later,  "  the  town  of  Epernay  sent,a  deputy  to  buy  barley.  He 
came  to  me  and  asked  permission  to  buy  a  few  loads  on  the 
market.  I  did  not  feel  justified  in  refusing  permission  to  buy, 
after  the  townspeople  were  provided.  So  long  as  we  have  such 
supplies  of  this  grain  as  we  have  had  in  the  past,  I  am  sure  that 
it  will  not  be  wise  to  refuse  permission  to  the  neighboring  towns. 
This  extra  trade  encourages  the  Lorrainers  and  constantly 
attracts  more.  The  assistance  given  the  towns  makes  them 
less  inclined  to  seek  our  wheat."3  A  month  later  he  says: 
'  The  inhabitants  of  Upper  Champagne  continue  to  depend 
upon  us  for  their  subsistence.  I  see  that  they  are  given  all  the 
barley  they  desire.  The  foreigners  are  bringing  such  great 
quantities  that  we  have  enough  for  the  town,  and  for  these 
poor  country  people."  4 

This  dependence  upon  Vitry  was  not  unusual,  although 
we  seldom  have  so  detailed  a  description.  In  1708,  Harouys, 
in  a  general  report  upon  the  trade  of  the  province,  says  that 
Rheims,  Epernay,  and  the  frontier  towns  Sedan  and  Mezieres 
have  to  come  to  Vitry  for  wheat.5  Vitry  was  thus  beginning 
to  serve  as  a, general  distributive  market.  Grain  came  in  from 
a  wide  area  and  was  divided  between  Paris  and  the  parts  of  the 

Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21647.     145.     Vitry,  27  Dec.  1709.     Delamare. 
/&«£.  21648.     17.     Vitry,  8  Mai  1710.     Delamare. 
Ibid.  21648.     25.     Vitry,  30  Mai  1710.     Delamare. 
Ibid.  21647.     198.     Vitry,  n  Juin  1710.     Delamare. 
Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  73,  226. 


Il8  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

\ 

province  that  were  not  naturally  well  supplied.  The  larger 
function  of  the  wholesale  market  appeared  as  well  as  the  definite 
regulations  of  the  market. 

In  the  producing  regions  supplying  Paris  there  was- one  feature 
common  to  all.  On  the  Oise,  on  the  Marne,  and  on  the  Seine, 
in  the  Beauce,  even  in  the  Loire  Valley,  there  was  a  marked 
concentration  of  the  wholesale  trade.  In  each  region  one  or 
two  markets  gradually  attracted  all  the  trade.  The  wide  and 
complicated  ramifications  of  the  sixteenth  century  trade  were 
simplified.  In  1709,  Paris  was  practically  supplied  from  the 
markets  of  Noyon,  Soissons,  Vitry,  Chalons,  Bray,  Montlhery, 
Chartres,  and  Saumur.  At  Vitry  and  Bray,  definite  wholesale 
markets  were  taking  form.  The  idea  could  easily  be  applied 
to  the  other  great  market  towns.  Once  that  step  was  taken 
the  worst  of  the  troubles  of  the  grain  trade  would  be  overcome, 
but  some*  difficulties  still  remained.  These  were  more  inti- 
mately connected  with  Paris  herself,  and  with  the  grain  in 
transit. 

IV 

The  Parisian  City  Markets 

Wholesale  price-making  at  Paris  was  quite  as  crudely  organized 
as  in  the  provinces.  There  was  no  systematic  competition,  no 
correlation  of  the  conditions  existing  in  the  different  supply 
areas.  This  indefiniteness  created  uncertainty  which  could 
easily  generate  a  panic  in  times  of  stress.  The  inadequacy 
of  market  machinery  had  the  further  consequence  of  inviting 
speculative  operations  on  the  part  of  the  grain  merchants. 

There  was  no  single,  comprehensive,  wholesale  grain  market 
at  Paris.  Each  of  the  three  principal  sources  of  supply  had  a 
separate  market.  The  Port  de  Greve,  near  the  Hotel  de  Ville, 
on  the  quai  opposite  the  Isle  Saint-Louis,  was  the  mart  for  all 
grain  coming  down  the  Seine  or  Marne.  The  supplies  from 
Soissons,  Noyon,  and  from  the  Lower  Seine  arrived  at  the 
Port  de  FEcole,  the  quai  on  the  right  bank  near  the  old  Louvre 
and  the  church  of  Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois.  The  Halle  au 
Ble,  opposite  Saint-Eustache,  on  the  site  of  the  present  Halles, 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS        119 

was  the  market  for  the  overland  grain.  These  three  markets 
received  practically  all  the  grain  that  came  to  the  city.  But  a 
large  portion  of  the  supply  of  food  stuffs  never  entered  the  city 
in  the  form  of  wheat.  In  1637,  one-half  the  total  supply  came 
in  the  form  of  flour.  The  grain  from  which  this  was  made 
was  bought  by  bakers  on  the  markets  of  the  environs.  The 
concentration  of  trade  in  the  seventeenth  century  brought  much 
of  this  bakers'  buying  into  touch  with  the  general  trade  at 
Montlhery,  but  many  of  the  smaller  markets  were  still  important, 
especially  on  the  Marne  in  the  vicinity  of  Meaux;  on  the  Seine, 
near  Corbeil  and  Melun;  and  in  the  section  of  Brie  nearest 
the  city,  Rozoy,  Brie-Comte-Robert,  and  other  markets. 

The  operations  of  the  bakers  in  the  environs  in  the  latter 
part  of  the  seventeenth  century  were  very  extensive.  They 
appear  in  few  of  the  records,  but  the  inquiries  of  Delamare  in 
1699  reveal  the  general  character  of  their  activity.  From  Lagny 
he  writes:  "The  bakers  from  the  Faubourg  Saint- Antoine 
scour  the  countryside,  buying  in  all  the  farms.  Some  send  their 
grain  to  the  mill  at  Noisel,  a  league  from  the  town,  and  then 
ship  by  river  to  Brie-sur-Marne,  where  they  go  for  it  with  carts. 
Others  ship  at  the  village  of  Javelins,  two  leagues  from  Lagny, 
a  false  port  used  to  conceal  their  operations.  Some  use  the  port 
of  Trillebardou  and  send  the  grain  down  to  Saint-Maur.  The 
town  market  has  consequently  been  quite  deserted  for  eighteen 
or  twenty  years.  The  peasants  do  not  come  to  town  with  their 
grain,  and  if  it  were  not  for  eight  or  nine  petty  merchants  who 
buy  of  the  peasants  and  bring  grain  to  market,  it  would  fre- 
quently happen  that  there  would  be  no  gram  on  the  market."  1 
Further  investigation  by  Delamare  produced  a  list  of  names 
of  the  principal  persons  engaged  in  the  trade  at  Lagny.  He 
found  six  bakers  of  Paris  buying  regularly  in  the  farms;  six 
factors  of  merchants  and  bakers  of  Paris;  and  thirty  or  forty 
peasants  who  were  most  frequently  visited  by  the  Parisian 
bakers  and  merchants.2  Very  much  the  same  troubles  appear 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21645.  49.  Lagny,  19  Fev.  1699.  Delamare.  Letter,  with 
copy  of  depositions  of  witnesses. 

1  Ibid.     75.     Lagny,  1699.     Delamare's  notes. 


120  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

at  Brie-Comte-Robert.  "  The  peasant  proprietors  and  farmers 
have  ceased  to  bring  their  grain  to  market,  coming  instead  with 
samples  in  their  pockets.  The  bakers  and  the  merchants  who 
buy  conclude  the  bargain  on  the  basis  of  the  samples  and  then 
go  to  the  farms  for  the  grain."  l 

The  wholesale  trade  of  the  city  was  not  really  visible  even 
at  Paris;  the  quantities  held  by  the  bakers  could  never  be 
ascertained.  The  importance  of  this  element  of  uncertainty 
doubtless  increased  in  the  course  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
but  even  in  1700  it  was  a  serious  complication.  To  this  element 
of  difficulty  must  be  added  the  indefiniteness  arising  from  the 
absence  of  concentration  in  the  sale  of  bread.  The  bakers 
sold  directly  in  the  retail  markets  of  the  various  quarters,  so 
that  the  trade  was  an  absolutely  incalculable  factor.  Grain 
thus  appeared  on  three  independent  markets;  bread  and  flour 
on  sixteen  different  markets,  seven  of  which  were  really  of  first- 
class  importance.2  Speculative  dealing  that  had  already  begun 
in  some  of  the  producing  regions  was  vigorously  and  successfully 
suppressed  at  Paris.  There  was  no  bond  of  unity  between  the 
numerous  markets  engaged  in  the  grain  trade. 

At  Paris,  indeed,  the  conservatism  of  the  period  was  strongest. 
New  'ideas  worked  in  only  with  the  greatest  of  difficulty.  The 
active  buying  and  selling  among  merchants  without  displacement 
of  the  grain  was  not  permitted.  Such  regrating  was  frowned 
upon  with  all  possible  severity.  The  wholesale  merchants  at 
Paris  sold  on  the  ports  to  bakers,3  and  to  the  well-to-do  bourgeois 
who  accumulated  stores  for  their  use  and  had  the  grain  ground 
as  their  needs  demanded.  It  was  all,  in  a  sense,  retail  trade. 
The  retail  buyer  was  ill-informed,  careless  of  minute  differences 
of  price,  and  relatively  unskilled  in  the  technique  of  buying. 
But  in  addition  to  the  ignorance  and  incapacity  of  the  buyers, 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.      2iiv.      13  Juillet  1694.     Proces  Verbal.     Testimony 
of  fitienne  Lesueur.     See  also  a  memoir  on  the  market  at  Tournan  in  1699,  Bib. 
Nat.,  Fr.  21645.    576. 

2  Coin  de  Saint-Paul;  Place  Maubert;  Marche"Neuf;  Faubourg  Saint- Germain; 
les  Quinze  Vingtc;  le  Marais;  Quai  des  Grands  Augustins.     See  G7.     1659.     Re~ 
ports  of  d'Argenson,  1709-10. 

3  See  especially  G7.    1659.    Memoire  du  30  Nov.  1709  sur  Le  Port  de  Greve. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS         121 

the  efficiency  of  the  grain  markets  was  seriously  affected  by  one 
of  the  regulations  to  which  the  merchants  were  subjected.  The 
elasticity  of  the  market  was  impaired  by  the  restrictions  placed 
upon  the  liberty  of  the  merchants  to  raise  prices.  Each  boat- 
load of  grain  was  regarded  as  a  unit,  although  the  boats  contained 
30-40  muids  (150-200  bushels).  The  whole  load  must  be  sold 
at  the  opening  price  or  at  a  lower  figure.  Sales  were  frequently 
very  slow,  so  that  portions  of  many  boat-loads  would  be  on  sale 
at  the  same  tune.  Whatever  grain  was  held  thus  could  not  be 
influenced  by  any  conditions  which  would  cause  a  rise  in  prices. 
Furthermore,  any  grain  arriving  on  the  port  must  be  placed 
on  sale;  the  merchants  were  not  allowed  to  remove  the  grain 
to  granaries  unless  it  had  been  damaged  by  water  so  that  special 
treatment  was  necessary.  All  these  circumstances  aggravated 
the  general  defects  of  the  market  system  of  Paris.  Unprofes- 
sional buying  of  a  retail,  rather  than  wholesale,  character, 
absence  of  responsiveness  to  changes  in  demand,  regulations 
distinctly  hostile  even  to  the  honest  interest  of  the  merchants,  — 
everything  tempted  the  merchant  to  play  upon  the  weakness 
of  the  metropolis,  in  the  hope  of  realizing  the  gains  which  a  better 
organization  would  have  permitted  within  the  limits  of  the  law. 

The  efforts  of  the  merchants  to  hold  back  their  consignments 
of  grain  were  the  outcome  of  the  regulations  in  regard  to  sale. 
If  a  boat  arrived  when  the  market  was  dull,  the  merchant  suf- 
fered not  only  from  a  slow  sale,  but  also  found  himself  deprived 
of  any  hope  of  benefiting  from  an  improvement  in  the  market. 
The  low  prices  of  the  dull  period  would  be  the  maximum  that 
could  be  realized  upon  that  grain.  What  wonder  that  the  mer- 
chants formed  granaries  just  outside  of  Paris,  that  they  devised 
expedients  for  delaying  grain  in  transit,  that  they  devoted  them- 
selves to  a  careful  study  of  the  idiosyncrasies  of  the  Parisian 
market!  Driven  to  such  measures  in  pure  self  defence,  they 
were  not  slow  to  discover  the  vast  opportunities  for  gain  afforded 
by  the  inadequacy  of  the  market  organization  and  by  the  extra- 
ordinary invisibility  of  the  wholesale  supply. 

The  investigations  of  1660  were  first  directed  against  these 
entrepots,  and  with  great  success.  Quantities  of  grain  were 


122  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

found  and  sent  to  Paris  to  relieve  the  distress.  The  Proces 
Verbaux  contain  long  lists  of  visits  to  granaries.  ' "  The  wife 
of  Sebastian  Toussaint  said  that  her  husband  was  not  at  Trille- 
bardou.  She  opened  a  granary  containing  thirty-four  muids  of 
wheat,  which  had  been  brought  down  from  Chalons  and  Vitry."  l 
In  some  cases  the  declarations  give  the  date  of  purchase.  At 
Meaux,  for  instance,  one  of  the  dealers  said  that  "  the  grain 
had  all  been  bought  at  Chalons  about  two  years  ago."  2  En- 
trepots of  up-river  grain  were  found  at  Trillebardou,  Meaux, 
Mary,  La-Ferte-Gaucher,  La-Ferte-sous-Jouarre,  and  Lizy.3 
Some  of  the  grain  had  been  kept  in  store  for  five  or  six  years, 
but  that  was  probably  exceptional.  The  same  abuse  evoked 
complaints  throughout  the  rest  of  the  century.  In  1684,  the 
Provost  of  Merchants  says  that  the  merchants  "  place  their 
grain  in  granaries  and  entrepots  in  various  towns  on  the  river 
by  which  the  grain  is  brought  to  Paris.  They  consult  with  each 
other  and  agree  to  ship  small  quantities  from  these  towns  to 
Paris.  They  even  delay  the  boats  in  transit,  so  that  the  ports 
shall  not  be  abundantly  supplied.  They  seek  to  assure  them- 
selves unjust  gains  at  the  expense  of  the  public."  4  In  1698, 
the  Provost  issued  summons  to  one  Francois  Marin,  Measurer 
and  Merchant  of  Meaux,  "  who  has  recently  purchased  thirty 
muids  of  wheat  at  Vitry,  to  be  carried  into  Meaux  and  to  be 
mixed  with  grain  from  France  and  Brie,  before  being  brought 
to  Paris." 5  In  1700,  commissioners  were  sent  to  Chateau- 
Thierry  to  secure  the  shipment  of  grain  delayed  in  transit. 
For  some  reason  or  other,  the  Proces  Verbal  of  the  commission 
was  copied  into  the  Registers  of  the  city,  so  that  it  has  survived. 
In  this  instance  about  300  muids  of  oats  had  been  sent  down 
from  Chalons  to  Chateau-Thierry.  The  report  is  significant 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.     194.     7  Oct.  1660.     Proces  Verbal  a  TriUebardou. 

2  Ibid.     205.     29  Oct.  1660.     Meaux. 

3  Ibid.     289  and  298.    Originals,  signed  by  the  Commissioners  and  witnesses. 
Oct.  1660. 

4  H.  1830.     Reg.  du  Bureau,  Ixix.     i4^ept.  1684.     Commission  to  Bon  Risle, 
huissier,  to  open  granaries.     The  municipal  records  probably  contained  the  reports 
of  the  commissioners.    See  also  H.  1831.     Reg  du  Bureau,  923.     30  Juillet  1688. 

6  H.  1837.    Reg.  du  Bureau.    28  Aout  1698. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS        123 

chiefly  because  it  reveals  the  manner  in  which  the  legal  require- 
ments were  evaded.  To  prevent  entrepots,  boats  arriving  at 
the  ports  were  required  to  exhibit  way-bills  (Lettres  de  Voiture) 
stating  the  place  where  the  grain  was  shipped  and  the  destination. 
If  this  ordinance  could  be  enforced,  the  entrepots  could  not  be 
formed.  But  the  regulation  was  of  no  practical  importance. 
The  merchants  shipped  from  the  up-river  ports  without  taking 
way-bills,  by  necessity  working  in  confidence  with  the  local 
officials.  As  the  local  officials  were  themselves  engaged  in  the 
trade,  the  difficulties  of  getting  off  without  way-bills  were 
reduced  to  a  minimum. 

Practically  none  of  these  boats  sent  down  to  Chateau-Thierry 
were  accompanied  by  way-bills.  Le  Lieurre,  who  received  them 
at  Chateau-Thierry,  said  that  "  he  did  not  know  whence  they 
had  been  shipped,  but  that  the  boatmen  were  from  Chalons. 
The  boats  were  addressed  to  him  by  Pouillot,  a  factor  at  Chalons, 
and  orders  had  been  sent  to  unload  the  boats  and  store  the  grain 
in  granaries.  He  could  not  say  to  whom  the  grain  belonged, 
as  there  were  no  way-bills  (Lettres  de  Voiture).1  Another  con- 
signment arrived  while  the  commissioners  were  on  the  spot,  so 
that  they  were  able  to  get  detailed  information  from  Barbier, 
the  boatman.  He  said  that  he  had  brought  six  boats  down 
six  weeks  before.  They  contained  100  muids  of  oats,  which 
he  had  taken  aboard  at  Thou-sur-Marne,  four  leagues  above 
Chalons.  Charles  Pouillot,  factor  for  Collinet  of  Chalons,  had 
the  grain  loaded.  The  grain  belonged  to  Collinet  of  Chalons 
(a  merchant  trading  regularly  with  Paris).  There  were  no 
way-bills  because  the  oats  were  not  destined  for  Paris,  but  merely 
a  note  from  Pouillot  addressing  the  consignment  to  Robert 
Fournier,  a  measurer  at  Chateau-Thierry."  2  All  these  inci- 
dents are  significant:  the  shipment  from  a  little  village  outside 
Chalons;  the  absence  of  way-bills;  the  evasive  explanation 
of  the  informality  in  shipment.  They  explain  the  persistence 
of  the  entrepots  on  the  Lower  Marne,  despite  the  constant 
efforts  of  the  Provost  of  Merchants  to  stop  the  delays  in  transit. 

1  H.  1839.     Reg.  du  Bureau,  10.     23  Aotit  1700.     Testimony  of  Le  Lieurre. 
*  Ibid. 


124        THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

The  final  shipment  from  the  lower  Marne  towns  was  a  simple 
matter.  Those  towns  were  all  important  shipping  points  for 
the  grain  of  the  vicinity,  most  of  them  busy  trading  ports  with 
granaries  of  resident  merchants,  and  there  was  the  additional 
facility  of  weekly  or  semi-weekly  freight  boats.  Consequently 
the  entrepot  trade  could  easily  be  concealed  under  cover  of  the 
normal  trade  of  those  towns.1 

The  wholesale  supply  of  Paris  was  thus  rendered  invisible 
by  an  extraordinary  combination  of  circumstances.  In  the 
producing  regions,  the  trade  was  largely  independent  of  markets. 
In  some  places  the  trade  was  carried  on  in  the  granaries, 
while  in  other  places  the  merchants  scoured  the  countryside, 
buying  in  the  farms.  In  either  case,  the  grain  never  came 
into  general  view.  At  Paris,  the  wholesale  traders  were  obliged 
to  engage  in  what  was  practically  retail  trade.  Such  few  advan- 
tages of  concentration  as  were  secured  in  the  producing  regions 
were  nullified  by  the  multiplicity  of  city  markets.  The  bakers 
added  to  the  confusion  by  procuring  a  portion  of  their  supplies 
in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  city,  buying  in  small  quantities 
on  local  markets,  or  canvassing  the  farms  with  the  same  energy 
that  was  displayed  by  the  merchants  in  the  more  distant  pro- 
ducing regions.  Lastly,  the  difficulties  of  disposing  of  grain 
advantageously  at  Paris  gradually  led  the  merchants  to  form 
entrepots  nearby,  from  which  they  could  bring  grain  to  the 
ports  at  short  notice.  It  is  difficult  to  imagine  a  more  completely 
invisible  supply. 

This  invisibility  and  the  sense  of  insecurity  it  engendered 
caused  constant  apprehension  in  the  metropolis.  Even  in  these 
days  of  agitation  against  great  corporations,  the  intensity  of 
feeling  of  the  seventeenth  century  Parisian  can  hardly  be  under- 
stood. His  outpourings  on  the  subjects  of  monopoly  and 
regrating  are  likely  to  excite  little  besides  derisive  comments 
on  the  obsolete  economic  thought  of  the  time.  But  a  sympa- 
thetic comprehension  of  his  actual  situation  leads  to  the  recog- 
nition that  there  was  some  reason  for  his  panicky  fears  and  his 

1  See  the  Proces  Verbaux  of  Delamare  in  1699  at  Meaux,  La-Ferte'-sous-Jouarre, 
and  Lizy.  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21645.  29,  92,  158. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  PARISIAN  MARKETS        12$ 

suspicious  hostility  to  the  merchants.  All  classes  were  so  sen- 
sitive to  the  least  sign  of  danger  that  the  instability  of  the 
Parisian  markets  was  doubtless  much  increased.  It  was  this 
deep-seated  apprehension  that  yielded  a  ready  credence  to  the 
legend  of  the  Pacte  de  Famine  in  the  latter  eighteenth  century. 
Then,  as  in  1709,  the  source  of  all  trouble  was  inadequate 
market  machinery. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  AND  THE  WHOLE- 
SALE MERCHANTS 

THE  history  of  the  trade  that  developed  around  Lyons  differs 
in  one  important  feature  from  the  history  of  the  Parisian  trade. 
In  the  Seine  Basin  the  sources  of  supply  were  numerous  and 
fairly  well  utilized  from  an  early  date ;  the  relative  abundance 
rendered  official  interference  less  conspicuous.  The  trade  was 
allowed  to  develop  according  to  the  play  of  circumstances.  The 
Lyonese  trade  followed  a  very  different  course.  The  supply  of 
grain  available  was  barely  adequate  even  in  years  of  ordinary 
fertility.  Every  dearth  caused  a  panic,  both  in  the  producing 
regions,  and  in  the  city.  All  were  convinced  that  the  supply 
was  inadequate.  This  feeling  was  intensified  by  the  incomplete 
knowledge  of  the  relative  importance  of  the  possible  sources  of 
supply.  The  most  favorable  regions  were  the  last  to  be  sys- 
tematically exploited,  and  then,  instead  of  drawing  supplies 
regularly  from  every  possible  source,  the  merchants  endeavored 
to  purchase  in  one  region  all  the  grain  needed  by  the  city. 
There  was  little  of  the  concurrent  utilization  of  the  many  sources 
of  supply  that  is  so  striking  in  the  Seine  Basin.  Lastly,  the 
/'officials  left  the  merchants  too  little  freedom.  In  critical 
/  moments  the  provincial  officials  stopped  the  trade  absolutely, 

/  or  at  least  assumed  complete  control  of  all  movements  of  grain. 
The  municipal  officials  endeavored  to  encourage  the  merchants, 

\  but  they  frequently  apprehended  serious  deficiencies  and  then 
\.  engaged  in  trade  on  the  account  of  the  city.  At  such  times,  the 
Consuls  intended  to  force  the  merchants  to  sell  at  lower  prices, 
and  actually  sold  the  municipal  grain  at  cost.  But  these  ventures 
generally  resulted  in  severe  losses,  and  the  good  intentions  of 
the  Consuls  were  misrepresented.  The  losses  attracted  public 
attention,  and  the  merchants,  who  suffered  from  competition 
with  the  municipality,  were  not  slow  to  spread  rumors  of  under- 

126 


THE  CHAMBER  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS 

hand  practices.  They  suggested  various  methods  by  which 
private  gains  might  be  secured  at  the  expense  of  the  public. 
All  these  differences  may  be  traced  to  the  normal  excess  of  supply 
in  the  Seine  Basin,  and  to  the  bare  adequacy  of  the  supply 
available  for  meeting  the  necessities  of  Lyons. 

The  organization  of  the  trade  at  Lyons  was  less  advanced.  At 
Paris  even  in  the  thirteenth  century,  there  were  wholesale  mer- 
chants trading  in  distant  sections  and  bringing  grain  to  Paris  by 
water.  At  Lyons,  there  was  no  wholesale  water-borne  trade  even 
in  the  early  fifteenth  century.  .The  trade  in  the  Rhone  Basin 
never  achieved  the  degree  of  organization  found  at  Bray  and 
Vitry  in  1 709.  The  simple  local  market  persisted  longer  at  Lyons, 
and  the  wholesale  trade  was  less  highly  organized.  In  addition 
to  this  element  of  connection  with  early  types  of  marketing, 
the  emphasis  upon  early  forms  is  intensified  by  the  possibility 
of  treating  the  sixteenth  century  at  greater  length.  The  history 
of  that  period  in  the  Seine  Basin  seems  to  have  been  relatively 
uneventful.  At  all  events,  the  records  are  inadequate,  especially 
when  compared  with  the  richness  of  material  for  the  late  seven- 
teenth century.  In  the  Rhone  Basin,  the  sixteenth  century  was 
a  period  of  significant  development,  and  the  records  have  sur- 
vived practically  intact,  so  that  the  gradual  rise  of  the  wholesale 
trade  can  be  traced  in  considerable  detail.  Then  too,  the  seven- 
teenth century  leads  to  so  little  that  is  new  that  the  interest  in 
Lyonese  development  lies  rather  in  the  point  of  departure  than 
in  the  final  result.  Every  feature  of  the  Parisian  trade  carried 
our  attention  forward  to  the  creation  of  the  modern  market  sys- 
tem. Every  incident  in  the  history  of  the  trade  of  Lyons  carries 
us  back  to  medieval  conditions. 

The  specific  problems  of  the  grain  trade  at  Lyons  were  due 
in  great  measure  to  the  physical  characteristics  of  the  region. 
The  situation  of  Lyons  is  truly  magnificent,  but  the  nature 
of  the  advantages  of  the  location  entails  disadvantages  which 
have  exerted  a  great  influence  upon  the  history  of  the  city. 
The  rough  mountainous  character  of  eastern  France  necessarily 
gives  great  prominence  to  the  depression  between  the  Saone 
and  the  Jura,  which  continues  for  a  short  distance  below  the 


128         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

junction  of  the  Rhone  and  the  Saone.  The  many  advantages 
offered  by  this  strip  of  fertile  plain,  in  the  midst  of  the  numerous 
ranges  of  mountains,  inevitably  created  an  important  settlement 
at  the  junction  of  the  rivers,  —  the  point  which  commanded 
the  whole  plain,  and  in  addition  possessed  the  advantage  of  a 
good  road  over  the  mountains  to  central  France.  Lyons  was 
the  natural  entrepot  for  all  the  trade  between  Italy  or  Germany 
and  Central  or  Northern  France.  The  mountainous  character 
of  the  region  produced  a  concentration  of  trade  that  would  not 
have  developed  without  some  such  compelling  circumstance. 
The  excellence  of  the  site  of  Lyons  is  due  to  this  isolation  between 
the  Massif  Central,  the  Alps,  and  the  Jura.  But  despite  the 
brilliant  commercial  development  founded  upon  this  unique 
position,  the  permanent  welfare  of  the  city  could  be  assured 
only  by  some  more  lasting  source  of  wealth  than  the  Italian 
trade  that  was  poured  into  France  through  Lyons  in  the  six- 
teenth and  seventeenth  centuries.  The  silk  trade  encouraged 
manufacturers,  and  an  industrial  development  began  of  which 
the  Lyonese  had  great  hopes.  But  then  the  disadvantages  of 
the  situation  of  the  city  became  apparent.  The  configuration 
of  the  region  hampered  industrial  development;  great  concen- 
tration of  population  was  impossible  because  of  the  limited 
food  supply  available  in  the  relatively  infertile  Rhone  Basin. 

The  available  supply  of  grain  was  small  not  only  in  the  imme- 
diate vicinity  of  Lyons,  but  also  in  the  more  distant  regions 
whence  grain  could  be  procured  without  prohibitive  cost.  The 
plains  near  the  city  are  exceedingly  narrow.  Opposite  the 
city,  the  foot  hills  of  the  Jura  are  scarcely  fifteen  miles  distant. 
Below  the  junction  of  the  rivers,  the  hills  approach  more  and 
more  closely  so  that  the  identity  of  the  plain  is  soon  lost.  Above 
Lyons  the  plain  is  wider  and  extends  north  up  the  Saone  Valley 
with  little  serious  interruption,  but  Lyons  could  not  rely  upon 
that  region,  since  the  Saone  towns  drew  their  support  from 
the  upper  reaches  of  this  plain.  The  rougher  districts  were 
hardly  more  than  self-sufficient,  and  at  times  they  were  even 
dependent  upon  Lyons.  Lyons  was  thus  actually  confined 
to  the  region  within  thirty  or  forty  miles  of  the  city.  Bresse, 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  129 

Bugey,  and  a  corner  of  Dauphine  furnished  the  excess  supply 
available  in  the  immediate  vicinity. 

The  difficulty  of  securing  abundant  supplies  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  led  to  a  determined  effort  to  discover  reliable  sources 
of  supply  elsewhere,  but  this  was  no  simple  matter.  Grain 
could  be  secured  on  the  Lower  Rhone  in  small  quantities,  both 
in  Languedoc  and  in  Provence.  There  was  ordinarily  a  small 
surplus  in  Auvergne,  in  the  vicinity  of  Clermont-Ferrand.  A 
more  considerable  supply  could  be  found  in  Burgundy  and 
Bassigny.  But  each  region  presented  some  special  difficulty. 
The  swift  current  of  the  Rhone  made  transportation  from 
Languedoc  and  Provence  costly  and  difficult.  The  surplus  of 
the  Lower  Rhone  too  was  not  very  large,  and  official  opposition 
combined  with  these  uncertainties  to  prevent  the  development 
of  regular  trade  between  Lyons  and  the  Lower  Rhone.  From 
Auvergne,  transportation  was  costly,  as  much  of  the  journey 
was  overland  from  Roanne  to  Lyons.  Burgundy  was  the  most 
favorable  source  of  supply,  but  the  principal  producing  sections 
were  far  from  the  river,  and  grain  was  not  collected  in  the  river 
towns  until  the  activity  of  the  Lyonese  had  started  a  movement 
of  trade  in  that  direction.  These  difficulties  checked  the  develop- 
ment of  trade.  The  merchants  hesitated  to  embark  in  the 
risky  venture  of  buying  grain  in  Languedoc,  Auvergne,  or  Bur- 
gundy, though  the  Consulate  endeavored  to  encourage  private 
enterprise.  These  three  features  are  characteristic  in  the  history 
of  the  Lyonese  trade:  scarcity  of  grain,  timidity  of  the  private 
merchants,  municipal  participation  and  stimulation  of  trade. 

The  Parisian  trade  had  begun  to  assume  considerable  propor- 
tions before  the  records  became  sufficiently  elaborate  to  furnish 
any  indications  of  its  character.  At  Lyons  there  is  no  such 
"  pre-historic  "  period.  The  grain  trade  first  appears  in  the 
records  in  the  late  fourteenth  century,  but  unlike  the  Lime 
des  Metiers  of  Etienne  Boileau,  these  documents  suggest  the 
utmost  simplicity  of  trade.  At  Lyons,  the  earliest  material 
easily  available  is  to  be  found  in  the  Letters  Patent  and  Letters 
Close,  a  much  less  fruitful  source  of  information  than  guild 
statutes.  Letters  Close  were  issued  in  1386  by  the  Governor 


130  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

of  Dauphine  to  the  Castellans  of  Vaulx,  Saint-Symphorien- 
d'Ozon,  Pusignan,  Mezieux,  Colombier,  and  other  places, 
ordering  them  to  allow  the  citizens  of  Lyons  to  carry  off  their 
rents  in  grain.1  The  right  of  Lyons  to  draw  supplies  from  the 
plain  was  thus  recognized  at  an  early  date,  despite  the  compli- 
cations caused  by  the  provincial  boundary.  This  is  the  theme 
of  all  the  early  letters.  In  1415,  the  ecclesiastical  consistory 
of  Dauphine  was  required  to  authorize  inhabitants  of  Lyons  to 
transport  grain  from  Dauphine  to  Lyons.  The  complaints  of 
the  Lyonese  were  occasioned  by  the  difficulties  experienced  in 
carrying  to  Lyons  tithes,  cens,  and  other  payments  in  kind.2  A 
couple  of  years  later  the  subject  was  canvassed  more  thoroughly 
by  the  Consuls  at  Lyons  and  the  Governor  of  Dauphine.  The 
Consuls  asserted  that  citizens  of  Lyons  were  not  allowed  to  bring 
to  the  city  the  rents  that  accrued  in  Dauphine.3  This  narrow 
limitation  of  rights  is  striking,  and  although  it  is  easy  to  infer 
too  much  from  what  is  left  unsaid,  it  is  none  the  less  remarkable 
that  there  was  no  reference  to  grain  merchants  or  to  trade 
between  Dauphine  and  Lyons.  In  1432,  the  charter  of  the 
Governor  of  Dauphine  permitted  ordinary  trade:  "  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Dauphine  shall  be  allowed  to  sell  their  grain  in  Lyons, 
and  the  inhabitants  of  Lyons  may  procure  grain  in  the  province."  4 
This  is  clearly  the  last  phase  of  the  struggle  to  obtain  full  trading 
rights  in  the  plain  to  the  east  of  Lyons.  The  limits  of  the  region 
are  indicated  by  the  letter  of  1386,  and  although  the  later  meas- 
ures bear  no  restriction,  it  is  fairly  certain  that  active  trade 
was  limited  to  the  small  area  between  the  foot  hills  of  the  Jura 
and  the  Rhone.  The  most  significant  aspect  of  this  episode 
is  the  suggestion  of  a  very  simply  organized  trade.  The  people 
of  Lyons  evidently  drew  most  of  their  grain  from  the  immediate 
vicinity  and  much  of  it  was  the  product  of  their  own  estates. 
Gradually,  regular  trade  with  this  corner  of  Dauphine  became 
necessary.  The  city  was  small  and  the  mechanism  of  the  grain 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  AA.  78,  18.      10  Dec.  1386.     See  also  AA.  77,  n.    4  Sept. 
1379,  similar  letter  by  Carolus  de  Bouille. 

2  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,  381,  i.    6  Nov.  1415. 

3  Ibid.,  381,  2.     1417.    Divers  Lettres. 

4  Ibid.,  381,  4.    21  Sept.  1432. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  131 

trade  very  rudimentary.  Probably  there  were  no  merchants 
engaged  in  bringing  grain  up  or  down  the  river.  The  market 
was  supplied  by  the  blatiers  and  peasants  of  the  plain.  In  1460, 
we  find  the  first  reference  to  grain  markets  at  Lyons.  Pro- 
hibitions in  Forez  led  ultimately  to  Royal  Letters  Patent  ad- 
dressed to  the  Bailli  of  Macon  and  the  Senechal  of  Lyons: 
"  Prohibitions  have  recently  been  issued  in  Forez  and  Beaujolais, 
so  that  the  merchants  and  other  persons  of  those  provinces 
have  not  dared  sell  their  grain  to  our  subjects  of  Lyons.  .  .  . 
The  merchants  and  inhabitants  of  Lyons  have  consequently 
been  unable  to  engage  in  trade  with  those  of  Forez  and  Beau- 
jolais, as  they  are  wont.  This  has  caused  the  price  of  grain  to 
rise  at  Ly«ns  and  in  Lyonnais.  .  .  .  For  these  reasons  we  order 
you  to  permit  all  merchants  of  Lyons  and  Lyonnais  to  export 
from  Forez  and  Beaujolais  grain  already  purchased  or  to  be 
purchased."  * 

If  this  was  the  only  evidence  to  suggest  a  very  simply  organized 
trade,  I  should  hesitate  to  characterize  the  first  half  of  the 
fifteenth  century  in  this  manner.  Charters  are  a  particularly 
unreliable  basis  for  conclusions  since  there  is  so  much  chance 
involved  in  their  preservation.  Large  numbers  have  been  lost, 
and  there  is  no  reason  to  infer  that  the  decimation  of  such 
material  has  been  governed  by  anything  but  blind  chance. 
The  charters  cited,  however,  are  only  a  small  portion  of  the  ma- 
terial on  which  inferences  may  be  based,  and,  where  there  is  so 
little  tangible  evidence,  it  is  necessary  to  read  it  in  connection 
with  evidence  of  a  later  period.  In  the  history  of  the  Lyonese 
grain  trade  the  first  important  mass  of  material  appears  in  1481, 
as  the  result  of  municipal  attempts  to  secure  grain.  The  incident 
is  significant  not  only  in  its  general  character  but  in  its  date. 
It  is  an  indication  of  the  beginning  of  the  rise  of  Lyons,  and 
helps  to  explain  both  the  simplicity  of  organization  in  the  grain 
trade  before  1450  and  the  energetic  efforts  of  the  municipality 
at  the  close  of  the  century.  The  fairs  of  Lyons  were  established 
in  1463;  the  first  important  patents  to  the  silk  weavers  were 
granted  by  Louis  XI;  at  that  time,  the  Italians  began  to  come 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,  381,  6.    3  Juin  1460. 


132         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

in  considerable  numbers.  None  of  these  elements  in  the  com- 
mercial growth  of  Lyons  were  of  great  importance  in  the  latter 
half  of  the  fifteenth  century,  but  all  these  little  facts  suggest 
that  this  was  indeed  the  period  when  the  great  expansion  of  the 
city  began.  The  small  provincial  town  was  beginning  to  expand. 
Development  of  new  sources  of  food  supply  had  become  a  press- 
ing question. 

In  1481,  the  Consuls  undertook  to  purchase  grain  directly; 
there  was  scarcely  any  reference  to  merchants,  and  no  reference 
to  regular  grain  merchants.  There  is  no  indication  that  there 
was  any  regular  trade  with  distant  sections.  Apparently  this 
municipal  undertaking  was  a  bold  pioneer  enterprise.  It  was 
essentially  the  work  of  merchants  engaged  primarily  in  other 
lines  of  trade.  The  project  was  sketched  in  full  at  the  first 
meeting  that  considered  the  subject.  On  the  fifth  of  August, 
1481,  "  all  the  councillors  assembled  to  consider  the  grain  supply, 
and  to  prevent  the  city  from  suffering  any  inconvenience.  Hum- 
bert de  Vary  was  summoned  to  attend  and  join  in  the  delibera- 
tion. ...  It  was  finally  decided  to  send  to  the  king  in  order 
to  get  permission  to  procure  grain  in  Languedoc,  Dauphine, 
and  the  Beauce,  and  if  possible  to  secure  exemption  from  tolls. 
Furthermore,  it  was  decided  to  receive  in  the  name  of  the  town 
such  monies  as  might  be  subscribed  for  the  purchase  of  grain. 
The  price  should  be  fixed  by  the  councillors  to  yield  the  profit 
deemed  expedient.  This  done,  it  was  decided  to  send  Taille- 
mand  to  Moulins  on  the  morrow,  as  he  reported  that  grain 
had  arrived  there.  He  shall  forward  grain  promptly  to  the  city, 
and  shall  also  endeavor  to  discover  if  grain  can  be  bought  in  the 
Beauce.  He  shall  consider  whether  it  would  not  be  well  to 
buy  as  much  as  2000  anees.1  One  Papillon  of  Moulins  has 
said  that  he  would  be  willing  to  be  party  to  a  venture  of  1000 
francs,  if  Taillemand  would  make  him  a  loan,  so  the  latter  was 
asked  if  he  would  engage  in  the  venture.  He  said  that  he  was 
already  in  partnership  with  Papillon."  2  These  last  lines  suggest 

1  The  ane*e  is  equivalent  to  6£  bushels  English  measure. 

8  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  352,  II,  Actes  Consulates.  5  Aout  1481.  The  MS. 
is  difficult,  and  the  reading  of  the  last  two  lines  is  somewhat  uncertain.  The 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  133 

a  mercantile  undertaking  independent  of  the  project  of  the 
consulate,  but  this  is  the  only  reference  to  distant  purchases  by 
private  individuals.  The  proposal  to  get  special  Letters  Patent 
from  the  King  led  to  the  specific  description  of  the  regions 
whence  supplies  were  to  be  derived.  The  proposal  tc  buy  in 
the  Beauce  also  appeared  in  the  instructions  to  the  agent  of  the 
municipality.  On  the  whole,  the  scheme  has  the  appearance 
of  being  the  result  of  deliberations  by  merchants  who  think  of 
buying  grain,  in  this  time  of  need,  in  the  provinces  to  which 
their  trade  carries  them.  The  trading  connection  with  Orleans 
and  Paris  suggested  the  Beauce.  The  frequent  trade  at  the 
fair  of  Beaucaire  of  Avignon  suggested  purchases  in  Languedoc. 
The  great  distance  to  which  they  propose  to  send  indicates  a 
perception  of  the  futility  of  relying  entirely  upon  the  grain  in 
the  immediate  vicinity  of  Lyons.  Neither  the  plain  to  the  east 
of  the  city,  nor  the  parts  of  Forez  and  Beaujolais  frequented 
by  the  petty  merchants,  could  suffice  for  the  growing  needs  of 
the  city. 

The  municipality  at  first  endeavored  to  direct  the  purchases 
itself.  Humbert  de  Vary,  who  was  acting  as  an  agent  for  the 
Consuls,  bought  1 500  anees  of  grain  at  Orleans  and  other  places 
in  that  region,  early  in  September.  Just  as  he  was  ready  to 
have  the  grain  shipped,  prohibitions  were  issued.  At  this 
juncture  the  expediency  of  securing  Royal  Patents  was  revealed. 
The  envoy  at  the  Court  reported  that  the  King  had  issued  the 
Patents  desired,  and  the  Consuls  at  once  forwarded  the  docu- 
ments to  Orleans.1  But  the  Consuls  found  the  details  of  the 
undertaking  burdensome,  particularly  when  the  grain  had 
arrived  and  it  became  necessary  to  distribute  the  municipal 
supply  by  selling  grain  and  bread  in  the  small  quantities  needed 
by  individuals. 

These  aspects  of  municipal  purchases  were  probably  respon- 
sible for  the  final  organization  agreed  upon  at  the  meeting  of 
October  28th.  It  was  then  resolved  that  the  city  "would 

Archivist  kindly  revised  my  transcript.  This  volume  of  the  registers  contains 
the  notes  taken  during  the  meetings,  and  the  record  is  at  times  influenced  by  the 
hurry  of  note-taking. 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  352,  III.    22  Sept.  1481. 


134  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

entrust  the  matter  to  four  well-intentioned  citizens  who  were 
skilled  in  such  affairs.  These  persons  should  make  the  purchases, 
arrange  for  the  payments,  and  do  all  other  things  that  were 
necessary.  In  order  that  the  notables  who  had  loaned  funds 
should  be  protected  by  a  more  complete  guarantee,  the  Consuls 
summoned  the  wardens  of  the  guilds  and  other  notables." 
This  Assembly  agreed  to  all  the  propositions  of  the  Consuls, 
and  gave  them  full  authority  to  establish  the  commission  of 
four  to  handle  all  details  of  the  purchases.1  "  The  commissioners 
purchased  large  quantities  of  grain  in  the  name  of  the  town, 
procuring  such  supplies  that  the  city  and  vicinity  were  main- 
tained in  abundance  for  the  greater  part  of  a  year  in  which  they 
would  have  suffered  severely  without  this  aid.  .  .  .  Between 
Christmas  1481  and  July  1482,  the  commissioners  distributed 
about  3300  anees  of  grain:  1000  anees  as  raw  grain,  2300  anees 
in  the  form  of  bread."  2  The  operations  of  the  municipality 
were,  thus,  of  great  importance  at  the  time.  Very  likely  grain 
had  never  before  been  handled  at  Lyons  in  such  quantities. 
The  Consuls  had  shown  what  could  be  done  in  the  wholesale 
grain  trade,  and  although  their  object  was  primarily  to  meet 
immediate  needs,  the  desire  to  stimulate  private  effort  was 
doubtless  present. 

The  energy  of  the  consulate  seems  to  have  roused  the  mer- 
chants of  the  city  to  a  realization  of  the  possibilities  of  the  grain 
trade.  The  next  twenty  years  were  marked  by  the  appearance 
of  wholesale  grain  merchants.  In  1489,  there  is  an  interesting 
indication  of  the  rapidity  with  which  the  city  was  becoming 
accustomed  to  dependence  upon  more  distant  sources  of  supply. 
The  bakers  complained  that  the  shipments  from  Burgundy, 
Dauphine,  and  Dombes  had  been  stopped  by  local  prohibitions. 
They  protested  against  this  interference  with  long  established 
custom.3  Ten  years  later  the  merchants  were  more  definitely 
established.  Several  merchants  offered  to  supply  the  city  with 
grain  "  at  six  '  blancs '  (sic)  per  anee  above  cost,"  if  the  city 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  19,  138.     9  Aotit  1489. 

2  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  381,  10. 

3  Ibid.,  BB.  19,  138.     9  Aout  1489. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  135 

would  guarantee  them  against  loss.1  The  Consuls  agreed  to 
this  proposition.  A  year  later,  there  was  dearth  in  Lyonnais, 
Dauphine,  and  Bresse.  The  Consuls  decided  to  ask  permission 
to  export  5-6000  mines  from  Burgundy.  The  register  is  not 
explicit,  but  it  implies  that  the  grain  was  to  be  bought  by  mer- 
chants, although  the  municipality  undertook  to  obtain  the 
necessary  permits. 

In  these  twenty  years,  the  outward  aspect  of  the  grain  trade 
was  completely  transformed.  Before  1481,  there  is  no  evidence 
of  wholesale  trade.  The  city  was  supplied  by  peasants  from  the 
plain,  and  to  some  extent  by  small  quantities  of  grain  drawn 
from  Forez  and  Beaujolais.  There  is  nothing  to  suggest  ac- 
quaintance with  more  distant  sources  of  supply,  nothing  to 
suggest  the  presence  of  wholesale  merchants,  nothing  that  could 
properly  be  called  wholesale  trade.  In  the  distress  threatening 
in  1481,  the  Consuls  resolved  to  make  purchases  in  distant 
regions.  Certain  merchants  were  commissioned  to  buy  grain 
and  manage  the  undertaking.  There  was  no  perception  of 
the  best  sources  of  supply,  but  large  quantities  of  grain  were 
bought  primarily  in  the  Beauce  and  in  Auvergne.  Then  the 
merchants  turned  their  attention  to  the  grain  trade.  In  1489, 
dependence  upon  Burgundy  was  declared  to  be  an  "  immemorial  " 
custom.  The  merchants  who  had  thus  extended  the  scope 
of  the  Lyonese  food  supply,  however,  were  probably  not  pro- 
fessional grain  merchants.  The  venture  in  grain  may  well  have 
been  an  incident  among  other  transactions.  But  wholesale 
dealing  in  grain  had  begun  and  there  was  some  knowledge  of 
the  regions  where  grain  could  be  found. 

In  1500,  the  fear  of  dearth  led  to  the  organization  of  a  Bureau 
to  buy  grain  on  account  of  the  municipality.  This  measure 
was  taken  in  December  and  the  experience  of  1481  was  evidently 
still  fresh  in  the  minds  of  the  Consuls.  Four  persons  were 
named  "  to  act  as  bursars  and  to  act  as  sureties  for  the  sums 
subscribed."  Two  of  the  persons  named  failed  to  appear  on 
the  following  day  to  accept  the  office,  and  after  a  short  interval 
their  places  were  filled.2  There  was  thus  a  commission  with 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  24,  176.    3  Aotit  1498. 

2  Ibid.,  BB.  24,  289,  290,  298.    18,  19  Dec.  1500;  15  Fev.  1500-01. 


136  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

practically  the  same  powers  as  the  commission  of  1481,  but  the 
presence  of  a  body  of  wholesale  grain  merchants  altered  the 
situation  fundamentally.  The  municipal  Bureau  could  not 
proceed  with  the  complete  independence  that  was  not  only 
possible  but  necessary  in  1481.  The  merchants  rendered  direct 
purchases  by  the  commissioners  less  necessary,  and  the  munici- 
pality scarcely  needed  to  do  more  than  procure  Letters  Patent 
from  the  King.  This  step  indeed  had  been  taken  before  the 
commission  of  four  was  chosen.  The  King  was  asked  to  grant 
patents  for  the  export  of  grain  from  Burgundy,  Bassigny,  Cham- 
pagne, Franche  Comte,  Languedoc,  and  Provence  —  a  most 
comprehensive  catalogue  of  all  the  possible  sources  of  supply.1 
The  Patents  arrived  at  Lyons  early  in  January,  and  then  there 
was  a  most  interesting  recognition  of  the  changed  conditions  of 
the  grain  trade.  "  To  proceed  to  the  execution  of  the  said 
Patents,  the  Consuls  summoned  the  principal  merchants,  who  are 
accustomed  to  buy  grain  in  the  Duchy  of  Burgundy,  Bassigny,  Cham- 
pagne, and  the  County  of  Burgundy"  Then  the  various  merchants 
were  asked  what  amounts  of  grain  they  would  agree  to  buy. 
"  Pierre  Prestreau  offered  to  bring  100  charges  of  grain  to  Lyons. 
Thibaut  Canis  said  he  would  buy  500  charges  in  Burgundy. 
Jehan  Combe,  a  baker,  offered  to  secure  500  charges  in  Bas- 
signy." "  Benoit  Panthier  agreed  to  bring  300  anees  from 
Burgundy  within  a  month,  and  300  more  before  Easter." 2 
When  the  merchants  made  agreements  of  this  type,  the  city 
issued  passports  to  them  addressed  to  the  officials  of  the  pro- 
ducing regions.  The  activity  and  number  of  merchants  seems 
to  indicate  a  remarkable  rapidity  of  development. 

Despite  the  complications  introduced  by  the  presence  of 
merchants,  the  municipal  commission  made  purchases  in  the 
name  of  the  town.  February  ninth,  the  Consuls  ordered  "  that 
Pierre  Renard  should  send  a  trustworthy  man  to  Roanne,  on 
the  morrow,  to  find  out  how  much  grain  there  was  in  that  town, 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  24,  288.     n  Dec.  1500. 

2  Ibid.,  BB.  24,  292.     5  Jan.  1500-01,  and  19  Jan.     Quarnet  et  Papier  fait  pour 
tenir  raison  de  la  traicte  des  Bleds  que  le  Roy  a  octroyee  a  la  Ville.     See  also  the 
deliberations  of  the  Consuls,  7-8  Jan.,  p.  293. 


axilly 
oPoutaillier 


St.Jean  de  Losne 

°Pagny 


Burgundy 
and  Bassigny 


Shaded  Area  represent*  the  districts 

•whence  the  bulk  of  the  wholesale 

supply  was  derived 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  137 

and  to  buy  400  anees  at  any  price  that  it  is  necessary  to  pay."  1 
A  week  later,  Pierre  Renard  was  ordered  "  to  go  to  Burgundy 
to  buy  grain  in  the  name  of  the  town."  2  He  was  instructed 
to  buy  freely  according  to  his  judgment.  The  Consuls  also 
had  grain  purchased  in  Languedoc.  The  agent"  in  that  section, 
however,  interpreted  his  instructions  too  liberally,  buying 
3000  anees  at  a  cost  of  12,000  francs.  The  Consuls  were  unable 
to  furnish  this  sum,  so  the  grain  was  turned  over  to  one  of  the 
merchants.3  Other  contracts  in  Languedoc  and  Provence  to 
the  amount  of  1600  ecus  (4800  if rancs)  were  accepted  by  the 
Consuls.  The  function  of  the  four  commissioners  is  not  very 
clear.  Their  commission  had  given  them  full  authority,  but 
the  Consuls  retained  the  control  of  the  grain  trade.  The  organi- 
zation of  the  commission  had  followed  the  precedent  of  1481, 
but  the  difference  in  conditions  was  soon  perceived,  and  the 
Consuls  found  that  they  could  easily  attend  to  all  the  details 
of  the  trade.  In  July,  1504,  a  commission  of  six  persons  was 
organized  "to  procure  a  fund  of  10,000  francs,  to  send  to  court 
and  to  the  Governor  of  Burgundy  to  secure  Patents  for  the 
export  of  grain."  4  This  commission  did  not  make  any  direct 
purchases,  but  contracts  were  made  with  merchants  to  guarantee 
them  against  losses  due  to  a  fall  in  prices.5  The  municipal 
efforts  were  not  important,  and  the  merchants  were  left  to  their 
own  devices.  In  reality,  municipal  trading  of  the  type  that 
appeared  in  1481  was  obsolete  even  in  1500,  and  the  increased 
activity  shown  by  the  merchants  rendered  encouragement  super- 
fluous. It  seemed  as  if  the  stimulus  given  the  wholesale  trade 
had  been  so  completely  successful  that  the  municipality  could 
cease  to  concern  itself  with  that  matter. 

But  there  was  still  a  need  for  some  encouragement  and  control. 
The  merchants  were  only  too  willing  to  receive  aid,  and  guaran- 
tees against  loss  and  passports  could  advantageously  be  offered 
to  merchants  who  were  willing  to  undertake  the  trade.  The 

Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  24.     9  Fev.  1500-01. 
Ibid.,  BB.  24.     17  Fev.  1500-01. 
Ibid.,  BB.  24  (304).     15  Mars  1500-01. 
Ibid.,  BB.  24,  466.     29  Juillet  1504. 
Ibid.,  BB.  24,  466v.     12  Aout  1504. 


138         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

years  1500-1504  had  witnessed  the  opening  up  of  great  pros- 
pects. The  trade  awoke  to  a  full  consciousness  of  all  the  sources 
of  supply,  and  no  region  was  too  distant  to  tempt  the  mer- 
chants. Languedoc,  Provence,  Beauce,  Burgundy,  Bassigny, 
Champagne,  Franche  Comte,  all  held  out  hopes  to  the  Lyonese. 
But  this  extraordinary  extension  of  the  trade  was  not  permanent. 
The  merchants  possessed  a  very  inadequate  knowledge  of  the 
relative  advantages  or  the  extent  of  the  supply  available  in 
these  regions,  and  hopes  of  great  gains  faded  gradually  before 
the  obstacles  that  were  revealed  by  bitter  experience.  But  a 
full  knowledge  of  conditions  in  the  producing  regions  was  gradu- 
ally obtained. 

This  resort  to  the  distant  regions  of  the  Rhone  Basin  was 
probably  irregular  during  the  early  sixteenth  century.  Supplies 
were  ordinarily  secured  nearer  the  city,  but  in  case  of  need 
merchants  were  ready  to  buy  in  Burgundy  or  Languedoc.  The 
first  fifty  years  of  the  century  are  interesting  by  reason  of  the 
gradual  development  of  regular  dependence  upon  Burgundy. 
The  regions  near  the  city  were  still  utilized  in  part,  particularly 
the  plains  of  Dauphine  and  Bresse.  But  while  the  other  sections 
gradually  lost  their  importance,  the  wholesale  merchants  turned 
their  attention  more  and  more  definitely  towards  Burgundy. 
The  trade  developed  a  distinct  organization  in  the  Saone  towns, 
and  with  the  gradual  improvement  of  the  system  of  marketing, 
the  resources  of  Burgundy  became  steadily  more  available. 
In  1529,  Burgundy  was  not  mentioned  in  the  sources  of  supply 
enumerated  by  the  witnesses  examined  by  the  Governor  of 
Lyonnais,  to  discover  the  cause  of  the  high  price  of  grain.  "  The 
high  prices  are  due,"  they  said,  "  to  the  prohibitions  which 
have  been  issued  in  the  neighboring  provinces,  Dombes,  Beaujo- 
lais,  Forez,  Vivarais,  Auvergne,  and  Velay,  which  generally 
supply  Lyons.  Grain  is  generally  brought  from  these  provinces 
to  Lyons,  but  none  has  come  recently  on  account  of  the  pro- 
hibitions." l  Merchants  were  busy  in  Burgundy,  but  they  were 
not  buying  for  Lyons,  and  it  is  hardly  likely  that  they  were 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,  381.  21  Oct.  1529.  Proces  Verbal  fait 
a  Lyon  par  Pomponne  de  Trevoux,  Gouverneur  ez  Pais  de  Lyonnais. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  139 

Lyonese.  In  February,  1527,  Genoa  purchased  1500  mines  of 
grain  in  Burgundy.1  A  month  later  the  Consuls  permitted  the 
Commander  of  the  Knights  of  Saint  John  to  carry  164  anees  of 
grain  down  the  river  from  Burgundy.2  A  year  later  the  Consuls 
were  disturbed  by  the  quantities  of  grain  passing  the  city,  so 
they  sent  a  deputy  to  the  Governor  of  Burgundy  asking  him 
to  require  the  merchants  to  leave  one-third  of  their  grain  at 
Lyons.3  This  proposal  seemed  to  meet  with  little  success  for 
in  May  the  same  fears  appear  in  the  deliberations.  Jehan 
Charreton  asked  for  permission  to  carry  700  mines  of  grain 
down  the  river.  He  said  that  it  was  purchased  in  Burgundy 
and  Champagne,  and  that  it  was  destined  for  the  Grand  Master 
of  Rhodes.  It  is  pretty  clear  that  the  Consuls  disliked  to  issue 
the  permit,  but  Charreton  exhibited  Royal  Patents  and  they 
dared  not  interfere.4  The  general  question  was  discussed  for  a 
while  but  no  decision  was  reached.  A  week  later,  a  merchant 
from  Provence  came  down  the  Saone  with  1200  anees  of  grain 
destined  for  Aries.  He  had  Royal  Patents,  but  the  Consuls 
persuaded  him  to  sell  part  of  his  grain  at  Lyons.5  The  shipments 
from  Burgundy  to  the  lower  river  were  possibly  heavier  than 
usual  in  1528,  but  it  was  not  an  infrequent  phenomenon 6  and  it 
does  not  suggest  an  explanation  of  the  omission  of  Burgundy 
from  the  list  of  sources  of  Lyonese  supply.  Lyons  was  able 
to  do  without  Burgundian  supplies  in  ordinary  years,  and  the 
Burgundian  surplus  was  disposed  of  elsewhere. 

The  slow  development  of  Lyonese  trade  in  Burgundy  was 
primarily  due  to  two  factors,  the  slow  growth  of  the  demand 
of  Lyons  and  the  difficulties  of  trading  in  Burgundy.  Of  the 
two,  the  absence  of  organization  in  the  producing  region  was  un- 
doubtedly the  more  important,  for  the  moment  that  facilities  be- 

Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,  381,  17.     15  Fev.  1527. 

Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  381,  17  bis.     15  Mars  1527. 

Ibid.,  BB.  47,  15.    30  Avril  1528. 

Ibid.,  BB.  47,  16.  7  Mai  1528.  Chappe  IV,  460,  3.  The  Royal  Patents 
mentioned  in  the  registers. 

Ibid.,  BB.  47,  19.     14  Mai  1528. 

Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  393,  33.  16  Fev.  1539.  Dijon,  Arch.  Mun.,  G.  256.  24 
Jan.  1530-40. 


140        THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

came  greater  in  Burgundy  the  less  favorable  sources  in  Auvergne 
and  Velay  would  be  abandoned.  It  was  not  essential  that  the 
demand  of  Lyons  should  greatly  increase.  The  advantage 
of  trading  with  Burgundy  was  not  only  a  matter  of  quantity 
but  also  a  matter  of  transportation  to  Lyons.  These  basic 
factors,  however,  were  of  little  avail  in  the  early  sixteenth  cen- 
tury, as  the  grain  was  not  collected  in  Burgundy  with  reference 
to  the  Lyonese  trade.  It  was  not  easy  to  find,  and  the  most 
fertile  regions  were  far  from  the  Saone,  so  that  even  when  the 
merchant  had  secured  his  grain,  he  must  needs  arrange  for  land 
transportation  in  a  province  where  he  was  not  familiar  with  the 
routes  or  the  carters. 

'From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Lyonese,  the  most  serious 
difficulty  was  the  absence  of  any  considerable  supplies  in  the 
river  towns.  It  is  hazardous  to  assert  that  there  was,  at  that 
time,  no  movement  from  the  back  country  to  Auxonne,  Maxilly, 
and  Saint- Jean-de-Losne,  but  it  is  quite  certain  that  such  move- 
ments were  inconsiderable.  In  1505,  the  Echevins  of  Dijon 
mentioned  a  rumor  "  that  several  carters  had  passed  carrying 
grain  to  the  Saone."  l  The  next  day  they  issued  an  order  to 
pay  a  gratuity  to  a  peasant  who  informed  the  proper  officials 
that  grain  was  passing  (Axsery)  on  carts  toward  Saint- Jean-de- 
Losne.2  In  1509,  the  implication  was  less  direct.  The  Echevins 
complained  of  high  prices,  of  markets  that  were  inadequately 
furnished ;  all  the  troubles  were  attributed  to  the  export  of  grain 
from  the  vicinity  under  the  cover  of  darkness.3  In  1531,  grana- 
ries are  mentioned  at  Auxonne,  but  they  were  based  on  the 
revenues  of  estates.4  The  towns  were  used  as  shipping  ports, 
but  the  merchants  were  obliged  to  buy  in  the  back  country. 
Thus,  in  1529,  the  Mayor  of  Dijon  induces  one  of  the  Lyonese 
merchants  to  sell  one-half  the  grain  collected  at  Saint-Pierre- 
de-Massilly.  "  The  Lyonese  merchants,  who  were  two  in  num- 
ber, said  that  they  had  only  100  mines  of  grain,  which  they 

1  Dijon,  Arch.  Mun.,  G.  258.     12  Juin  1505. 

2  Ibid.,  G.  258.     13  Juin  1505. 

8  Ibid.,  G.  258.     1509.     Memoire  centre  la  Cheret6. 
4  Ibid.,  G.  260.     27  Mai  1531;  3  Jan.  1532. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  141 

had  bought  in  divers  places  —  Lorraine,  Champagne,  and  else- 
where."1 

In  reality  the  Burgundian  trade  was  very  loosely  organized 
at  this  time.  Dijon  and  Langres  were  the  only  towns  where 
there  was  much  trade  in  grain.  There  were  merchants  in  both 
places,  but  even  in  these  towns  the  wholesale  trade  was  largely 
a  matter  of  sales  in  the  granaries  of  the  landlords. 

The  local  merchants  of  Burgundy  were  essentially  merchants 
of  the  earlier  type,  persons  buying  on  the  local  market,  hoard- 
ing, and  selling  when  prices  rose.  They  engaged  in  the  move- 
ment of  grain  only  to  a  slight  degree,  although  they  did  buy 
in  country  granaries.  The  Echevins  of  Dijon  mention  such 
merchants  in  1509.  "  There  are  several  wealthy  merchants 
here  engaged  in  engrossing,  despite  the  ordinances." 2  In 
1539,  the  Lieutenant  of  the  Bailli  of  Dijon  issued  an  ordinance 
against  "  merchants  and  other  persons  who  go  daily  to  the 
market  towns,  where  they  buy  grain  and  form  granaries." 3 
The  Lieutenant  of  the  Governor  also  took  measures  against 
merchants,  "  who  have  bought  grain  in  the  markets  in  order  to 
form  hoards.  ...  or  who  have  bought  or  given  earnest  money 
for  the  grain  of  nobles  or  of  other  persons."  He  ordered  that 
any  grain  in  excess  of  private  needs  should  be  straightway 
sold  on  the  public  market.4  The  scale  of  the  operations  of  these 
merchants  of  Dijon  is  not  very  clear,  but  the  information  about 
the  merchants  of  Langres  gives  some  idea  of  the  magnitude  of 
their  business.  We  have  this  note  of  a  single  transaction: 
"  Jehan  Gastebois,  merchant  resident  at  Langres,  acknowledges 
the  receipt  of  2172"  from  the  agents  of  Dijon,  in  consideration 
of  divers  consignments  of  grain,  viz:  — 120  mines®  6U  5s;  160 
mines  bought  by  them  of  me  and  of  Nicholas  ifendelot,  merchant 
at  Langres  "  etc.5  The  merchants  of  Langres  probably  secured 

1  Dijon,  Arch.  Mun.,  G.  258.     n  Mai  1529. 

2  Ibid.,  G.  258.     1509.     Memoire  stir  les  Bleds. 

3  Ibid .,  G.  256.     15  Jan.  1539.    Ord.  du  Lieu,  du  Bailli  de  Dijon. 

4  Ibid.,  G.  264.     14  Mai  1539.      Copie  d'une  Ordonnance  du  Lieu,  du  Gou- 
verneur.     See  also  G.  256.     i,  18,  22  Oct.   1535.     Ord.  du  Lieu,  du  Bailli  de 
Dijon. 

6  Ibid.,  G.  263.  26  Juillet  1532.  G.  263.  Compte  des  Bleds  achete's  pour  la 
Ville  de  Dijon  suivant  1'Ordon,  du  17  Mars  1531-32. 


142  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

their  grain  by  purchases  on  the  markets  and  in  country  granaries. 
The  merchants  at  Dijon  doubtless  handled  quite  as  large  a  trade 
as  the  merchants  of  Langres.  On  the  whole,  it  is  not  too  much 
to  assert  that  we  find  at  this  time  the  beginnings  of  the  local 
wholesale  trade. 

The  merchants,  however,  controlled  only  a  part  of  the  trade. 
The  granaries  of  rentiers  were  probably  a  more  important  factor 
than  the  granaries  formed  by  merchants.  These  hoards  formed 
of  rents  in  kind  were  not  necessarily  located  in  the  towns.  In 
many  cases,  the  grain  was  stored  at  least  temporarily  in  the 
country.  The  significance  of  this  form  of  hoard  is  not  much 
influenced  by  its  location,  though  it  was  naturally  much  easier 
to  deal  with  the  persons  who  had  town  granaries. 

The  extent  of  these  granaries  was  revealed  by  the  efforts  of 
the  Echevins  of  Dijon  to  secure  supplies  in  times  of  distress, 
Visitation  of  granaries  was  the  most  obvious  and  most  successful 
provision  against  dearth.  ,  This  was  the  first  step  taken  in  1529. 
The  Echevins  decided  that  "  it  was  necessary  to  know  who  had 
granaries  in  the  town  and  in  the  country."  It  was  proposed  to 
buy  grain  in  the  name  of  the  town,  and  without  any  inquiry 
"  they  resolved  to  speak  to  M.  de  Firloix,  Madame  d'Agen, 
M.  Joigny,  Maitre  Gerard  Benigny,  factor  of  the  Admiral, 
Sr.  Valrien,  Thomas  Mathus,  M.  des  Barres,  Antoine  C  —  (?) 
and  MM.  de  Saint  Esleu  (?),  all  of  whom  are  said  to  have  grana- 
ries in  the  town."  1  These  were  the  people  whose  granaries 
were  so  well  known  that  it  was  a  matter  of  common  knowledge. 
The  next  day  other  granaries  were  reported,  notably  those 
of  Mile,  de  Maillotz,  who  had  60  mines  at  Dijon,  and  60  mines 
at  Chevigny.2  In  June,  one  of  the  Echevins  reported  that  he 
had  purchased  grain  in  the  granaries  of  the  Admiral  at  Mirabel, 
Beaumont,  Charmes,  Rouvre,  and  Fontaine-Franchise.3  Other 
granaries  were  mentioned.4  In  1531,  it  was  the  same  story, 
though  there  was  more  buying  at  Langres  and  the  importance 

1  Dijon,  Arch.  Mun.,  G.  258.     26  Avril  1529. 

2  Ibid.,  G.  258.     27  Avril  1529.    The  names  are  difficult  to  read. 

3  Ibid.,  G.  258.     7  Mai  1528;   19  Juin  1529. 

4  Ibid.,  G.  259.     Compte  des  Bleds  achetes  en  1529. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  143 

of  the  clerical  granaries  was  emphasized.  The  memoir  mentions 
only  the  quantities  that  are  still  to  be  shipped,  but  even  these 
are  considerable.  From  the  Dean  of  Langres,  60  mines  were  to 
be  received;  from  M.  1'Omcial  of  Langres,  40  mines;  from  M. 
Andre  Bobinet,  prebend,  18  mines;  50  mines  at  Givey  in  Mon- 
tagne  were  still  to  be  paid  to  the  Dean  of  Langres."  l  Lay 
granaries  were  visited  at  Rouvre,  Breteniers,  Thorey,  Saulon, 
La  Chapelle,2  Montigny,3  and  Vauldrimont.4  Another  interest- 
ing phase  of  the  purchases  made  by  Dijon  in  1531,  was  the  buying 
of  grain  that  was  stored  in  the  villages  of  Bassigny  by  merchants 
of  Langres:  61  mines  were  bought  of  Jacques  Benne,  merchant 
at  Langres,  to  be  delivered  at  Cogirnon  near  Chalindrey  in 
Bassigny.  Other  merchants  of  Langres  agreed  to  deliver  grain 
at  Chassigney,  Prangey,  Chaume,  Mormand,  Troichaud,  Rozet, 
Trouchoit,  Monteycourt,  Belleme,  and  Saint-Maurice.5  Most 
of  these  little  places  can  hardly  be  identified  today,  but  it  is 
necessary  to  call  attention  to  the  extent  of  this  practice.  The 
grain  was  very  slightly  concentrated.  Despite  the  appearance 
of  merchants  at  Dijon  and  Langres,  the  grain  remained  in  the 
villages  until  it  was  hunted  out  by  the  merchants  or  until  the 
absentee  landlord  decided  to  sell  the  accumulated  rents  of  his 
estates.  There  was  little-or  no  movement  of  grain.  It  required 
a  great  effort  to  amass  any  considerable  quantity,  and  if  it  were 
not  for  the  size  of  some  of  the  granaries,  it  would  have  been 
well-nigh  impossible  to  collect  a  large  quantity.  The  resources 
of  the  province  were  great,  but  they  could  not  be  easily  utilized 
because  of  the  absence  of  organization  of  the  wholesale  trade. 

When  the  Lyonese  merchants  first  came  to  Burgundy  they 
generally  went  to  Dijon,  but  the  municipal  officials  disliked  to 
see  them  buying  in  the  vicinity,  and  there  were  various  ways 
of  passing  them  on  to  other  regions.  Even  the  agents  of  Dijon 

1  Dijon,  Arch.  Mun.,  G.  258.     Me"moires  des  Restes  des  grains  qui  sont  a  venir 
des  achapts  faits  par  la  Ville  de  Dijon  depuis  le  careme  derrenier  passe.     1531. 

2  Ibid.,  G.  261.    9  Fev.  1531. 

3  Ibid.,  G.  260.    3  Juin  1531. 

4  Ibid.,  G.  260.     Pentecdte,  1531. 

6  Ibid.,  G.  263.  Compte  des  Bleds  achet£s  pour  la  Ville  de  Dijon  suivant 
1'Ordonnance  du  17  Mars  1531-32. 


144        THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

at  court  endeavored  to  dissuade  the  Lyonese  from  attempting 
to  buy  in  Burgundy.  "  Much  better  terms  could  be  made  with 
the  merchants  of  Champagne  and  Bassigny,"  they  said.1  This 
unwillingness  to  encourage  purchases  around  Dijon  undoubtedly 
added  to  the  difficulties  of  the  Lyonese.  Supplies  were  unques- 
tionably to  be  had  in  Bassigny,  but  transportation  was  difficult 
and  the  trade  in  Bassigny  was  not  concentrated  even  to  the  degree 
that  the  trade  of  Burgundy  was  concentrated  at  Dijon.  In 
these  conditions,  we  have  the  explanation  of  the  slow  develop- 
ment of  Lyonese  trade  in  Burgundy.  The  trade  had  too  little 
connection  with  the  Saone  towns;  the  importance  of  local  and 
town  granaries  made  it  difficult  for  a  stranger  to  engage  in  the 
trade;  the  jealous  regard  of  Dijon  for  the  supplies  of  Burgundy 
generally  obliged  the  merchants  to  push  on  to  Bassigny  where 
all  the  difficulties  were  increased. 

Despite  the  obstacles  in  the  way  of  regular  trade,  the  Lyonese 
merchants  travelled  up  to  Burgundy  in  continually  increasing 
numbers,  so  that  in  1557  Burgundy  was  called  "  the  nurse  of 
Lyons  and  Lyonnais."  2  It  was  at  this  period  that  the  influence 
of  this  persistent  buying  began  to  appear.  The  gradual  develop- 
ment of  trade  with  Lyons  attracted  trade  to  the  Saone  towns, 
and  in  1556  the  transition,  which  ultimately  produced  a  com- 
plete reorganization  of  trade  in  Burgundy,  was  well  under  way. 
Dijon  and  Langres  lost  much  of  their  importance,  and  Auxonne, 
Talmay,  Maxilly,  and  Saint- Jean-de-Losne  became  the  centers 
of  an  active  trade  drawing  from  Burgundy  and  Bassigny  for 
the  support  of  Lyons. 

Our  information,  in  1556-57,  is  derived  from  letters  written 
by  the  Deputies  sent  to  Burgundy  by  the  Consuls  of  Lyons. 
The  first  letter  indicates  nothing  new.  They  were  shipping 
grain  at  Auxonne  and  visiting  granaries  in  Burgundy,  Bassigny, 
Lorraine,  and  Tranche  Comte.3  In  the  letters  of  the  following 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  AA.  101,  12.     Paris,  15  Jan.  1528-29.    Laurencin. 

2  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  339-340.     Proces  verbal  faite  par  Mre.  Jehan  de  Fournel. 
Conseiller  du  Roy,  Lieut.  Gen.  en  la .  senechaussee  et  siege  pr£sidiale  de  Lyon,  10 
Fev.  1556-57- 

3  Ibid.,  AA.  32.     Auxonne,  27  Mars  1556.     Guimbre. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  145 

year  indications  of  change  appear.  There  are  references  to 
merchants  resident  in  the  river  towns.  This  addition  to  the 
trade  from  Bassigny  to  the  Saone  caused  a  pressure  upon  means 
of  transportation  that  enabled  the  carters  to  charge  two  or  three 
times  the  ordinary  rates.  "  There  is  a  rumor  in  these  parts/' 
writes  the  Deputy,  "  that  Dutenot,  Craignat,  and  Mascoyer 
are  going  to  ship  more  than  3 ,000  mines  of  grain.  The  merchants 
of  Auxonne  and  Guillaume  Imbellot  of  Chalons-sur-Saone  have 
also  shipped  great  quantities."  1  "  The  carters  are  so  persis- 
tently sought  out  by  these  merchants  of  Auxonne,  Dijon,  Beaune, 
and  Chalons  that  it  almost  impossible  to  get  hold  of  any."2 
"  Mascoyer  and  Oudelot  sent  out  three  men  to  find  carters,  but 
the  best  they  could  do  was  to  secure  a  promise  of  twelve  or 
thirteen  next  week,  and  if  Oudelot  were  not  Capitan  of  the 
carters  of  the  Commissariat  he  would  not  have  been  able  to 
compass  more.  His  position  enabled  him  to  secure  others, 
and  the  shipment  of  the  grain  has  begun."  3  "  The  carters 
have  at  last  banded  together  after  having  been  beaten  by  the 
agents  of  Mascoyer,  as  well  as  by  those  of  Dutenot  and  Arginot, 
and  by  the  agents  of  the  merchants  of  Auxonne  and  Beaune. 
The  carters  now  ask  forty  sous  for  what  they  used  to  do  for 
fifteen  sous,  and  for  the  trip  from  Bassigny  which  formerly 
gave  them  35  sous,  they  how  ask  3"  15  sous  (75  sous)."  4  The 
trade  was  rapidly  losing  the  apathy  of  the  earlier  period,  and  it 
was  beginning  to  move  to  the  Saone  towns  to  meet  the  Lyonese 
merchants. 

The  development  of  the  trade  of  the  river  towns  proceeded 
steadily  and  in  1581  there  were  active  merchants  in  all  the  more 
important  towns,  collecting  grain  to  sell  to  the  Lyonese.  It 
is  unfortunately  impossible  to  trace  the  details  of  the  transition, 
but  the  general  fact  of  the  change  is  indicated  by  the  corre- 
spondence between  the  officials  of  the  Saone  towns  and  Lyons. 
It  is  in  itself  significant  that  there  was  enough  trade  to  engender 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  AA.  32.    Langres,  26  Mars  1556-57. 

2  Ibid.,  Letter  of  22  Avril  1557. 

3  Ibid.,  Letter  of  26  Mars. 

4  Ibid.,  AA.  32.    3  Avril  1556-57. 


146  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

such  correspondence,  and  the  letters  are  so  explicit  that  it  is 
impossible  to  escape  the  conclusion.  In  January  1581,  the 
Echevins  of  Auxonne  write  to  the  Consuls  of  Lyons:  "  The 
merchants  of  this  town  who  are  engaged  in  trade  with  Lyons 
make  complaints  of  the  conduct  of  a  collector  who  wishes  to 
levy  *  Coupenage '  on  the  grain  sent  to  Lyons.  .  .  .  You 
will  find  that  this  is  important,  as  it  will  increase  the  cost  of 
grain,  and  some  merchants  may  lose  interest  in  the  trade."  l 
Later  in  the  same  month,  "  the  merchants  of  Macon  assembled 
with  the  merchants  of  the  Duchy  of  Burgundy,  the  Vicomte 
of  Auxonne,  and  of  Bassigny,  to  secure  relief  from  the  extortions 
of  the  Reverend  Archbishop  of  Lyons,  who  asserts  a  right  to 
levy '  coupenage.'  " 2  There  are  similar  complaints  from  Chalons- 
sur-Saone.3  In  1589  a  hoard  was  purchased  by  Sr.  d'Acier  of 
Auxonne  and  other  merchants  who  were  associated  with  him.4 
The  first  step  in  the  organization  of  the  wholesale  trade  had  been 
taken;  local  merchants  had  begun  to  collect  grain  at  the  shipping 
ports  on  the  river. 

The  municipality  exerted  an  important  influence  upon  this 
development  of  the  wholesale  trade,  since  the  difficulties  of 
marketing  in  Burgundy,  the  hesitation  between  the  different 
sources  of  supply,  the  fear  of  loss,  all  tended  to  discourage  the 
merchants.  Throughout  the  century  the  municipality  was 
constantly  assisting  and  stimulating  the  merchants. 

The  most  direct  form  of  assistance  needed  by  the  merchants 
was  protection  against  the  prohibitions  issued  by  the  local 
officials  of  the  producing  regions.  This  task  the  municipality 
discharged  easily.  There  was  generally  a  deputy  at  the  Court, 
who  could  at  any  time  secure  Royal  Patents  to  cancel  the  pro- 
hibitions issued  by  the  Governors,  provincial  parlements,  or 
municipalities.  Deputies  were  also  sent  to  the  producing 
regions  to  secure  the  repeal  or  modification  of  prohibitions,  or 
to  assure  the  execution  of  the  Royal  Patents  and  of  the  licenses 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mim.,  AA.  70,  32.    Auxonne,  15  Jan.  1581. 

2  Ibid.,  AA.  72,  35.    Macon,  21  Jan.  1581. 

8  Ibid.,  AA.  70,  91.     Chalons,  19  Jan.  1581.  • 

4  Ibid.,  AA.  29.     Paigny,  5  Nov.  1589.     Charny. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  147 

issued  by  the  Consuls  on  the  authority  of  the  royal  letters. 
All  these  forms  of  control  must  needs  be  exercised  by  the  Consuls 
themselves.  There  could  be  no  question  of  creating  a  Chambre 
d'Abondance  after  the  plan  of  1481. 

The  great  risks  of  the  trade  were  a  more  serious  difficulty, 
and  did  much  to  deter  the  extension  of  private  enterprise.  This 
was  important  even  in  ordinary  seasons  when  the  merchants 
were  trading  in  Burgundy.  In  years  of  dearth,  the  consequences 
of  this  timidity  of  the  merchants  furnished  more  ground  for 
apprehensions.  At  such  times,  the  Consuls  felt  that  it  was 
necessary  to  stimulate  trade  from  all  possible  sources  of  supply, 
encouraging  buying  not  only  in  Burgundy  but  also  in  Auvergne 
and  in  Languedoc.  The  risk  of  such  ventures  was  enhanced 
by  the  infrequency  of  trade,  and  the  actual  risk  was  magnified 
by  ignorance.  Conditions  in  Languedoc  in  1529  are  typical. 
Claude  de  Bourges  had  been  sent  to  Avignon  by  the  Consuls 
to  stimulate  the  local  merchants,  and  to  buy  for  the  city.  He 
found  grain  in  plenty.  The  Legate  "  addressed  him  to  three 
merchants,  M.  de  Lers,  who  had  about  1000  se tiers  of  wheat, 
Maitre  Moreton,  steward  of  my  Lord  the  Legate,  who  had 
1 200  setiers,  and  Sr.  Honnorat  Plonyer.  In  all  there  were 
3000  anees,  located  near  the  river,  conveniently  for  shipment. . . . 
If  prices  were  high  enough,  he  says,  there  are  plenty  of  persons 
who  would  be  willing  to  send  grain  up  to  Lyons.  I  know  half 
a  dozen  already,  who  will  ship  if  they  are  guaranteed  against 
losses."  *  At  Romans,  the  Maitre  de  le  Monnaye  tells  him  that 
there  is  plenty  of  grain,  but  that  it  is  dear.  If  trade  were  free, 
it  would  perhaps  be  possible  to  buy  advantageously,  but  the 
merchants  will  not  send  grain  up  to  Lyons  at  the  risk  of  selling 
at  the  same  price  there.2  At  Valencte,  he  found  a  man  who 
would  send  grain  up  to  Lyons,  if  he  were  guaranteed  the  price 
of  twenty-eight  sous  per  bichet.3  There  is  no  evidence  that 
such  contracts  were  made  in  that  particular  instance,  but  such 
guarantees  were  freely  given  by  the  Consuls.  The  contracts 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  AA.  29.    Avignon,  6  Nov.  1529.    Claude  de  Bourges. 

2  Ibid.    Valence,  26  Oct.  1529.     Claude  de  Bourges. 

8  Ibid.     Valence,  12  Nov.  1529.     Claude  de  Bourges. 


148  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

were  made   and   enforced   to   the  letter.     In    1544,   such  an 
agreement  had  been  made  with  Etienne  Tremblay  of  Charlieu, 
who  engaged  to  bring  600  anees  to  Lyons  from  the  Beauce.    He 
complained  that  he  had  been  able  to  sell  only  40  anees  before 
prices  fell,  and  he  claimed  reimbursement.    The  Consuls  refused 
to  pay.     They  declared  that  he  had  not  kept  any  of  the  articles 
of  the  contract.     The  grain  had  not  reached  Lyons  within  the 
time  specified,  and  he  had  refused  to  sell  either  at  the  price 
agreed  upon,  or  at  the  current  price.1     Somewhat  later,  the 
Consuls  summoned  Robert  Tricaut,  and  asked  him  if  he  would 
go  to  the  Beauce  to  bring  grain  to  Lyons.     They  agreed  to 
guarantee  a  price  of  twenty-four  sous  per  bichet,2  but  Tricaut 
.refused,  and  the  Consuls  finally  decided  to  send  him  "  to  Orleans 
and  other  places  on  the  road  where  grain  merchants  are  to  be 
found."     He  was  instructed  to  secure  promises  from  merchants 
to  bring  grain  to  Lyons,  and  guarantee  them  24-26  sous  per 
bichet  at  least,  and  if  prices  were  higher  the  merchants  were  to 
have  the  surplus.3     In  1573,  the  Consuls  adopted  even  more 
vigorous  measures.      "  Claude  Platt,  Andre  Mornier,  Claude 
Belleton,  Franc/ois  Lobat,  and  Benoit  Montcony  were  ordered 
to  purchase  1000  anees  of  grain  for  the  provision  of  the  city,  to 
prevent  the  people  from  suffering  want  at  the  end  of  the  season. 
The  merchants  replied  that  they  were  willing  to  make  the  pur- 
chases and  that  they  would  give  their  time  and  use  their  credit 
to  the  best  of  their  ability,  but  they  did  not  think  that  the  loss 
should  fall  on  them  if  the  grain  were  shipwrecked  or  sold  below 
cost,  or  if  they  lost  any  of  the  specie  which  they  must  needs  send 
to  Burgundy."      The  Consuls  agreed  to  guarantee  the  mer- 
chants against  loss.4     This  case  was  rather  involved  as  the  mer- 
chants were  themselves  Consuls,  and  were  thus  guaranteeing 
private  ventures  with  the  authority  of  the  town.     It  indicates 
the  opportunity  for  transactions  that  were  perhaps  of  doubtful 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  61,  270.     9  Avril  1543-44.     See  also  BB.  61,  234. 
3  Mars  1543-44- 

2  Ibid.,  BB.  61,  237.     10  Mars  1543-44.     Note  also  of  a  similar  contract  with 
Antoine  Bouyn. 

8  Ibid.,  BB.  61,  240.     14  Mars  1543-44. 
4  Ibid.,  BB.  91,  52.     17  Fev.  1573. 


TEE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  149 

ethical  character.  In  the  same  year,  an  agent  was  sent  to 
"  Dauphine  and  Avignon  to  discover  how  much  grain  was 
available  for  export  to  Lyons,  and  to  assure  the  merchants  that 
the  Consulate  would  guarantee  them  against  loss."  *  Later 
a  premium  of  two  sous  per  bichet  was  offered  to  all  "  foreign  " 
merchants  who  brought  grain  to  Lyons  during  the  months 
of  April,  May,  and  June.2  This  type  of  encouragement 
may  fairly  be  characterized  as  an  established  policy.  Such 
powers  must  necessarily  be  exercised  by  the  Consuls  them- 
selves. It  was  not  a  task  to  be  delegated  to  a  subordinate 
commission. 

But  when  the  Consuls  endeavored  to  extend  their  activity 
beyond  these  limits,  when  they  purchased  grain  instead  of 
encouraging  the  merchants,  the  difficulties  multiplied  out  of  all 
proportion  to  the  results.  Direct  municipal  purchases  were 
made  in  1528-29,  1530,  1532,  1544,  1573,  and  1580,  but  the 
administration  of  the  affair  was  always  hopelessly  involved. 
In  1528,  the  purchases  were  not  large,  but  the  gram  had  to  be 
forced  on  the  bakers  at  the  end  of  the  season  at  a  distinct  sacri- 
fice, as  it  had  been  held  too  long.  A  list  of  the  bakers  was  drawn 
up  and  each  assigned  a  fixed  amount  of  grain,  which  they  were 
required  to  buy  weekly  of  the  Consuls  at  twelve  sous  five  deniers 
per  bichet.  They  were  ordered  to  use  no  other  grain  while  the 
ordinance  was  in  force.3  The  bakers  were  bitterly  opposed  to 
this  action  as  the  price  was  high.  They  refused  to  take  the 
amounts  assigned,  or,  in  some  cases,  took  the  grain  but  refused 
to  pay  the  price,  delaying  payment  indefinitely.  All  these 
troubles  meant  loss  to  the  municipality,  and  cast  discredit  on 
municipal  purchases.  In  1573,  the  Consuls  ordered  the  dis- 
tribution of  i  oo  anees  per  week  to  the  bakers,  and  this  time  there 
was  less  trouble.4  In  1580,  the  grain  had  to  be  forced  on  the 
bakers  by  measures  which  caused  much  ill  feeling.  The  bakers 
complained  of  the  prices  charged  for  the  grain,  and  of  the  prices 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  91,  83.     8  Mai  1573. 
3  Ibid.,  BB.  91,  105.     7  Juillet  1573. 
8  Ibid.,  BB.  47  &  71.     28  Mai  1528. 
«  Ibid.,  BB.  91,  87.     19  Mai  1573. 


150         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

at  which  they  were  allowed  to  sell  their  bread.     Some  refused  to. 
take  the  grain.1 

Another  mode  of  assuring  the  city  against  the  irregularities 
of  trade  was  the  control  of  a  private  granary  secured  by  reason 
of  special  favors  or  by  a  direct  contract.  In  September  1559,  one 
Tipperaus  "  offered  to  store  2000  anees  of  grain  in  the  city  to 
be  sold  at  such  times,  previous  to  the  Saint- Jean,  1560,  as  shall 
please  the  Consuls.  In  consideration  of  this  agreement,  the 
said  Tipperaus  was  paid  fifteen  sous  per  bichet."  2  A  more 
elaborate  contract  of  the  same  type  was  made  in  October  of 
the  same  year:  "  Claude  Tisserand,  merchant  and  citizen  of 
Lyons,  promises  to  secure  and  place  in  granaries  before  Christ- 
mas 2000  anees  of  grain  which  shall  be  stored  at  his  expense 
and  risk  until  the  Saint- Jean  following.  He  agrees  further  to 
sell  said  grain  to  the  inhabitants  of  Lyons  as  the  Consuls 
shall  direct,  with  the  understanding  that  he  shall  sell  at  one 
sou  less  than  the  market  price  if  the  current  price  exceeds 
eighteen  sous  per  bichet,  and  that  in  case  the  price  falls 
below  fifteen  sous  six  deniers  per  bichet,  the  Consuls  will  be 
liable  for  the  difference  between  the  current  rate  and  fifteen 
sous  six  deniers."  3 

The  policy  of  the  Consuls  during  this  period  of  growth  was  a 
policy  of  encouragement  of  private  initiative,  and  of  supple- 
mentary purchases  on  the  credit  of  the  town.  The  wisdom  of 
encouragement  can  hardly  be  questioned;  the  trade  was  in  such 
a  condition  that  the  hope  of  gain  was  pretty  evenly  balanced 
by  the  risk  of  loss.  Legal  obstacles  contributed  to  dissuade  the 
merchants.  These  troubles  could  be  adequately  met  by  the 
Consuls  directly;  the  ordinary  organization  of  the  city  was  able 
to  deal  with  all  questions  which  arose  in  the  fulfilment  of  this 
aspect  of  municipal  policy.  But  the  Consuls  were  never  content 
to  stop  at  this  point.  The  wholesale  trade,  even  with  the  en- 
couragement of  the  municipal  guarantees,  tended  to  fall  below 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  105,  66.     12  Avril  1585.     Also  GG.  Chappe  IV,  481. 
Comptes  de  1573.     Ibid.,  BB.  117,  in.     15  Avril  1586. 

2  Ibid.,  BB.  81,  196.     7  Sept.  1559. 
«  Ibid.,  BB.  81,  205.     5  Oct.  1559. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  151 

the  amount  required  to  keep  prices  within  comfortable  limits  in 
periods  of  stress.  The  Consuls  were  constantly  seeking  to  reduce 
prices  below  the  level  which  the  merchants  judged  necessary  to 
assure  a  fair  hope  of  profit.  To  accomplish  this  purpose,  the 
Consuls  were  obliged  to  undertake  ventures  which  were  almost 
certain  to  involve  loss.  They  placed  on  the  market  quantities 
of  grain  which  lowered  prices  below  the  actual  cost  of  the 
grain. 

The  expediency  of  this  policy  was  never  very  seriously  ques- 
tioned. Criticism  was  levelled  at  the  details  of  administration 
rather  than  against  the  policy.  At  times,  there  were  accusations 
of  fraud.  In  the  period  from  1500  to  1580,  municipal  pur- 
chases were  not  large,  but  as  the  community  became  convinced 
that  some  purchases  of  this  sort  were  desirable,  it  became 
equally  certain  that  the  Consuls  could  not  advantageously 
administer  the  undertaking  themselves.  At  no  time  between 
1504  and  1586  was  a  commission  actually  established,  as  in  1481, 
1500,  and  1504,  but  in  one  way  or  another  it  just  missed  being 
established.  The  rise  of  the  wholesale  merchants  made  direct 
purchases  less  necessary  than  they  had  been  in  1481,  and  the 
importance  of  the  Consulate  in  affording  encouragement  to  the 
merchants  tended  to  put  everything  related  to  the  trade  in 
the  hands  of  the  Consuls.  Then,  too,  there  was  an  unwilling- 
ness to  recognize  the  necessity  of  direct  purchases  by  the  munic- 
ipality. The  Consuls  were  ever  hoping  to  render  the  private 
trade  wholly  adequate.  But  the  experience  of  the  sixteenth 
century  demonstrated  both  the  necessity  of  some  regular  pur- 
chases by  the  municipality  with  the  expectation  of  some  loss 
and  the  necessity  of  some  subsidiary  commission  to  manage 
this  undertaking. 

The  idea  of  a  definite  and  independent  Chambre  d'Abondance 
appeared  throughout  the  century,  but  it  was  not  carried  out 
until  the  necessity  of  some  regular  municipal  trade  was  recog- 
nized. The  early  plans  were  not  adopted  because  the  Consuls 
could  not  persuade  themselves  that  direct  purchases  were  more 
than  a  temporary  expedient  of  such  exceptional  character  as  to 
make  the  special  machinery  of  a  Commission  unnecessary. 


152         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

In  1528,  the  first  year  of  serious  trouble  after  1504,  the  larger 
outlines  of  a  Chambre  were  sketched.  "  M.  Champyer  .  .  . 
thought  that  all  should  contribute  a  quantity  of  grain  propor- 
tionate to  their  means,  so  that  the  poor  people  should  not  lack. 
Four  persons  should  be  elected  to  take  charge  of  the  affair. 
They  should  be  given  the  list  of  contributors. "  The  other 
persons  present  were  of  the  same  opinion,  and  the  Consuls  went 
so  far  as  to  draw  up  a  list  of  contributions,  but  the  commission 
was  not  heard  from.1  This  Bureau  would  have  been  a  much 
less  important  commission  than  that  of  1481,  but  it  was  not 
unlike  that  of  1504.  Purchases  were  made  by  the  municipality 
in  1528,  and  the  mode  in  which  they  were  made  suggests  a  prob- 
able explanation  of  the  view  that  no  special  Commission  was 
necessary  or  desirable.  Claude  de  Bourges,  the  agent  in  Langue- 
doc,  was  sent  thither  to  stimulate  private  trade  by  assurances 
against  risk  or  by  promise  of  definite  prices.  His  purchases 
for  the  municipality  were  certainly  only  an  incident  in  his  com- 
mission, and  it  is  quite  possible  that  they  were  made  only  when  he 
found  it  excessively  difficult  to  stimulate  individual  initiative. 
He  says,  indeed,  in  the  letter  of  November  6:  "I  declared  to 
the  Legate  the  cause  of  my  journey,  .  .  .  the  permission  to 
export  grain  from  Languedoc."  2  Similar  implications  appear 
in  the  letter  of  October  26,  from  Valence.  Evidently  the  Con- 
suls had  hoped  that  the  trade  would  flow  towards  Lyons  once 
the  prohibitions  were  cancelled  and  the  merchants  excited  by 
the  expectation  of  good  prices.  This  aspect  of  the  policy  of  the 
Consuls  is  more  directly  revealed  by  reports  of  Guimbre,  the 
agent  in  Burgundy.  In  April,  the  Consuls  hear  that  "  the  mer- 
chants of  Auxonne  and  others  who  have  grain  complain  that 
their  grain  cannot  be  sold,  or  at  any  rate  has  a  very  small  sale 
on  account  of  the  prohibitions."  Guimbre  writes  that  the  mer- 
chants of  Burgundy  dare  not  send  their  grain  down  to  Lyons  on 
account  of  the  prohibitions.3  Rumors  and  statements  of  this 
type  inevitably  led  the  Consuls  to  attach  an  exaggerated  impor- 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  47,  165.     8  Dec.  1528. 

2  Ibid.,  AA.  29.    Avignon,  6  Nov.  1528. 
8  Ibid.,  BB.  47,  224.     5  Avril  1529. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  153 

tance  to  the  prohibitions.  They  were  slow  to  learn  that  there 
were  many  other  causes  which  tended  to  make  the  wholesale 
trade  less  considerable  than  they  hoped.  Direct  purchases 
were,  in  many  cases,  if  not  regularly,  a  last  resort,  a  mode  of 
procuring  supplies  that  was  adopted  only  when  the  agents  had 
failed  to  stimulate  the  local  merchants  to  make  shipments. 

In  1544,  we  have  some  of  the  commissions  of  the  deputies  of 
the  town.  They  were  probably  given  much  the  same  powers  as 
the  deputies  of  1528.  Antoine  Bouyn  was  sent  to  Languedoc, 
Decapelle  to  Beauce,  Charollais,  Nivernais,  and  Bourbonnais, 
Janot  and  Guillaume  du  Mont  of  Seurre,  to  Forez  and  Auvergne. 
All  the  commissions  were  at  first  drawn  up  in  the  same  terms: 
"  we  have  given  and  give  power  and  authority  to  ...  to 
proceed  to  ...  (Languedoc)  .  .  .  and  other  suitable  places 
to  take  up  grain,  and  make  contracts  and  agreements  with  the 
merchants  and  other  persons  to  the  effect  that  grain  shall  be  t 
sent  to  Lyons,  in  such  quantities  as  he  shall  deem  proper.  For 
the  assurance  of  the  price  and  purchase  of  -the  grain,  he  shall  have 
authority  to  contract  liabilities  binding  upon  us  as  councillors, 
and  upon  the  property  of  the  town,  and  if  he  judges  it  expedient 
he  may  contract  liabilities  binding  upon  us  as  private  individuals 
and  upon  our  property."  1  The  intention  is  here  obscure. 
The  commissioner  is  charged  both  with  stimulation  of  private 
trade  and  with  purchases  in  the  name  of  the  town.  The  draft 
was  unsatisfactory  to  the  Consuls,  and  a  revised  form  was  issued 
the  next  day.  Antoine  Bouyn  was  given  this  commission, 
which  emphasizes  the  policy  of  encouragement.  "  The  said 
Bouyn  shall  make  agreements  with  such  merchants  as  he  shall 
find  suitable,  engaging  them  to  ship  not  more  than  10-12,000 
anees  of  grain.  He  shall  agree  that  if  they  cannot  sell  the  grain 
for  a  price  that  is  fixed  by  him,  they  shall  be  indemnified  for  the 
loss  suffered.  The  merchants  shall  agree  to  bring  the  grain  to 
Lyons  at  their  expense  and  at  their  risk,  and  they  shall  be 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mtm^  BB.  61,  214.  25  Fev.  1543-44.  The  original  is  obscure 
in  phrasing,  especially  the  words  "  pour  recouvrer  des  bleds,  et  illec  marchander 
et  convenir  avec  telz  marchands  et  personnes  qu'il  verra  estre  son  affaire.  Pour 
fair  venir  en  ceste  ville  telle  quantite"  dea  bleds  qu'il  s'avisera." 


154  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

required  to  sell  as  soon  as  the  grain  arrives."  l  The  commission 
to  Jannot  was  of  the  same  character.  He  was  instructed  to  go 
to  Puy,  Riom,  Montferrand,  Clermont,  and  elsewhere  in  Au- 
vergne,  to  see  if  he  could  not  come  to  some  agreements  with  the 
merchants  and  other  persons  having  granaries.  If  he  found 
merchants  who  were  willing  to  sign  contracts,  he  might  engage 
for  the  delivery  of  6000  anees,  and  might  guarantee  a  price  of 
twenty-three  sous  per  bichet.2 

The  effort  to  confine  the  deputies  to  the  policy  of  encourage- 
ment is  marked.  This  is  more  significant  when  it  is  considered 
in  connection  with  the  failure  of  a  project  for  a  loan  to  be  used 
for  the  purchase  of  grain.  The  preceding  August,  the  Consuls 
had  gone  so  far  as  to  summon  an  assembly  of  notables  "  to  find  a 
remedy  for  the  dearth,  to  form  granaries  and  to  find  money."  3 
The  resolution  was  carried  in  due  form,  but  there  is  no  record  of 
any  meeting,  nor  any  accounts  of  grain  bought  outright  in  the 
name  of  the  town.  The  commissions  first  drawn  up  for  the 
deputies  were  revised  to  avoid  a  possibility  of  interpreting  them 
as  a  grant  of  power  to  make  purchases.  The  intention  of  the 
municipality  is  clear.  The  policy  of  encouragement  and  insur- 
ance against  risk  was  to  be  maintained  as  long  as  possible,  and 
in  that  year  it  was  not  necessary  to  resort  to  direct  purchase. 

In  1573,  we  find  the  municipality  not  only  engaged  in  direct 
purchase  of  grain,  but  also  establishing  a  commission  to  attend 
to  the  details.  The  Consuls  had  purchased  1000  anees  of  grain. 
On  February  2,  the  first  instalment  arrived.  The  Consuls 
then  ordered  "  that  the  grain  should  be  placed  in  the  most 
convenient  granaries  at  the  Port  Saint  Vincent,  and  that  Sr.  de  la 
Capelle  should  be  commissioned  to  keep  account  of  the  entry 
and  of  the  distribution  of  the  grain.  And  because  certain 
bourgeois  have  offered  to  lend  money  to  assist  the  town,  on 
condition  of  being  reimbursed  with  the  money  received  from  the 
sale  of  the  grain,  it  has  been  decided  to  accept  the  loans  offered. 
In  case  the  sums  subscribed  by  the  bourgeois  are  not  sufficient, 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  61,  216.     26  Fev.  1543-44. 

*  Ibid. 

8  Ibid.,  BB.  6 1,  113.     17  Aotit  1543. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  155 

2ooou  shall  be  borrowed  on  the  Place  to  be  employed  in  the  pay- 
ment of  the  1000  anees.  To  do  this,  we  commission  the  Council- 
lors Morniers  and  Demasses,  both  to  receive  the  loans  of  the 
bourgeois,  and  to  borrow  the  surplus  on  the  Place.  .  .  .  The 
said  Consuls  agree  and  promise  both  in  their  capacity  as  Consuls 
and  in  their  private  capacity,  to  guard  the  sums  entrusted  to 
them  and  repay  each  person  in  full."  1  This  special  committee 
of  two  Consuls  possessed  many  of  the  duties  of  the  later  Chambre 
d'Abondance,  but  the  Consulate  as  a  body  retained  direction  of 
all  the  purchases.2  In  the  next  few  years,  there  was  a  growing 
conviction  that  the  supplies  furnished  by  the  wholesale  trade 
were  likely  to  be  slightly  inadequate.  These  purchases  in  1573 
were  followed  in  1574  by  a  more  formal  recognition  of  the  prob- 
able necessity  of  similar  measures  in  the  future.  The  Consuls 
went  so  far  as  to  secure  Royal  Letters  Patent  granting  them  full 
power  to  make  purchases  and  receive  loans.3  The  Patent  is 
so  much  concerned  with  the  question  of  provincial  prohibitions 
that  it  is  difficult  to  decide  whether  the  cancellation  of  the  pro- 
hibitions or  the  grant  of  authority  to  form  reserves  was  its 
principal  object.  The  inclusion  of  the  provisions  for  the  forma- 
tion of  municipal  granaries  indicated  that  the  idea  was  occupy- 
ing a  larger  place  in  the  minds  of  the  Consuls. 

In  1580,  the  project  was  again  brought  forward,  and  the 
motives  are  stated.  "  Inasmuch  as  the  city  frequently  suffers 
from  dearth,  the  Consuls  have  resolved  to  establish  a  general 
granary  which  shall  always  be  kept  filled,  and  renewed  at  regular 
intervals.  With  this  in  view,  all  the  Estates  of  the  town  and 
the  inhabitants  of  the  neighborhood  shall  be  invited  to  contribute 
to  this  good  and  holy  enterprise."  4  The  conception  of  a  per- 
manent reserve  was  entirely  new,  and  the  proposal  signifies  an 
increased  lack  of  confidence  in  the  adequacy  of  the  wholesale 
supply.  The  difficulties  were  in  reality  two-fold;  there  was  a 
great  possibility  that  the  merchants  would  fail  to  bring  enough 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  91,  35.     2  Fev.  1573. 
a  Ibid.,  BB.  91,  82.     7  Mai  1573. 

8  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  401,  52.  7  Oct.  1574.  Lettres  Patentes  de  Henri  III, 
confirmees  par  le  Due  de  Lorraine,  20  Oct.  1574. 

4  Ibid.,  BB.  105-106.     7  Jan.  1580.     Chappe  IV,  443,  i. 


156        THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

grain  to  Lyons,  and  it  was  even  more  likely  that  irregularity  of 
arrival  w^uld  subject  the  town  to  periods  of  distressingly  high 
prices.  The  formation  of  a  municipal  granary  of  moderate 
capacity  would  remedy  both  of  these  dangers  which  were  at  last 
believed  to  be  inherent  in  the  conditions  of  the  trade.  The 
idea  of  such  a  granary  managed  by  an  independent  commission 
gained  more  and  more  hold  on  the  citizens  of  Lyons.  It  was  an 
essentially  different  conception  from  the  Bureaux  of  1481, 
1500,  and  1504.  The  main  idea  of  the  early  commissions  was 
to  purchase  supplies  in  distant  sections  from  which  there  was  no 
regular  trade  to  Lyons.  The  growth  of  the  wholesale  trade 
had  rendered  this  type  of  municipal  policy  obsolete  even  in 
1500  and  1504.  The  new  policy  of  encouraging  individual 
effort  supplanted  the  policy  of  municipal  purchase  and  succeeded 
until  the  trade  ceased  to  expand.  Then  the  municipality  found 
that  some  purchases  could  advantageously  be  made.  It  was 
beginning  to  be  necessary  to  supplement  individual  endeavor. 
It  was  expedient  to  form  a  reserve  to  protect  the  city  against 
the  irregularities  due  to  the  uncertainty  of  river  transport  and 
the  temporary  delays  caused  by  prohibitions. 

The  experience  of  1586  brought  this  policy  to  the  point  of 
complete  expression.  The  fulfilment  was  long  postponed,  but 
the  conception  of  the  new  policy  was  complete  in  every  essential 
feature.  The  gradual  pressure  by  which  the  Consuls  were 
driven  to  make  extensive  purchases  is  the  most  significant 
feature  of  the  episode.  In  the  latter  part  of  March,  the  Consuls 
apprehended  serious  inconvenience  from  the  prohibitions  in 
Burgundy  and  Dauphine.  The  merchants  were  unable  to 
afford  any  immediate  relief  on  account  of  these  obstacles,  so  that 
a  visitation  of  private  granaries  was  ordered.  These  were  to  be 
opened  to  provide  for  the  needs  of  the  town  until  grain  could  be 
obtained.1  Meanwhile,  Patents  had  been  obtained  from  the 
King,  cancelling  the  prohibitions.  The  deputies  of  the  town 
in  Burgundy  were  instructed  to  enforce  these  patents;  and  a 
deputy  was  sent  at  once  to  Auvergne  to  secure  the  passage  of  the 
grain  held  at  Roanne.2  A  week  later  the  fear  of  dearth  had 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  116,  63.     20  Mars  1586. 

2  Ibid.,  BB.  116,  67.     29  Mars  1586. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  157 

become  more  pressing.  The  prohibitions  in  Burgundy  and 
Bassigny  seemed  so  dangerous  that  another  agent  was  sent  to 
the  King  to  obtain  fresh  Patents  to  nullify  the  prohibitions. 
Then  the  Consuls  began  to  doubt  the  possibility  of  securing 
supplies  from  Burgundy  in  time;  the  agent  to  the  King  was 
consequently  instructed  to  buy  grain  at  Orleans.  "  He  shall 
pass  through  Orleans  to  see  if  he  can  not  find  some  merchant 
willing  to  sell  800-1000  muids  of  grain,  to  be  delivered  at  Lyons 
by  May  fifteenth."  1  April  15,  a  deputy  arrived  from  Roanne 
to  report  that  there  was  a  considerable  quantity  of  grain  but  the 
prices  were  high.  He  was  sent  back  at  once  with  instructions 
to  buy  2000  anees,  and  although  there  was  at  first  some  desire 
to  limit  the  price  to  be  paid,  he  was  finally  given  carte  blanche, 
for  fear  that  the  opportunity  of  securing  the  grain  might  be  lost.2 
A  week  later,  the  deputies  in  Burgundy  were  sent  instructions 
to  buy  3000  anees  or  more  anywhere  they  could  and  at  any  price.3 
The  Consuls  had  given  up  all  hope  of  securing  adequate  supplies 
from  the  merchants.  The  prohibitions  might  be  removed,  but 
the  delays  incident  to  getting  private  ventures  under  way  would 
render  this  resource  of  no  avail.  The  city  needed  grain  at  once. 
The  only  expeditious  means  of  obtaining  supplies  was  direct 
municipal  purchase,  and  the  Consuls  did  not  hesitate.  Their 
efforts  were  successful.  The  first  serious  realization  of  danger 
appeared  on  April  fourth.  On  May  tenth,4  the  first  instal- 
ments arrived  from  Burgundy.  Municipal  purchases  continued 
till  the  harvest.5 

The  prohibitions  in  the  provinces  gave  the  crisis  a  severity 
that  was  distinctly  abnormal,  but  the  inadequacy  of  the  private 
trade,  so  powerfully  impressed  upon  the  Consuls,  was  real. 
The  volume  of  trade  might  at  any  time  fall  below  the  amount 
needed  by  the  city;  prohibitions,  ice  on  the  river,  mere  timidity 
on  the  part  of  the  merchants  might  cause  a  temporary  but  pro- 
longed scarcity.  The  absence  of  a  large  supply  close  at  hand 

Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  116,  68.     4  Avril  1586. 

Ibid.,  BB.  117,  113.     15  Avril  1586. 

Ibid.,  BB.  117,  119.     22  Avril  1586. 

Ibid.,  BB.  117,  134.     10  Mai  1586. 

Ibid.,  BB.  117,  passim.    Chappe  IV,  411,  60  bis.     Paris,  19  Juin  1586. 


158         TEE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

exposed  the  city  to  dangers  from  irregularity  that  were  no 
serious  menace  to  cities  like  Paris  and  Rouen.  The  crisis  in 
1586  was  phenomenal;  it  resulted  in  a  remarkably  precise 
formulation  of  all  the  ideas  that  had  been  in  the  air  since  1573. 
May  13,  1586,  a  general  assembly  was  summoned  to  consider 
a  plan  drawn  up  by  the  Consuls  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of 
the  difficulties  experienced  so  frequently. 

In  the  opening  speech,  Mandelot,  the  Governor  of  Lyonnais, 
stated  the  motives  which  impelled  the  Consuls  to  call  the  meet- 
ing. He  laid  great  stress  on  the  feeling  that  private  trade  was 
at  times  unable  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  town.  "  Even  the 
Consuls,"  he  says,  "  have  recently  had  great  difficulty  in  securing 
grain,  on  account  of  the  severity  of  the  dearth  throughout 
France.  To  prevent  the  recurrence  of  such  distress  in  the 
future,  the  Consuls  have  decided  to  empower  six  notable  bour- 
geois to  buy  grain  after  the  harvest.  Their  purchases  shall  be 
stored  in  a  public  granary,  to  succor  the  people  in  time  of 
famine."1 

The  remarkable  feature  of  this  proposal,  however,  was  the 
extraordinary  completeness  of  the  provisions  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  Commission.  "  The  Commission  shall  have  the 
title  Intendants  d'Abondance  and  shall  promise  the  Consuls 
to  buy  or  have  bought,  after  the  harvest  of  the  present  year, 
such  quantities  of  grain,  wheat,  rye,  and  lentils,  as  the  Consuls 
and  the  Intendants  shall  deem  expedient.  They  shall  make 
these  purchases  in  Beauce,  Sologne,  Nivernais,  Bourbonnais, 
Auvergne,  Charollais,  and  other  neighboring  regions.  As  far 
as  possible  they  shall  refrain  from  purchasing  grain  in  Burgundy, 
in  order  not  to  curtail  the  opportunities  of  the  merchants  to  engage 
in  the  trade  which  they  ordinarily  pursue  in  Burgundy  and  Bassigny. 
Likewise  the  said  Intendants  shall  make  no  purchases  in  the 
government  of  Lyonnais,  nor  in  the  Pays  de  Dombes,  since 
the  bourgeois,  citizens,  and  other  inhabitants  are  accustomed 
to  make  provision  for  their  families  by  purchases  in  these 
regions. 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  116,  89;  117,  140.  13  Mai  1586.  Assemblee  en 
THostel  Commun  de  la  Ville  de  Lyon.  The  wording  of  the  speech  is  condensed. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  159 

"  The  Intendants  shall  provide  for  the  shipment  of  all  grain 
bought  in  pursuance  of  their  orders,  and  shall  store  it  in  granaries 
of  which  they  shall  hold  the  keys. 

"  The  Consuls  shall  entrust  to  the  Intendants  not  more  than 
20,000  ecus  soleil  in  specie,  drawn  either  from  the  personal 
fortunes  of  the  Consuls  or  from  sums  borrowed  by  them  on  their  t 
own  credit.  In  acknowledgment  of  this  sum,  the  Intendants 
in  their  own  names  shall  deliver  receipts  to  each  of  the  amount 
loaned,  which  shall  be  repaid  at  the  end  of  the  year  with  the 
profit  of  -  — %  per  year,  or  from  fair  to  fair  at  the  rate  of 
'  change  '  in  this  city. 

"  And  inasmuch  as  it  would  be  advisable  to  create  a  larger 
fund  than  this  20,000  ecus,  the  Intendants  shall  exert  their 
influence  to  borrow  the  sum  needed  for  the  purchases,  transporta- 
tion, and  other  expenses  incidental  to  the  undertaking.  For 
these  sums,  the  Intendants  shall  give  receipts  made  out  in  their 
own  name,  to  bear  such  interest  and  profit  as  they  shall  agree 
upon. 

"  For  the  transaction  of  these  various  affairs,  they  shall 
assemble  at  a  regular  place  of  meeting.  All  six  Intendants  shall 
attend  if  possible,  but,  in  the  absence  of  one  or  two,  the  four 
present  shall  decide  such  questions  as  arise,  and  their  decisions 
shall  afterwards  be  ratified  by  the  absent  members.  The 
duties  shall  be  divided  among  them,  and  they  shall  have  authority 
to  commission  such  agents  as  they  shall  find  necessary,  to  make 
the  purchases  and  supervise  transportation.  Likewise  one  of 
their  number  shall  be  particularly  charged  to  keep  or  supervise 
the  keeping  of  the  cash  book  and  other  papers  concerning  the 
undertaking. 

1  The  duties  and  authority  of  the  Intendants  shall  terminate 
annually,  beginning  with  the  feast  of  Saint- Jean  Baptiste,  and 
ending  on  the  same  feast  day  in  the  following  year.  At  the  end 
of  the  year  thus  indicated,  three  of  the  six  Intendants  shall 
leave  office  and  in  their  place  three  persons  shall  be  elected  by 
the  Echevins  and  the  Intendants.  These  newly-elected  Inten- 
dants' shall  discharge  the  duties  of  the  office  for  the  year,  and 
at  its  close  the  three  Intendants  of  longest  standing  shall  leave 
office,  and  three  others  shall  be  elected. 


l6o        TEE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

"  At  the  end  of  each  year,  between  Easter  and  the  Saint- 
Jean,  the  aforesaid  grain  purchased  and  stored  in  the  city  shall 
be  sold  by  persons  appointed  by  the  Intendants  for  the  purpose, 
who  shall  take  charge  of  all  the  product  of  the  sale,  in  order  to 
pay  the  loans  from  individuals,  both  principal  and  interest.  .  .  . 

"  When  the  grain  has  been  sold,  the  Intendants  shall  render 
account  of  their  administration  to  the  Consuls,  and  to  the  three 
incoming  Intendants.  The  Governor,  the  Clergy,  the  officers  of 
Justice,  and  other  notables  may  be  present,  and  if  it  appears  by 
the  account  that  there  has  been  a  loss,  whether  because  of  sale 
below  cost,  or  by  reason  of  deterioration,  excessive  expense  of 
transportation,  or  loss  from  shipwreck,  fire,  violence,  theft, 
or  pillage,  the  Consuls  in  their  private  capacity  shall  indemnify 
the  Intendants  and  reimburse  them  immediately  after  the 
rendition  of  the  account,  without  any  formal  process. 

"  The  sum  thus  paid  by  the  Eerie  vins  to  the  Intendants 
shall  be  distributed  and  imposed  on  all  the  inhabitants  of  the 
town,  as  the  Orders  and  the  Estates  have  expressly  consented. 
Likewise,  if  it  shall  please  God  to  grant  any  profit,  it  shall  belong 
to  the  public  and  remain  to  serve  as  part  of  the  fund  assigned 
to  the  enterprise."  1 

This  elaborate  attempt  to  organize  municipal  purchases 
was  premature.  It  was  the  result  of  an  unusual  crisis  which  was 
somewhat  artificial  because  of  the  excessive  influence  of  pro- 
hibitions. The  moment  chosen  for  the  establishment  of  the 
Chambre  d'Abondance  was  unfortunate;  coming  at  the  close 
of  a  season,  when  the  municipality  had  extended  its  credit  for 
immediate  purchases,  it  proved  to  be  impracticable  for  the  Con- 
suls to  turn  over  the  sum  of  20,000  ecus,  provided  for  in  the  plan. 
The  six  Intendants  d'Abondance  were  duly  elected  and  they 
endeavored  to  discharge  the  duties  imposed  upon  them,  but  there 
was  no  money.  At  the  end  of  October,  they  appeared  at  the 
Consulate,  and  said  that  they  had  sent  into  the  provinces  to 
make  purchases,  but  that  the  Echevins  had  failed  to  pay  the 
20,000  ecus  without  which  the  enterprise  could  not  be  pros- 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  116,  89;  117,  140.  13  Mai  1586.  One  of  these 
registers  is  the  minute  made  during  the  meeting,  the  other  is  the  formal  copy. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  l6l 

ecuted.  They  added  that  they  would  be  obliged  to  resign,  if 
the  funds  were  not  speedily  forthcoming.  The  Consuls  asked 
for  time  to  consider  the  subject,  but  no  record  of  a  decision 
appears.1  There  are  no  accounts  of  purchases  by  these  In  ten- 
dan  ts  d'Abondance,  so  that  it  is  likely  that  they  resigned  on 
account  of  lack  of  funds. 

There  is  no  more  significant  commentary  upon  the  nature  of 
institutions  and  of  institutional  development  than  the  absence 
of  any  municipal  purchases  for  the  half  century  that  follows 
the  formulation  of  the  elaborate  scheme  of  1586.  It  was  not  an 
unprecedented  proposal ;  the  origin  of  every  feature  of  the  scheme 
can  be  perceived  in  the  history  of  the  preceding  decade,  and  above 
all  in  the  events  of  the  first  four  months  of  1586.  We  can 
rarely  trace  the  gradual  development  of  a  relatively  new  institu- 
tion with  more  completeness.  Nothing  could  produce  a  more 
convincing  impression  of  permanence  and  of  appositeness,  and 
yet  all  this  structure  crumbled  and  fell  to  the  ground,  incapable 
of  supporting  its  own  weight.  For  fifty  years  there  was  no 
suggestion  of  a  recurrence  of  such  a  crisis  as  that  of  1586;  no 
renewal  of  the  project  to  form  a  municipal  granary.  The 
private  trade,  which  in  1573,  1580,  and  1586  had  revealed  serious 
incapacity  to  supply  the  needs  of  the  city,  succeeded  for  a  long 
period  in  meeting  all  the  wants  of  Lyons.  When  the  Consuls 
finally  became  convinced  that  the  general  wholesale  trade  was 
not  quite  adequate,  the  trade  ceased  to  cause  further  difficulty. 
The  problem  which  had  seemed  so  serious  in  1586  apparently 
ceased  to  exist  for  half  a  century. 

The  explanation  of  this  curious  feature  of  the  grain  trade  at 
Lyons  is  probably  similar  to  the  explanation  that  has  been 
suggested  for  the  persistence  of  the  system  of  local  marketing. 
There  were  latent  defects  in  organization  which  were  really 
inherent  in  the  conditions  of  the  trade,  but  they  appeared  only 
under  pressure  of  unusual  circumstances.  Some  chance  incident 
might  reveal  the  nature  of  the  difficulty  long  before  the  pressure 
of  conditions  had  become  sufficiently  insistent  to  require  com- 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  117,  233.  31  Oct.  1586.  The  Consuls  were  to 
decide  the  matter  the  third  of  November,  but  there  is  no  record  under  that  date. 


1 62  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

plete  reorganization.  The  solution  of  many  social  problems 
is  frequently  conceived  long  before  the  difficulty  has  become  so 
pressing  that  reform  is  necessary.  In  this  sense,  the  Abondance 
of  1586  was  a  premature  solution  of  the  grain  trade  problems 
of  the  seventeenth  century.  The  sixteenth  century  was  char- 
acterized at  Lyons  by  the  effort  to  stimulate  individual  en- 
deavor; the  municipality  avoided  direct  purchases  as  far  as 
possible,  and  wisely  relied  upon  the  supplies  procured  by  mer- 
chants. The  seventeenth  century  was  characterized  by  a 
deepening  conviction  of  the  inexpediency  of  reliance  upon  the 
private  trade.  A  fortuitous  combination  of  circumstances  in 
1586  happened  to  bring  out  most  of  the  essential  difficulties 
that  characterize  the  seventeenth  century,  so  that  the  policy 
of  the  seventeenth  century  was  strikingly  foreshadowed  long 
before  it  became  a  practical  necessity. 

In  1620,  the  first  indication  of  renewed  trouble  in  the  grain 
trade  appeared.  The  Consuls  were  not  active,  but  the  judicial 
officers  endeavored  to  protect  the  city  against  want.  The 
expedient  adopted  was  a  curious  compromise  between  the 
policies  of  encouragement  and  of  direct  purchase.  The  mer- 
chants of  the  city  were  summoned  towards  the  end  of  March 
and  ordered  "  to  maintain  fixed  reserves  in  their  granaries  until 
the  month  of  August.  Until  then  each  merchant  shall  replenish 
his  granaries  as  he  sells,  so  that  the  quantity  in  his  possession 
shall  never  fall  below  the  amounts  indicated  in  the  annexed 
roll.  To  free  the  merchants  from  any  fear  of  a  decline  in  price 
which  might  cause  them  to  lose  money,  it  is  also  ordered  that 
until  the  month  of  August,  the  bakers  of  the  town  shall  be 
required  to  buy  grain  of  the  said  merchants,  at  the  price  of 
I2U5  sous  per  anee  for  wheat  from  the  Pays  de  Verdun  or  above, 
and  13 n  per  anee  for  wheat  from  the  lower  river."  1 

Ten  years  later,  the  project  for  a  Chambre  d'Abondance 
reappeared.  The  Abondance  was  formed  to  supplement  the 
efforts  of  private  merchants,  especially  by  endeavoring  to  procure 
supplies  in  regions  not  generally  frequented  by  the  merchants. 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,  427,  3.  27  Mars  1620.  Ordonnance  de  la 
S6n6chaussee. 


THE  CHAMBRE  DJ  ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  163 

The  merchants  confined  their  attention  to  Burgundy,  but  it  was 
hazardous  to  rely  so  completely  upon  a  source  of  supply  which 
might  be  rendered  valueless  by  a  local  crop  failure.  The  natural 
tendencies  in  the  development  of  the  wholesale  trade  had  been 
unsound;  the  advantages  of  Burgundy  were  so  marked,  the 
disadvantages  of  the  lower  river  so  distinct,  that  the  private 
merchants  gradually  neglected  entirely  the  sources  of  supply 
which  had  been  utilized  for  a  brief  period  in  the  early  sixteenth 
century  before  the  Burgundian  trade  had  become  concentrated 
in  the  Saone  towns.  Trade  with  the  lower  river  might  have  been 
stimulated,  perhaps,  by  means  of  guarantees  and  premiums,  but 
the  delays  and  indirectness  of  such  procedure  were  too  serious 
to  render  such  a  policy  expedient.  In  1630,  the  Consuls  frankly 
adopted  the  essential  features  of  the  Abondance  of  1586.  The 
Bureau  was  charged  with  making  purchases  in  the  regions  unfre- 
quented by  the  merchants  and  with  the  formation  of  granaries 
designed  to  secure  the  city  against  the  dangers  arising  from  the 
irregularity  of  the  trade. 

As  in  1586,  the  project  was  laid  before  a  General  Assembly 
of  the  town,  but  the  assembly  was  much  less  ambitious  than  its 
predecessor.  The  Intendants  pour  F  Abondance  were  appointed 
for  a  year  only,  but  their  attributions  were  practically  identical 
with  those  of  the  Indendants  of  1586,  and  the  constant  reference 
to  the  meeting  of  1586  indicates  direct  influence.  A  few  men 
who  had  attended  in  1586  were  present  in  1630.  The  chief 
difference  lay  in  the  mode  of  securing  funds.  In  1586,  the 
Consuls  had  agreed  to  contribute  20,000  francs  and  private 
subscriptions  were  to  be  solicited;  in  1630  a  loan  was  to  be 
raised  entirely  by  private  subscriptions,  and  30,0x30  francs  were 
promised  at  the  meeting.  There  was  no  provision  for  any  loan 
from  the  municipality,  so  that  the  financial  basis  of  the  Chambre 
d'Abondance  was  quite  independent  of  the  municipality.  The 
rate  of  interest  to  be  paid  was  fixed  at  6i%  and  the  guarantee 
against  loss  was  to  have  an  official  character,  which  it  possessed 
actually,  but  not  technically,  in  1586.  A  new  provision  was 
added  requiring  the  bakers  to  buy  gram  of  the  Abondance  at 
fixed  prices,  in  order  to  dispose  of  supplies  left  in  the  granaries 


164         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

at  the  close  of  a  season.1  In  other  respects  the  articles  of  1586 
and  1 630  were  identical. 

This  Chambre  d 'Abondance  remained  active  till  1632.  It 
was  reestablished  in  1637-38,  without  any  noteworthy  change  in 
organization.  In  1643,  tne  organization  of  the  Chambre  was 
modified  in  many  details  and  it  was  proposed  to  make  it  per- 
manent, thus  adopting  at  last  the  most  ambitious  element  of  the 
plan  of  1586.  The  articles  drawn  up  by  the  General  Assembly 
were  printed  and  distributed  quite  widely,  and,  as  the  Abondance 
then  became  a  permanent  body,  the  year  1643  came  to  be  re- 
garded as  the  date  of  the  establishment  of  the  Chambre  d'Abond- 
ance. There  were  some  important  changes.  The  number  of 
directors  was  increased  from  eight  to  eleven,  and  it  was  pro- 
vided that  the  Provost  of  Merchants  and  one  Consul  should 
be  members  ex  officio.  In  regard  to  raising  of  the  loan  there 
was  a  compromise  between  the  plans  of  1586  and  1630.  "  The 
purchases  of  grain  shall  be  made  with  funds  subscribed  by  the 
Directors  of  the  Abondance  and  by  the  Consulate.  The  Con- 
sulate shall  subscribe  in  its  official  capacity  as  member  of  the 
Abondance,  and  shall  employ  the  municipal  funds."  Evidently 
reliance  upon  voluntary  subscriptions  had  proved  to  be  inade- 
quate and  the  loans  were  given  a  more  official  character.  The 
other  provisions  of  previous  plans  were  repeated:  the  limitation 
of  purchases  to  distant  sections  unfrequented  by  merchants, 
the  interest  to  be  paid  on  loans,  the  guarantee  against  loss,  and 
the  regulation  that  the  bakers  must  buy  remainders  at  prices 
fixed  by  the  Directors  of  the  Abondance.2 

The  permanence  projected  in  1643  was  really  achieved.  The 
accounts  are  the  simplest  indication  of  the  persistence  of  the 
Chambre.  The  Archives  at  Lyons  still  possess  the  accounts 
of  the  Abondance  for  the  years:  1648-50,  1651-53,  1654,  .  .  . 
1667-70,  and  for  each  subsequent  year  to  1713.  The  Abondance 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  GG.  Chappe  IV,  442-443.  (Extrait  des  Registres  Con- 
sulaires),  30  Juillet  1630. 

a  G7.  1633.  ImprimS,  Paris,  1667.  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  18599,  429-  Imprime', 
Paris,  1667.  » 

Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,  5  and  6.      Several  copies.      The  original 
minute  is,  of  course,  in  the  Actes  Consulaires  under  the  date  31  Aout  1643. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D' ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  165 

was  not  maintained  from  1713  to  1730.  But  in  1730  it  was 
reestablished  and  remained  in  existence  until  the  Revolution.1 
Some  registers  of  the  deliberations  of  the  Abondance  have  also 
survived,  covering  roughly  the  period  i63o-84.2  The  Abon- 
dance was  thus  an  important  factor  in  the  history  of  the  Lyonese 
trade  after  1643. 

If  the  Chambre  d' Abondance  is  considered  solely  from  the 
point  of  view  of  organization,  the  year  1643  marks  the  beginning 
of  the  last  phase  of  this  form  of  public  purchase  of  grain.  The 
policy  adopted  by  the  Abondance,  however,  underwent  consider- 
able change.  The  relations  with  the  merchants  were  very 
different  in  1693  and  1643.  It  is  scarcely  too  much  to  say  that 
the  real  purpose  of  the  Abondance  was  fundamentally  different. 

The  registers  of  deliberations  for  the  years  1630-49  show  that 
the  policy  of  the  directors  was  closely  related  to  the  municipal 
policy  of  the  sixteenth  century.  The  Consuls  of  that  period 
had  sought  primarily  to  stimulate  the  private  wholesale  trade 
with  Burgundy.  In  the  early  seventeenth  century  the  directors 
of  the  Abondance  were  commissioned  in  part  to  purchase  grain 
directly  in  Auvergne,  Beauce,  and  Languedoc,  but  also  to  stimu- 
late private  merchants  to  engage  in  trade  with  these  regions. 
Lyons  needed  to  have  the  possibility  of  recourse  to  more  than 
one  source  of  supply.  The  private  merchants  were  accustomed 
to  trade  only  with  Burgundy  and  it  was  desirable  to  induce 
them  to  extend  the  range  of  their  purchases.  The  stimulation 
of  trade  was  hardly  one  of  the  purposes  of  the  establishment 
of  the  Abondance,  but  in  practice  it  became  a  definite  policy. 
In  fact,  the  Abondance  from  1630-50  adopted  the  policy  of  the 
Consuls  of  the  sixteenth  century,  although  the  different  aspects 
of  the  policy  received  different  emphasis.  The  Abondance 
gave  much  attention  to  direct  purchases.  Grain  was  bought 
more  frequently  and  in  larger  quantities  than  at  any  time  in 
the  sixteenth  century.  Like  the  Consuls,  they  were  obliged 
to  secure  special  Letters  Patent  from  the  King  to  protect  their 
shipments  and  to  safeguard  the  merchants  against  the  local 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  GG.  Chappe  IV,  481. 
*  Ibid.,  GG.  Chappe  IV,  538,  49,  50,  51- 


1 66         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

prohibitions.  But  the  directors  of  the  Abondance  also  made 
many  contracts  both  with  the  local  and  the  Lyonese  merchants, 
engaging  to  secure  them  against  changes  in  price  if  the  mer- 
chants agreed  to  deliver  the  grain  at  Lyons  within  specified 
periods.  This  was  the  policy  of  the  sixteenth  century.1  Local 
"  foreign  "  merchants  were  brought  to  a  consciousness  of  the 
possibilities  of  trade  with  Lyons;  the  Lyonese  were  shown  the 
advantages  of  making  purchases  in  Languedoc,  as  well  as 
Burgundy. 

In  the  course  of  the  seventeenth  century,  there  was  a  distinct 
development  of  trade  with  Languedoc.  Auvergne  and  the 
Beauce  were  very  seldom  visited  by  Lyonese  whether  at  the 
instance  of  the  Abondance  or  on  private  initiative,  since  both 
regions  offered  few  advantages  and  the  difficulties  were  great. 
The  lower  river  was  more  tempting,  and  it  is  pretty  evident 
that  it  was  visited  more  and  more  frequently.  This  change 
was  in  part  due  to  the  efforts  of  the  Abondance  to  stimulate 
trade,  in  part  due  to  the  normal  development  of  the  wholesale 
trade.  It  was  this  change  that  altered  the  relation  between  the 
Abondance  and  the  merchants. 

The  transition  cannot  be  dated  with  accuracy,  but  the  char- 
acter of  the  changes  in  the  organization  of  the  trade  can  be  very 
clearly  traced  in  the  letters  of  the*  deputies  of  the  Abondance 
in  Burgundy,  1667-77.  In  the  latter  half  of  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury the  Burgundian  trade  had  begun  to  flow  toward  the  Saone 
towns.  Local  merchants  appeared  who  collected  the  grain  in 
the  back  country  and  brought  it  to  the  river  to  meet  the  mer- 
chants from  Lyons.  The  organization  of  this  wholesale  trade 
developed  steadily,  and  by  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury it  was  so  highly  concentrated  in  the  river  towns  that  the 
Lyonese  merchants  did  most  of  their  buying  in  the  towns.  The 
Lyonese  merchant  thus  tended  to  become  a  capitalist  who 
confined  his  attention  to  the  latter  stages  of  the  trade,  trusting 
commission  agents  or  factors  with  the  collection  of  the  grain 
in  the  producing  regions.  The  papers  of  a  law  suit,  in  which 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  GG.  Chappe  IV,  538-549.  Registres  des  Deliberations 
1' Abondance. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS 

the  Consuls  of  Lyons  were  engaged  in  1630,  indicate  that  this 
capitalistic  form  of  trade  was  an  established  practice  even  then. 
The  Lyonese  merchants  were  buying  in  Champagne,  in  Bassigny, 
and  in  Burgundy.1  In  most  of  the  towns,  the  larger  merchants 
were  represented  by  factors.  There  are  traces  of  partnerships.2 
These  and  other  facts  indicate  that  the  conditions  we  find  in 
1667-77  may  have  prevailed  much  earlier.  In  all  probability, 
however,  there  is  a  change  in  degree.  Even  if  there  were  factors 
and  commission  agents  in  the  early  seventeenth  century,  it 
is  hardly  likely  that  this  form  of  trade  was  so  important.  The 
conduct  of  the  Abondance  in  the  years  1630-50  shows  that  the 
merchants  could  not  then  be  easily  induced  to  buy  on  the  lower 
river.  Later,  when  the  development  of  the  local  wholesale 
trade  had  emphasized  the  capitalistic  side  of  the  trade  of  the 
Lyonese  merchants,  they  found  it  easier  to  turn  their  capital 
in  any  direction.  The  large  mercantile  house  with  its  staff 
of  factors  and  its  regular  commission  merchants  could  readily 
develop  relations  with  the  local  commission  merchants  of  the 
lower  river.  The  larger  scale  of  doing  business  was  in  itself 
likely  to  make  the  merchant  more  willing  to  direct  his  trade 
to  the  most  advantageous  sections. 

The  letters  of  1667-77  show  that  the  trade  had  reached  this 
stage  of  development,  and  they  also  suggest  that  the  large  scale 
of  operations  was  relatively  new.  The  local  merchants  were 
nearly  all  working  on  commission  for  Lyonese  merchants.  Du 
Pradt  writes  in  November,  1667,  "  there  are  very  few  mer- 
chants here  who  have  not  commissions  from  Lyons.  One 
Fegnet,  at  Talmay,  collects  great  amounts  by  reason  of  his 
intimate  knowledge  of  Franche  Comte  and  the  vicinity  of 
Langres.  He  works  on  commission,  and  has  promised  not  to 
engage  himself  on  new  commissions  without  speaking  to  me."  3 
Other  agents  are  noted,  "  one  Balan  d'Apremont,  who  ordinarily 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,  411,  67.     Juin-Sept.  1630.     Proces  entre  les 
fichevins  de  Chalons-sur-Saone  et  de  Lyon. 

2  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  411,  63.      12  Avril  1628.     Arret  de  Conseil.  .  .  . 

3  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  460,  30.     Gray,  10  Nov.  1667.     Most  of  these  letters  were 
written  by  Du  Pradt,  a  deputy  of  the  Chambre  d' Abondance,  to  the  Directors  of 
the  Chambre  at  Lyons. 


1 68         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

works  on  commission  for  merchants  of  Lyons."  1  The  Aigneus, 
uncle  and  nephew,  "  Dugas  and  his  company,"  and  many 
others  are  mentioned.  The  Aigneus  worked  on  a  standing 
engagement  with  certain  merchants,  and  this  contract  made 
such  demands  on  them  that  Aigneu  said  he  could  not  undertake 
to  buy  a  couple  of  hundred  mines  for  the  Abondance,  as  he  did 
not  wish  to  break  with  his  regular  employers.2  The  efforts  of 
these  local  dealers  brought  the  grain  to  the  river  very  quickly. 
In  1671,  Du  Pradt  says  that  the  granaries  of  the  river  towns 
were  generally  filled  by  the  first  week  in  November.3  In  Sep- 
tember, 1667,  he  says  that  there  is  no  new  grain  to  be  had  any- 
where, but  that  there  will  be  an  abundance  before  the  end  of 
October.4  This  does  not  mean,  of  course,  that  the  whole  crop 
was  moved  towards  the  river,  but  the  portion  of  the  crop  usually 
available  for  wholesale  trade  appeared  in  the  river  towns  early, 
so  that  the  local  merchants  were  well  supplied  by  the  first  of 
November,  and  were  ready  to  ship  to  Lyons. 

The  complete  ascendency  of  the  local  merchants  appears 
most  clearly  when  the  grain  is  followed  into  the  back  country. 
Almost  everywhere  we  meet  the  merchants  of  the  river  towns, 
rarely  Lyonese  merchants.  The  proportions  of  the  trade  in 
the  towns  attracted  many  blatters,  so  that  the  factors  were  able 
to  buy  much  grain  on  the  town  markets  or  in  the  streets.  This 
appearance  of  blaliers  in  the  towns  is  indeed  one  of  the  most 
striking  features  of  the  period.  Writing  from  Auxonne  in 
November,  1667,  Du  Pradt  says:  "from  Langres,  which  is 
ten  leagues  distant,  much  grain  comes  to  this  town.  At  Marsilly 
and  at  Talmay,  there  are  many  carts  loaded  with  grain." 5 
At  Gray,  in  1669,  120  carters  came  in  during  a  single  week. 
Arrivals  were  quite  as  frequent  at  Auxonne.6  But  the  intensity 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,  460,  30.     Auxonne,  20  Nov.   1667.     Du 
Pradt. 

2  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  460,  30.     Gray,  31  Oct.  1667.     Du  Pradt.     See  also  ibid., 
Chalons-sur-Sa6ne,  4  Dec.  1667.    Du  Pradt. 

8  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  460,  30.  Auxonne,  8  Nov.  1671.    Du  Pradt. 

4  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  460,  30.  Auxonne,  14  Sept.  1667.     Du  Pradt. 

6  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  460,  30.  Auxonne,  3  Nov.  1667.     Du  Pradt. 

8  Ibid.,  Gray,  22  Nov.  1669.  Du  Pradt.     Auxonne,  25  Nov.  1669.     Du  Pradt. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  169 

of  competition  among  the  commission  merchants  did  not  always 
allow  the  blatters  to  get  to  the  town  market.  The  rivalry  was 
particularly  keen  between  Dugas  and  the  Aigneus.  In  Decem- 
ber, 1667,  Du  Pradt  says:  "Dugas  and  his  associates  have 
2500  anees  of  grain  already  purchased,  and  they  are  still  buying, 
striving  to  get  ahead  of  the  Aigneus  who  have  quite  as  much  as 
they  have.  They  have  agreed  several  times  to  divide  equally 
what  is  brought  to  town  and  take  it  all  at  the  same  price.  But 
they  break  their  agreement  almost  as  soon  as  it  is  made.  Last 
Tuesday,  they  nearly  came  to  blows.  They  pushed  prices  up 
to  27  sous  6  deniers  per  bichet"  (15-16  sous  was  a  normal 
price).  Du  Pradt  could  not  resist  the  temptation  to  enter 
into  the  game,  so  he  advised  the  Aigneus  to  stop  buying  in  the 
town.  "  The  granaries  of  Dugas  were  full,  both  in  the  town 
and  in  the  country.  Dugas  would  soon  be  unable  to  house 
more  grain,  and,  as  he  has  no  commissions,  he  would  have  to 
stop  buying.  Prices  would  fall  and  Aigneu  would  be  able  to 
secure  his  grain  at  a  moderate  figure."  l  The  merchants  also 
bought  in  the  back  country  directly  of  the  peasants.  Dugas 
and  the  Aigneus  were  buying  in  the  country  in  1667.  In  1669, 
one  of  the  merchants  of  Lyons  was  scouring  the  country  buying 
of  the  peasants.2  In  1667,  bakers  from  Lyons  were  buying 
in  the  farms,  forcing  prices  up  to  extraordinary  figures.3  In 
1672,  two  local  merchants  were  said  to  be  making  a  round  of 
the  country  districts.4  The  trade  was  thus  characteristically 
centered  in  the  river  towns.  Carters  came  in  from  Tranche 
Comte,  Bassigny,  and  Champagne.  The  merchants  bought 
in  or  near  the  towns.  Some -of  the  merchants  bought  in  the 
country,  both  in  the  granaries  of  landlords  and  of  the  peasants.5 
From  time  to  time,  Lyonese  merchants  endeavored  to  compete 
with  the  commission  agents,  and  perforce  bought  in  the  country. 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,  460,  30.     Auxonne,  2  Dec.  1667. 

8  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  460,  30.    Gray,  22  Fev.  1669,  Aigneu  aux  Directeurs. 

3  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  460,  30.    Auxonne,  3  Nov.  1667.    Du  Pradt. 

4  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  460,  30.     Auxonne,  17  Dec.  1672.     Du  Pradt. 

6  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  460,  30.  Gray,  16  Nov.  1669.  Du  Pradt.  "  A  Rey  .  .  . 
tous  ecus  qui  se  meslent  (du  commerce  des  bleds)  n'en  ont  pas  2000  mesures,  et 
c'est  la  plus  grande  partie  bled  de  ferme." 


170        THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

On  the  whole,  the  trade  was  in  the  hands  of  the  commission 
agents.  The  organization  of  the  Burgundian  trade  upon  this 
basis  made  the  Lyonese  merchants  feel  much  less  closely  at- 
tached to  the  locality,  and  reduced  their  part  in  the  trade  to 
wholesale  buying  and  selling  of  the  simplest  form.  This  inevi- 
tably tended  to  increase  the  mobility  of  their  operations.  In- 
dependently of  these  causes  the  scale  of  buying  tended  to 
increase. 

In  1693,  the  Abondance  was  facing  a  very  different  situation 
from  that  of  1630.  Then,  the  merchants  were  disinclined  to 
buy  outside  of  Burgundy.  They  were  accustomed  to  the  narrow 
routine  of  their  trade,  devoting  much  of  their  energy  to  finding 
supplies  in  Burgundy.  In  1693,  they  were  possessed  of  more 
capital.  They  were  free  to  devote  their  attention  to  the  larger 
aspects  of  the  trade,  as  the  petty  business  of  collecting  grain 
in  Burgundy  was  done  by  the  local  commission  merchants. 
They  were  ready  to  buy  in  Languedoc  and  Provence,  and  quite 
as  well  prepared  as  the  Abondance  to  undertake  such  a  venture. 
In  1693,  the  private  merchants  were  buying  in  Languedoc  and 
Provence  even  before  the  Abondance.  The  Chambre  was  no 
longer  necessary  because  the  merchants  confined  their  attention 
too  exclusively  to  Burgundy,  or  because  they  were  over-cautious 
and  unwilling  to  incur  risks  in  novel  ventures.  The  Abondance 
stood  in  a  new  relation  to  the  city  and  to  the  merchants.  What 
was  its  influence  upon  the  private  trade  ?  Did  it  still  discharge 
a  useful  function  ?  The  necessity  of  asking  these  questions 
suggests  the  extent  of  the  change  that  had  taken  place.  Pre- 
vious to  1693  the  utility  of  the  Abondance  was  not  seriously 
questioned,  and  the  judgment  of  the  historian  confirms  the 
opinion  of  contemporaries.  Before  1693,  it  is  relatively  easy 
to  see  many  good  reasons  for  such  a  municipal  commission. 
After  1693,  whatever  our  final  judgment  may  be,  the  Chambre 
d'Abondance  presents  a  serious  question. 

Some  criticism  appears  as  early  as  1683,  when  the  Intendant 
wrote  to  the  Controleur  General:  "  The  Chambre  d'Abondance 
stores  grain  in  large  granaries,  to  insure  adequate  supplies  in 
time  of  dearth.  If  the  rules  of  this  establishment  were  well 


THE  CHAMBRE  &  ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS 

observed,  it  would  be  a  great  aid  to  the  city,  but  when  people 
who  have  inferior  grain  sell  it  at  high  prices  to  the  Abondance, 
the  city  gains  little  and  the  poor  suffer.  It  is  said  that  the 
Abondance  costs  the  city  5000-6000  u  annually,  although  it 
ought  to  be  no  occasion  for  loss  and  might  even  yield  a  profit. 
The  directors  should  buy  when  grain  is  cheap  and  sell  when  it 
is  high."  1  All  too  frequently  it  happened  that  this  was  just 
what  the  Abondance  failed  to  do.  They  waited  until  the  dearth 
was  perceived  and  then  bought  frantically  at  any  price.  Con- 
sequently their  purchases  were  made  while  prices  were  highest 
and  some  grain  was  often  unsold  when  prices  had  fallen  to  the 
normal  level.  This  difficulty  arose  in  part  from  the  unwilHng- 
ness  of  the  bourgeois  to  make  loans  to  the  Abondance  when  the 
prospect  of  dearth  was  not  immediately  before  them.  Even 
"  if  they  promised  subscriptions  many  delays  in  payment  might 
occur  which  would  seriously  impair  the  efficiency  of  the  Abon- 
dance." The  bourgeois  took  little  interest  in  the  Abondance 
except  in  time  of  crisis. 

In  the  fall  of  1693  this  indifference  to  the  needs  of  the  Abon- 
dance was  striking.  The  Hotel  de  Ville  had  contributed  40,000 
livres,  the  Abondance  raised  20,000  livres  among  its  directors, 
and  several  bourgeois  promised  loans  amounting  to  340,000 
livres.  But  only  70,000  livres  of  these  voluntary  subscriptions 
were  paid  in,  and  those  who  were  still  to  pay  objected  to  placing 
their  funds  in  the  hands  of  the  Consuls,  lest  the  Consuls  should 
apply  the  loans  to  some  other  purpose.2  The  Abondance  did 
not  possess  resources  that  would  render  it  independent  of  the 
Consuls,  and  as  soon  as  the  Consuls  interfered,  the  Abondance 
lost  much  of  its  slight  influence  with  the  bourgeois.  The 
Abondance  needed  to  have  larger  funds  at  its  disposal;  it  should 
not  be  harassed  by  delays  in  payment  of  subscriptions ;  and  its 
relation  to  the  Consulate  needed  to  be  defined  more  clearly. 
Some  reform  was  essential.  In  the  fall  of  1693  it  was  too  weak 
to  be  of  real  assistance,  but  it  had  sufficient  vitality  to  involve 
the  city  in  considerable  losses.  At  this  time,  the  sentiment 

1  G7.     355.    Memoire  sur  la  Police  de  Lyon.    Aout,  1683.     d'Ormesson. 

2  G7.     1631.    Lyon,  19  Sept.  1693.    Montgivraut. 


172         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

of  the  citizens  was  favorable  to  the  Abondance;  it  was  not  a 
question  of  doing  away  with  it,  but  of  a  reorganization  designed 
to  increase  its  efficiency. 

In  September  and  October,  the  principal  amendment  sug- 
gested was  an  increase  in  the  number  of  Directors.  Each 
Director  was  supposed  to  contribute  to  the  funds  employed, 
and  the  idea  current  was  in  favor  of  adding  from  twelve  to 
fifteen  directors  to  the  nine  special  directors  chosen  in  accor- 
dance with  the  Regulation  of  1643.*  The  Due  de  Villeroy 
opposed  this  on  the  ground  that  "  the  great  number  of  Directors 
might  cause  much  trouble.  The  wisest  measures  are  seldom 
taken  by  large  bodies,  which  agree  on  the  course  to  be  taken 
only  with  great  difficulty/  ...  It  would  be  much  better  to 
raise  the  standard  of  wealth  required  of  each  Director."  2  De- 
spite the  great  influence  of  Villeroy  at  Lyons,  his  criticism  had 
no  immediate  effect.  The  Controleur  General  sent  Letters 
Patent  for  the  increase  in  the  number  of  Directors,  and  some 
attempt  was  apparently  made  to  organize  the  work  on  this  basis. 
The  failure  was  complete.  October  20,  Montgivraut  writes: 
"  your  letters  on  the  augmentation  of  the  Directors  of  the 
Abondance  were  received  three  weeks  ago,  but  nothing  has  been 
done.  For  I  do  not  consider  that  anything  is  accomplished 
by  the  mere  appointment  of  from  twelve  to  fourteen  men, 
who  not  only  have  not  been  set  to  work,  but  who  have  not  even 
been  informed  of  their  appointment.  There  is  not  a  sou  in 
the  chests  of  the  Abondance,  and  200,000  francs  are  still  due  on 
the  subscription  made  four  months  ago.  There  is  no  thought 
of  procuring  new  loans.  I  am  convinced  that  the  lack  of  funds 
prevents  any  active  buying;  nothing  is  being  done."3  The 
failure  of  these  attempts  led  to  new  projects  for  reform  of  the 
Abondance,  and  gradually  the  wisdom  of  Villeroy's  suggestions 
became  clear.  The  discussion  was  lengthy,  and  week  after 
week  passed  without  any  hope  of  seeing  the  Abondance  in 

1  G7.     1631.    Lyon,  19  Sept.  1693.     Montgivraut. 

2  G7.     1631.     Du  camp  de  Carniere,  15  Oct.  1693.     Villeroy,  Gouverneur  de 
Lyonnais. 

8  G7.     1631.    Lyon,  20  Oct.  1693.     Montgivraut. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D' ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  173 

condition  to  undertake  any  active  work.  The  •  possibility 
of  dearth  was  constantly  haunting  the  Consuls,  and  they  began 
an  energetic  canvass  of  Languedoc  and  Provence.  Unfor- 
tunately, the  deputy  who  was  sent  to  make  the  purchases  for 
the  Consuls  proved  to  be  more  active  than  discreet.  All  the 
worst  features  of  municipal  interference  were  emphasized,  and 
his  conduct  exerted  a  marked  influence  upon  the  attitude  of  the 
Lyonese  to  the  Chambre  d'Abondance.  Public  opinion  which 
had  been  favorable  became  more  or  less  hostile,  and  there  was 
much  severe  criticism  of  all  interference  with  the  grain  trade. 

In  previous  attempts  to  supplement  the  purchases  made  by 
merchants,  the  Consuls  and  the  Abondance  had  always  endeav- 
ored not  to  interfere  with  the  merchants.  All  the  early  regle- 
ments  of  the  Abondance  had  required  the  directors  to  purchase 
grain  only  in  those  regions  not  frequented  by  merchants.  Every- 
thing was  done  to  assist  and  stimulate  private  endeavor.  In 
1693,  the  Consulate  gave  every  one  the  impression  that  it  was 
seeking  to  drive  the  private  merchants  out  of  business.  Whether 
this  was  the  result  of  Chaiz's  indiscretion  or  whether  the  Consuls 
really  had  designs  against  the  merchants,  we  cannot  now  be 
certain;  but  the  conduct  of  Chaiz  on  the  lower  river  is  not 
involved  in  any  obscurity.  Complaints  of  his  arbitrary  action 
appear  in  September,  and  continue  in  increasing  volume  for  the 
next  two  months. 

A  merchant  of  Lyons  writes,  16  September:  "  I  have  just 
received  letters  which  declare  that  Sr.  Chaiz  pretends  to  have 
orders  giving  him  exclusive  right  to  purchase  gram.  This 
has  caused  us  to  stop  buying.  He  has  forbidden  the  boatmen 
under  pain  of  imprisonment  to  ship  gram,  for  anyone  besides 
himself,  and  this  has  intimidated  the  boatmen.  Those  who  had 
started  up  river  with  our  gram  have  stopped  on  the  way,  unwill- 
ing to  proceed,  and  others  refuse  to  handle  our  grain  at  all."  1  A 
month  later,  Berulle,  the  Intendant  at  Lyons,  reports  a  mass 
of  rumors  and  suspicions.  "  Chaiz  not  only  prevents  the 
merchants  from  continuing  their  purchases  but  even  forces 

1  G7.  1631.  Lyon,  16  Sept.  1693.  Jourdan  de  Grousse,  Marchand  a  Lyon, 
au  C.  G. 


174         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

them  to  agree  to  make  none  in  the  future.  To  compel  them 
to  obey,  he  prevents  them  from  shipping  the  grain  already 
purchased,  and  obliges  them  to  turn  it  over  to  him  at  the  cost 
price.  This  conduct  estranges  the  merchants  so  completely 
that  I  fear  we  shall  be  without  grain.  I  remonstrate  daily 
with  the  Provost  of  Merchants.  ...  It  is  more  than  a  month 
since  any  grain  has  arrived  at  Lyons.  The  conduct  of  Chaiz 
and  of  the  Consulate  is  particularly  suspicious.  Chaiz  has 
gone  to  Baville  and  to  Lebret  (Intendants  of  Languedoc  and 
Provence)  and  has  told  them  that  it  is  your  (i.  e.  the  Controleur 
General's)  desire  that  the  merchants  should  buy  no  more  grain, 
and  that  the  grain  belonging  to  the  town  should  alone  be  shipped. 
I  have  written  them  to  the  contrary,  but  everything  at  Aries 
is  held  up,  and  Baville  holds  four  large  boats  at  Pont-Saint- 
Esprit,  so  that  nothing  comes  through  to  Lyons.  It  would 
be  well  for  you  to  write.  Although  you  have  ordered  the  Con- 
sulate to  do  nothing  without  informing  me,  they  let  me  know 
nothing  of  what  is  going  on,  as  they  do  not  wish  to  have  anyone 
spying  around  or  contradicting  them.  Their  only  thought 
is  to  make  profits.  If  the  Echevins  prevent  the  merchants  from 
loading  grain,  it  is  simply  to  harass  and  discourage  them,  so  as 
to  induce  them  to  turn  over  their  grain  to  Chaiz  at  a  low  price. 
The  Echevins  find  it  very  agreeable  to  sell  for  40"  what  cost 
them  only  30  .  I  should  not  worry  over  their  profits,  if  I  did 
not  feel  that  their  treatment  of  the  merchants  would  infallibly 
result  in  a  scarcity."  1 

The  complaints  finally  had  some  effect.  November  7,  the 
Provost  of  Merchants,  Du  Lieu,  says  that  he  will  recall  Chaiz, 
and  that  he  has  already  urged  him  to  encourage  the  merchants.2 
But  it  is  difficult  to  be  sure  of  the  effect  of  the  letter  referred  to. 
The  exhortation  to  Chaiz  to  encourage  the  merchants  apparently 
reached  him  about  the  i8th,  and  this  is  doubtless  the  letter 
to  which  the  factor  of  Saladin  and  Jourdan  refers:  "  I  gave 
Chaiz  the  last  letter  of  the  Provost  of  Merchants,"  he  says. 
"  Chaiz  flew  into  a  rage,  saying  that  he  would  rather  be  recalled 

1  G7.     1631.     Lyon,  (24)  27  Oct.  1693.     Bemlle  au  C.  G. 

2  G7.     1631.    Lyon,  7  Nov.  1693.     Du  Lieu. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D' ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  175 

than  do  anything  contrary  to  his  duty.  He  gave  a  list  of  all 
his  purchases  to  Lebret,  who  gave  him  permission  to  ship. 
Chaiz  said  that  he  could  not  sincerely  include  our  purchases 
in  the  list  as  they  were  not  bought  on  the  account  of  the  city, 
and  as  they  were  to  be  sold  to  the  bourgeois  at  high  prices.  .  .  . 
You  (  i.  e.  his  principals)  must  try  to  get  letters  from  the  Inten- 
dant, if  you  expect  to  ship  any  grain  from  these  provinces  .  .  . 
for  the  Intendant  does  not  wish  to  permit  the  export  of  any 
grain  except  by  Chaiz,  the  deputy  from  Lyons.  If  Chaiz  had 
only  wished  to  help  us,  he  need  only  have  said  that  our  grain 
was  for  Lyons,  and  the  Subdelegue  would  have  made  no  trouble. 
But  Chaiz  insists  on  interfering.  He  has  told  the  Intendant 
that  we  merchants  must  sell  to  him,  and  that  he  alone  was  to 
ship.  .  .  .'M  Towards  the  end  of  November,  Chaiz  was  re- 
called,2 and  the  complaints  of  the  merchants  on  the  Lower 
Rhone  were  less  numerous. 

The  hostility  to  the  merchants  was  doubly  serious,  for  the  mer- 
chants were  buying  quite  as  actively  as  the  Consuls.  An  esti- 
mate, drawn  up  November  24,  represents  the  purchases  of  the 
Consuls  and  the  merchants  as  about  equal.3  The  discourage- 
ment of  the  merchants  was  thus  a  serious  indiscretion  on  the 
part  of  the  Consuls,  and  the  incident  doubtless  explains  much 
of  the  opposition  to  municipal  interference  that  comes  to  the 
surface  in  connection  with  the  reorganization  of  the  Abondance 

1  G7.     1631.    Tarascon,  18  Nov.  1693.     Meinard  a  MM.  Saladin  et  Jourdan. 

2  G7.     1631.    Lyon,  28  Nov.  1693.     Du  Lieu. 

3  G7.     1631.    Lyon,  24  Nov.  1693. 

For  the  Consulate  For  the  Merchants 

In  Granary     2000  anees.  Saladin  &  Jourdan   ....  10,000  ane*es 

At  the  Abondance     2550    "  Guignier 4000 

En  Route   2500    "  Chapeyron 3000 

Ready  for  shipment  in  Galdy     3000 

Languedoc  and  Provence  11,600     "  Rollin   3000 

Others 3000 

Ordered  at  Genoa   .  8000    "  


26,000 


26,650    ' 

See  also  a  memoir  of  10  Dec.  1693  (also  G7.  1631).  Estimates  of  arrivals  from 
10  Juillet-io  Dec.  1693:  14,460  anees  for  the  Consulate,  and  15,809  anees  for 
the  Merchants. 


176         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

in  January,  1694,  while  all  the  details  were  fresh  in  people's 
minds.  One  of  the  privileges  to  be  given  the  Abondance  was 
preference  in  the  use  of  all  means  of  transportation.  This 
awoke  vivid  memories  of  the  troubles  of  November,  1693, 
and  Villeroy  protested:  "  I  will  say  frankly  that  I  do  not  approve 
of  that  article.  The  preference  in  the  right  to  use  boats  will 
be  a  serious  blow  to  commerce,  which  is  already  sufficiently 
disturbed.  I  will  even  say  that  in  my  opinion  the  only  way  to 
procure  an  abundance  of  grain  is  to  allow  private  persons  com- 
plete freedom  to  bring  grain  to  Lyons.  The  Chambre  d'Abon- 
dance  by  its  care  and  industry  may  assure  lower  prices,  and 
properly  speaking  that  is  its  function,  but  I  am  persuaded  that 
a  commercial  town  like  Lyons  should  not  limit  the  freedom  of 
individuals."  1  Berulle,  the  Intendant,  denies  that  the  Abon- 
dance is  of  any  utility.  "  The  trade  should  properly  be  left 
to  the  merchants,  and  to  them  alone.  That  is  a  principle  in 
which  I  firmly  believe.  To  them  alone  does  Lyons  owe  its  food 
supply,  and  not  in  the  least  to  the  Chambre  d'Abondance.  .  .  . 
We  should  not  begrudge  the  merchants  their  gain."  2  At  no 
previous  time  do  we  find  such  vigorous  expressions  of  hostility 
to  the  Abondance.  It  is  due  in  part  to  a  real  change  in  the  rela- 
tion of  the  Abondance  to  the  merchants,  in  part  it  is  a  reflection 
of  the  antagonisms  aroused  by  Chaiz  in  November,  1693.  On 
the  whole,  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  the  distrust  of  the  Abon- 
dance in  January,  1694,  was  largely  due  to  the  indiscretions  of 
Chaiz.  The  proposed  reform  evoked  opposition,  indeed,  but 
the  Chambre  was  reorganized  and  worked  steadily  until  1713,  - 
nearly  twenty  years.  In  1699,  Villeroy  commended  the  directors 
for  their  public  spirit  and  for  their  services  to  the  city.  In 
short,  everything  points  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Lyonese 
still  believed  that  the  Abondance  was  necessary.  They  still 
hoped  that  it  would  prevent- extraordinarily  high  prices  and  secure 
the  city  against  serious  dearth.  The  merchants  were  certainly 
no  longer  in  need  of  encouragement;  no  new  sources  of  supply 
remained  to  be  developed  or  emphasized;  the  merchants  were 

1  Boislisle,  op.  cit.y  I,  350,  1273.     14,  17,  22-26  Jan.  1694.     Villeroy  au  C.  G. 

2  Ibid.,  I,  350,  1273.     23  Mai  1694.     Berulle. 


THE  CHAMBRE  D'ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS 

quite  ready  to  trade  either  in  Burgundy  or  LanguedoC;  the 
most  notable  reasons  for  the  creation  of  an  Abondance  no  longer 
existed.  What,  then,  was  the  Abondance  supposed  to  do  ? 

The  new  regulations  for  the  organization  of  the  Chambre 
throw  some  light  upon  this  question.  They  present  a  marked 
contrast  to  the  provisions  of  1643.  In  the  plan  of  1694,  there 
is  no  long  article  providing  that  the  directors  shall  make 
all  purchases  in  provinces  seldom  frequented  by  the  merchants. 
Emphasis  is  placed  on  the  mode  of  procuring  funds.  "  Each  one 
of  the  (ten)  directors  shall  place  10,000 u  in  the  Chest  of  the 
Abondance.  He  shall  receive  interest  at  6%."  1  This  was  an 
innovation  only  in  part  as  the  directors  had  previously  been 
required  to  contribute  something,  though  no  stated  sum  was 
mentioned.  The  next  two  articles  are  more  novel  and  more 
significant.  "The  Consulate  shall  place  a  fund  of  120,000  u 
at  the  disposition  of  the  Treasurer  of  the  Abondance,  and  the 
Consuls  shall  not  claim  interest  or  restitution  of  the  principal 
under  any  pretext  whatsoever.  This  sum  is  to  serve  as  capital 
and  as  gage  of  surety  for  the  reimbursement  of  the  sums  fur- 
nished by  the  Directors  and  of  the  sums  borrowed  by  them  of 
individuals.  ...  At  all  tunes  there  shall  be  at  least  10,000 
anees  in  the  granaries  of  the  Abondance,  and  the  grain  shall  be 
sold  each  year  and  replaced."  "  If  the  advances  of  the  Con- 
sulate are  consumed  by  the  payment  of  interest  and  by  losses, 
it  shall  make  additional  advances."  There  was  provision  for 
the  repayment  of  the  Consulate  if  the  gains  of  the  trade  enabled 
the  directors  to  dispense  with  the  loan  made  by  the  Consuls. 
This  article,  however,  was  evidently  inserted  to  cover  a  con- 
tingency that  was  not  regarded  as  at  all  probable.  One  other 
article  shoulcj  be  noted:  "The  Directors  shall  not  engage  in 
the  grain  trade  on  their  own  account,  directly  or  indirectly, 
during  their  tenure  of  office." 

The  Abondance  was  thus  to  have  a  minimum  capital  of  220,- 
ooo11,  increased  by  possible  private  loans;  but  interest  was  to 

1  My  notes  are  from  the  copy  at  the  Arch.  Nat.  G7.  1633.  Other  copies  may 
be  found  at  Lyons,  Chappe  IV,  450,  15  and  in  the  Serie  BB.  under  the  date  9  Jan. 
1694. 


1 78  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

be  paid  only  on  half  of  this  capital.  The  120,000"  advanced 
by  the  Consuls  was  to  be  regarded  as  irrevocably  spent.  In 
short,  the  Abondance  was  not  expected  to  be  a  financial  success. 
Losses  were  anticipated.  They  were  indeed  an  inevitable 
feature  of  the  Abondance  as  it  was  conceived  in  1694.  It  was 
to  do  two  things:  it  was  regularly  to  hold  grain  through  the 
season;  it  was  to  take  special  measures  in  time  of  dearth  in 
order  to  keep  prices  low.  Sales  of  grain  at  cost,  or  even  below 
cost,  were  certainly  regarded  by  the  Abondance  as  one  of  its 
distinctive  functions.  Both  of  these  duties  almost  necessarily 
involved  a  loss.  The  grain  in  store  not  only  resulted  in  a  con- 
stant expense  for  housing  and  for  interest  charges,  but  it  must 
needs  be  held  until  the  end  of  the  season  and  it  must  generally 
be  sold  for  less  than  it  cost.  The  directors  were  not  usually 
allowed  to  market  at  favorable  moments ;  only  in  time  of  dearth 
might  the  granary  be  drawn  down  below  the  10,000  anees  pre- 
scribed. The  losses  likely  to  result  in  time  of  dearth  are  easily 
understood.  The  directors  would  begin  to  buy  in  large  quantities 
only  when  prices  had  begun  to  rise;  they  would  be  obliged  to 
continue  to  buy  until  prices  at  Lyons  were  reduced  to  a  sat- 
isfact^ry  figure. 

These  features  of  the  policy  of  the  Abondance  in  time  of  dearth 
appear  clearly  in  1698-99.  The  prohibitions  of  Ferrand,  Inten- 
dant  of  Burgundy,  issued  on  October  14,  and  the  letter  of  the 
Controleur  General,  showed  the  directors  that  no  reliance 
could  be  placed  upon  Burgundy.  Ferrand  had  even  declared 
positively  that  he  could  not  permit  the  export  of  more  than 
9500  anees,  which  would  enable  Lyons  to  wait  for  grain  from  the 
lower  river. 

"  The  Chambre  held  a  consultation  immediately,  and  sent 
commissioners  in  all  directions  to  buy  and  ship  grain  with  all 
possible  expedition.  The  high  prices  caused  by  Ferrand's  pro- 
hibitions in  no  wise  deterred  the  Abondance.  Of  the  9500  anees 
to  be  exported  from  Burgundy,  the  Abondance  took  licenses 
for  3500  anees  and  distributed  the  rest  among  the  charities  of 
the  town  and  the  merchants.  .  .  .  We  distributed  to  the  bakers 
of  the  town  the  2000  anees  of  grain  which  came  from  Burgundy, 


THE  CHAMBRE  D' ABONDANCE  AT  LYONS  179 

fixing  the  price  at  36  u.  ...  It  was  deemed  expedient  not 
to  make  the  price  lower,  in  order  not  to  discourage  the  mer- 
chants; and  this  much  more  than  fear  of  loss  forced  us  to  maintain 
this  policy.  We  were  not  sure  that  we  could  do  without  their 
aid.  The  fear  of  ice  and  the  closing  of  the  river  made  us  anxious, 
and  we  realized  that  the  individual  merchant  is  more  industrious 
than  a  whole  company."  1 

The  Abondance  clearly  considered  itself  bound  to  furnish 
Lyons  with  grain  at  less  than  the  market  price.  There  was  a 
constant  feeling  that  the  high  prices  of  seasons  of  dearth  were 
in  a  sense  iniquitous  and  that  prices  must  be  brought  down. 
This  could  be  done  only  by  sales  at  less  than  ordinary  mercantile 
rates.  It  is  difficult  not  to  feel  that  the  desire  for  low  prices 
in  time  of  dearth  was  unreasonable,  and  that  the  Abondance 
is  from  this  time  on  endeavoring  to  procure  a  more  abundant 
supply  than  could  have  been  secured  if  all  the  trade  were  to 
yield  a  profit.  Here  we  find  the  influence  of  the  location  of 
the  city  important.  The  possibilities  of  procuring  food  stuffs 
were  limited.  Lyons  was  never  destined  to  become  a  great 
metropolitan  center,  but  at  the  close  of  the  seventeenth  century 
the  aspirations  of  the  Lyonese  were  extensive.  At  that  time 
the  city  was  certainly  of  first-class  importance,  and  the  Lyonese 
were  anxious  for  the  future  of  their  city.  It  is  perhaps  not  too 
much  to  see  in  this  last  phase  of  the  Abondance  an  indication 
of  the  pressure  which  was  destined  to  limit  the  growth  of  the 
city.  The  population  of  Lyons  was  tending  to  increase  more 
rapidly  than  the  available  food  supply  would  warrant.  The 
endeavor  to  procure  grain  at  less  than  the  commercial  rate 
was  a  natural  outcome  of  this  pressure.  But  the  efforts  were 
doomed  to  failure,  and  in  the  course  of  the  eighteenth  century 
the  Abondance  gradually  declined,  almost  in  the  same  measure 
as  the  commercial  prestige  of  the  city.  As  Lyons  sank  into  its 
natural  position,  the  effort  to  procure  grain  below  cost  was 
abandoned. 

1  G7.     358.     Lyon,  25  Juillet  1699.     Le  PrSvot  des  Marchands  a  Villeroy. 


/ 
\ 


CHAPTER  IV 

LYONESE  MERCHANTS  AND  DEARTH  IN  THE  PRODUCING 

REGIONS 

THE  history  of  the  grain  trade  in  the  Rhone  Basin  presents 
two  relatively  distinct  problems.  The  more  prominent  is  the 
creation  of  a  supply  area  for  Lyons.  This  required  municipal 
encouragement,  and  even  when  the  private  trade  had  reached 
a  high  degree  of  development  the  citizens  still  felt  that  municipal 
purchases  were  necessary  to  assure  reasonable  prices.  The 
other  problem  in  the  Rhone  Basin  attracts  less  attention  but 
it  is  quite  as  important  and  throws  more  light  upon  the  character 
of  medieval  trade  and  methods  of  marketing.  There  was  a 
constant  tendency  to  subject  the  producing  regions  to  excessive 
withdrawals  of  grain,  so  that  there  was  at  times  a  serious  dearth 
in  the  rural  districts.  .  In  time  of  scarcity,  the  cities,  with  their 
free  capital  and  wealthy  bourgeois,  could  generally  secure  all 
the  grain  they  needed.  The  poverty  of  the  rural  sections 
rendered  much  of  the  rural  demand  ineffective.  The  grain 
flowed  towards  the  towns,  and  if  any  region  suffered  it  was  the 
country. 

This  seeming  paradox  is  the  fundamental  fact  in  the  relation 
between  town  and  country.  The  commercial  power  of  the  town 
gave  it  an  advantage  that  was  decisive  in  seasons  of  dearth. 
The  mechanism  for  supplying  the  city  developed  faster  than 
the  mechanism  for  protecting  the  country  against  the  aggres- 
siveness of  the  merchants.  This  was  true  both  in  the  Seine 
Basin  and  in  the  Rhone  Basin,  but  the  difference  in  conditions 
rendered  this  feature  of  the  trade  less  harmful  in  the  Seine 
Basin  than  in  Eastern  France.  The  abundance  of  supply  in 
most  of  the  regions  tributary  to  Paris,  combined  with  the  number 
of  sources  which  might  be  utilized,  prevented  this  pressure  upon 
the  country  from  becoming  an  actual  menace  to  the  welfare  of  the 
region.  The  dread  of  this  contingency  was,  however,  perennial. 

180 


DEARTH  IN  THE  PRODUCING  REGIONS  l8l 

In  Champagne  it  recurs  again  and  again,  particularly  in  the 
regions  on  the  frontier.  From  Soissonnais  we  receive  graphic 
accounts  of  the  impending  peril.  On  the  Upper  Seine  there  are 
frequent  complaints,  especially  from  Troyes.  But  the  danger 
is  always  forestalled.  The  anticipation  is  so  lively,  the  means 
of  relief  so  close  at  hand,  that  the  ominous  forebodings  are  never 
realized.  In  the  Rhone  Basin,  the  possibility  becomes  an 
actuality.  The  narrow  limitations  of  supply,  the  difficulty 
of  resorting  to  other  sources,  or  of  shifting  the  burden  of  trade 
from  one  locality  to  another,  made  the  pressure  of  dearth  felt 
in  every  section  of  the  Rhone  Basin  whenever  the  crops  failed 
to  yield  the  average  return.  In  the  Seine  Basin  the  rural  dis- 
tricts suffered  little  from  the  lack  of  highly  organized  market 
machinery.  In  Eastern  France,  the  country  was  in  great  need 
of  protection  from  the  excessive  exports  that  might  be  made  by 
the  Lyonese  merchants. 

The  source  of  all  trouble  was  the  inexact  determination  of  the 
surplus  above  local  needs.  Both  Burgundy  and  the  Lower 
Rhone  had  a  surplus,  and  if  exports  could  be  confined  to  this 
there  would  be  no  trouble,  but  the  wholesale  markets  could  not 
be  forced  to  limit  their  purchases  to  the  actual  surplus.  The 
crudity  of  market  organization  made  it  impossible  to  obtain 
any  accurate  information  of  the  abundance  of  the  harvest,  of 
the  amount  of  exports,  or  of  the  grain  in  the  hands  of  the  whole- 
sale merchants  but  still  in  the  province.  Absence  of  reliable 
information  on  these  fundamental  points  would  have  rendered 
current  prices  valueless,  even  if  no  other  factors  were  involved. 
In  addition  to  the  ignorance  of  these  conditions,  we  must  bear 
in  mind  the  influence  of  the  modes  of  marketing.  In  the  Rhone 
Basin,  there  were  no  true  wholesale  markets.  The  trade  was 
not  concentrated,  except  for  shipment.  There  was  little  active 
competition  among  the  wholesale  merchants.  They  bought 
directly  in  the  country,  as  far  as  possible,  and  did  their  best 
to  avoid  competition.  Such  competition  as  appears  was  in- 
tensely personal  and  not  wide  enough  in  scope  to  be  properly 
effective.  The  wholesale  supply  was  thus  so  invisible  that  the 
current  prices  did  not  represent  the  interplay  of  all  the  factors 


1 82         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

in  the  grain  trade.  This  characteristic  of  current  prices  is  most 
strikingly  exemplified  in  connection  with  the  relation  between 
the  local  demand  and  the  wholesale  trade.  These  two  demands 
upon  the  supplies  of  the  producing  regions  were  never  formally 
pitted  against  each  other.  Wholesale  merchants  at  times  came 
into  competition  with  the  bourgeois  of  a  particular  town,  but 
there  was  no  general  attempt  to  estimate  the  local  demand  of 
the  whole  producing  region,  nor  any  attempt  to  secure  a  com- 
prehensive representation  of  the  Lyonese  demands. 

The  inadequacy  of  prices  as  a  basis  for  the  distribution  of 
commodities  is  the  most  fundamental  characteristic  of  the 
medieval  market  system.  In  some  form,  these  general  facts 
can  be  perceived  throughout  the  history  of  the  grain  trade, 
without  any  important  limitation  as  to  time  or  place.  It  is 
the  most  wide-spread  of  all  phenomena.  But  in  most  places 
the  general  principle  is  suggested  only  by  a  few  brief  remarks, 
or  by  indications  so  scattered  that  effective  presentation  is 
impossible.  Three  incidents,  however,  in  the  history  of  the 
trade  in  the  Rhone  Valley  in  1693  and  1709  exhibit  clearly  what 
is  elsewhere  obscure,  but  everywhere  of  capital  importance. 
These  three  episodes  thus  deserve  attentive  consideration  not 
only  because  they  are  intrinsically  interesting,  but  also  because 
they  afford  an  opportunity  of  appreciating  fully  the  nature 
of  the  curiously  tangled  web  of  inter-market  relations  that 
prevailed  throughout  the  medieval  period  and  well  into  the 
eighteenth  century. 

I 

Languedoc  and  Provence  in  1693 

After  the  harvest  of  1693,  the  merchants  and  the  Consuls 
of  Lyons  took  measures  to  secure  grain  in  Languedoc  and  Pro- 
vence, as  it  was  soon  perceived  that  the  crop  in  Burgundy 
was  not  so  large  as  usual.  Private  merchants  had  been  buying 
in  the  south  before  the  harvest  in  May  and  June,  but  heavy 
losses  on  some  of  their  shipments  had  discouraged  them.1  They 
hesitated  at  first  to  undertake  new  ventures,  but  the  realization 

1  G7.     1631.     Lyon,  6  Juin  1693.     B6rulle  au  C.  G. 


DEARTH  IN  THE  PRODUCING  REGIONS  183 

of  conditions  in  Burgundy  roused  them  to  activity  and  they  were 
soon  buying  eagerly  at  Narbonne,  Aries,  Tarascon  and  in  the 
other  entrepots  of  the  southern  provinces.  In  September, 
the  merchants  were  well  under  way  with  their  new  purchases, 
equipped  with  licenses  from  Berulle,  the  Intendant  at  Lyons, 
to  authorize  their  exports  from  Languedoc  despite  the  prohibi- 
tions.1 The  granting  of  licenses  continued  throughout  Sep- 
tember and  October  in  ever  increasing  volume.2  At  the  end 
of  October,  one  of  the  agents  charged  with  buying  provisions 
for  the  army  writes  that  he  can  do  nothing  in  Languedoc  and 
Provence  on  account  of  the  merchants  of  Lyons  who  are  buying 
everywhere  and  monopolizing  all  existing  means  of  transporta- 
tion.3 In  Provence  especially,  the  activity  of  the  Lyonese  was 
notable.  Chaiz  was  buying  for  the  municipality,  making  enemies 
of  all  the  private  merchants  by  his  efforts  to  prevent  the  ship- 
ment of  their  grain  and  to  secure  their  purchases  at  a  discount. 

This  feverish  excitement  on  the  part  of  the  Lyonese  caused 
much  apprehension.  Early  in  October,  Baville,  the  Intendant 
in  Languedoc,  ordered  a  domiciliary  visitation  to  determine 
the  quantity  of  grain  available  in  the  province  and  the  popula- 
tion to  be  supplied.4  The  results  were  anything  but  encouraging. 
A  population  of  1,553,271  persons  was  reported.  Nimes,  Agde, 
Beziers,  Narbonne,  Carcassonne,  Saint-Papoul,  and  Mirepoix 
had  a  surplus  of  410,524  quintals,  above  what  was  needed  for 
their  own  consumption.  These  towns,  however,  were  the 
principal  shipping  points  in  the  province  and  elsewhere  there 
was  less  than  was  needed  to  maintain  the  population  to  the 
next  harvest.  This  deficiency  was  estimated  at  1,741,918 
quintals,  very  considerably  in  excess  of  the  small  surplus  of  the 
shipping  points.  Besides  these  statistics  the  commissioners 
made  various  observations  in  the  text  of  their  report.  Of  the 
dioceses  of  Uzes  and  Mende,  they  say:  "  The  merchants  of 

1  G7.     1631.     Lyon,  17  Sept.  1693.     Berulle. 

2  G7.     1631.     Estat  des  Passeports  donnez  pour  les  Bleds  de  Lyon,  15  Sept.- 
10  Oct.  1693.     The  diversity  of  measures  makes  the  calculation  of  totals  more 
burdensome  than  is  worth  while. 

3  G7.     1632.     Paris,  30  Oct.  1693.     Signature  illegible. 

4  G7.     1631.     Narbonne,  5  Oct.  1693.     Le  Franc  de  la  Grange. 


1 84  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

Lyons  have  carried  off  more  than  20,000  quintals  from  the 
diocese  of  Uzes  alone,  and,  although  the  diocese  suffers,  it  will 
be  able  to  get  along  with  the  chestnuts  which  are  gathered  there. 
But  the  situation  is  different  in  Mende.  The  supplies  there 
will  last  only  till  April. 

"  Only  in  one  part  of  Vivarais  was  the  harvest  tolerably  good. 
In  the  rest  of  the  diocese  it  was  utterly  inadequate.  But  there 
was  a  good  crop  of  chestnuts,  and  as  M.  de  Baville  took  care  to 
prevent  exports,  and  some  grain  was  sent  up  from  Nimes,  and 
Upper  Languedoc,  it  is  hoped  that  the  diocese  will  be  able  to 
subsist. 

"  The  dioceses  of  Lodeve  and  Saint-Pons  scarcely  ever  pro- 
duce enough  grain  for  the  maintenance  of  their  inhabitants, 
who  seek  markets  in  the  provinces  of  Narbonne  and  Beziers, 
where  there  is  ordinarily  enough  to  supply  their  wants. 

"  Castres,  Lavaur,  Alby,  and  Montauban  have  not  witnessed 
so  poor  a  harvest  in  many  years.  Some  assistance  can  be  sent 
from  Saint-Papoul  and  from  Carcassonne,  but  it  can  hardly 
be  commensurate  with  their  needs.  .  .  ."  l 

Two  months  later,  Baville  writes  from  Narbonne:  "  so  large 
a  number  of  poor  come  from  Rouergue  and  Auvergne,  singly 
and  in  families,  that  it  is  scarcely  possible  to  provide  for  them. 
Their  faces  show  that  they  abandon  their  homes  rather  on  ac- 
count of  extreme  misery  than  from  any  spirit  of  disorder  and 
brigandage.  The  misery  is  greatest  in  the  dioceses  of  Saint- 
Pons,  Alby,  Castres,  and  Mende.  There  is  no  grain,  no  money, 
and  the  dioceses  have  no  credit.'7  2 

In  Languedoc,  then,  the  Lyonese  merchants  succeeded,  during 
the  fall,  in  depleting  the  reserves  at  the  shipping  points  which 
otherwise  would  have  served  for  the  maintenance  of  the  dioceses 
which  had  lacked.  These  dioceses,  however,  stood  in  no  different 
relation  to  the  markets  in  the  shipping  points,  than  Lyons. 
Consequently,  the  first  merchants  to  arrive  could  purchase 
the  available  grain.  The  Lyonese  were  sure  to  arrive  first, 

1  G7.  1631.  Proces  Verbaux  sur  la  Recherche  des  Grains  dans  Languedoc, 
1693. 

*  G7.     1631.    Narbonne,  5  Dec.  1693.    Baville. 


DEARTH  IN  THE  PRODUCING  REGIONS  185 

as  the  dioceses  nearby  could  maintain  themselves  for  a  short 
time  and  ordinarily  came  down  to  Narbonne  and  the  other 
coast  ports  only  in  the  spring  and  early  summer.  The  trade, 
if  left  to  itself,  would  inevitably  result  as  it  did  in  1693.  This 
exhaustion  of  the  province  was  the  logical  and  inevitable  result 
of  the  lack  of  organic  interdependence  between  the  various 
local  markets  of  the  province. 

In  Provence,  the  effect  of  the  Lyonese  purchases  was  less 
serious;  there  was  constant  apprehension,  but  the  province  was 
saved  by  relatively  good  crops  in  the  interior,  where  the  grain 
was  not  so  convenient  for  shipment  to  Lyons. 

Notwithstanding  considerable  imports  from  Languedoc,  Pro- 
vence, Burgundy,  and  Morocco,  Lyons  was  not  very  easily 
supplied.  In  the  latter  part  of  May,  1694,  Berulle  writes  that 
there  is  only  grain  enough  in  the  city  to  supply  its  wants  for 
four  days.  Large  shipments,  however,  were  on  their  way  up 
stream,  and  on  June  12,  the  markets  of  Lyons  were  filled  to 
overflowing.1 

II 

Burgundy  in  1709 

In  1709,  we  find  that  the  endeavor  to  supply  Lyons  affects 
both  Burgundy  and  Languedoc  seriously.  Unfortunately,  there 
is  no  one  in  Burgundy  so  completely  in  touch  with  every  detail 
as  Baville  in  Languedoc.  The  story  of  the  troubles  in  Bur- 
gundy does  not  come  to  us,  therefore,  with  his  clearness  of 
insight  and  masterly  knowledge,  but  if  we  read  between  the  lines, 
piecing  together  the  scattered  information  that  flows  in  from 
intendants,  mayors,  bishops,  and  private  individuals,  the  gen- 
eral outlines  of  the  narrative  may  be  perceived. 

Trouble  began  soon  after  the  harvest  of  1708.  The  first 
reports  came  in  from  Tranche  Comte  whence  mucn  grain  was 
generally  shipped  to  the  Saone  towns.  "  The  light  crop,"  writes 
an  official  of  Besangon,  "  has  obliged  us  to  employ  all  our  powers 
in  maintaining  supplies  in  the  public  markets.  But  we  have 
encountered  many  obstacles,  through  the  great  shipments  made 

1  G7.     1633.    Lyon,  23  Mai  1694.    B£fulle.    Lyon,  12  Juin  1694.    Bundle. 


1 86  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

by  Lyonese  merchants.  They  have  already  exported  40,000 
sacks,  and  the  shipments  continue  without  interruption  by  reason 
of  the  Order  in  Council  of  September  22,  which  permits  the 
transportation  of  grain  frpm  one  province  to  another.  .  .  . 
More  than  thirty  commission  merchants  have  come  from  Lyon- 
nais.  They  are  now  contracting  for  all  the  grain  in  the  prov- 
ince. Prices  have  doubled,  and  if  their  contracts  are  executed 
in  their  entirety,  we  shall  be  reduced  to  famine."  l 

A  merchant,  who  had  contracted  to  deliver  15,000  sacks  of 
wheat  at  Auxonne  for  the  army,  gives  a  more  general  account 
of  conditions  in  the  area  supplying  the  same  towns.  He  went 
up  into  Lorraine,  October  10,  and  was  much  surprised  to  find 
a  wide-spread  apprehension  of  dearth  of  grain.  "  The  bakers 
of  Nancy  were  scouring  the  countryside,,  for  six  and  seven  leagues 
around,  offering  6-7  livres  of  their  money  per  rezal.  .  .  . 
Such  as  had  any  grain  to  sell  had  closed  their  granaries  as  soon 
as  the  rumors  of  dearth  became  current.  The  panic  spread 
to  all  the  towns  and  villages  of  Lorraine,  especially  along  the 
frontier  of  Champagne  and  Franche  Comte,  where  there  are 
more  than  fifty  villages  whose  crops  were  completely  ruined 
by  the  hail.  The  inhabitants  have  assembled  in  bands  and  pre- 
vented the  shipment  of  grain  purchased  by  the  merchants  of 
Auxonne.  They  cut  the  sacks  and  handle  roughly  those  who 
are  sent  to  ship  the  grain."  z 

One  of  the  directors  of  the  Chambre  d'Abondance  also  de- 
scribes the  unusual  conditions  existing  in  Burgundy.  Writing 
from  Gray,  August  30,  he  says:  "  Yesterday  I  passed  the  day 
at  Maxilly  and  Talmay  where  there  are  great  entrepots  of  grain 
coming  from  Langres,  but  I  found  no  one  who  would  sell.  They 
say  they  have  none.  I  commissioned  Pettier  of  Auxonne  and 
Christianot  of  Maxilly  to  make  a  tour  of  Bassigny  in  secret, 
to  see  what  they  can  find.  However,  there  is  little  hope  of 

1  G7.     1644.     Besancon,  16  Nov.   1708.     Vicomte,  Mayeur.     Lieu.  Gen.,  et 
fichevins  de  B. 

2  G7.     1645.    Memoire  pr6sent6  par  Sebastien  Mar6chal  a  M.  de  St.  Contest 
concernant  le  traitte  de  15,000  sacs  de  froment,  qu'il  s'est  oblige  de  fournir  a 
Auxonne  dans  le  fin  de  Dec.  1708. 


DEARTH  IN  THE  PRODUCING  REGIONS  187 

getting  any  grain  from  the  section  before  All  Saints'.  All  we 
can  do  is  to  give  commissions  to  trusty  merchants  to  buy  what 
they  can  along  the  Saone  or  in  Tranche  Comte."  * 

Prohibitions  had  been  issued  by  the  Intendants  in  the  months 
of  July  and  August.  There  had  been  extensive  purchases  for 
the  army,  which  had  consumed  the  ordinary  reserves,  and  on  the 
crop  failure  their  apprehension  increased  almost  to  the  point  of 
panic.2  The  incident  furnishes  an  interesting  illustration  of  the 
inadequacy  of  the  market  system.  The  supplies  of  the  province 
were  already  seriously  depleted,  but  nevertheless  the  merchants 
were  no  less  eager  to  buy.  The  Intendant  Pinon  puts  the 
matter  very  tersely  in  his  letter  of  September  7.  'l  The  dearth 
which  you  fear  at  Lyons  is  already  present  in  this  province." 
But  Lyons  was  soon  reduced  to  desperate  straits.  Ravat  writes 
from  Lyons,  October  9:  "Including  what  we  have  received 
from  Burgundy,  we  have  only  5000  anees  of  grain.  We  need 
1400-1500  anees  per  week.  We  are  not  allowed  to  ship  freely 
from  Languedoc  and  Provence.  Lyonnais  and  Beaujolais 
have  no  grain,  and  are  on  the  verge  of  lacking  bread." 4  Despite 
the  seriousness  of  the  situation  at  Lyons,  the  cities  of  Burgundy 
were  no  better  off.  The  people  at  Dijon  were  on  the  point  of 
breaking  out  in  a  bread  riot,  and  the  officials  tried  to  calm  them 
by  renewing  the  old  prohibitions.5 

The  panic,  which  was  imminent  throughout  the  fall  and  winter 
of  1708-09,  finally  broke  out  in  the  spring.  The  officials  had 
arranged  for  limited  shipments  to  relieve  Lyons,  but  the  people 
took  the  law  into  their  own  hands.  Burgundy  became  a  scene 
of  violence  and  disorder  which  swept  away  the  last  vestige  of 
organized  trade. 

1  G7.     1645.     Gray,  30  Aout  1708.     Pen-in,  Direct.  d'Abondance  a  Ravat. 
Enclosed  by  Ravat  in  his  letter  of  7  September. 

2  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,  453,  20.     Memoire  pour  etre  envoye  a  M. 
d'Argenson.    Oct.  1708.    This  gives  a  brief  account  of  the  year  preceding  the 
date. 

3  G7.     1645.     Bourg  en  Bresse,  1708.     Pinon. 

4  G7.     1645.     Lyon,  9  Oct.,  7  Sept.  1708.     Ravat,  PreV.  des  Marchands. 

6  G7.  1641.  Dijon,  i  Dec.  1708.  Bouchu.  Prem.  Pres.  du  Parlement  de 
Bourgogne. 


1 88  THE  GRAIN   TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

"  The  fury  of  the  people  burst  all  bounds  when  they  learned 
of  the  ordinance  providing  for  the  passage  of  the  grain  of  Trem- 
ville,  destined  for  the  Abondance  of  Macon,  and  of  some  belong- 
ing to  private  merchants.  It  is  said  quite  openly  at  Pontaillier 
and  Auxonne  that  all  grain  will  be  stopped  without  distinction. 
The  orders  of  the  Intendant  are  disregarded.  At  Auxonne, 
the  town  guard  and  other  troops  were  called  out  to  stop  the  grain 
boats  coming  down  the  river.  At  Pontaillier,  the  grain  of  the 
Abondance  de  Lyon  was  seized  and  distributed  to  the  people 
at  a  set  price."  1  Similar  violence  was  directed  against  the  grain 
boats  at  Maxilly,  Mantouche,  and  Gray.2 

Around  Dijon,  the  dearth  had  become  actual  famine.  Com- 
missioners of  the  Parlement  of  Dijon  report,  April,  1709,  that 
"  the  peasants  in  the  greater  part  of  the  province  are  already 
reduced  to  living  on  the  bushes  and  herbs  growing  wild  in  the 
fields.  They  eat  horses  and  other  animals  that  have  died  of 
disease.  In  nearly  all  the  towns  and  villages,  the  people  are 
in  revolt  against  the  municipal  officers  and  threaten  to  burn 
and  kill  the  few  inhabitants  who  have  any  property.  In  many 
places  armed  bands  of  peasants  stop  the  convoys  of  grain  des- 
tined for  the  sustenance  of  the  towns."  3  Three  days  later, 
the  market  at  Dijon  was  so  scantily  furnished  (only  100  meas- 
ures) that  bread  could  hardly  be  had  of  the  bakers.  The 
President  of  the  Parlement  resolved  to  send  out  four  companies 
of  infantry  to  procure  grain.4 

Despite  all  this,  mark  the  attitude  of  the  Lyonese  merchants. 
"  Scarcely  was  the  edict  registered  prohibiting  the  assemblies 
designed  to  interfere  with  the  grain  trade,  than  the  merchants 
from  Lyons  came  in  great  numbers  to  Saint-Jean-de-Losne 
and  carried  off  all  the  grain.  This  may  be  the  occasion  of  a 
great  outburst  of  violence.  .  .  .  They  give  no  heed,  however. 
Several  villages  are  reduced  to  frightful  extremities;  the  inhabi- 

1  G7.     1645.     Auxonne,  31  Mars  1709.     Rude,  Voi tuner  des  B16s. 

2  G7.     1645.    Lyon,  9  Avril  1709.    Ravat. 

8  G7.  1641.  22  Avril  1709.  Rapport  des  Commissaires  du  Parlement  de 
Dijon. 

4  G7.     1641.    Dijon,  25  Avril  1709.    De  Migieu. 


DEARTH  IN  THE  PRODUCING  REGIONS  189 

tants  maintain  life  only  by  eating  boiled  herbs  and  roots.  Chil- 
dren of  four  or  five  years,  for  whom  the  mothers  have  no  bread, 
feed  in  the  fields  like  so  many  sheep."  l 

Langres,  in  the  center  of  the  main  source  of  supply,  was 
barely  able  to  maintain  itself  through  the  spring  months.  "  No 
longer  able  to  draw  any  grain  from  the  country,  the  bourgeois 
were  obliged  to  furnish  the  markets  and  support  the  people 
from  the  month  of  February  to  the  present  time  (July  i).  Their 
charity  and  zeal  for  the  public  welfare  have  compassed  so  much, 
that  although  they  ought  to  have  closed  their  granaries  to  inhabi- 
tants of  the  country  and  reserved  them  for  the  townspeople, 
nevertheless  they  have  continued  markets  for  the  country 
people  two  days  of  the  week.  Grain  is  furnished  only  to  those 
who  have  a  certificate  of  indigence  from  their  curate.  These 
markets  have  prevented  the  country  people  from  dying  of 
starvation,  but  they  have  drained  the  town  of  oats,  and  the 
wheat  is  nearly  consumed."  2 

Upper  Burgundy,  the  Saone  towns,  Dijon,  and  Langres 
were  pretty  well  drained.  The  situation  was  even  more  serious 
in  Lower  Burgundy,  Maconnais,  and  the  territory  around 
Chalons-sur-Saone.  Inadequately  supplied  by  the  vicinage, 
these  towns  generally  secured  some  assistance  from  Upper 
Burgundy,  but  the  Lyonese  trade  was  about  the  only  trade 
permitted  at  all  during  the  year  1708-09,  so  that  the  distress 
was  intense  along  the  river  between  Lyons  and  Upper  Burgundy. 
Curiously  enough,  the  officials  in  these  towns  were  under  the 
impression  that  Lyons  was  superabundantly  supplied.  "  We 
see  numbers  of  boats  pass,  carrying  grain  for  the  Abondance 
at  Lyons,"  writes  the  Bishop  of  Macon.  "  I  checked  a  crowd 
of  peasants  who  wished  to  stop  the  boats  and  buy  of  the  boat- 
men, but  I  cannot  promise  to  restrain  them  in  the  future.  I 
know  that  the  granaries  of  the  Abondance  at  Lyons  are  full  of 
grain,  and  it  is  trying  to  see  them  making  reserves  beyond  their 
needs,  when  we  are  in  actual  want.  .  .  .  The  peasants  flock 

1  G7.     1641.    Dijon,  4  Mai  1709.    Quarre",  Proc.  Gen.  au  Parlement  de  Dijon. 
8  G7.     1643.    Memoire  sur  1'etat  Present  de  la  Ville  de  Langres,  envoye"  i  Juillet 
1709.     Signe  par  M.  L'fiveque  et  tout  le  corps  de  la  Ville. 


190         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

into  town  in  crowds,  seeking  to  buy  grain.  Frequently  they 
are  obliged  to  return  without  any."  * 

The  other  side  of  the  story  appears  in  a  letter  of  Ravat,  the 
Provost  of  Merchants  at  Lyons:  "  In  Burgundy  and  along 
the  Lower  Rhone,  it  is  just  as  if  we  were  in  hostile  territory. 
Our  grain  is  violently  seized  without  any  formality.  The  boat- 
men are  attacked  by  armed  men,  who  threaten  to  kill  them  if 
they  offer  the  least  resistance."  "  The  needs  of  the  city  be- 
come daily  more  considerable,  by  reason  of  the  peasants  who 
flock  in  from  all  sides  under  the  pretext  of  bringing  a  little 
butter  or  garden  truck  for  sale.  They  eat  their  fill  of  bread 
and  carry  away  as  much  as  they  can  conceal  from  the  guards 
at  the  gates."  2  A  month  later,  —  "  We  have  put  everybody 
on  rations  of  a  pound  of  bread  per  diem,  and  to  make  the  bread- 
stuffs  last  longer  we  have  ordered  every  one  to  eat  black  bread. 
We  no  longer  separate  the  bran  from  the  flour."  3 

In  the  river  towns,  however,  the  distress  of  famine  was  in- 
creased by  the  lawlessness  and  brigandage  which  became  general 
in  April  and  May.  At  Auxonne,  a  crowd  assembled  about  a 
merchant,  whose  life  was  saved  only  by  a  squad  of  soldiers. 
Somewhat  later,  all  the  grain  merchants  of  Auxonne  left  the 
town  for  fear  of  being  assaulted.  The  most  graphic  accounts 
appear  in  the  letters  of  the  Bishop  of  Chalons.  He  has  a  some- 
what different  explanation  for  some  of  the  phases  of  the  distress, 
but  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  exact  information  is  such  that  it 
is  impossible  to  go  beyond  the  statements  made. 

"There  is  great  distress  in  this  province,"  he  writes  April  12, 
"  not  on  account  of  scarcity  of  grain,  however,  for  that  has 
existed  for  several  years.  The  source  of  trouble  is  the  avarice 
and  hardness  of  the  engrossers.  Perceiving  that  the  harvests 
were  light,  they  bought  up  nearly  all  the  grain,  and  guard  it 
like  so  many  dragons.  The  price  is  already  high,  and  will 
double  shortly,  if  the  cupidity  and  avarice  of  these  engrossers 
is  not  brought  within  bounds.  Practically  all  persons  of  means 

1  G7.     1641.     Macon,  5  Avril  1709.     fiveque  de  Macon. 
*  G7.     1645.    Lyon,  n  Avril  1709.     Ravat. 
8  G7.     1645.    Lyon,  25  Mai  1709.     Ravat. 


DEARTH  IN  THE  PRODUCING  REGIONS 

of  all  ranks  and  conditions  have  turned  grajn  merchants  within 
the  last  two  months  in  order  to  profit  by  the  distress  of  the 
people.  Under  pretext  of  not  allowing  the  shipment  of  the  grain 
in  the  villages,  the  peasants  have  taken  arms.  In  some  places, 
seditious  spirits  without  honor  or  property  have  placed  them- 
selves at  the  head  of  these  peasants,  and  lead  them  around, 
breaking  into  granaries  to  steal  and  pillage.  They  sell  on  the 
markets  what  they  have  stolen.  Others  infest  the  roads,  crying 
and  begging  for  bread,  often  demanding  it  with  threats  of 
violence.  Throughout  the  country  districts  there  is  no  security 
for  one's  purse  or  for  one's  life.  The  poverty  of  individuals 
is  such  that  they  cannot  sow  even  the  lesser  grains,  as  they  have 
none,  nor  any  money  to  buy.  The  miserly  engrossers  wish 
to  sell  at  seven  and  eight  livres  per  bushel  what  we  used  to  buy 
at  eight  or  ten  sous.  We  have  issued  an  ordinance  in  this  town 
requiring  all  the  lesser  grains  to  be  brought  to  market  within 
the  next  fortnight,  to  be  sold  at  a  reasonable  price.  .  .  . 

"  One  other  thing  that  does  much  to  increase  the  misery  is 
the  pretext  of  the  necessities  of  Lyons.  That  town  has  twice 
as  much  grain  as  it  can  use  for  several  years.  The  granaries 
of  the  Hospital  and  of  the  Abondance  are  full.  The  only  distress 
there  was  during  the  closing  of  the  Saone  to  navigation  by  the 
ice.  Since  then,  when  all  the  river  towns  were  resting  on  the 
assurance  that  they  had  an  abundance  of  grain  for  several  years, 
Lyons,  which  does  not  lack  people  who  seek  only  their  personal 
gain,  has  carried  off  all  the  grain  in  Bassigny,  on  the  frontier 
of  Lorraine,  and  in  Burgundy.  .  .  .  Meanwhile,  all  the  towns 
and  villages  of  Burgundy  suffer.  The  poor,  unable  to  secure 
grain  or  bread,  take  whatever  they  can  lay  their  hands  on.  The 
peasants  leave  their  villages,  and  crowd  into  the  towns,  which 
close  their  gates  in  order  not  to  increase  the  number  of  paupers. 

"  There  is  a  little  town  called  Seurre,  noted  for  the  rebellions 
in  the  wars  of  1640-50,  and  for  similar  disorders  in  1694.  The 
well-to-do  have  turned  t  pirattes  de  bled.'  They  scour  the 
country  for  four  or  five  leagues,  taking  everything  on  land  or 
on  the  rivers.  One  of  those  who  are  most  active  has  a  band  of 
100-120  men,  with  a  train  of  wagons.  They  break  into  the 


192         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

chateaux  where  there  is  grain,  and  carry  off  whatever  they  find 
on  the  rivers  Saone  and  Doubs.  All  is  carried  to  Seurre,  where 
they  have  more  than  15,000  bichets.  If  the  war  breaks  out 
in  the  provinces,  town  against  town,  and  the  peasants  all  in 
arms,  these  disorders  can  end  in  nothing  short  of  a  general  insur- 
rection." l 

"  There  is  no  grain  on  the  markets  of  the  towns.  The  towns 
that  wish  to  procure  supplies  from  outside  can  obtain  them  only 
by  means  of  escorts  of  100-200  men.  The  peasants  are  massed 
on  the  highways  to  prevent  the  shipment  of  grain  from  their 
villages,  and  the  strongest  carry  off  the  grain.  It  is  the  beginning 
of  a  Civil  War.  The  Intendant  has  ordered  that  all  grain 
shall  be  carried  to  market,  but  little  comes.  Yesterday  there 
were  only  eight  bushels  for  300-400  peasants  who  were  com- 
plaining of  the  famine.  The  inhabitants  of  Macon,  not  wishing 
to  take  the  risk  of  going  after  grain,  have  spread  hand  bills 
through  the  country  for  five  or  six  leagues  around  offering  to 
pay  100  francs  per  bichet.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  Lyonese 
have  carried  off  more  than  300,000  bichets  in  the  last  eight 
months,  they  are  still  scouring  the  country  around  the  Saone 
and  Doubs,  offering  25-30  ecus."  2 

"  At  Chauvort,  a  little  village  a  quarter  of  a  league  from 
Verdun,  and  three  from  Chalons,  there  was  a  young  man,  Jean 
Baptiste  Bret,  formerly  a  grain  merchant.  He  ruined  himself 
by  his  misconduct  and  is  now  trying  to  redeem  his  fortune 
at  the  expense  of  the  countryside.  He  has  taken  advantage 
of  the  general  misery,  to  practise  brigandage.  With  his  band 
of  followers  he  goes  to  the  houses  where  he  knows  there  is  grain, 
carries  it  off  by  force,  pays  for  part  of  it  at  such  prices  as  suit 
his  fancy,  orders  his  men  to  take  the  rest  under  the  pretext 
of  pressing  necessity,  although  most  of  his  band  are  really  engaged 
in  the  grain  trade  like  their  leader.  At  the  least  resistance 
they  batter  in  the  doors.  All  the  honest  people  have  already 
abandoned  the  town,  on  account  of  this  violence.  One  of  the 

-1  G7.  1641.  Chalons-sur-Sa6ne,  12  Avril  1709.  Henri,  fiveque  de  Chalons. 
See  also  the  letter  of  8  May  1709  for  further  details  about  Seurre. 

2  G7.     1641.     Chalons-sur-Saone,  21  Avril  1709.     Henri,  fiveque  de  Chalons. 


DEARTH  IN   THE  PRODUCING  REGIONS  193 

fichevins,  after  resisting  for  quite  a  while,  finally  joined  the 
band,  and  now  boasts  that  he  will  soon  be  at  the  head  of  five 
hundred  resolute  men.  He  swears  that  he  will  make  himself 
more  feared  in  Burgundy  than  Cavalier  was  in  the  Cevennes."  l 

The  letters  of  the  Bishop  of  Chalons  seem  to  be  rather  ill- 
informed  in  many  respects;  he  has  no  accurate  conception  of 
conditions  at  Lyons,  or  of  the  extent  of  exports  to  Lyons,  but  his 
general  impression  of  the  cause  of  the  trouble  in  Burgundy  is 
probably  true.  It  is  hard  to  believe  that  there  was  really  less 
grain  in  Burgundy  in  April  and  May,  1709,  than  was  needed  by 
the  inhabitants.  The  closing  of  the  granaries  and  the  complete 
abandonment  of  even  t^ie  old  market  system  are  quite  enough 
to  account  for  all  the  disorder.  Yet,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
the  crisis  could  have  been  met.  The  necessities  of  Lyons  and 
the  supplies  sent  to  the  royal  granaries  created  a  demand  that 
led  inevitably  to  the  feverish  speculation  and  disorganization 
of  the  markets.  Lyons  certainly  did  not  secure  any  more  grain 
than  was  barely  necessary  for  her  sustenance.  The  crisis  re- 
vealed in  startling  clearness  the  necessity  of  closer  organization 
of  the  trade. 

Ill 

.  Languedoc  in  IJOQ 

In  Languedoc  there  was  more  calm.  The  different  factors 
can  be  traced  more  clearly,  and  the  repression  of  the  panic 
removed  the  distorting  elements  of  violence  and  disorder. 
The  harvest  of  1708  in  Languedoc  was  better  than  the  average; 
distinctly  good  in  Lower  Languedoc,  it  was  only  slightly  less 
abundant  in  the  more  fertile  Upper  Languedoc.2'  These  reas- 
suring crop  prospects  attracted  a  considerable  trade  to  Langue- 
doc. The  Genoese  came,  as  usual;  the  Lyonese  also  appeared, 
as  in  1693 ;  some  grain  passed  from  Upper  Languedoc  to  Guienne. 
The  fertile  area  in  Languedoc  thus  shipped  in  three  directions. 
The  magnitude  of  the  exports  contemplated  soon  gave  Baville 
reason  for  serious  apprehension.  The  Genoese  were  planning 

1  G7.     1641.     Chauvort,  3  Mai  1709.     P.  Lebault. 

2  G7.     1644.     Montpellier,  5  Aout  1708.    Baville. 


194         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

to  buy  40,000  quintals,  and  by  August  18  had  sent  60  ships  to 
Agde  and  Cette.  The  dearth  in  Guienne  and  Provence  was  then 
known.  Baville  proposed  that  prohibitions  of  foreign  export 
be  used.1  A  week  later,  he  reported  that  the  Genoese  came  in 
increasing  numbers.  Without  waiting  for  orders  from  the  Con- 
troleur  General,  he  required  them  to  get  permits  from  him  for 
the  export  of  grain,  and  on  his  own  authority  limited  exports 
temporarily  to  1000  setiers.2  The  magnitude  of  the  demands 
of  the  Genoese  is  explained  by  their  intention  of  exporting  to 
Spain  and  to  the  Estates  of  the  Duke  of  Savoy.3  They  were 
only  allowed  to  export  5000-6000  setiers,  and  before  the  general 
edict  arrived  at  the  end  of  October,  most  of  the  Genoese  had 
left.4  Shortly  after,  the  municipality  of  Nice  asked  permission 
to  buy,  but  they  were  refused.5  In  short,  a  very  considerable 
element  in  the  potential  demand  on  Languedoc  was  deflected 
by  administrative  interference. 

Before  the  Genoese  had  gone  (September  16),  the  Abondance 
of  Lyons  appeared  on  the  scene.  They  proposed  to  buy  in  the 
eastern  portions  of  Languedoc  where  shipment  up  the  Rhone 
would  be  easy.6  Two  weeks  later,  the  demands  of  Lyons  had 
taken  definite  shape  in  a  request  for  permission  to  buy  18,000 
setiers  along  the  Rhone 7  —  the  least  fertile  part  of  the  province 
which  raised  scarcely  enough  for  its  own  maintenance.  Baville 
refused  to  grant  the  request,  and  told  the  agents  from  Lyons 
to  begin  by  purchasing  3,000  setiers.  By  October  16,  prices  had 
begun  to  rise,  despite  the  prohibitions  of  foreign  export  and  the 
careful  limitation  of  export  to  Lyons  and  Provence.  Baville 
tried  to  deflect  the  Lyonese  agents  to  Narbonne.8  Throughout 
December,  the  merchants  of  Lyons,  Provence,  and  Guienne  were 
drawing  supplies  from  Languedoc.  Towards  the  end  of  January 

1  G7.     1644.     Montpellier,  18  Aotit  1708.     Baville. 

2  Ibid.   26  Aout  1708.     Baville; 


Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 


1  Sept.  1708.     Baville. 
28  Oct.  1708.     Baville. 

2  Nov.  1708.     Baville. 

1 6  Sept.  1708.     Baville. 
i  Oct.  1708.     Baville. 


Ibid.,  1 6  Oct.  1708.     Baville. 


DEARTH  IN  THE  PRODUCING  REGIONS 

1709,  Baville  reported  that  prices  were  still  rising.  He  was 
obliged  to  extend  his  prohibitions  to  Guienne,  though  exports 
were  to  continue  under  cover  of  permits.  In  this  manner, 
20,000  setiers,  purchased  by  Bourdonnaye,  the  Intendant  at 
Bordeaux,  were  to  be  shipped  to  Agenois.  Meanwhile,  Provence 
had  become  practically  dependent  upon  Languedoc.  Baville 
was  trying  to  furnish  25,000  quintals  per  month.1  In  March, 
distress  appeared  in  Languedoc.  "  Grain  is  as  dear  as  in  Guienne 
or  Provence.  In  many  places  there  have  been  popular  tumults, 
especially  in  the  Vivarais.  In  this  crisis  it  will  be  impossible 
for  me  to  continue  with  my  plans  to  aid  Provence.  I  shall 
oblige  the  merchants,  to  whom  I  have  given  permits,  to  go  there, 
although  they  would  much  perfer  not  to  ship  their  grain  from 
Languedoc,  where  they  can  sell  as  dear  as  in  Provence  without 
incurring  any  risk."  2  By  the  end  of  the  month,  panic  had 
developed.  "  The  price  of  grain  has  declined  at  Toulouse,  and 
risen  slightly  in  Lower  Languedoc,  but  the  difficulty  is  no  longer 
a  matter  of  prices.  The  grain  itself  is  lacking  everywhere. 
There  has  suddenly  been  a  complete  cessation  of  commerce, 
arising  in  part  from  the  fear  that  there  will  be  no  harvest  this 
year.  All  who  have  a  little  grain  have  resolved  to  hoard  it 
and  keep  it  for  their  sustenance.  All  the  markets  have  ceased 
hi  the  larger  towns.  The  towns,  beginning  with  Montpellier, 
are  oppressed  by  anxieties,  rendered  doubly  keen  by  the  mer- 
curial temper  of  the  people.  Narbonne,  Beziers,  and  Agde, 
which  are  the  granaries  of  the  province,  have  sent  deputies  to 
beg  me  to  allow  them  to  hold  what  they  have,  as  it  is  no  more 
than  sufficient  for  their  needs.  Although  it  is  contrary  to  my 
principles,  I  have  issued  several  ordinances  requiring  the  opening 
of  granaries  and  the  bringing  of  grain  to  market.  I  have  also 
instigated  inquiries  to  discover  how  much  grain  we  could  count 
on."  3 

In  April,  serious  consequences  appeared  in  Lower  Languedoc. 
"  The   trade  with  Upper  Languedoc   had   ceased."      Baville 

1  G7.     1644.    Montpellier,  25  Jan.  1709. 

2  Ibid.,  15  Mars  1709. 

3  Ibid.,  26  Mars  1709.     Baville.     See  also,  Montpellier,  18  Mars  1709.    Baville. 


196         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

proposed  "  to  open  the  granaries  in  the  dioceses  of  Toulouse, 
Lavaur,  and  Alby,  to  take  what  was  absolutely  necessary."  x 
Montpellier  and  Nimes  had  only  enough  grain  to  last  two  weeks. 
Baville  accordingly  proposed  that  Joubert,  the  Sindic  of  Langue- 
doc, should  go  to  Castelnaudary,  to  confer  with  Royer  from 
Toulouse  and  with  the  merchants  who  had  been  buying  in 
Guienne  and  Montauban.  It  was  hoped  that  some  division 
of  supplies  could  be  arranged  for  both  Toulouse  and  Lower 
Languedoc.2  This  was  finally  done  after  much  negotiation, 
and  both  Toulouse  and  Lower  Languedoc  were  supplied. 

The  scarcity  prevailing  and  the  slight  hopes  of  an  average 
harvest  in  1709  rendered  some  importation  indispensable.  In 
May,  Baville  began  to  arrange  for  shipments  from  the  Levant. 
The  towns  of  Montpellier,  Nimes,  Carcassonne,  and  Agde  gave 
pledges  to  secure  the  residents  against  loss.  The  province  as 
a  whole  furnished  some  funds.3  This  grain  began  to  arrive 
in  September  and  arrivals  continued  throughout  the  winter 
months  of  1709-10. 

IV 

These  three  incidents  in  the  history  of  the  trade  in  the  Rhone 
Valley  indicate  at  once  the  possibility  of  actual  depletion  of  the 
producing  regions  and  the  importance  of  the  element  of  panic. 
The  quantities  of  grain  available  seem  to  have  been  much  less 
inadequate  than  the  confusion  and  distress  would  give  us  reason 
to  believe.  Administrative  interference  did  much  to  relieve 
pressure  upon  the  supply  in  the  granaries,  and  formed  reserves 
uncertain  in  extent,  but  of  great  importance  in  time  of  distress, 
thus  tending  to  counteract  the  unfortunate  circumstances  which 
so  frequently  fomented  panics.  The  presence  of  these  correc- 
tive tendencies  makes  it  peculiarly  difficult  to  determine  how 
much  of  the  excitement  in  time  of  dearth  was  mere  unreasoning 
fear,  and  how  much  was  well  grounded  apprehension. 

1  G7.     1644.     Montpellier,  19  Avril  1709.     Baville. 

2  Ibid.,    22    Avril   1709.     Baville    &    Riquet    2e.       Pie's,    du   Parlement   de 
Toulouse. 

3  Ibid.,  21  Mai  1709.     Baville.     See  also  Letters  of  7  Juin  1709,  23  Juin  1709. 


DEARTH  IN  TEE  PRODUCING  REGIONS  197 

The  most  cursory  reading  of  the  official  correspondence  in 
time  of  dearth  suggests  that  much  of  the  complaint  of  dearth 
was  wholly  due  to  a  failure  to  understand  new  developments 
in  trade.  The  cry  of  disette  appears  as  soon  as  some  busybody 
asserts  that  there  is  not  enough  grain  in  town  to  last  until  the 
next  harvest.  No  attention  whatever  is  given  to  the  possibility 
of  securing  grain  from  other  points  to  replace  grain  exported. 
The  possibility  of  such  compensating  movements  is  relatively 
foreign  to  the  ordinary  thought  of  the  time.  Each  worthy 
burgher  was  possessed  with  the  idea  that  famine  stared  him  in 
the  face,  if  the  granaries  of  the  town  did  not  actually  contain 
all  the  grain  that  would  be  needed  till  the  next  harvest.  The 
largest  towns  had,  of  course,  outgrown  these  notions,  but  else- 
where there  was  no  conception  of  a  steady  flow  of  trade  supply- 
ing the  wants  of  the  town  from  month  to  month  without  ever 
accumulating  any  very  considerable  reserve.  A  steady  dis- 
tributive trade  of  this  type  was  in  truth  a  relatively  new  feature 
in  commercial  life.  Trade  had  been  highly  seasonal,  and,  except 
for  the  trade  of  the  locality  centering  on  the  town  market,  the 
connection  of  the  town  with  the  larger  centers  of  commerce  was 
limited  to  the  various  fairs.  The  grain  trade  had  never  had 
quite  the 'same  customs  as  the  other  branches  of  trade,  but  the  *"\ 
principle  appears  in  this  feeling  that  the  producing  region  should  \ 
never  permit  the  exportation  of  grain  unless  the  maintenance 
of  the  area  till  the  next  harvest  was  assured.  When  these  limits  / 
were  reached,  the  parties  seeking  grain  should  be  excluded  and  / 
sent  elsewhere.  Each  town  was  to  secure  supplies  for  itself  / 
without  regard  to  the  needs  of  other  towns.  Combination  / 
among  towns  to  secure  a  supply  to  be  used  for  common  needs 
was  foreign  to  the  ideas  of  the  ordinary  people,  even  in  the 
seventeenth  century,  though  it  appears  clearly  in  some  phases 
of  administrative  policy. 

In  1693,  Aries  and  Tarascon  wished  to  close  their  gates  to  the 
merchants  of  Lyons.  The  harvest  in  the  immediate  vicinity 
had  been  light,  and  the  Lyonese  merchants  were  active.  Prices 
had  begun  to  rise  early  in  September,  and  even  the  Subdelegue 


198  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

suggested  some  limitation  of  shipments  to  Lyons.1  In  October, 
Lebret  writes:  "The  inhabitants  of  Aries,  Tarascon,  and  the 
vicinity  have  already  sold  to  the  Lyonese,  or  the  merchants 
from  Dauphine,  two- thirds  of  their  surplus  grain."  2  Appre- 
hensions were  repeated  frequently  in  the  letters.  In  November, 
Lebret  ordered  a  domiciliary  visitation  to  determine  the  quantity 
of  grain  in  Aries,  Tarascon,  and  other  places.  The  investigation 
revealed  that  Aries  had  not  enough  to  last  till  the  harvest.3 
A  week  later,  the  magistrates  of  Aries  were  surprised  to  find 
that  Lebret  was  authorizing  a  shipment  of  600  setiers  to  Lyons. 
"  We  take  the  liberty  to  represent  that  this  grain  is  included 
in  the  declaration  which  we  submitted.  If  what  remains  for 
our  own  provision  is  deflected  elsewhere,  we  shall  no  longer 
be  able  to  find  sustenance  for  our  inhabitants.  We  have  not 
the  resources  which  we  once  possessed."  4  Lebret  yielded  to 
these  instances,5  but  he  had  had  quite  a  different  plan  for  the 
conduct  of  the  grain  trade. 

The  policy  that  he  had  intended  to  follow  is  sketched  in  his 
letter  of  September  25:  "The  orders  I  have  given  to  Chaiz, 
to  discontinue  his  purchases,  have  produced  the  effect  I  had  in 
mind.  The  price  of  grain  along  the  Rhone  has  risen  to  a  figure 
that  will  attract  foreign  grain,  without  giving  the  people  cause 
to  grumble.  I  hope  to  be  able  to  continue  after  this  fashion. 
When  the  price  falls  rather  low,  I  shall  give  currency  to  the 
talk  of  dearth  at  Lyons;  then,  if  the  price  rises  to  i9u-2ou 
per  charge,  I  shall  have  all  purchases  discontinued.  In  this 
Way,  I  shall  be  able  to  allow  Lyons  to  draw  from  Provence 
for  more  than  six  months.  The  success  of  this  project  will 
depend  on  what  comes  in  from  foreign  ports,  so  that  I  shall  have 
to  maintain  the  strictest  secrecy.  None  must  be  informed  of 
my  intentions  but  the  little  birds  that  I  use  to  spread  my  rumors. 
Our  principal  object  should  be  to  attract  foreign  grain.  To 

1  G7.     1632.    Aix,  6  Dec.  1693.    Lebret.    Ibid.,  Aries,  22  Aout  1693.    Le  Roy, 
Subdele"gue.    Ibid.,  Aix,  10  Sept.  1693.    Lebret. 

2  G7.     1632.     Aix,  14  Oct.  1693.    Lebret. 

3  G7.     1631.    Lambesc,  13  Nov.  1693.    Lebret  a  Berulle. 

4  G7.     1631.     Aries,  24  Nov.  1693.     Maire  et  fichevins  d' Aries  a  Lebret. 
6  G7.     1631.    Lambesc,  26  Nov.  1693.    Lebret  a  Canaples. 


DEARTH  IN  THE  PRODUCING  REGIONS  199 

do  that,  prices  must  be  maintained  at  a  relatively  high  level, 
so  that  it  will  be  inexpedient  to  publish  any  statement  to  the 
effect  that  Lyons  will  have  no  more  need  of  the  grain  of  Pro- 
vence/' 1 

The  development  of  continuous  trade  was  of  importance  in 
most  of  the  towns  of  Languedoc  and  Provence  and  in  other 
places,  such  as  Rouen,  Orleans,  Bordeaux,  and  Nantes.  But 
it  would  be  easy  to  exaggerate  the  extent  of  this  new  feature 
in  the  grain  trade.  While  it  is  true  that  in  areas  of  active  move- 
ment it  was  no  longer  customary  to  hoard  the  year's  supply, 
the  old  self-sufficiency  was  still  an  actual  fact.  It  is  hard  to 
stigmatize  as  unreasoning  the  apprehensions  which  appear 
in  relatively  infertile  sections,  when  the  season's  supply  is  not 
assured. 

Closely  connected  with  the  gradual  transition  to  a  continuous 
distributive  trade  were  the  latent  defects  of  the  old  market 
system.  These  were  much  more  potent  breeders  of  panic  than 
the  failure  to  perceive  the  new  tendencies.  Uncertainty,  which 
is  the  insidious  cause  of  every  panic,  obscured  every  stage  in 
the  wholesale  marketing  of  grain.  At  no  step  in  the  process  was 
it  possible  to  perceive  clearly  the  extent  of  either  supply  or 
demand.  The  total  amount  of  the  crop  was  never  accurately 
known,  since  the  amount  of  grain  hidden  away  in  the  granaries 
of  land-owners  was  quite  beyond  any  powers  of  calculation. 
Added  to  these  uncertainties  was  the  uncertainty  as  to  the  exact 
amount  of  grain  purchased  by  merchants  from  distant  towns  for 
export. 

The  statistics  which  appear  in  the  administrative  correspon- 
dence as  "  Etats  des  Bleds  "  merely  reveal  the  colossal  extent 
of  contemporary  ignorance.  In  1693,  a  fairly  systematic 
endeavor  was  made  to  prepare  such  estimates  throughout  the 
kingdom.2  The  attempt  was  carried  out  in  several  provinces, 
but  it  was  found  that  it  did  more  harm  than  good.  The  figures 
for  the  towns  were  generally  pretty  accurate,  and  as  the  inquiry 
frequently  revealed  greater  scarcity  than  had  been  realized,  the 

1  G7.     1632.    Aix,  25  Sept.  1693.    Lebret. 

2  G7.     ; 630-34,  passim. 


200         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

reports  merely  spread  panic.  The  inquiries  were  successfully 
prosecuted  only  in  the  regions  of  slight  activity. in  the  grain 
trade  or  in  the  consuming  regions.  In  the  producing  regions, 
crop  estimates  never  progressed  beyond  the  merest  guesses'.1 

This  invisibility  had  curious  results.  In  1662,  the  Parlement 
of  Toulouse  issued  prohibitions  of  export  from  its  jurisdiction. 
Hotman  was  buying  in  the  vicinity  for  Paris  and  the  Lower 
Loire  Valley.  The  merchants  with  whom  he  had  made  engage- 
ments cancelled  their  contracts.  Hotman  then  proceeded  to 
buy  large  quantities  in  the  granaries  of  the  nobility.  Permits 
made  shipments  possible  despite  the  prohibitions,  and  Paris 
and  the  Lower  Loire  were  thus  supplied  from  an  area  where 
there  was  sufficient  scarcity  apparent  to  give  color  to  prohibi- 
tions.2 This  curious  paradox  is  simply  and  adequately  explained 
by  the  ignorance  of  the  quantities  available  in  the  granaries. 
It  is  possible,  of  course,  that  the  prohibitions  were  not  based 
on  any  sincere  conviction  of  their  necessity,  but  references  to 
riots  in  divers  places  render  this  supposition  unlikely. 

The  evidence  is  not  always  quite  so  clear,  but  there  are  many 
indications  that  a  similar  explanation  would  frequently  apply 
to  Burgundy.  In  September,  1693,  it  was  clearly  the  intention 
of  the  merchants  to  draw  entirely  from  the  granaries.  "  The 
grain  merchants  of  Lyons,  who  have  through  their  correspon- 
dents the  best  information  about  Burgundy,  are  quite  certain 
of  the  places  where  the  grain  of  preceding  harvests  is  to  be 
found.  They  assure  me  that  the  new  grain  and  the  buckwheat 
(ble  noir),  which  is  the  ordinary  food  of  the  people,  are  more 
than  sufficient  for  the  sustenance  of  the  inhabitants,  and  that 
Burgundy  can  safely  dispose  of  its  old  grain."  3  The  inde- 
pendence of  the  granary  supplies  and  the  local  markets  thus 
created  a  greater  appearance  of  dearth  than  was  actually  war- 
ranted. The  quantity  existing  in  the  granaries  was  never  known, 

1  Excepting,  of  course,  the  estimates  for  single  towns,  such  as  those  made  by 
Delamare  in  1709,  and  by  other  agents  of  Paris  at  various  dates. 

2  Bib.  Nat.,  M61.  Colb.,  107  bis.  832.     Agen,  21  Jan.  1662.     Hotman.    Ibid., 
107,  463.    Agen,  ii  Fev.  1662.    Hotman.     Ibid.,  107,  22.     Bordeaux,  20  Mars 
1662.    Hotman.    Ibid.,  108,  I52V.     17  Avril  1667.    Memoire  par  Hotman. 

9  G7.     1631.    Lyon,  4  Sept.  1693.     Jourdain,  Marchand  de  Lyon. 


DEARTH  IN  THE  PRODUCING  REGIONS  2OI 

and  was  generally  under-estimated.  All  these  factors  were 
more  likely  to  create  panic  than  to  afford  confidence  to  a  people 
that  saw  its  markets  scantily  supplied. 

Finally,  the  informal  manner  in  which  wholesale  purchases 
were  made  was  sure  to  give  rise  to  the  wildest  kind  of  rumors. 
There  is  a  definiteness  about  a  market  which  is  always  an  element 
of  safety.  The  market  may  be  subject  to  great  eccentricities, 
and  there  is,  of  course,  a  tendency  to  mild  hysteria  at  times, 
but  the  concentration  of  buying  on  a  market  does  render  the 
demand  an  ascertainable  factor.  The  absence  of  such  markets 
in  most  of  the  producing  regions  made  trade  conditions  subject 
to  panic  in  the  calmest  moments.  The  administrative  corres- 
spondence  is  constantly  revealing  this  curious  feature,  now  in 
brief  asides,  now  in  strict  injunctions  to  some  agent,  now  in 
scornful  criticism  of  the  clumsy  action  of  agents  or  merchants. 
Not  infrequently,  the  first  rise  in  prices  in  a  period  of  dearth 
is  attributed  exclusively  to  this  cause.  Speaking  of  Burgundy 
in  March,  1693,  Berulle  writes:  "  there  was  never  so  much 
grain  in  that  province  as  there  has  been  this  year.  The  muni- 
tionnaire  has  made  all  his  purchases  there,  and  there  is  still  a 
vast  quantity  left.  I  am  told  that  certain  individuals  in  that 
province  have  purchased  more  than  100,000  anees.  The  rise 
in  prices  is  due  to  the  slight  precautions  taken  by  the  agents 
of  the  munitionnaires.  Instead  of  making  secret  contracts  for 
their  purchases,  they  ride  around  the  country  in  person  in  their 
chaise  roulant.  Le  Noble,  who  was  charged  with  the  purchases, 
sent  prices  up,  an  ecu  per  anee,  at  one  stroke,  by  his  unskilful 
conduct.  Still,  what  has  contributed  the  most  has  been  the 
formation  of  granaries  by  divers  inhabitants  of  Burgundy, 
who  are  persuaded  that  grain  is  sure  to  rise.  They  have  bought 
all  they  could  and  have  closed  their  granaries;  as  little  grain 
comes  to  market  prices  have  risen."  l 

It  is  the  same  story  in  the  south.  "  The  rumor  has  spread 
here,"  writes  Le  Bartz  at  Marseilles  in  June,  1693,  "  that  orders 
for  large  purchases  are  to  come  from  Lyons.  I  have  been  told 
since  that  a  man  has  arrived  who  says  that  he  is  to  buy  15,000 

1  G7.     1631.    Lyon,  2  Mars  1693.     Berulle,  Intendant  a  Lyon. 


202  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

charges.  A  fine  beginning!  His  purchases  should  all  be  made 
before  anyone  knows  that  he  is  here  buying;  and  when  it  is  all 
done  he  must  minimize  the  extent  of  his  shipments.  If  he  has 
really  bought  15,000,  he  must  admit  only  3000-4000."  l  With 
all  their  worldly  wisdom,  the  merchants  were  seldom  able  to 
restrain  themselves  at  the  critical  moment  following  the  realiza- 
tion that  a  dearth  was  likely.  The  mercantile  parlance  develops 
an  idiom  which  expresses  rather  exactly  the  character  of  the 
wholesale  trade  at  such  periods.  When  the  merchants  hurry 
through  the  country,  buying  right  and  left  in  the  granaries  or 
of  the  peasants,  seeking  to  secure  control  of  the  crop  at  any 
cost,  they  are  said  to  "  mettre  le  feu  sur  les  bleds."  2  This  idiom 
is  of  universal  currency,  appearing  in  all  sections,  and  with  all 
its  connotation  it  no  more  than  expresses  that  state  of  feverish 
speculation  which  such  haphazard  buying  so  inevitably  created. 
But  despite  all  this  excitement,  despite  all  this  publicity  of 
scattered,  isolated  incidents  in  the  buying  of  the  wholesale 
merchants,  there  is  never  the  slightest  possibility  of  discovering 
how  much  they  have  bought  or  how  much  there  is  to  buy. 
Every  fact  that  tends  to  develop  panic  is  paraded  before  the 
public,  every  detail  that  could  allay  apprehension  is  usually 
inconspicuous  or  secret.  The  merchants  themselves  are  as 
much  in  the  dark  as  the  people.  Each  knows  the  extent  of  his 
own  dealings,  none  can  have  any  idea,  however  crude,  of  the 
extent  of  others'  purchases.  A  panic  is  essentially  unreasoning 
fear,  but  under  these  circumstances  it  is  hardly  surprising  that 
reasonable  men  became  panic  stricken. 

1  G7.     1632.     Marseille,  8  Juin  1693.     Le  Bartz.     See  also  G7.     1632.     Mar- 
seille, i  Juin  1693.    Le  Bartz. 

2  Here  is  an  example  from  Tournus  sur  Saone,  from  Le  Noble,  the  munition- 
naire:  "  Les  lettres  que  je  recois  de  Maxilly  et  de  Saint- Jean-de-Losne  me  marquent, 
que  le  feu  se  met  tout  de  nouveau  sur  les  bleds  qui  restent  en  Bourgogne.  .  .  . 
Le  nomme  Vacher  d'Auxonne,  et  le  nomme"  Bonnardot  qui  demeure  du  coste  de 
Verdun  et  qui  est  frere  et  parent  de  trois  ou  quatre  marchants  du  mesme  nom  a 
Lyon,  ayant  porte  la  mine  de  Saint- Jean-de-Losne  qui  ne  peize  que  650  Ibs.  a  5O11. 
C'est  a  dire  que  celle  de  Maxilly  qui  peze  750  Ib.  va  venir  a  55 11.  bien  qu'elle 
n'etoit  que  48 11.  ...     Si  ces  gens  la  qui  ont  desia  de  fort  grosses  parties  de  bleds 
acheptees  et  enarres  ont  la  liberte  d'aller  leur  train  dans  le  temps  present  ...  les 
bleds  n'auront  point  de  prix."     G7.     1631.    Tournus,  14  Juillet  1693. 


CHAPTER  V 

AREAS  OF  HIGHLY  LOCALIZED  MARKETS  AND 
EXTREMES  OF  MISERY 

IN  regions  of  active  trade  all  the  difficulties  can  be  traced 
to  the  confusion  caused  in  the  producing  regions  by  the  demands 
of  the  larger  towns;  in  those  parts  where  the  local  markets 
were  not  thus  disturbed,  other  troubles  developed  out  of  the  iso- 
lated position.  No  part  of  France  escaped,  whether  fertile  or 
sterile;  frequented  by  metropolitan  merchants,  or  so  com- 
pletely isolated  that  the  local  market  had  practically  no  relations 
with  the  outside  world.  The  producing  regions  tributary  to 
the  great  cities  might  be  threatened  with  dearth,  but  usually 
relief  could  be  procured  either  through  prohibitions  or  by  imports 
from  some  favored  regions.  In  the  remote  sections  of  the  back 
country,  supplies  were  almost  never  carried  off  by  unduly  aggres- 
sive merchants,  but  if  the  crops  failed  in  these  sterile  sections, 
it  was  very  difficult  to  secure  relief  from  elsewhere.  The  apathy 
of  the  few  merchants  of  such  towns  was  so  great  that  little  could 
be  hoped  from  private  initiative,  so  that  here,  too,  the  grain 
trade  was  in  need  of  administrative  interference.  These  rural 
sections  were  constantly  confronted  with  the  possibility  of 
actual  famine,  and  on  the  whole  these  isolated  localities  experi- 
enced the  greatest  extremes  of  misery. 

The  conditions  were  not  characteristic  of  all  areas  where  the 
market  system  was  highly  localized;  a  number  of  relatively 
isolated  towns  escaped  the  form  of  trouble  that  most  threat- 
ened the  independent  local  market.  Where  the  locality  formed 
an  enclave  in  the  territorial  area  comprised  in  the  market  system 
of  a  great  city,  there  was  little  danger.  Local  supplies  were 
usually  adequate,  and  generally  unmolested  by  the  wholesale 
merchants.  If  crops  failed  and  the  province  was  threatened 
with  dearth,  the  existence  of  the  great  trade  routes  offered 

203 


204         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

sufficient  facilities  for  obtaining  supplies.  These  locab'ties 
were  numerous.  The  markets  of  Blois  and  Tours,  which  have 
been  described  in  a  previous  chapter,  were  both  of  this  type. 
So  also,  on  the  Upper  Loire,  were  all  the  larger  towns  between 
Orleans  and  Riom.  On  the  Rhone,  such  towns  as  Chalons- 
sur-Saone,  Macon,  Vienne,  Montelimar,  Avignon  were  in  this 
position.  None  were  regularly  in  trade  with  any  large  town; 
their  supplies  were  obtained  independently.  In  the  Seine  Basin, 
it  is  more  difficult  to  classify  the  doubtful  towns.  The  river 
towns  for  the  most  part  were  engaged  in  trade  with  Paris,  except 
when  they  were  beyond  the  usual  trade  limits.  But  there  were 
many  towns  on  the  borders  of  the  territory  tributary  to  Paris 
which  were  enclaves.  Rheims,  Laon,  Rethel,  in  the  Marne 
Valley;  Sens  and  the  Yonne  towns;  Troyes  and  the  upper 
reaches  of  the  Seine  —  all  these  were  outside  the  usual  area  of 
Parisian  trade,  and  yet  near  enough  to  derive  relief  from  the 
wholesale  merchants  in  the  time  of  dearth.  In  the  south,  many 
towns  of  this  type  can  be  found  along  the  trade  routes,  both  in 
Languedoc,  on  the  line  of  the  Canal  du  Midi,  and  in  Guienne, 
on  the  Garonne.  These  places  probably  suffered  less  from  the 
disorders  of  the  grain  trade  than  any  other  type  of  market  area. 
They  enjoyed  all  the  advantages  of  freedom  from  intimate 
connection  with  the  large  towns,  and  at  the  same  time,  all 
the  possibilities  of  relief  assured  them  by  the  proximity  of  such 
organized  trade  as  existed. 

The  special  problems  arising  out  of  the  highly  localized  market 
system  were  confined  to  the  inhospitable  cantons  of  central 
France,  to  the  rugged  sections  of  the  north-east,  and  to  the 
sandy  plains  of  Saintonge  and  Angoumois.  The  inhabitants 
of  these  extensive  regions  were  obliged  to  draw  their  livelihood 
from  the  sterile  soil  and  from  the  forests.  There  was  little 
trade,  little  industry,  little  communication  of  any  kind  with 
the  outside  world.  Even  in  the  latter  part  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  many  of  these  remote  towns  and  villages  seem  almost 
literally  "self-sufficing."  But  the  dearth  of  records  in  such 
regions  reduces  us  to  mere  conjecture,  and  as  "  self-sufficiency  " 
should  not  be  emphasized  as  a  vital  feature  of  the  localized 


AREAS  OF  HIGHLY  LOCALIZED  MARKETS  2O$ 

market,  it  is  best  not  to  insist  on  the  probabilities.  Whenever 
detailed  descriptions  come  to  light,  some  inter-market  trade 
is  revealed,  a  very  inconsiderable  trade  to  be  sure,  involving 
only  two  or  three  small  markets,  but  still  inter-market  trade. 
One  of  the  most  precise  reports  from  a  region  of  highly  localized 
trade  is  the  memoir  of  Saint  Contest  on  the  Election  of  Brive, 
in  Angoumois. 

"  The  election  is  composed  of  ninety-four  parishes,  in  half 
of  which  a  considerable  quantity  of  wine  is  made.  Part  is 
consumed  locally,  and  part  is  sold  in  Upper  Limousin  and  down 
Bordeaux  way.  The  grain  raised  is  rye,  barley,  patris,  buck- 
wheat, and  all  sorts  of  vegetables.  These  lands  do  not  produce 
one- tenth  of  the  wheat  and  oats  needed.  •  Those  grains,  are 
imported  from  the  vicinity  of  the  Vicomte  of  Turenne,  from 
Perigord,  and  from  Quercy.  The  other  sorts  of  grain  do  not 
suffice  for  the'  inhabitants,  and  the  deficiency  is  made  up  by  the 
other  half  of  the  election,  by  Tulle,  and  by  Auvergne.  Pas- 
turage is  very  rare.  In  the  other  half  of  the  election  there  is  an 
abundance  of  rye  and  of  chestnuts,  a  sufficiency  of  forage  and 
pasture,  and  also  much  buckwheat  and  oats.  There  is  very 
little  commerce  in  the  election,  and  the  commodities  sold  there 
are  very  low  in  price.  In  some  cantons,  there  is  a  very  delicate 
sort  of  wine,  which  is  sold  in  the  parishes  that  have  no  vine- 
yards and  in  the  vicinity  of  Limoges;  formerly  the  trade  was 
considerable  .  .  .  but  since  vines  have  been  planted  in  Upper 
Limousin  there  has  been  a  great  diminution  in  the  sales.  The 
poorer  wines  are  turned  into  brandy  and  sent  down  to  Bordeaux 
.  .  .  but  that  trade  does  not  amount  to  much.  The  trade  in 
cattle  is  more  considerable.  Wheat  is  so  cheap  that  the  Paris 
bushel  sells  at  5-6  sous."  l 

The  interesting  fact  here  is  not  so  much  the  slightness  of  the 
general  trade  of  the  region,  as  the  independence  of  central  mar- 
kets. Grain  prices  are  apparently  determined  not  by  prices 
in  Montauban,  Toulouse,  or  Bordeaux,  but  by  the  local  demand 
and  supply.  Part  of  the  supply  indeed  comes  from  sections 

1  G7.  345.  16  Juillet  1687.  Memoire  de  St.  Contest  sur  1'filection  de 
Brive. 


206  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

that  might  at  times  be  in  touch  with  the  Garonne  Valley 
trade,  but  for  the  most  part  this  little  area  is  governed  by  its 
own  local  market.  The  medieval  system,  in  its  developed 
form  of  a  market  with  Uatiers,  is  quite  adequate  in  ordinary 
seasons.  * 

Auvergne,  another  of  the  relatively  barren  provinces,  is  not 
without  trade.  "  This  province  is  composed  of  six  elections, 
Aurillac,  Brioude,  and  Saint-Flour,  or  Upper  Auvergne,  Riom, 
Clermont,  and  Issoire,  or  Lower  Auvergne.  In  Lower  Auvergne 
there  is  the  section  called  Limagne,  which  is  a  very  fertile  but 
not  a  wealthy  section,  as  the  difficulties  of  trade  oblige  the 
inhabitants  to  consume  themselves  what  is  produced.1 

"  Upper  Auvergne  is  a  mountainous  country,  covered  with 
snow  for  six  months  in  the  year,  but  it  possesses  great  advan- 
tages for  grazing,  which  is  the  basis  of  considerable  trade  in 
cattle  and  cheese.  The  inhabitants  secure  their  grain  in  Lower 
Auvergne."  2 

Local  rural  trade  of  this  type  appears  also  in  Rouergue. 
Velay  and  the  Venaissin  drew  supplies  from  the  neighborhood 
of  Millau.  There  was  a  slight  trade  in  grain  between  the  elec- 
tions of  Limoges  and  Bourganeuf. 

In  all  of  these  cases  there  is  some  definite  record,  but  a  large 
portion  of  the  territory  of  the  kingdom  does  not  appear  in  the 
records  at  all.  The  condition  of  these  sections  is  by  no  means 
unimportant  although  we  can  do  little  more  than  speculate. 
Fortunately  we  are  not  entirely  without  evidence.  The  great 
dearth  of  1693  led  in  some  regions  to  the  creation  of  crude 
statistics  which  are  of  especial  interest  by  reason  of  the  light 
thrown  upon  the  distribution  of  population. 

In  Alengon,  in  1693,  there  are  detailed  figures  for  each  village, 
and  a  tabulation  of  four  territorial  divisions  exhibits  these 
results,  which  represent  a  very  fair  average  for  the  region. 
(See  table  on  following  page.) 

1  The  grain  from  this  section  was  the  basis  of  the  trade  of  Paris,  Orleans,  and 
Lyons  in  Auvergne.       Recourse  was  had  to  Auvergne  perhaps  only  in  years  of 
trouble  but  there  was  always  a  spasmodic  grain  trade  with  this  part  of  Auvergne. 

2  G7.     101.    1683.    Memoire  envoyee  par  M.  de  Bercy. 


AREAS  OF  HIGHLY  LOCALIZED  MARKETS 


207 


An  inspection  of  the  roll  of  parishes  suggests  that  about  one- 
half  the  population  was  living  in  villages  of  less  than  five  hun- 
dred inhabitants.1  Similar  statistics  for  the  Generalite  of  Pau 
show  that  the  average  size  of  villages  was  200  inhabitants.2 


Election 

No.  of 

Parishes 

No.  of  towns 
of  1000  or 
more  inhab. 

Extreme 
range  in  the 
size  of,  villages 

Size  of  towns 

persons 

Verneuil 

Chat,  de  la  Ferte"  Ar- 

nault   

2O 

I  20—450 

Alenqon 

Baillage  de  Moulins  . 

17 

I 

130-700 

I  QOO 

Vicomte  d'Effey  

53 

7 

So-^OO 

1000-3000 

Vicomte  d'Alencon  .  . 

42 

3 

153-938 

IIOO, 

1180,  12,000 

In  1682,  in  the  County  of  Bigorre,  an  enumeration  of  the  villages 
and  towns  by  families  gives  the  following  results :  — 


Less  than 
10  families 


10-20 

families 


21-50 
families 


families 
15 


IOI-200 

families 


201-500 
families 


In  the  whole  county  there  were  only  thirteen  places  of  more 
than  100  families.  The  characteristic  size  of  the  village  was 
between  15  and  45  families.3 

On  the  whole,  there  is  enough  evidence  to  suggest  that  the 
population,  especially  in  the  infertile  districts,  was  very  widely 
scattered  in  relatively  small  villages.  There  was  a  minimum 
of  concentration,  and  for  this  reason  these  little  villages  must 
have  been  able  to  get  along  with  very  rudimentary  com- 
mercial machinery.  A  few  small  villages  and  a  central  market 
town  may  well  have  found  no  development  of  the  primitive 
market  necessary.  These  out  of  the  way  regions  escape  notice, 
but  it  is  well  not  to  forget  their  existence,  for  the  pushing  of  the 


1  G7. 

2  G7. 


1630.     5  Dec.  1693. 

1640.    Sept.  1709.    Denombrement  de  tout  le  pays  de  Basse  Navarre. 

132.    Papiers  des  fitats  de  Beam.    Estat  de  Villes  et  Paroisses  qui  sont 


dans  la  Comte  de  Bigorre;  avec  la  nombre  des  feux  et  des  families. 


208  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN   FRANCE 

metropolitan  market  system  into  these  remote  sections  is  one  of 
the  characteristic  features  of  the  late  nineteenth  century,  a 
reflex  movement  following  the  perfection  of  central  organization. 
So  far  as  we  have  any  material,  it  appears  that  the  compara- 
tively infertile  sections  were  outside  the  general  movement  of 
the  grain  trade.  The  effect  of  a  failure  of  crops  in  these  regions 
is  thus  an  interesting  speculation.  If  we  draw  the  simpler  deduc- 
tions that  suggest  themselves,  we  might  infer  that  in  periods  of 
scarcity  the  people  simply  starved.  This,  indeed,  was  only  too 
frequently  the  case. 

An  idea  of  the  intensity  of  famine  may  best  be  obtained  from 
the  substitutes  resorted  to.  In  some  regions  there  were  systematic 
endeavors  to  ascertain  the  utility  of  common  herbs.  The  most 
elaborate  record  of  such  attempts,  with  which  I  am  acquainted, 
is  in  the  papers  of  Dr.  Gilbert  Retif,  of  Pont-de-Vaux  in  Lower 
Burgundy.  This  was  a  region  of  great  distress  in  1693;  it 
was  just  south  of  the  more  productive  parts  of  the  province, 
and  unable  to  secure  much  relief,  as  whatever  went  out  was  sent 
to  Lyons.  The  experience  of  that  year  was  apparently  the 
moving  cause  underlying  his  experiments,  for  when  he  sent 
his  memorials  to  Paris  in  1699,  they  were  evidently  the  result 
of  considerable  labor.  He  used  the  daffodil  or  asphodel  most 
frequently  in  his  trials,  but  he  does  not  seem  to  have  considered 
much  more  than  the  agreeableness  of  his  bread.  The  experi- 
ments most  frequently  took  the  form  of  giving  people  this  as- 
phodel bread  when  they  supposed  they  were  having  ordinary 
bread;  failure  to  perceive  any  difference  is  the  principal  argument 
in  its  favor.  There  was  no  consideration  of  the  actual  food 
value  of  the  bread.  This  doctor  made  a  trip  through  Angoumois 
and  Limousin  to  experiment  on  the  herbs  there,  —  an  interesting 
indication  of  the  needs  of  that  ill-favored  region.  The  asphodel 
was  found,  and  Retif  made  his  suggestions.  The  local  officials 
demurred;  they  said  that  the  root  was  poisonous.  He  cited  the 
doctors  and  herbalists  of  antiquity  in  favor  of  the  herb.  In  one 
place  the  local  doctors  were  commissioned  to  test  the  plant. 
They  boiled  it,  and  made  "  learned  "  notes  on  the  properties 
of  the  mash.  Then  they  burned  it,  and  examined  the  ashes. 


AREAS  OF  HIGHLY  LOCALIZED  MARKETS  2OQ 

Next  they  pressed  it,  and  subjected  the  liquid  to  such  tests  as 
could  be  made  with  the  five  senses  of  man.  After  this  hocus 
pocus  the  herb  was  pronounced  safe.1 

None  of  the  other  attempts  at  substitution  were  quite  as 
deliberate  as  that  of  the  Burgundian  doctor,  but  all  sorts  of 
expedients  were  tried  with  various  degrees  of  success.  In 
Rouergue,  in  July,  1709,  the  chestnuts  gave  out,  and  the  people 
eked  out  the  little  rye  and  barley  that  remained  with  the  as- 
phodel.2 The  same  root  was  used  in  parts  of  Touraine  in  lyog.3 
In  parts  of  Languedoc,  dog-bane  (chien  dent)  was  used  mixed 
with  rye  or  wheat.4  In  all  these  cases,  the  subsidiary  roots 
were  used  merely  to  make  the  small  supplies  of  grain  last  longer. 
The  use  was  apparently  not  attended  with  any  serious  results. 
In  Limousin  and  Perigord,  turnips  were  used  as  a  dilution  for 
the  grain.5 

The  Due  de  Lesdiguieres,  writing  from  Dauphine  in  May, 
1675,  says  that  "  the  inhabitants  (of  Dauphine)  have  lived 
during  the  past  winter  on  bread  made  from  acorns  and  roots, 
and  now  they  are  reduced  to  eating  grass  in  the  fields  and  the 
bark  of  trees."  6 

In  1686,  Baville  writes  that  many  people  in  the  Cevennes 
live  on  acorns  and  herbs.7  In  September,  1693,  Bouchu,  Inten- 
dant  in  Dauphine,  writes  a  most  extraordinary  letter.  He  speaks 
of  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  making  investigations  of  the 
quantity  of  grain,  and  after  admitting  that  conditions  are 
desperate,  he  continues:  "  the  hard  life  to  which  these  people 
are  accustomed  is  in  itself  a  ground  for  hope.  It  is  no  exag- 
geration to  say  that  the  greater  part  of  the  provinces  of  Tarantais 
and  Maurienne  have  lived,  since  1690,  on  flour  made  from  nut- 

1  G7.     1637.     1699.     Memoires  et  Documents  sur  le  pain  de  Racine  nou- 
vellement  inventi  par  M.  Gilbert  Retif,  Doc.  en  Med.  de  la  Ville  de  Pont-de-Vaux. 
Journal  d'un  Voyage  en  Angouleme  et  Limousin. 

2  G7.     1646.    Montauban,  31  Juillet  1769.    Le  Gendre. 

3  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  171-450.    14  Juin  1709.    Turgot  a  Tours. 

4  G7.     1644.    Montpellier,  30  Aout  1709.    Baville. 

6  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  I,  514,  1828.  17  Jan.  1699.  Bernage,  Intendant  a  Limoges. 
G7.  138.  Perigueux,  2  Jan.  1699.  fiveque  de  Perigueux. 

6  Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Colb.,  171,  333.     Grenoble,  29  Mai  1675. 

7  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  I,  65,  265.     29  Mars  1686. 


210         TEE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

shells,  in  which  the  most  well-to-do  do  not  mix  more  than  a 
tenth  part  of  oats  or  barley  meal.  M.  de  Chamlay  is  a  witness 
to  the  truth  of  this,  and  he  has  carried  samples  of  this  sort  of 
bread  to  the  King."  l 

At  times  some  villages  in  the  distressed  regions  were  reduced 
to  downright  starvation,  and  in  these  crises,  anything,  every- 
thing was  used.  The  accounts  seem  at  times  to  indulge  in  an 
excess  of  statement,  but  the  official  character  of  the  corre- 
spondence and  the  position  of  the  writers  make  it  hard  to  believe 
that  the  letters  fail  in  any  respect  but  understatement.  In 
March,  1662,  M.  Bellay,  a  doctor  at  Blois,  writes  to  the  Marquis 
de  Sourdeac,  "  In  the  thirty- two  years  that  I  have  been  a  doctor 
in  this  province,  I  have  never  seen  anything  that  approaches 
the  desolation  now  existing  at  Blois,  where  there  are  4000  (poor) 
who  have  flowed  in  from  neighboring  parishes.  In  the  country 
the  dearth  is  greater.  The  peasants  have  no  bread.  They  pick 
up  all  kinds  of  meat  scraps,  and  the  moment  that  a  horse  dies, 
they  fall  upon  it  and  eat  it. 

"  Malign  fevers  are  beginning  at  Salinier  (?).  The  poverty 
is  so  great  that  there  is  a  little  barley  that  has  not  been  bought, 
as  no  one  had  any  money.  The  artisans  are  dying  of  hunger, 
the  bourgeois  is  so  grievously  afflicted  (that  he  cannot  aid  the 
poor).  I  have  just  learned  that  a  child  was  found  at  Cheverny 
that  had  eaten  its  own  hands.  These  are  horrors  which  fairly 
make  your  hair  stand  on  end."  2  In  order  to  arouse  the  sym- 
pathy of  the  Parisians,  and  to  secure  relief  funds,  a  letter  from 
the  Superior  of  the  Carmelite  Convent  at  Blois  was  printed 
and  distributed  at  Paris  as  a  hand-bill.  "  There  are  3000  poor 
in  the  town  and  faubourgs  of  Blois.  Grain  is  worth  200  ecus 
per  muid,  measure  of  Paris,  and  prices  are  still  rising.  The 
poor  people  in  the  country  look  like  disinterred  corpses.  .  .  . 
Whenever  they  find  dead  horses  or  mules  or  other  beasts  they 
fill  themselves  with  the  rotten  meat,  which  destroys  rather 
than  maintains  life.  The  poor  people  of  the  town  live  like  pigs 
on  bran  mash,  and  consider  themselves  lucky  when  they  get  a 

1  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  I,  338,  1235.     22  Sept.  1693. 

2  Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Colb.,  107,  344.     Bellay,  Medecin  a  Blois,  2  Mars  1662. 


AREAS  OF  HIGHLY  LOCALIZED  MARKETS  211 

belly  full  of  that  stuff.  They  pick  up  decayed  cabbage  stalks 
in  the  gutters,  and  then  they  cook  these  with  bran.  They  beg 
for  the  water  in  which  salt  codfish  has  been  cooked.  ...  In 
the  fields  and  along  the  roads,  women  and  children  have  been 
found  dead,  their  mouths  still  full  of  grass."  l 

In  the  spring  of  1694,  there  were  reports  of  serious  famine 
in  various  places.  Near  Villefranche  in  Beaujolais,  some  of  the 
peasants  had  been  reduced  to  such  poverty  by  the  failures  of  the 
crops  that  they  no  longer  had  any  money  to  buy  grain,  and  were 
reduced  to  eating  raw  herbs.2  In  another  part  of  Beaujolais, 
the  distress  was  due  to  actual  physical  lack  of  supplies.  "  There 
is  not  in  any  parish  of  Charollais  half  the  grain  that  is  needed 
for  its  sustenance  till  the  harvest.  At  present  the  poor  people 
live  on  bread  made  from  the  roots  of  ferns,  which  causes  terrible 
outbreaks  of  disease.  The  decent  people  cannot  stay  in  the 
churches  during  mass.  At  Charolles  and  Paray  the  poor  die  of 
hunger  in  the  streets,  without  anyone  being  able  to  assist  them. 
They  are  far  to6  numerous,  and  grain  is  not  to  be  had  for  money." 3 
In  Lower  Armagnac,  the  Archbishop  of  Auch  says  the  population 
is  only  a  quarter  of  what  it  was  three  years  before.  Sickness 
and  migration  are  responsible  for  the  diminution.  In  many 
places  the  people  live  on  grape  pips  (Pepins  de  raisins),  roots, 
and  ferns  which  they  grind  up  to  make  flour."  4 

In  1709,  similar  extremes  of  misery  are  reported.  At  Valence, 
"  les  plus  mauvaises  herbes  font  a  present  presque  toute  leur 
nourriture."  5  In  the  less  fertile  sections  of  the  generality  of 
Orleans  the  distress  was  intense.  "  The  people  in  the  country 
near  Bourges,  having  no  money  to  buy  grain  are  reduced  to  eating 
herbs  and  roots,  which  they  boil  without  any  salt  or  other 
seasoning,  so  that  grave  epidemics  are  feared."  6  The  officers 

1  Arch.  Nat.,  A.  D.  XI,  37.     1662.     Imprime  dans  la  Bibliotheque  Rondonneau. 
"  Avis  Important." 

2  G7.     1635.     1694.     Deux  Placets  de  Noyel,  Receveur  General  de  la  Taille 
en  Villefranche. 

3  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  I,  357,  1298. 

4  Ibid.,  I,  360.     6  Sept.  1694.     Archeveque  d'Auch. 

5  G7.     1643.    Valence,  14  Mai  1709.    fiv^que  de  Valence. 

6  G7.     1640.     Bourges,  3  Mai  1709.     Foulle,  Intendant  a  Bourges. 


212  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

of  Douzy  write:  "We  have  no  grain  for  our  maintenance. 
More  than  three-quarters  of  the  inhabitants  and  the  peasants 
for  four  leagues  around  are  reduced  to  eating  unseasoned  herbs 
and  the  cattle  that  they  kill  in  the  fields."  l 

It  is  idle  to  deny  the  sporadic  existence  of  the  utmost  extremes 
of  misery,  but  a  moment's  reflection  will  bring  these  relatively 
isolated  cases  within  proper  bounds.  In  many  instances  the 
extremes  were  suffered  only  by  the  indigent,  swelled  undoubt- 
edly in  number  by  the  heavy  losses  entailed  by  accident  to  the 
crops,  but,  after  all,  only  a  part  of  the  population.  Further- 
more, actual  lack  of  bread  was  confined  to  rural  districts.  At 
times  the  towns  were  possessed  of  very  small  reserves;  occa- 
sionally, they  were  obliged  to  put  their  inhabitants  on  rations, 
as  at  Lyons  in  1693  and  1709.  But  the  towns  did  not  starve. 
Then,  too,  only  certain  parts  of  the  country  districts  suffered. 
I  have  seen  only  one  instance  of  such  suffering  in  a  fertile  region,2 
and  in  that  case  the  lack  of  means  was  perhaps  a  more  consider- 
able factor  than  lack  of  grain.  Despite  all  the  highly  colored 
statements  that  have  been  made  up  about  the  dearths  in  France, 
I  cannot  believe  that  the  extremes  of  distress  pictured  were 
anything  more  than  infrequent  and  highly  localized  phenomena. 
All  the  cases  of  the  sort  that  I  have  seen  have  been  cited  here 
or  in  other  places,3  and  the  presumption  is  very  strong  when  such 
striking  conditions  are  not  reported  more  frequently  in  a  mass 
of  correspondence,  such  as  that  of  the  Controle  General.4  Con- 
ditions were  bad  enough,  but  they  certainly  were  not  as  desperate 

as  has  often  been  represented. 

i 

1  G7.  1646.     Douzy,  13  Juin  1709.     Les  Officiers  de  la  Fairies  de  Douzy. 

2  Boislisle,    op.    tit.,  I,  363,  1320.       6  Mai  1694.      Larcher    in    Champagne 
says,  "  La  calamite  est  encore  plus  affreuse  dans  les  villages,  oft  la  plupart  des 
manouvriers  ne  trouvant  presque  plus  de  travail,  ou  du  moins  si  peu  qu'il  ne  suffit 
pas  a  leur  gagner  du  pain  pour  eux  et  pour  leurs  families,  sont  des  jours  entiers 
sans  en  manger  un  morceau,  reduits  a  vivre  de  son  ou  de  racines,  qu'ils  font  cuire 
avec  un  peu  de  sel,  et  les  plus  a  leur  aise  sont  ceux  qui  peuvent  avoir  du  pain 
d'avoyne  ou  de  sarrazin."     It  is  the  artisans  that  suffer,  and  from  lack  of  money 
rather  than  lack  of  grain. 

8  See  Chap.  IV.     A  case  in  Lower  Burgundy. 

4  I  have  carefully  examined  the  whole  of  the  correspondence  on  the  great 
dearths. 


AREAS  OF  HIGHLY  LOCALIZED  MARKETS  213 

The  most  serious  depletion  of  the  population  was  due  to  the 
fevers  and  epidemics.  These,  in  many  cases,  owed  their  origin 
to  a  local  dearth,  but  the  question  was  intimately  connected 
with  the  question  of  poor  relief.  At  all  times,  whether  of  abun- 
dance or  of  dearth,  the  pauper  or  semi-pauper  class  was  the 
element  in  the  population  that  suffered  the  miseries  so  graphi- 
cally described  by  the  critics  of  the  Old  Regime.  There  was 
little  organized  charity,  and  most  of  the  attempts  at  relief 
originated  with  the  Church.  The  Intendants,  however,,  took 
the  matter  in  hand  in  the  periods  of  greatest  distress,  but  at 
such  times  it  was  difficult  to  create  an  efficient  organization. 
Workhouses  and  public  works  were  established,  but  they  fre- 
quently spread  the  epidemics  and  increased  rather  than  de- 
creased the  death  rate.  This  was  Bouville's  complaint  of  the 
Aumones  Generates  in  Limousin  in  1691.  "  This  great  assem- 
bling of  the  poor  of  all  ages  and  sexes  gives  rise  to  horrible 
abominations,  and  leads  to  an  incredible  spread  of  disease,  which 
is  favored  by  the  inadequate  nutrition.  When  the  grain  begins 
to  turn  color,  these  almshouses  encourage  idleness,  by  affording 
a  certainty  of  having  bread  and  soup,  and  by  making  possible 
a  life  of  licentious  freedom.  This  general  assembly  of  the  poor 
should  be  prevented  by  obliging  each  town  to  feed  its  own  poor. 
The  paupers  should  be  ordered  to  do  the  work  assigned  to  them 
by  the  -directors,  so  that  none  should  be  induced  by  idleness  to 
enter  the  workhouse."  l 

In  Beam  in  1693,  the  poor  who  had  flocked  into  Pau  were  shut 
up  in  barns  and  houses,  and  given  rations,  but  this  merely  made 
matters  worse.  The  fevers  which  had  already  appeared  in- 
creased at  an  alarming  rate,  especially  among  the  poor,  and  out 
of  800-900  shut  up  in  the  relief  houses,  two  hundred  died  within 
a  fortnight.  In  the  country  districts  thousands  were  suffering 
from  extreme  destitution.2  From  Montauban  in  1694,  the 
Archbishop  writes:  "  The  price  of  grain  has  already  risen  so 
high  that  the  poor  can  no  longer  buy.  Seven  or  eight  dead 
persons  are  found  at  the  gates  of  the  town  each  day,  and  in  my 

1  Boislisle,  op,  cit.,  I,  228,  1018. 

*  Ibid.,  I,  321,  1191.  12  Mai  1693.  Sanson. 


214        THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

diocese  of  150  parishes,  400  people  die  daily  from  improper 
nourishment.  I  myself  feed  300  poor  each  day,  in  town  or  on 
my  estates."  l  In  1695  the  Intendant  at  Montauban  says  that 
the  district  is  in  a  pitiable  state.  "  The  people  are  in  misery 
transcending  all  powers  of  the  imagination,  so  exhausted  that 
they  are  incapable  of  any  exertion.  The  sterility  of  previous 
years  carried  off  one-half  or  two-thirds  the  population  of  parishes, 
so  that  in  many  places  there  are  not  enough  people  left  to  culti- 
vate the  soil.  The  distress  is  not  equally  spread,  however. 
It  is  worst  in  Armagnac,  and  it  may  be  necessary  to  colonize 
from  neighboring  provinces  to  repopulate  that  canton."  2 

The  problem  of  poor  relief  was  increased  in  difficulty  by  the 
migratory  habits  of  the  population.  In  June,  1693,  "  whole 
communities  of  the  elections  of  Rouergue  and  Quercy  abandoned 
their  villages  and  sought  food  elsewhere.  Near  Figeac,  Cahors, 
Villefranche,  and  Rodez  some  of  these  unfortunates  have  been 
found  dead  in  the  fields,  with  their  mouths  full  of  grass."  3 

The  appearance  of  dearth  in  a  canton  was  generally  sufficient 
to  set  numbers  of  the  poor  in  motion.  When  there  was  a  large 
town  near,  they  flocked  into  town;  if  no  such  hope  of  finding 
relief  presented  itself,  they  wandered  from  province  to  province, 
so  that  the  infertile  sections  of  the  Massif  Central  were  the  scenes 
of  many  curious  migrations  of  paupers.  In  1692,  Perigord  was 
suffering.  The  poor  had  collected  in  great  masses,  and  Bouville 
feared  that  they  would  set  out  for  Limoges.4  In  1698,  a  private 
correspondent  writes  from  Bordeaux:  "  The  dearth  in  Perigord 
has  already  caused  large  numbers  of  persons  to  leave  their 
homes,"  "  en  trouppe  et  en  famille,"  seeking  places  where  grain 
has  been  stored.5  In  Roussillon,  the  distress  is  equally  great. 
"  If  the  king  does  not  send  grain  for  the  sustenance  of  this  town 
(Prais  de  Mollo)  more  than  fifty  families  (220  persons)  must 
needs  leave,  exclusive  of  six  families  that  have  already  left.  .  .  . 

1  Boislble,  op.  cit.,  I,  360,  1308.     16  Avril  1694.    fiveque  de  Montauban. 

2  Ibid.,  I,  391,  1432.     28  Mai  1695.     Sanson. 

3  G7.    1632.    Montauban,  19  Juin  1693.     Brunot,  Rec.  Gen.  des  Finances. 

4  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  I,  297,  1122.     2  Oct.  1692. 

5  G7.     138.     Bordeaux,  21  Nov.  1698. 


AREAS  OF  HIGHLY  LOCALIZED  MARKETS  215 

All  are  going  to  foreign  parts."  1  In  1705,  the  Curates  of  the 
election  of  Cahors  write:  "  our  parishes  are  reduced  to  the  sad 
necessity  of  dying  of  starvation  or  of  abandoning  the  country 
unless  they  receive  sufficient  aid  to  enable  them  to  subsist 
till  the  harvest.  .  .  .  Some  have  already  abandoned  their 
homes,  and  all  are  inclined  to  follow  their  example.  Only  a 
very  extraordinary  charity  can  stop  them."  2 

These  infertile  districts  were  thus  in  need  of  a  double  relief; 
in  the  first  place,  the  break-down  of  the  local  market  system 
rendered  administrative  intervention  necessary  to  secure  grain 
from  the  principal  grain  producing  regions,  then  when  this  grain 
had  arrived,  a  large  share  had  to  be  distributed  as  a  charity. 

In  1694  and  1698-99,  Limoges  and  Limousin  were  quite  depen- 
dent on  the  importations  of  grain  made  by  the  Intendant  from 
Brittany  and  Bordeaux.  In  the  fall  of  1693,  a  letter  of  the 
Bishop  of  Limoges  suggests  that  something  was  done  to  procure 
grain  from  Berry  by  public  subscription.  The  local  crops, 
however,  were  not  consumed  until  the  spring  of  1694.  Bernage 
perceived  the  necessity  of  extraordinary  measures  as  early  as 
February.  "  The  nearer  I  approached  Limoges,  the  more 
striking  were  the  misery  and  the  dearth.  I  was  fairly  frightened 
by  the  prodigious  crowd  of  paupers,  but  the  Bishop  assured  me 
that  it  was  quite  ordinary."  Nevertheless,  he  straightway 
obtained  a  grant  of  3o,ooou  to  procure  grain  in  Bordeaux, 
Poitou,  or  Brittany.  In  March,  he  writes:  "  I  urged  the 
merchants  to  form  a  company  to  import  grain  from  the  neigh- 
boring provinces,  but  the  merchants  of  this  section  do  not  wish 
to  undertake  anything  of  the  sort  at  their  own  risk.  Their 
unf amiliarity  with  that  trade,  and  the  many  risks  frighten  them. 

1  promised  them  armed  escorts,  but  it  does  not  reassure  them. 
They  would  like  to  act  as  Royal  agents,  but  they  refuse  to  make 
any  advances  or  to  take  any  risks."     Bernage  proposes  a  scheme 
for  royal  action.     The  grain  will  have  to  be  sold  at  less  than  the 
market  price,  but  the  King  need  not  lose  more  than   i5,ooou 

1  G7.    506.    Prais  de  Mollo,  7  Nov.  1698.    Chevalier  de  Landort  a  d'Albaret. 

2  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  II,  283,  911.     13  Nov.  1705.     See  also  Ibid.,  II,  255,  821. 

2  Juin  1705. 


2l6         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

on  a  sum  of  i2o)ooo}1.1  The  grain  was  purchased  for  the  most 
part  in  Brittany  and  Poitou  and  was  shipped  to  Rochefort  and 
Bordeaux.2  The  grain  arrived  in  May,  June,  and  July,3  and  was 
distributed  throughout  an  extensive  territory.  One  granary 
was  established  at  Angouleme,  others  at  Limoges,  Souillac, 
Terrasson,  Pressac,  and  Saint-Jean-d'Angely.  From  these 
entrepots  the  relief  was  distributed  to  all  parts  of  the  distressed 
region.4 

In  1698,  it  was  a  repetition  of  the  same  story.  The  neces- 
sities of  the  province  were  early  perceived.  Bernage  urged 
the  merchants  to  engage  in  the  trade  but  they  refused.  He 
borrowed  from  the  royal  tax  collectors  and  bought  grain  in 
Brittany.5  Perigord  was  equally  dependent  upon  administra- 
tive relief.  Writing  from  Bergerac  in  April,  1699,  Bezons 
says:  "  the  price  of  grain  has  not  risen  here,  as  I  have  had 
large  quantities  put  on  the  market  and  have  given  orders  to 
continue.  I  am  obliged  to  secure  wagons  to  transport  the  grain 
from  Perigueux.  The  Bishop  has  bought  grain  to  sell  below 
the  market  price."  6  A  couple  of  weeks  later  the  Bishop  says: 
"  with  the  aid  of  the  Intendant  I  have  purchased  grain  and 
lentils  at  Bordeaux,  Libourne,  Saint-Foix,  Bergerac,  and  Mont- 
leduc,  whence  I  have  them  brought  here  (Perigueux).  They 
are  no  sooner  arrived  than  they  are  sold.  But  this  trade  cannot 
long  continue,  as  we  have  not  the  money  necessary.  The 
province  will  be  without  grain.  I  ask  only  for  10,000  francs 
which  I  will  use  for  lentils."  7 

Dauphine  is  difficult  to  classify;  in  some  respects  it  is  an 
infertile,  non-commercial  region,  but  regarded  in  other  lights 
it  appears  as  a  supply  area.  In  truth,  there  were  small  sections 
that  were  fertile,  which  were  frequently  engaged  in  a  border  trade 
with  Savoy  or  Lyons.  The  rest  of  the  province  seems  to  have 

G7.     1634.    Limoges,  19-22  Mars  1694.     Bernage. 

Ibid.  Limoges,  17  Avril  1694.     Bernage. 

Ibid.  Limoges,  8  Juin  1694,  6  Juillet,   27  Juillet  1694. 

Ibid.  1694.    Memoire  sur  les  Bleds  acheptes  pour  le  Limousin. 

Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  I,  491,  1756.     Summaries  of  several  letters. 

6  G7.     138.    Bergerac,  12  Avril  1699.     Bezons. 

7  Ibid.  Perigueux,  i  Mai  1699.    fiveque  de  Perigueux. 


AREAS  OF  HIGHLY  LOCALIZED  MARKETS  217 

hardly  sufficed  for  its  own  needs.  The  army  was  also  introducing 
complications  in  the  trade  from  time  to  time.  The  border 
trade  tended  to  deplete  the  local  markets.  Details  are  not  very 
plentiful,  but  references  appear  in  both  1698  and  1709.  "  The 
price  of  grain  is  rising  steadily, "  writes  Berulle  from  Grenoble 
in  October,  1698,  "  partly  on  account  of  the  light  harvest, 
partly  on  account  of  the  shipments  to  Savoy  by  the  Pont-de- 
Beauvoisin.  I  have  felt  assured  that  you  (i.  e.  the  Controleur 
General)  would  approve  of  the  prohibitions  that  I  have  issued, 
as  there  were  many  persons  forming  granaries  in  Savoy.  The 
inhabitants  of  Bourgoin  and  neighboring  places  complained 
that  certain  rich  usurers  of  Bourgoin  bought  the  greater  part 
of  the  grain  of  the  region,  converted  it  into  flour  and  shipped 
it  to  Lyons,  as  the  grain  from  Dauphine  was  selling  4U  per 
quartal  higher  than  the  inferior  Burgundian  grain.  This  move- 
ment was  very  considerable  and  caused  so  great  a  dearth  that 
flour  had  risen  to  three  sous  per  pound.  The  prohibitions 
have  produced  a  decline  in  price."  l 

In  1709,  the  border  trade  was  a  more  serious  problem.  "  The 
Parlement  of  Grenoble  issued  an  edict  dispensing  inhabitants 
of  Gapenc.ois,  Embrunois,  and  Briangonnais,  from  the  obliga- 
tion to  sell  on  the  public  markets.  If  the  arret  is  not  revoked, 
.  .  .  the  whole  country  will  be  reduced  to  famine,  and  we  shall 
not  know  to  whom  to  appeal  for  grain.  I  have  been  obliged 
to  interrupt  this  letter,  to  go  to  the  market  place  to  pacify  the 
crowd.  Everyone  is  grumbling  and  complaining  as  they  find 
no  grain  of  any  kind."  2 

This  trade,  however,  was  hardly  more  than  local,  merely 
a  distribution  of  the  provincial  crop.  There  were  no  regular 
trading  connections  which  could  assist  when  the  crops  of  the 
province  failed.  At  those  periods  of  distress,  Dauphine  was 
quite  dependent  on  the  supplies  procured  by  administrative 
activity.  This  phase  of  action  appears  most  distinctly  in  a 
letter  of  Bouchu  written  26  September,  1693 : 

1  G7.  244-  Grenoble,  7  Oct.  1698.  Berulle.  G7.  .  244.  Fenestrelle,  18  Sept. 
1699.  Berulle.  See  also  G7.  243.  Grenoble,  10  Sept.  1695.  Berulle. 


>99.     ISerulle.     bee  also  u'.     243.     urenoble,  10  bej 
8  G7.     1631.     Gap,  i  Juin  1709.    fiveque  de  Gap. 


2l8  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

11  For  more  than  a  month,  I  have  vainly  exhorted  the  principal 
towns  to  raise  funds  to  buy  grain  in  Languedoc,  or  in  the  sea- 
ports of  Provence.  What  would  have  cost  eighteen  francs  then 
costs  23  francs  now.  ...  I  have  assembled  here  in  Grenoble 
deputies  from  all  the  towns  in  the  province.  I  have  spoken  to 
each  separately  and  then  to  all  assembled.  Even  if  the  most 
moderate  conclusions  possible  are  drawn  from  their  testimony, 
the  province  has  not  enough  grain  to  maintain  its  inhabitants 
after  February.  The  towns  of  Dauphine  have  no  revenues, 
so  that  it  is  not  easy  to  devise  remedies.  All  that  I  have  been 
able  to  do  after  thorough  discussion  is  to  make  a  contract  with 
one  man,  who  agrees  to  advance  money  to  the  town  of  Vienne 
for  the  purchase  of  12,000  quintals.  That  will  relieve  the  most 
pressing  needs  in  that  canton,  and  some  aid  can  be  sent  to 
neighboring  places. 

"  At  Grenoble,  the  price  of  grain  is  rising  at  each  market, 
so  that  it  is  now  selling  at  4  livres,  or  4  livres  5  sous  per  quartal. 
Everything  was  ripe  for  a  fourth  increase,  when  the  pains  that 
have  been  taken  and  the  manifestations  of  popular  feeling 
induced  several  individuals  to  sell  the  grain  that  they  had  in 
boats  on  the  river.  But  there  is  not  a  large  enough  quantity 
to  reduce  the  market  price,  and  as  the  dealers  made  less  than 
they  had  hoped  for,  they  are  not  likely  to  continue  in  the  enter- 
prise. As  the  town  has  no  revenue  at  all,  I  have  deemed  it 
expedient  to  provide  for  the  needs  of  the  town.  So  I  have 
made  a  contract  with  an  individual  who  agrees  to  deliver  18,000 
se tiers  at  Grenoble  for  3  francs  10  sous  per  quartal,  under  the 
following  conditions:  He  is  to  sell  only  one-half  of  the  whole, 
in  proportionate  lots  during  November,  December,  January, 
and  February.  This  first  half  assures  me  that  the  price  of  grain 
will  not  rise  above  3  francs  10  sous  per  quartal.  The  other  hah0, 
which  he  is  to  sell  only  in  accordance  with  my  orders,  gives  me 
some  assurance  for  May  and  June.  I  have  also  stipulated  in  the 
contract  that  I  can  have  him  sell  at  less  than  3  francs  10  sous, 
if  I  reimburse  him.  ...  I  am  working  out  a  little  scheme 
on  this  basis.  By  manipulating  the  prices  of  this  grain,  I  hope 
to  derange  all  the  calculations  of  those  who  are  hoarding  grain 
in  anticipation  of  a  rise  in  price. 


AREAS  OF  HIGHLY  LOCALIZED  MARKETS 

"As  for  Lower  Dauphine,  the  towns  of  Romans,  Valence, 
Crest,  and  Montelimar,  the  trouble  there  is  more  serious  than 
at  any  of  the  other  places.  The  town  of  Montelimar  proves 
by  its  registers  of  the  flour  coming  in  from  the  neighboring 
mills,  that  the  annual  consumption  of  grain  is  23,000  setiers. 
By  the  register  of  the  tithes,  the  year's  harvest  is  estimated  at 
12,000  setiers,  3,000  setiers  are  needed  for  seed,  so  that  there  is 
only  9,000  setiers  to  supply  the  town.  Notwithstanding  all  this, 
the  price  of  grain  is  much  lower  there  than  at  Grenoble  where 
the  harvest  was  even  lighter.  This  is  apparently  due  to  the  fact 
that  there  are  few  strangers  in  these  small  towns.  Each  inhabi- 
tant consumes  what  he  has,  and  is  on  the  verge  of  a  severe  dearth 
without  realizing  it.  Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  hard  to 
know  how  to  secure  grain  for  these  towns  in  other  provinces. 
The  cost  of  transportation  amounts  to  more  than  the  price  of 
the  small  quantities  of  grain  sold  on  their  markets,  so  that 
any  efforts  to  relieve  them  would  seem  to  impose  an  unnecessary 
burden."  * 

This  explanation  of  conditions  in  Montelimar  is  a  complete 
exposition  of  the  defects  of  the  market  system  in  these  non- 
commercial regions.  The  improvidence  and  the  inability  to 
meet  extraordinary  conditions  are  both  worthy  of  note.  For 
the  distribution  of  the  local  supply  these  merchants  were  all 
the  machinery  needed,  but  in  those  exceptional  crises  which 
occurred  once  in  a  decade  or  once  in  a  generation,  the  local 
market  was  absolutely  inadequate.  Here  again,  we  have  the 
characteristic  feature  of  all  medieval  institutions.  They  were 
carefully  adapted  to  the  ordinary  conditions,  and  so  long  as 
nothing  new  appeared  to  change  the  situation,  the  cumbersome 
machinery  worked  satisfactorily.  The  least  strain,  the  least 
element  of  novelty,  anything  extraordinary  reduced  the  system 
to  inefficient  chaos.  In  the  producing  regions,  the  market  system 
was  unable  to  preserve  an  equilibrium  between  the  demands  of 
the  metropolis  and  the  country.  In  the  non-commercial  regions, 
the  markets  afforded  no  assistance  when  the  usual  local  sources 
of  supply  failed. 

1  G7.  1630.  Grenoble,  26  Sept.  1693.  Bouchu  &  Pussort,  Copie  envoyee  au 
Controleur  General. 


220         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

These  constant  break-downs  in  times  of  crisis  are  the  most 
fertile  cause  of  our  misunderstandings  of  the  medieval  regime. 
We  forget  that  the  system  did  work  ordinarily,  and  we  also  forget 
that  the  effort  to  devise  some  means  to  meet  the  recurring 
crises  is  what  transforms  medieval  into  modern  society.  The 
afflictions  of  a  crisis  were  borne  with  that  resignation  which 
we  still  find  in  the  Orient.  The  man  sat  down  calmly  to  meet 
his  fate.  If  it  pleased  God  to  smite  him  with  famine,  so  be  it. 
The  idea  that  these  troubles  can  or  should  be  avoided  is  a  strictly 
modern  idea. 


PART  II 


CHAPTER  I 

ROYAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  1500-1660 

THE  early  history  of  grain  trade  regulation  was  treated  by  the 
Physiocrats  from  the  standpoint  of  the  protective  controversy. 
They  drew  comparisons  between  Sully  and  Colbert,  much  to 
the  disadvantage  of  the  latter.  They  sought  to  identify  Colbert 
with  the  protective  policy  that  they  criticised.  "  Colbert, 
despite  his  sincere  regard  for  the  welfare  of  the  state,  followed 
the  wrong  course  and  was  in  the  end  seriously  embarrassed. 
Sully  with  less  art  had  based  his  action  on  the  natural  principle. 
He  regarded  land  as  the  source  of  all  wealth,  both  of  necessities 
and  of  luxuries.  The  increase  of  this  wealth  is  the  true  interest 
of  the  state.  The  encouragement  of  commerce  and  industry 
is  thus  dependent  upon  freedom  of  export,  for  without  freedom 
there  will  be  no  trade."  l  Sully  was  therefore  a  representative 
of  Physiocratic  ideas.  Without  full  knowledge  of  their  truths, 
he  acted  in  accordance  with  their  conceptions.  They  were  thus 
able  to  describe  their  policy  as  a  return  to  an  older  tradition 
unwisely  abandoned  by  Colbert. 

The  origin  of  the  free  trade  policy  is  doubtless  one  of  the 
most  interesting  problems  of  the  period,  but  the  question  cannot 
be  answered  as  easily  as  one  might  be  led  to  suppose  by  the 
insinuations  of  the  Physiocrats.  Free  trade  and  protection 
mean  different  things  at  different  times.  The  sense  we  attach 
to  these  terms  is  somewhat  different  from  their  meaning  to  the 
Physiocrats,  and  in  the  sixteenth  and  early  seventeenth  centuries 
they  had  still  another  meaning.  There  is  a  steady  growth  in 
the  freedom  of  commercial  intercourse,  and  a  degree  of  restric- 
tion that  would  today  be  designated  as  protection  was  formerly 
called  free  trade.  The  distinction  between  tariff  for  revenue 

1  Forbonnais,  Recherches  sur  les  Finances  de  France,  Paris,  1760, 1,  292. 

223 


224  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

only  and  tariff  to  protect  home  industry  is  relatively  new.  In  the 
sixteenth  century,  the  distinction  was  drawn  between  absolute  * 
prohibition  of  export  and  permission  of  export  subject  to  all 
duties.  Such  a  permission  of  export  is  all  that  can  be  found  in 
the  sixteenth  century,  but,  while  there  is  an  element  of  liberalism 
in  such  a  policy,  it  is  hardly  what  we  would  call  free  trade. 
The  prohibitive  edicts,  too,  must  be  scrutinized  carefully. 
Prohibitions  were  frequently  issued  with  the  express  intention 
of  permitting  export  under  the  cover  of  special  licenses.  The 
sale  of  these  licenses  was  a  source  of  revenue  sufficiently  attrac- 
tive to  lead  to  some  prohibitive  legislation  that  was  more  directly 
related  to  the  needs  of  the  Crown  than  to  the  exigencies  of  the 
grain  trade.  Considerations  of  revenue,  however,  were  seldom 
predominant.  The  trade  was  regulated  primarily  with  reference 
to  the  interests  of  the  consumers.  The  King  intended  to  en- 
courage export  when  harvests  were  good,  and  to  prohibit  exporta- 
tion when  there  was  danger  of  dearth. 

The  general  terms  in  which  royal  edicts  were  issued  might 
easily  lead  to  a  misunderstanding  of  a  different  type.  The 
solidarity  of  the  modern  state  and  the  enforcement  of  laws 
throughout  the  national  area  is  likely  to  close  our  eyes  to  the 
discrepancy  between  the  form  and  the  reality  of  royal  mandates 
in  the  days  of  the  old  monarchy.  Edicts,  general  in  form,  were 
frequently  local  measures  in  reality.  Some  measures  could  not 
be  enforced  in  all  parts  of  the  kingdom  because  of  the  weakness 
of  the  royal  officials.  More  frequently,  a  general  edict  was 
restricted  in  its  influence  through  the  legitimate  exercise  of 
discretion  by  the  local  authorities.  Such  action  was  expected, 
and  there  was  a  real  elasticity  in  the  application  of  general 
edicts  because  they  did  not  become  law  until  published  in  the 
locality.1  The  edict  did  not  become  a  dead  letter  merely  through 
the  indifference  of  the  local  officials;  it  was  deliberately  with- 
held and  for  cause;  it  never  acquired  legal  force  in  that  part 
of  the  kingdom.  Publication  did  not  follow  as  a  matter  of  course 

1  Ordonnance  Civil.  1667.  Art.  V.  The  commentary  on  this  article  by  the 
eighteenth  century  jurists  is  particularly  significant,  e.  g.  Serpillon,  Paris,  1776. 
See  also  infra,  pp.  253,  276,  279,  280-281,  284,  288,  289,  293. 


ROYAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE    22$ 

in  every  part  of  the  realm,  and  this  was  particularly  true  in  the 
case  of  detailed  administrative  measures  like  the  grain  trade 
edicts. 

The  tendency  of  the  royal  chancery  to  generalize  makes  it 
highly  probable  that  many  of  the  royal  measures  of  this  period 
were  significant  primarily  in  the  Seine  Basin.  The  weakness 
of  the  monarchy  in  the  south  during  the  Wars  of  Religion  makes 
it  unlikely  that  any  great  degree  of  control  was  exercised  over 
that  part  of  the  kingdom,  and  there  is  sufficient  evidence  to 
suggest  that  the  interests  of  the  Seine  Basin  would  sufficiently 
explain  much  that  was  done. 

The  foreign  export  trade  from  the  Seine  Basin  has  already 
been  described.1  In  the  fifteenth  century  most  of  the  grain 
from  the  Oise  Valley  went  down  to  Rouen,  whence  considerable 
quantities  were  sent  abroad.  The  gradual  exclusion  of  the 
Rouenese  merchants  from  the  Oise  and  the  Upper  Seine  Basin 
still  left  the  surplus  of  this  fertile  region  available,  though  the 
trade  was  in  the  hands  of  Parisian  merchants.  In  all  probability, 
the  volume  of  exports  decreased  on  account  of  the  increased 
demand  of  Paris,  but  there  were  years  when  the  abundance 
of  the  harvests  made  foreign  export  possible.  At  such  times 
the  grain  either  followed  the  old  route,  down  stream  to  Rouen, 
or  it  passed  overland  from  Noyon  to  the  Somme,  and  reached 
the  sea  at  Saint-Valery.  The  extent  of  this  movement  cannot 
be  ascertained,  but  of  its  existence  there  can  be  little  doubt. 
In  February,  1501,  the  Echevins  of  Paris  found  it  necessary 
to  adopt  measures  "  to  prevent  the  exhaustion  of  Santois, 
the  Beauvoisis,  and  neighboring  provinces  by  exports  down  the 
Somme  to  foreign  destinations."  2  In  1508,  the  Echevins  were 
informed  "  that  peasants  and  others  of  Corbeil,  Melun,  Etampes, 
and  other  towns  are  carrying  quantities  of  grain  from  Paris 
each  day  by  wagons  or  otherwise.  They  go  even  to  Champagne 
to  buy,  selling  and  delivering  the  grain  to  merchants  who  export 
it.  ...  Furthermore,  the  merchants  take  up  all  that  they  can 
buy  in  Santois,  and  ship  it  to  Rouen  by  way  of  the  Seine."  3 

1  Part  I,  Cfc.  II,  §2.  «  Ibid.,  I,  148.     23  Fev.  1508. 

2  Reg.  du  Bureau,  I,  53-54.     20  Fev.  1501. 


226         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

A  month  later,  the  Provost  of  Merchants  says  that  he  has  been 
besieged  on  all  sides  by  merchants  "  desiring  permission  to  ship 
grain  from  Paris."  The  destination  is  not  given,  but  much 
probably  went  abroad.1  The  Parisian  authorities  were  con- 
stantly worried  by  the  question.  It  was  necessary  to  permit 
the  passage  of  grain  destined  for  neighboring  towns,  but  at  the 
same  time  they  were  anxious  to  prevent  foreign  export.  These 
fears  were  especially  evident  in  1528,  and  in  1536  the  Provost 
of  Merchants  declared  that  heavy  exports  were  being  made  to 
Rouen  and  that  the  merchants  of  Rouen  were  shipping  to  foreign 
ports.2  In  1565,  a  bourgeois  of  Paris  declared  that  "  there  were 
exports  of  grain  once  in  four  or  five  years,  when  it  pleases  God 
to  grant  abundant  crops,  and  when  there  is  dearth  in  Spain 
and  Portugal."  3 

The  anxiety  with  which  these  exports  were  regarded  was  the 
basis  of  much  royal  interference  with  the  grain  trade  in  the 
sixteenth  century.  The  fear  was.  quite  independent  of  the  actual 
volume  of  trade.  It  made  no  difference  whether  exports  were 
large  or  whether  they  were  small  and  infrequent.  It  was  cur- 
rently believed  that  a  dangerous  export  existed  and  it  was 
the  uncertainty  as  to  the  extent  of  the  trade  that  kept  alive  the 
fears  of  all  officials.  The  remedy  that  suggested  itself  to  the 
sixteenth  century  official  was  prohibition  of  trade  in  time  of 
dearth  and  careful  regulation  of  trade  in  years  of  plenty.  Prob- 
ably, too,  the  royal  councillors  were  inclined  to  stop  the  export 
trade  completely,  in  order  to  insure  Paris  an  adequate  supply. 
The  importance  of  this  purely  Parisian  influence  is  somewhat 
obscured  by  the  general  character  of  many  of  the  edicts. 

The  general  period,  1500-1660,  falls  into  three  clearly  marked 
divisions,  which  indicate  a  moderate  development  in  policy. 
From  the  beginning  of  the  century  until  1559,  very  little 
systematic  policy  can  be  discerned.  At  one  moment  the 
desire  to  check  exports  from  the  Seine  Basin  is  paramount. 
Then,  financial  motives  appear.  There  are  suggestions  in 

1  Reg.  du  Bureau,  I,  150.     23  Mars  1508. 

2  Ibid.,  II,  218.     27  Avril  1536.     II,  225.     30  Juin  1536. 
•  Ibid.,  V,  491-     1565- 


ROYAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE    22J 

1539  that  some  systematic  regulation  was  contemplated,  but 
nothing  definite  appears  till  twenty  years  later.  Throughout 
these  years,  grain  trade  edicts  were  dictated  by  momentary 
expediency,  without  regard  to  large  views.  It  was  a  period 
of  empirical  opportunism.  Between  1559  and  1571,  there  were 
several  efforts  to  establish  an  administrative  department  to 
regulate  the  grain  trade  throughout  France  in  accordance  with 
definite  principles.  These  schemes  failed,  as  the  bureaucracy 
was  not  then  sufficiently  developed  to  undertake  such  a  task. 
The^break-down  of  the  system  of  1559  and  1571  tended  to  dis- 
organize subsequent  efforts  to  regulate  the  trade.  Not  even 
Colbert  sketched  any  project  quite  as  ambitious  as  these.  But 
the  traditions  remained,  and  until  the  rise  of  Colbert  the  tradi- 
tions were  applied  without  material  modification. 

After  1571  the  regulation  of  the  grain  trade  presents  little 
that  is  new.  Between  1571  and  1660  there  is  merely  an  alter- 
nation of  prohibitions  and  permissions  of  export.  There  is  an 
attempt  to  adjust  this  policy  to  the  state  of  the  harvests,  but 
there  is  no  evidence  that  the  efforts  of  the  Crown  met  with  any 
great  degree  of  success.  The  period  is  significant  merely  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  traditions.  It  is  interesting  to  note  the 
relative  unimportance  of  the  edicts  of  Henry  IV  upon  which 
the  Physiocrats  laid  so  much  emphasis. 


1500^1559 

The  scattered  edicts  of  this  period  cannot  be  brought  within 
any  general  scheme,  since  each  arises  naturally  from  special 
circumstances.  They  are  without  logical  sequence  or  relation. 
Sometimes  the  trade  of  the  Seine  Basin  is  the  principal  motive, 
more  frequently  the  lean  treasury  influences  the  measure.  The 
first  edict  of  the  sixteenth  century  is  little  more  than  a  declaration 
that  the  King  proposes  to  regulate  the  grain  trade  exclusively, 
without  any  interference  from  governors,  barons,  dukes,  munic- 
ipal or  other  officials.  The  preface  says  that  it  has  been 
customary  for  these  persons  to  urge  the  King  to  prohibit  export 
in  order  that  they  might  derive  profit  from  issuing  permits 


228         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

to  the  merchants  desiring  to  engage  in  trade.1  The  need  of 
such  a  declaration  is  an  eloquent  commentary  on  the  confusion 
of  jurisdictions  and  the  weakness  of  the  monarchy  as  an  adminis- 
,  trative  power.  Furthermore,  we  might  infer  that  royal  attempts 
to  regulate  the  trade  were  more  frequent  than  the  extant  edicts 
would  suggest.  This  is  by  no  means  impossible.  Many  edicts 
and  Letters  Patent  may  have  been  lost  or  at  least  escaped  the 
collectors  of  ordinances.  March  12,  1515,  an  edict  was  issued, 
addressed  to  the  Provost  of  Paris  and  the  Baillis  of  Chartres, 
Senlis,  and  Vermandois:  "  Your  jurisdictions,  having  abundant 
supplies  of  grain,  are  being  daily  drained,  under  the  pretext  of 
trade  with  our  subjects  and  foreigners,  to  the  damage  and  loss 
of  our  subjects,  so  that  if  the  necessity  arose  of  provisioning  our 
towns  and  fortresses,  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  sufficient 
supplies.  Hence  you  are  ordered  to  proclaim  by  public  crier  in 
all  the  towns  and  villages  of  your  jurisdictions,  that  no  grain 
shall  be  carried  from  the  country  in  any  manner  or  under  any 
pretext  whatsoever." 2  Obviously,  an  edict  restricted  to  the 
Seine  Basin,  and  suggested  by  supposed  exports  from  the 
interior. 

In  1535,  we  have  a  general  permission  of  export.  The  har- 
vests have  been  abundant  so  that  "  all  merchants  and  other 
persons  generally  are  permitted  to  buy  grain,  in  such  parts  of 
the  kingdom  as  they  shall  see  fit,  for  export  to  such  provinces 
or  countries  as  they  shall  choose."  3  Then  in  1539,  there  was  a 
prohibition  which  was  clearly  a  fiscal  expedient.  All  previous 
edicts  were  annulled,  and  all  export  from  the  kingdom  forbidden, 
"  except  when  expressly  permitted,  under  royal  letters  patent, 
and  then  only  upon  condition  of  paying  one  '  ecu  soleil ' 4 
per  tonneau."  This  project,  however,  was  not  executed  without 
difficulty.  Many  evaded  the  edict  and  exported  under  cover 
of  old  Letters  Patent.  Estimation  of  the  amount  of  the  extra 
duty  was  difficult,  on  account  of  the  difference  in  measures. 
A  special  commissioner,  De  Neufville,  was  sent  through  the 

1  Ordonnances  des  Rois  de  France,  XXI,  363.     12  Fev.  1507. 

*  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  918. 

8  Ibid.,  eod.  loc.,  20  Fev.  1534-35. 

4  /.  e.  the  larger  6cu  equivalent  to  five  francs. 


ROYAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE    22$ 

Seine  Basin  to  learn  what  sums  were  due  from  the  merchants, 
and  to  enforce  the  edict  upon  the  basis  of  six  setiers  of  Paris 
(1300  Ibs.)  per  tonneau.1  But  the  whole  scheme  had  to  be  given 
up,  because  there  was  no  administrative  machinery  to  enforce 
it,  and  because  the  abundant  crop  made  it  necessary  that  the 
merchants  should  be  freed  from  the  uncertainties  of  subterfuges 
and  evasions.  Consequently,  May  27,  1540,  all  persons  were 
given  permission  to  export  grain  to  all  and  any  countries  save 
Geneva,  without  payment  of  the  "  ecu  soleil "  per  tonneau.2 

Again  in  August,  1558,  we  find  Letters  Patent  granting  per- 
mission for  six  months  to  export  freely  from  all  baillages  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Parlement  of  Paris.  But  all  customs 
duties  must  be  paid.3 

Besides  these  edicts  and  Letters  Patent  concerning  the  foreign 
export  trade  there  are  two  other  measures  of  significance.  June 
20,  1539,  an  edict  declares  the  inter-provincial  trade  free.  "  We 
have  wished  and  declared,"  it  runs,  "  that  all  persons  should  be 
permitted  to  transport  their  grain,  wine,  etc.,  freely  within 
the  confines  of  the  Kingdom,  without  interference  from  gover- 
nors, their  lieutenants,  baillis,  senechaux,  '  gardes  des  ponts, 
ports,  ou  passages '  or  others.  But  understanding  that  our 
wishes  have  not  been  carefully  observed  in  some  places,  and 
desiring  to  have  this  right  guarded  by  a  perpetual  edict,  so  that 
the  provinces  shall  be  mutually  aided  in  their  necessities  by 
this  movement  and  trade  in  foodstuffs,  with  that  intercourse 
and  friendship  which  our  subjects  should  have  with  each  other, 
we  have  ordered  that  all  our  subjects  shall  be  permitted  to  trans- 
port their  grain  and  wine  freely  within  the  limits  of  the  kingdom, 
upon  paying  the  duties  customarily  paid."  4  The  opening  words 
might  lead  us  to  suppose  that  there  had  been  previous  edicts, 

1  All  documents  given  by  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  920.    Edict  of  20  Nov.  1539. 

2  Isambert,  Reaieil  des  Lois,  Arrets,  et  Ord.,  XII,  674-676. 

3  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  923-924. 

4  Ibid.,  II,  922.    It  is  interesting  also  to  note  a  reference  in  undated  Letters 
Patent  of  Charles  VIII   (Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,  381,   13).     It  runs: 
"  Bien  que  nous  avons  voulu  et  ordonne  par  edit  perpetuel  que  le  trafic  et  negoce 
des  bleds  soient  libres  entre  nos  sujets  de  province  en  provence  ...  a  nostre 
tres  grand  regret  sommes  adverty  se  pratique  au  contraire  en  nostre  pays  de  Dau- 
phine  .  .  ."  etc. 


230         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

but  the  reference  is  doubtless  to  the  special  Letters  Patent 
issued  to  various  governors,  in  that  decade.  The  intention 
was  evidently  to  make  it  possible  to  dispense  with  the  necessity 
of  obtaining  special  royal  orders  to  quash  such  local  prohibitions. 
This  object  was  not  fulfilled,  and  the  local  authorities  continued 
to  issue  prohibitions  as  before,  recognizing  nothing  but  special 
Letters  Patent  as  competent  to  annul  their  acts.1  The  second 
measure  is  the  general  ordinance  of  August,  1539,  which  con- 
tains an  interesting  provision  on  the  grain  trade.  The  justices 
were  ordered  to  obtain  reports  upon  the  value  of  the  various 
kinds  of  grain  and  upon  the  current  ideas  of  the  abundance  of 
the  harvests.  Information  was  to  be  derived  from  the  mer- 
chants, who  were  compelled  to  furnish  the  required  data  gratui- 
tously, under  the  penalty  of  fines,  imprisonment,  prohibition  of 
right  to  continue  their  trade,  or  such  other  penalties  as  the  courts 
might  choose  to  impose.2  This  gives  evidence  of  a  desire  to 
obtain  information  which  is  the  most  notable  suggestion  during 
the  period  of  serious  intent  to  regulate  the  grain  trade.  It  is 
clearly  a  step  in  the  direction  of  that  systematic  control  so 
sincerely  attempted  in  1559  and  1571. 

II 

The  edict  of  December  20,  1559  is  the  logical  result  of  the 
rather  aimless  projects  of  Francis  I.  "  We  have  proposed  and 
decided  to  grant  permission  to  export  grain  each  year  in  accord- 
ance with  the  quantity  which  it  shall  be  found  can  be  shipped 
from  our  Provinces  without  inconveniencing  our  people,  and 
in  order  that  there  shall  be  none  of  the  abuses  which  have  been 
in  the  past  prejudicial  to  our  rights  and  to  the  interest  of  the 
people,  who  have  often  been  reduced  to  necessity  before  the  new 
harvest  by  reason  of  excessive  exports,  while  at  other  times 
unduly  strict  prohibitions  have  left  their  grain  on  their  hands 
without  profit.  We  have  resolved  to  establish  in  Paris  a  Bureau 
composed  of  eight  Resident  Councillors  or  Commissioners, 

1  Evidence  on  this  subject  is  too  abundant  to  render  citations  necessary  here. 
The  details  will  appear  in  the  following  chapter. 

*  Isambert,  Recueil  des  Lois,  Arrets,  el  Ord.,  XII,  pt.  2,  621,  art.  102. 


ROYAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE    231 

and  a  Secretary  of  Finance,  who  shall  sign  any  decisions  and 
orders  issued  by  the  Bureau's  Treasurer,  who  shall  receive  and 
account  for  the  money  received  from  our  customs,  and  two 
Sergeants.  This  Bureau  shall  be  authorized  to  make  regulations 
for  the  trade  in  grain  and  wine,  in  accordance  with  the  following 
provisions :  — 

"  i.  This  commission  shall  be  given  full  authority  to  grant  passports  for 
the  export  of  grain  or  wine  from  our  kingdom,  to  alien  or  to  native 
merchants,  understanding  always  that  the  total  of  permits  so 
issued  shall  be  limited  to  the  quantity  which  shall  be  declared 
at  the  beginning  of  each  year. 

"  2.  This  commission  shall  regulate  all  details  of  the  exportation  of 
gram. 

"  3.   All  previous  Letters  Patent  shall  be  annulled. 

"  4.  Governors,  lieutenant  governors,  and  others  in  authority  are  for- 
bidden to  issue  any  orders  concerning  the  trade. 

"  5.  All  export  by  land  or  by  sea  is  prohibited,  except  so  far  as  authorized 
by  the  Commission.1 

"  Finally,  inasmuch  as  the  preceding  year  has  been  abundant, 
proclamation  shall  be  made  of  a  general  export  of  50,000  ton- 
neaux  of  grain,  and  of  100,000  tonneaux  of  wine,  subject  to 
increase,  if  more  accurate  information  makes  it  seem  expedient."  2 

Although  it  is  hardly  possible  that  this  Commission  or  Bureau 
should  have  discharged  the  duties  assigned  to  it,  there  are  ref- 
erences in  the  archives  at  Lyons  which  show  that  some  permits 
were  issued  by  the  Bureau,  and  that  a  serious  attempt  was  made 
to  establish  the  elaborate  administrative  machinery  outlined. 

February  28,  1559-60,  two  months  after  the  establishment 
of  the  Bureau,  Jehan  Marechal,  bourgeois  of  Pont-de-Vaulx 
in  Bresse,  is  negotiating  with  the  Echevins  of  Lyons  for  the 
passage  of  grain  which  he  has  agreed  to  furnish  the  Duke  of 
Savoy.  He  is  allowed  to  carry  his  grain  past  the  city,  on  con- 
dition of  exhibiting  f  within  a  month  Letters  Patent  of  the  King 
or  of  the  Bureau  et  Chambre  d'Abondance  recently  established 
at  Paris.3  The  Bureau  was  not  only  concerned  with  the  sub- 
ject of  foreign  export;  all  matters  of  royal  customs  on  grain  and 

1  The  wording  is  condensed. 

2  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  924-925.     20  Dec.  1559. 

3  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  81,  253.     2#  Fev.  1559-60. 


232         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

wine  came  within  its  jurisdiction.  In  March,  1561,  the  fichevins 
of  Lyons  had  made  a  contract  with  a  merchant  for  the  delivery 
of  2000  anees  of  grain  from  Burgundy.  By  special  Letters  from 
"  the  Chambre  d'Abondance  recently  established  by  the  King," 
he  was  allowed  to  ship  his  grain  from  Burgundy  without  paying 
any  duties.1  Later,  in  the  same  year,  the  Echevins  of  Lyons 
complained  of  the  action  of  the  master  of  the  port  at  Macon. 
He  justified  himself  by  sending  "  an  extract  of  the  royal  edict, 
with  an  extract  of  the  letter  sent  him  by  the  Commissioners 
lately  established  by  the  King  at  Paris.  Also,  a  letter  from  the 
King  to  him  in  regard  to  the  movements  of  trade.  .  .  .  and  if 
you  desire  to  understand  His  Majesty's  wishes  more  com- 
pletely," he  writes,  "  you  can  address  yourselves  to  the  Com- 
missioners of  the  Abondance  in  Lyons,  who  will  communicate 
the  Letters  Patent  sent  them,  in  accordance  with  which  I  am 
required  to  send  to  the  said  Bureau  (at  Paris)  an  extract  of  the 
register  that  I  have  made  of  the  grain  and  wine  which  have  been 
shipped  from  the  province."  2 

Although  there  may  be  some  reason  to  doubt  the  exact  pur- 
port of  these  rather  obscure  references,  I  am  inclined  to  apply 
them  to  the  Bureau  created  by  the  edict  of  December,  1559. 
Evidently,  something  had  been  done  towards  a  real  execution  of 
the  edict.  Commissioners  had  been  established  in  some  of  the 
large  towns,  and  the  local  authorities  had  been  instructed  to 
prepare  statistical  reports  of  movements  of  grain  and  wine. 

The  registers  of  the  municipality  of  Paris  supply  us  with 
the  substance  of  Letters  Patent  which  do  not  appear  in  Dela- 
mare.  This  measure,  dated  at  Avignon,  September  25,  1504,3 
was  primarily  fiscal,  but  it  is  interesting  because  it  contemplated 
the  establishment  of  controllers  at  all  ports.  The  rest  of  the 
edict  was  devoted  to  an  elaborate  statement  of  dues  to  be  paid 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  82,  18.    4  Mars  1560-61. 

2  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  60  bis.    3  (13)  Aout  1561.    Le  Maitre  des  Ports  a  Mascon 
aux  fichevins  de  Lyon.     These  few  facts  came  to  light  in  an  endeavor  to  trace 
the  growth  of  the  Chambre  d'Abondance  at  Lyons;  a  search  in  the  Departmental 
Archives  might  furnish  more  material  upon  this  interesting  attempt  at  administra- 
tive control,  but  the  difficulties  of  the  search  would  be  very  considerable. 

8  Reg.  du  Bureau,  V,  490.     12  Fev.  1564-65. 


ROYAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE    233 

in  different  provinces,  but  only  a  small  part  of  the  text  appears 
in  the  registers.  It  is  clear  that  the  monarchy  was  at  this  time 
making  a  great  attempt  to  extend  its  administrative  authority. 

In  1565,  an  edict  of  June  8  carries  us  back  to  the  isolated 
edicts  of  Francis  I.  There  seems  to  be  a  complete  abandon- 
ment of  the  Bureau  of  1559.  This  act  of  June  8  prohibited 
exports,  because  "  the  severe  cold,  the  snows,  fogs,  and  frosts 
of  the  present  year,  indicate  clearly  that  there  will  be  little 
grain  at  the  harvest,  and  that  we  shall  be  obliged  to  depend 
upon  the  old  grain  which  is  already  dear."  l 

In  1567,  the  aims  of  1559  appear  in  somewhat  less  ambitious 
form.  There  is  no  commission  established,  but  the  King  pro- 
hibits all  exports,  and  announces  that  he  intends  to  grant  special 
permits  when  the  information  received  from  local  officials 
shows  that  such  favors  may  safely  be  accorded.2  In  June,  1571, 
this  scheme  is  elaborated.  Provision  is  made  for  systematic 
reports  from  the  M>cal  officials,  and  the  results  were  to  be  ex- 
amined by  the  Council  and  used  as  a  basis  for  the  granting  of 
permits.  The  statement  of  motive  is  like  that  in  most  of  the 
previous  edicts.  The  King  desires  "  to  limit  the  excessive  export 
by  which  grain  is  daily  sent  out  of  the  Kingdom  to  the  detri- 
ment of  our  subjects,  turning  our  abundance  into  dearth,  and 
making  imports  necessary."  "  Accordingly  we  declare  that  the 
power  of  granting  permissions  for  export  is  a  right  inherent  in 
our  Crown,  which  we  intend  to  delegate  to  no  one,  infringement 
of  which  shall  be  deemed  '  lese  majeste.' ' 

"  None  shall  ask  for  a  grant  of  permission  to  export,  or  for 
exemptions  from  any  dues  arising  from  exportation.  All  judges 
are  hereby  forbidden  under  pain  of  an  equivalent  fine,  to  make 
any  account  of  such  moneys,  as  we  intend  to  devote  these  sums 
to  the  support  of  our  army,  without  having  them  enter  our 
Treasury. 

"  No  grain  shall  be  exported  without  express  royal  permission 
under  pain  of  confiscation  of  grain,  ship,  wagons,  horses,  and 
fines." 

1  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  959.     8  Juin  1565. 
*  Ibid.,  II,  926.    4  Fev.  1567. 


234  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

These  clauses  were  merely  designed  to  deprive  all  previous 
acts  of  legal  force,  and  to  allow  royal  authority  full  sway  in  the 
creation  of  the  new  means  of  control,  described  in  the  following 
clauses :  — 

"  All  baillis,  senechaux,  or  their  lieutenants,  shall  send  com- 
missions each  August  to  the  judges  of  their  district,  seigniorial 
as  well  as  royal  judges,  in  virtue  of  which  the  said  judges  shall 
order  the  officers  of  towns,  boroughs,  and  villages  to  inform 
themselves  as  to  the  crops.  Reports  shall  be  sent  by  them  to 
the  Bailli,  who  shall  immediately  inform  us."  Various  pains 
and  penalties  are  provided  to  enable  the  judges  to  enforce  these 
provisions,  and  the  treasurers  of  the  generalites,  who  exercise 
the  functions  of  the  intendants  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
are  instructed  to  gather  such  information  as  they  can  upon 
the  circuits  undertaken  to  assess  the  direct  taxes. 

The  crop  statistics  derived  from  these  two  sources  were  then 
to  be  examined,  and  the  exportable  surplus  determined.  That 
quantity  would  then  be  divided  among  the  generalites,  and 
Letters  Patent  issued  stating  the  amount  that  had  been  assigned 
to  each.  The  bailli,  or  some  other  official  acting  in  his  stead, 
should  then  fix  a  date  for  the  public  sale  of  licenses  for  the 
export  of  grain.  Any  person  might  bid  for  the  right  to  export 
any  quantity  from  one  tonneau  or  one  charge  to  the  whole 
quantity  assigned  to  the  district.  The  license  was  not  to  include 
exemption  from  duty,  but  the  price  should  be  sufficiently  moder- 
ate to  permit  profit.  In  all  cases  the  permits  should  be  accorded 
to  the  highest  bidder. 

Minimum  prices  were  fixed  by  the  edict  at  3  livres  10  sous 
tournois  per  tonneau  or  10  sous  per  charge.  The  differences 
of  weight  and  measure  were  provided  for.  The  forms  to  be 
used  at  the  auction  were  prescribed.  Terms  of  payment  were 
left  to  be  established  later  in  accordance  with  the  suggestions 
of  the  baillis.  In  order  to  facilitate  execution,  export  was 
restricted  to  specified  ports,  and  domestic  shippers  were  required 
to  give  security  to  insure  the  landing  of  their  cargo  at  the  ports 
specified  in  their  sailing  papers.1 

1  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  926-930. 


ROYAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE        235 

The  scheme  was  chimerical  and  its  fiscal  object  is  evident,  but 
it  indicates  the  nature  of  the  policy  of  the  time.  The  narrow 
limitations  of  effective  royal  control  appear  when  we  examine 
the  character  of  these  two  edicts,  which  really  attempt  only  to 
systematize  the  policy  that  was  pursued  spasmodically  through- 
out the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries.  The  naivete  of 
the  idea  of  so  close  an  adjustment  of  royal  regulation  to  crop 
conditions  reveals  the  lack  of  comprehension  of  the  practical 
difficulties  of  executing  such  a  measure.  For  the  highly  organ- 
ized bureaucracies  of  the  present  day  it  would  be  a  serious 
undertaking;  for  the  administrative  system  of  Henry  III  it 
was  an  impossibility.  It  is  hardly  more  than  an  expression 
of  royal  intentions.  The  desire  to  regulate  the  economic  interests 
of  the  state  was  present;  the  means,  the  knowledge  of  conditions, 
the  ideas  of  what  might  be  done  did  not  correspond  in  the  least 
respect  with  the  magnitude  of  the  design.  The  ignorance  of  the 
conditions  of  the  kingdom  is  perhaps  the  most  striking  feature 
of  these  curious  attempts.  The  monarchy  was  working  in  the 
dark,  drafting  plans  based  upon  naive  a  priori  reasoning,  sketch- 
ing policies  which  would  require  the  exact  cooperation  of  officials 
over  whom  the  monarchy  had  little  direct  control. 

The  most  complete  illustration  of  the  delusions  cherished 
by  the  King  is  furnished  by  the  frequently  repeated  assertions 
that  the  inter-provincial  trade  was  free.  This  idea  reappears 
at  regular  intervals  in  practically  the  same  form.  Traces  can 
be  found  in  the  fifteenth  century.  Francis  I  states  the  prin- 
ciple very  carefully  in  1539  and  endeavors  to  give  the  liberal 
policy  all  the  weight  of  his  authority.  The  edicts  of  1567  and 
1571  contain  clauses  to  the  same  effect.  In  1577,  the  same  pro- 
vision is  reenacted.  "  Trade  from  province  to  province  shall 
be  free,  and  none  shall  be  compelled  to  secure  permits  from  any 
local  officers.  .  .  .  Such  persons  shall  stop  shipments  of  grain 
only  when  so  authorized  by  special  Letters  Patent."  l  Nothing 
could  be  more  explicit,  and  yet  the  local  archives  of  the  period 
are  full  of  ordinances  of  governors,  baillis,  senechaux,  lieutenants 
of  all  sorts,  mayors,  provosts  of  merchants,  syndics,  or  provincial 
1  Delamare,  op.  «'/.,  II,  705.  27  Nov.  1577. 


236  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

Parlements,  all  prohibiting,  or  otherwise  interfering  with  the 
domestic  grain  trade.  In  this  aspect  of  trade  regulation,  the 
Crown  claimed  an  authority  that  it  never  exerted.  It  did  pos- 
sess some  power,  but  not  of  the  type  suggested  by  its  persistent 
declarations  that  local  officials  should  have  nothing  to  do  with 
the  grain  trade.  There  is  an  element  of  unreality  in  all  this 
apparent  activity.  There  is  much  pretence  and  benevolent 
intention. 

Ill 

After  1571,  grain  trade  policy  is  merely  an  expression  of  the 
idea  that  it  is  good  to  allow  exportation  when  crops  are  abun- 
dant, and  necessary  to  prohibit  export  when  "the  harvest  fails. 
Dearth  or  fear  of  dearth  led  to  prohibitions  in  October,  1573, 
September,  1574,  and  September,  I587.1  The  general  edict  of 
November  27,  1577  contains  a  prohibition  that  is  essentially 
the  outcome  of  fiscal  necessities.  It  amounted  to  the  imposition 
of  a  new  duty  designed  to  secure  the  funds  needed  to  pay  the 
Swiss  debt,  but  the  fiscal  element  is  supplemented  by  a  com- 
plete prohibition  of  export  from  Picardy  and  Champagne. 

The  much-discussed  reign  of  Henry  IV  is  but  slightly  con- 
cerned with  grain  trade  regulation.  In  March,  1595,  there  was 
a  prohibition;  in  February,  1601,  a  temporary  permission  of 
export  was  granted.  In  1604,  there  was  a  momentary  suspen- 
sion of  the  border  trade  with  Spain,  growing  out  of  diplomatic 
difficulties.  To  build  upon  this  foundation  the  great  principles 
of  Sully's  free  trade  doctrine  requires  no  little  imagination. 
Both  general  edicts  are  provided  with  prefaces  which  are  filled 
with  the  spirit  of  the  sixteenth  century.  The  preface  of  the 
edict  of  March,  1595  is  largely  copied  from  the  notable  preface 
of  1557.*  There  is  nothing  new  either  in  preface  or  provision 

1  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  960-962. 

2  Ibid.,  II,  962.      "  Combien  que  V experience  nous  enseigne  que  la  liberte  du 
traffic  que  les  Peuples  et  Sujets  des  Royaumes  font  avec  leurs  Voisins  et  Etr angers,  est  un 
des  principaux  moyens  de  les  rendre  aisez,  riches  et  opulens  .  .  .  neanmoins  apres  avoir 
reconnu  que  Dieu  .  .  .  nous  a  mis  en  main  un  Royaume  compose  de  diver ses  contrees  et 
Provinces,  chacune  desquelles  en  son  endroit  est  autant  que  nulle  autre  de  la  Chretiente, 
fertile  et  abondante  .  .  .  et  que  ce  qui  defaut  en  Vune  se  trouve  facilement  en  V autre; 
tellement  que  les  habitans  d'icelui  n'ont  besoin  . . .  d'aller  emprunter  le  secours  du  voisint 


ROYAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE        237 

of  the  act  of  1595.  Similarly  the  act  of  1601,  the  only  "  liberal  " 
edict  issued,  displays  that  combination  of  fiscal  and  commercial 
motives  which  we  found  in  the  edicts  of  1540,  1577,  and  in  less 
striking  fashion  in  the  edits  of  1559  and  1571.  The  lengthy 
preface  confesses  previous  manipulation  of  the  trade  with  fiscal 
intent.  Prohibitions  have  been  issued  and  exports  permitted 
from  certain  provinces  upon  payment  of  extra  duties.  This 
edict  grants  general  freedom  of  export  for  one  year  without 
payment  of  the  extra  duties.  The  limitation  of  the  effect 
of  the  edict  to  one  year  is  literally  the  only  new  feature.  The 
ideas  of  the  time  appear  much  less  clearly  than  in  the  edicts 
of  1557,  1559,  and  1571,  and  the  policy  differs  in  no  respect 
from  that  of  Francis  I  in  1540,  or  of  Henry  III  in  1577.* 

The  first  half  of  the  seventeenth  century  witnesses  no  real 
innovation  in  grain  trade  policy,  though  at  times  there  is  a 
recurrence  of  explicit  limitation  of  edicts.  But  as  this  limitation 
was  tacitly  assumed  in  the  sixteenth  century,  it  is  hardly  proper 
to  attach  much  importance  to  the  formal  appearance  of  a  time 
clause  in  the  edict  of  1601,  and  those  of  Louis  XIII. 

The  history  of  these  years  is  little  more  than  a  catalogue  of 
edicts.  The  general  Ordinance  of  January,  1629,  restates  the 
whole  policy:  "  Henceforth  the  export  of  grain  and  wine  shall 
not  be  permitted,  unless  we  are  duly  informed  by  our  local  and 
municipal  officials  that  our  provinces  are  sufficiently  supplied. 
With  this  in  view  the  farms  of  the  export  duties  shall  be  let 
out  with  the  reservation  of  the  right  to  permit  or  prohibit  export 
as  is  deemed  expedient."  2 


lequel  de  son  coste  est  tous  les  jours  contraint  d'en  venir  chercher  en  nos  terres; 
considerans  aussi  que  si  sous  pretexte  de  la  liberte  du  trafic  nous  permettions  les  con- 
tinuations des  Traittes  et  transports  de  bleds  et  autres  grains  et  legumes  aux  Pays 
Etrangers,  comme  nous  avons  fait  par  le  passe,  il  seroit  a  craindre  que  pensant  ayder 
a  autrui,  nostre  Royaume  n'en  demeurast  tellement  degarni,  que  nos  Sujets  apres 
avoir  langui  sous  le  faix  de  tant  de  miseres  .  .  .  ne  vinssent  a  tomber  en  une  ex- 
treme disette  .  .  .  Nous  .  .  .  avons  fait  et  faisons  .  .  .  inhibitions.  ..."  See 
below,  pp.  347  f.,  for  preface  of  1557. 

The  section  italicized  repeats  as  to  substance,  and  in  part  verbally,  portions  of 
the  edict  of  1557. 

1  Delamare,  op.  tit.,  II,  932. 

2  Isambert,  Recueil  des  Lois,  Arrets,  et  Ord.,  XVI,  328,  art.  419. 


238         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

Other  edicts  were  issued  as  follows :  — 

24  Nov.  1625,  a  prohibition  of  export  on  account  of  deficient  harvests.1 
30  May  1629,  permission  of  export,  upon  paying  customs.2 

30  Sept.  1631,  prohibition  of  foreign  ex^>rt,  with  an  express  reservation 

of  the  inter-provincial  trade.    Deficient  harvest  alleged.3 
19  Nov.  1639,  permission  of  foreign  export,  upon  payment  of  the 

customary  duties.4 

5  Oct.  1642,  prohibition  of  foreign  export  on  account  of  dearth.5 
9  April  1643,  prohibition  designed  to  enforce  the  preceding  act.6 
2  Oct.  1643,  prohibition  of  foreign  export.7 

31  Aug.  and  3  Oct.  1648,  prohibition  of  export,  largely  due  to  military 

policy.8 

4  Sept.  1649,  prohibition  of  foreign  export,  on  account  of  dearth.9 
19  March  1655,  permission  of  foreign  export  for  the  remainder  of  the 

year.10 

This  barren  review  of  Letters  Patent  and  edicts  can  hardly 
have  failed  to  weary  the  reader.  The  royal  attempts  have  so 
little  connection  with  the  real  problems  of  the  sixteenth  century 
trade  that  the  study  of  the  royal  policy  is  without  interest 
except  for  the  antiquarian.  The  Crown  dismissed  the  inter- 
provincial  trade  with  the  reiterated  assertion  of  its  freedom; 
foreign  trade  was  to  be  regulated  with  care.  But  even  if  the 
intentions  of  the  Crown  had  been  carried  out,  it  would  have  failed 
to  touch  the  real  issue  in  the  grain  trade,  which  was  not  the 
limitation  of  foreign  export,  but  the  regulation  of  domestic 
trade.  France  was  not  characteristically  a  grain-exporting 
country.  Brittany,  Languedoc,  Aunis,  Picardy,  and  Normandy 
sent  grain  to  foreign  countries,  but  only  in  the  case  of  Brittany, 
Languedoc,  and  Aunis  was  the  grain  a  staple  export.  Exporta- 
tion was  a  relatively  incidental  problem  in  France;  the  serious 
issues  involved  in  the  grain  trade  were  all  questions  of  the 
regulation  of  domestic  trade. 

Isambert,  Ibid.,  XVI,  153. 
H.  1803.    Reg.  du  Bureau,  vi**x. 
Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  963. 
Isambert,  op.  cit.,  XVI,  514. 
Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  16740.    266,  copy. 
Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  963. 

Ibid.y  II,  964.    H.  1806.    Reg.  du  Bureau,  vHiii. 
Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  16740.    265. 

Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  964.    H.  1809.    Reg.  du  Bureau,  iii°lxiii. 
10  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  16740.    264. 


ROYAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE    239 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  emphasis  upon  the  protectionist 
controversy  has  been  so  unfortunate.  All  attention  has  been 
concentrated  on  royal  policy,  when  royal  policy  is  almost  negli- 
gible, not  only  because  the  foreign  trade  is  in  itself  unimportant, 
but  because  the  Crown  accomplishes  so  little.  Despite  the  loud 
protestations  of  offended  dignity,  the  efficient  control  throughout 
the  sixteenth  century  was  in  the  hands  of  the  local  officials. 
The  Crown  accomplished  nothing  more  than  the  establishment 
of  a  tradition  to  which  Colbert  gave  vitality. 


CHAPTER  II 

LOCAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE.     1500-1660 

THE  local  measures  are  very  similar  in  form  to  the  royal  edicts 
which  we  have  been  studying.  They  are,  for  the  most  part, 
prohibitions  or  permissions  of  export,  combined  with  the  system 
of  special  permits  allowing  exportation  despite  the  general 
prohibitions.  But  while  there  is  little  difference  in  the  outward 
appearance,  there  is  a  great  difference  in  their  purpose  and  in 
their  effect  upon  trade.  The  domestic  trade  introduces  com- 
plications that  do  not  appear  at  all  in  foreign  trade;  in  one, 
the  interest  of  a  producing  region  is  the  principal  cause  of  solici- 
tude; in  the  other,  both  producing  and  consuming  regions  are 
involved.  The  absence  of  any  national  boundary,  too,  makes 
it  impossible  to  sacrifice  either  region,  and  the  administrative 
officials  are  thus  charged  with  the  task  of  discovering  some 
means  of  moderating  the  intensity  of  this  conflict  of  interests 
between  different  parts  of  the  same  Kingdom. 

The  measures  of  local  officials,  whether  prohibitions  or  per- 
missions, were  always  a  relatively  spontaneous  reflection  of  the 
public  opinion  in  the  province.  In  the  seventeenth  century, 
the  intendants  endeavored  to  maintain  a  considerable  degree 
of  detachment  from  local  interests,  but  in  the  sixteenth  century 
most  acts  were  the  outcome  of  strong  local  feeling.  Each 
region  sought  its  own  welfare  without  much  regard  to  the  needs 
of  neighboring  sections.  The  consuming  centers  like  Paris 
and  Lyons  were  in  constant  dread  of  dearth,  because  they  were 
dependent  on  distant  sources  of  supply  which  might  be  cut  off 
more  or  less  completely  at  any  time  by  provincial  prohibitions. 
The  producing  regions  also  had  their  fears.  They  were  not 
exposed  to  any  serious  danger  of  lack  of  grain,  due  to  inade- 
quate harvests,  but  the  intensity  of  metropolitan  demand 
constantly  exposed  them  to  the  danger  of  excessive  exports, 

240 


LOCAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE        241 

which  would  seriously  deplete  the  supplies  of  the  province. 
Years  of  scarcity  were  certainly  a  menace  to  both  regions. 
Frequently,  there  was  enough  grain  physically  in  existence  to 
prevent  suffering  in  either  the  producing  or  consuming  centers, 
but  there  was  no  means  of  distributing  this  grain  equably  be- 
tween the  two  regions.  The  defects  of  the  market  system  gave 
the  advantage  in  bargaining  to  the  consuming  centers,  so  that 
there  was  a  distinct  likelihood  that  the  producing  regions  would 
experience  greater  difficulty  in  time  of  dearth  than  the  centers 
they  supplied.  This  possibility  was  clearly  realized  in  the  grain- 
growing  sections,  and  it  was  contemplated  with  panic-stricken 
fear.  The  producing  provinces  thus  regarded  the  grain  mer- 
chants with  ill-disguised  hostility.  To  them,  the  merchant 
meant  distress  and  suffering  in  times  of  dearth.  In  the  cities 
there  was  a  similar  feeling  against  the  provinces.  The  officials 
were  regarded  as  hard-hearted,  unchristian  beings,  bent  upon 
stopping  the  supplies  of  the  large  towns  in  order  to  swell  their 
private  fortunes  by  the  sale  of  licenses.  The  peasants  of  the 
producing  regions  and  the  inhabitants  of  small  -towns  along 
the  rivers  were  regarded  as  thieves  and  robbers  ready  to  attack 
the  merchants  at  any  moment,  to  steal  the  grain  outright,  or 
take  it  at  less  than  cost. 

When  considered  in  detail,  the  history  of  grain  trade  regulation 
in  the  sixteenth  century  enables  us  to  form  some  conception  of 
the  relative  importance  of  the  factors  that  ultimately  produced 
the  close  organization  of  the  metropolitan  market.  In  every 
aspect  of  the  problem,  the  sixteenth  century  reveals  real 
growth.  In  the  early  years,  the  conflict  of  interests,  which 
is  never  very  apparent  except  in  the  areas  supplying  Lyons 
and  Paris,  is  hardly  perceptible  even  in  the  Lyons  area.  The 
increasing  frequency  of  resort  to  Burgundy  finally  brought 
out  expressions  of  local  feeling,  and,  in  1557,  the  issue  was  joined 
between  Burgundy  and  Lyons.  This  apparent  deadlock  was 
solved  by  an  appeal  to  the  King.  All  through  this  phase  of  the 
history  of  the  grain  trade,  the  King  appears  in  this  essentially 
medieval  capacity.  He  is  not  an  administrator,  but  an  arbiter, 
not  seeking  to  govern  in  the  modern  sense  by  actual  adminis- 


242  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

trative  regulations  for  the  welfare  of  the  people,  but  serving 
merely  to  moderate  the  discord  in  the  body  politic.  This  aspect  of 
royal  activity,  however,  appears  clearly  only  when  the  opposition 
of  local  interests  has  become  sharp  and  well  denned.  But  once 
this  element  of  arbitration  enters  into  the  situation,  it  remains  a 
permanent  factor.  In  the  sixteenth  century,  the  King  acted 
directly  through  edicts  and  patents;  in  the  seventeenth  century, 
the  intendants  assumed  this  function.  Severally  and  collectively, 
they  exerted  all  their  influence  in  favor  of  the  general  welfare 
when  local  interests  would  naturally  result  in  a  narrow  pro- 
vincial policy.  Social  harmony  was  thus  secured  only  by  the 
active  interference  of  the  King  or  his  personal  representatives, 
the  intendants.  They  endeavored  to  remedy  the  evils  caused 
by  the  defective  market  system,  and  this  forced  them,  in  many 
instances,  to  assume  complete  control  of  the  distribution  of 
grain.  This  tendency  was  not  very  strong  in  the  sixteenth 
century,  as  the  Crown  was  not  sufficiently  informed  of  the  details 
of  the  trade,  but  in  the  seventeenth  century  the  policy  reached 
its  full  manifestation.  Intendants  like  Baville  would,  at  times, 
direct  all  details  of  the  distribution  of  grain  throughout  their 
provinces  during  the  whole  period  of  distress. 

Interests  of  two  types  were  effectively  represented  by  the  local 
officials:  the  intensely  circumscribed  interests  of  individual  towns, 
and  the  wider  interests  of  those  real  geographical  regions  which 
formed  the  provinces.  The  relation  between  political  boun- 
daries and  the  natural  divisions  of  the  country  is  of  significance 
in  the  history  of  the  grain  trade,  as  a  province  or  government 
was  almost  certain  to  include  the  whole  of  a  fertile  area;  and, 
as  they  frequently  included  several  of  those  sharply  defined 
regions,  they  represented  a  local  interest  of  a  very  pronounced 
kind.  The  products  of  the  various  sections  differed,  and  fre- 
quently the  whole  province  was  ultimately  dependent  upon  one 
part  for  its  grain  supply.  This  natural  basis  of  provincial 
boundaries  made  the  province  the  best  unit  for  regulation 
of  the  grain  trade  during  the  sixteenth  century.  A  prohibition 
of  export  from  the  province  permitted  the  ordinary  local  trade, 
but  guarded  the  region  against  any  disturbing  influence  of  extra- 


LOCAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE        243 

provincial  demand.  The  towns  which  were  used  as  shipping 
points  could  give  additional  force  to  restrictive  measures  by 
prohibitions  of  export  of  grain  stored  within  the  town.  The 
governors  and  the  provincial  parlements  were  usually  the 
authorities  who  issued  provincial  prohibitions,  and  not  infre- 
quently both  combined  in  their  efforts  to  protect  local  interests. 
The  Estates  seldom,  if  ever,  did  anything.  The  welfare  of  the 
large  commercial  towns  seeking  grain  was,  of  course,  defended 
by  the  municipal  officials.  At  Paris,  the  Parlement  of  Paris 
and  the  Chatelet  assisted.  The  characteristic  feature  of  adminis- 
trative regulation  in  the  sixteenth  century  was  the  persistent 
effort  of  provincial  governors  or  parlements  to  limit  the  export 
trade  of  the  province.  On  the  part  of  the  agents  of  Paris  or 
Lyons,  there  was  an  energetic  attempt  to  maintain  freedom 
of  trade.  The  former  relied  upon  their  local  privileges,  the  latter 
secured  royal  Letters  Patent  annulling  in  whole  or  in  part  the 
arrets  and  ordinances  of  the  provincial  authorities.  The  local 
officials  joined  the  issue,  the  question  was  settled  by  appeal 
to  the  King. 

The  baillis  and  the  senechaux  were  the  only  officials  with 
whom  we  are  concerned  who  were  closely  in  touch  with  the 
royal  government.  They  were  charged  with  the  general  task 
of  administration  of  the  royal  domain,  and  had  cognizance  of 
all  matters,  judicial,  administrative,  and  financial.  They 
enjoyed  a  large  measure  of  individual  initiative  and  possessed 
some  ordinance  making  power.  But  they  played  a  relatively 
small  part  in  the  history  of  the  grain  trade.  The  nature  of  the 
area  under  their  authority  made  effective  regulation  difficult, 
if  not  impossible.  As  they  had  charge  only  of  the  royal  domain, 
all  lands  belonging  to  the  Church  or  to  nobles  were  exempt 
from  their  control,  forming  enclaves  within  their  jurisdiction. 
The  baillage  or  senechausee  never  included  a  solid  block  of 
territory,  and,  quite  apart  from  the  confusion  caused  by  the 
enclaves  of  extra-domain  land,  the  limits  of  the  baillages  were 
never  well  ascertained  as  regards  each  other.  In  matters  of 
judicial  and  financial  administration  this  aspect  of  the  form  of 
the  baillage  was  not  of  great  importance,  but  such  a  jurisdiction 


244  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

was  obviously  unfitted  to  deal  with  questions  of  trade.  Further- 
more, the  power  of  the  bailli  had  been,  so  to  speak,  "  put  into 
commission  "  in  1498.  The  diversity  of  his  authority  was  so 
great  that  a  considerable  number  of  assistants  were  required, 
and  they  gradually  developed  a  deal  of  independence  in  the 
exercise  of  their  functions.  Unity  of  action  was  preserved  to 
some  degree  by  the  formation  of  a  council  of  the  baillage  com- 
posed of  these  officers.  But  such  a  body  acted  slowly,  and, 
even  in  the  sixteenth  century,  had  begun  to  limit  itself  more  and 
more  to  the  judicial  duties  which  later  became  its  sole  function.1 

Burgundy  and  Lyons 

The  Lyonese  merchants  began  to  seek  supplies  in  Burgundy 
at  the  close  of  the  fifteenth  century.  These  purchases,  however, 
attracted  little  attention  and  caused  no  anxiety  in  Burgundy. 
A  few  years  later,  when  the  first  prohibitions  were  issued,  the 
Lyonese  secured  countervailing  Letters  Patent  from  the  King. 
But  there  was  no  marked  hostility  to  the  Lyonese.  In  May, 
1520,  the  Governor  of  Burgundy  permitted  the  Lyonese  mer- 
chants to  export  2500  mines  of  grain  purchased  by  them  in 
Burgundy  and  Bassigny.  Prohibitions  had  been  issued,  and  the 
Lyonese  had  sent  to  the  King  for  Letters  Patent,  giving  them 
the  right  to  export  grain.  The  Governor  of  Burgundy  yielded 
to  the  royal  Letters  Patent,  apparently  without  debate,  although 
the  limitation  of  exports  to  2500  mines  may  have  been  his  own 
idea.2 

In  1528,  we  have  more  details  of  the  negotiations  between  Lyons 
and  Burgundy.  The  Consuls  of  Lyons  complained  in  August 
of  light  harvests  and  of  attempts  of  Italians  and  others  to  make 
shipments  to  Savoy  and  Piedmont.  They  proposed  to  secure 
Letters  Patent  from  the  King  prohibiting  export  from  Lyonnais.3 
December  7,  the  Consuls  assembled  the  notables  of  the  town  to 

1  G.  Dupont-Ferrier,  Les  Officiers  Royaux  des  Baillages  et  des  Senechaussees 
et  les  Institutions  Monarchiques  en  France  d  la  Fin  du  Moyen  Age,  Paris,  1902, 
p.  119. 

2  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,  381,   16.      26  Mai  1520.     Notarial  copy 
of  Letters  Patent. 

3  Ibid.,  BB.  47,  35-     20  Aoflt  1528. 


LOCAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE        245 

inform  them  that  they  had  sent  envoys  to  the  King  and  to  the  Gov- 
ernor of  Burgundy  in  order  to  secure  the  right  to  export  grain 
from  Burgundy.  The  Consuls  asked  for  money  with  which  to 
purchase  gram  on  the  account  of  the  municipality.1  A  month 
later,  one  Henry  Guimbre  was  commissioned  to  go  to  Burgundy 
to  buy  one  thousand  mines  of  grain  on  the  account  of  the  munici- 
pality. January  30,  Letters  Patent,  dated  January  15,  arrived 
from  the  Court,  authorizing  these  Lyonese  exports  from  Bur- 
gundy. These  Letters  were  at  once  forwarded  to  Guimbre.2 
Letters  and  reports  indicate  that  the  purchases  in  Burgundy 
aroused  no  opposition,  either  official  or  popular.3  In  the  letter  of 
May  6,  it  is  remarked,  however,  that  the  Lyonese  "  merchants 
hesitate  to  ship  to  Lyons,  on  account  of  the  rioting  that  occurs 
there,  and  because  prices  are  higher  at  Villefranche  and  Belleville 
and  other  places  which  are  passed  on  the  way  down" 4  There 
was  only  gram  enough  at  Lyons  to  supply  the  city  for  two 
days,5  and  the  anticipation  of  difficulties  in  Burgundy  or  on  the 
way  had  already  suggested  resort  to  other  provinces.  On  April 
23,  the  Consuls  had  resolved  to  send  agents  to  the  Parlement 
of  Grenoble  to  secure  the  right  to  export  from  Dauphine.  May 
n,  Letters  Patent  were  received  from  the  court,  authorizing 
Lyons  to  export  three  thousand  anees  of  grain  from  Dauphine, 
Viennois,  Forez,  and  Velay.  Letters  were  also  received  from 
the  Governor  of  Auvergne  and  Bourbonnois,  permitting  the 
export  of  one  thousand  se tiers  of  grain.6  At  the  end  of  the 
month,  more  royal  Letters  Patent  arrived,  covering  exports  from 
Dauphine.7  On  September  13,  royal  Letters  Patent  were 
issued,  covering  further  exports  from  all  these  provinces.8 

Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  47,  164.     7  Dec.  1528. 

Ibid.,  BB.  47,  183,  191.     7  Jan.  1528-29,  20  Jan.  1528-29. 

Ibid.,  BB.  47,  200,  233,  248.     10  Fev.,  20  Avril,  6  Mai  1528-29. 

This  is  a  singularly  direct  illustration  of  an  important  consequence  of  the 
independence  of  the  divers  municipal  markets. 

Letter  of  6  May. 

Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,  381.  18,  u,  25  Mai  1529.  Copies  des 
Lettres  Patents  de  Francois  I  et  des  Lettres  du  Gouveneur  d' Auvergne  et  de 
Bourbonnois. 

7  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  381,  19.    Original.    30  Mai  1529.    Autres  Let^es  Patentes 
13  Sept.  1529.    Chappe  IV,  38,  124. 

8  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  381,  20.    13  Sept.  1529. 


246  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

These  frequent  royal  Letters  Patent  seem  to  be  directed 
against  a  customary  provincial  prohibition.  Their  object  was  to 
anticipate  possible  objection,  rather  than  to  annul  prohibitions 
that  had  actually  been  issued  by  the  provincial  authorities.  It 
was  an  attempt  to  secure  that  freedom  of  the  provincial  trade  so 
vainly  enunciated  in  the  general  edicts.  At  this  period,  there  was 
almost  no  obstacle  in  the  producing  regions,  save  inertia.1 

In  September,  1539,  there  is  a  suggestion  of  a  more  positive 
desire  for  protective  prohibitions  in  the  producing  sections. 
Royal  Letters  Patent  were  issued  prohibiting  export  from  Bur- 
gundy. These  were  doubtless  obtained  by  direct  intercession 
at  Court.2  The  King  was  equally  accessible  to  other  influences, 
however,  and  in  October,  Letters  Patent  were  given  the  Consuls 
at  Lyons  authorizing  citizens  of  Lyons  to  export  grain  from 
Burgundy,  Bresse,  Bourbonnois,  Auvergne,  and  Dombes.3 

This  use  of  royal  Letters  Patent  continued  for  the  next  twenty 
or  twenty-five  years.  There  were  occasional  Patents  pro- 
hibiting export  from  Burgundy,  as,  in  September,  1540  and 
October,  1544;  more  frequently  there  were  grants  of  privilege 
to  Lyons.4  On  one  occasion  the  Lyonese  addressed  themselves 
directly  to  the  Governor  of  Burgundy,  who  permitted  the  export 
of  one  hundred  mines  of  grain.5 

In  1556-57,  the  attitude  of  the  Burgundian  officials  changed. 
They  no  longer  assented  readily  to  the  export  of  grain  to  Lyons 
but  discussed  seriously  the  expediency  of  permitting  any  export. 
Royal  Letters  Patent  received  little  more  attention  than  other 
forms  of  request. 

The  harvest  of  1556  was  not  abundant,  and  considerable 
exports  to  Lucca  and  to  Malta  tended  to  exhaust  Burgundy 

1  See  also  Lyon,  Arch.  Mini.,  Chappe  IV,  381,  25.      2  Fev.   1530.      Lettres 
Patent es  of  Francois  I. 

2  Dijon,  Arch.  Mun.,  G.  256.     13  Sept.  1539.    Ord.  du  Bailli  de  Dijon,  portant 
mandement  aux  Maire  et  Echevins  de  Dijon  de  publier  les  lettres  Patentes  de 
Francois  I  du  4  Sept.  1539. 

3  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,  393,  32.     28  Oct.  1539. 

4  Dijon,  Arch.  Mun.,  G.  256.     28  Sept.  1540.     28  Oct.  1544. 

6  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  61,  102-119.  18  Juillet,  21  Sept.  1543.  Ibid., 
Chappe  IV,  393,  34  bis.  26  Oct.  1543-  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  393,  37.  26  Oct. 
1545.  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  393,  38.  n  Dec.  1545. 


LOCAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE        247 

and  to  excite  the  apprehensions  of  the  Lyonese.  Joined  to 
these  unusual  demands  upon  Burgundy  and  Lyons  was  tjie 
quartering  of  the  army  of  the  Due  de  Guise,  then  at  Lyons. 
This  naturally  stimulated  the  Lyonese  merchants  to  greater 
activity  in  Burgundy.  The  officials  there  became  apprehensive 
and  prohibited  export.  "  At  Auxonne,  Seurre,  Chalons,  Macon, 
they  prevent  the  shipment  (February,  1557)  of  the  grain  that 
the  merchants  customarily  buy  for  the  provision  of  Lyonnais. 
.  .  .  They  even  prevent  the  passage  through  Burgundy  of  the 
grain  purchased  in  Franche  Comte  and  lands  under  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Empire."  1 

The  prohibitions  were  thus  more  positive  and  more  deliberate 
than  formerly,  and  they  were  the  direct  outgrowth  of  fear  of 
dearth. 

The  Consuls  of  Lyons  resorted  to  the  old  expedient.  Royal 
Letters  Patent  were  secured  February  24,  1557,  granting  Lyons 
the  privilege  of  exporting  30,000  charges  of  grain  from  Burgundy, 
Bresse,  and  Dombes.2  But  this  policy  no  longer  had  an  imme- 
diate effect  as  before.  On  March  13,  new  Letters  Patent  were 
granted  with  the  same  end  in  view.3  But  this  did  not  clear  away 
the  obstacles.  The  local  officials  proceeded  to  negotiate  and 
bargain.  The  twentieth  of  the  month,  the  Governor  of  Bur- 
gundy made  an  agreement  with  the  Commissioners  of  the  Con- 
suls at  Lyons.  The  whole  negotiation  is  an  illuminating  instance 
of  the  nature  of  royal  authority.  The  Letters  Patent  of  the 
King  were  absolute  grants  of  the  privilege  of  exporting  gram 
from  Burgundy,  but  the  document  embodying  the  result  of  the 
negotiations  states  "  that  in  consideration  of  the  Letters  Patent 
of  the  King  of  Feburary  last,  the  said  Barthelemy  Alexandrin, 
bourgeois  of  Lyons,  and  Jacques  Guimbre,  Commissionaire 
of  the  King  at  the  fortifications  of  Lyons,  both  in  their  private 
capacities,  and  as  Commissioners  of  the  Echevins  of  Lyons, 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,   393,   34.      26  Mars  1542.      Chappe  IV, 
393,  40.     10  Fev.  1556-57.     Proces  Verbal  faite  par  M.  Jehan  de  Fournel.    Con. 
du  Roy:  Lieu.  Gen.  en  la  Senechaussee  et  Siege  Presidial  de  Lion.  The  whole  of 
the  above  is  an  account  drawn  from  this  document. 

2  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  393,  41.     24  Fev.  1556-57. 

3  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  393,  42.     13  Mars  1556-57. 


248         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

have  signed  the  treaties  and  conventions  which  follow:  viz:  — 
the  said  Sieur  de  Saulx,  Governor  of  Burgundy,  grants  them  the 
right  and  privilege  of  exporting  500  mines  of  the  grain  that  they 
have  assembled  at  Maxilly  and  vicinity,  with  the  understanding 
that  said  grain  shall  be  carried  down  the  Saone  to  Lyons  .  .  . 
and  in  return,  said  Alexandrin  and  Guimbre  have  agreed  to 
carry  to  Dijon  250  mines  of  grain,  which  they  shall  be  required 
to  purchase  in  Bassigny  and  Langres,  or  other  places  outside 
the  government  of  Burgundy,  in  those  granaries  in  which  they 
have  been  buying.  This  they  shall  do  within  a  month.  .  .  . 
And  when  the  said  quantity  of  250  mines  of  grain  shall  have  been 
delivered  at  Dijon,  the  said  de  Saulx  promises  to  grant  them  the 
privilege  of  exporting  500  mines  of  grain  from  Maxilly  on  like 
conditions  of  delivering  250  mines  at  Dijon."  l  The  Governor 
of  Burgundy  thus  imposed  such  limitations  as  he  deemed  neces- 
sary upon  the  royal  order. 

The  Echevins  of  Lyons  were  not  very  well  satisfied  with  this 
rather  hard  bargain,  and  proceeded  to  obtain  fresh  Letters 
Patent  from  the  Court.2  These  recite  the  whole  story.  "  Inas- 
much as  by  our  Letter  Patent  of  February  24,  we  have  permitted 
the  Consuls  and  Echevins  of  Lyons  to  export  30,000  charges 
of  grain  from  Burgundy  and  other  provinces  .  .  .  and  not- 
withstanding this,  the  Lieutenant  of  the  Governor  of  Burgundy 
has  not  only  persisted  in  his  refusal,  but  even  seized  and  arrested 
all  the  grain  that  the  said  petitioners  had  purchased  and  trans- 
ported from  Lorraine,  Tranche  Comte,  Champagne,  and  Bas- 
signy, together  with  the  boats  on  which  the  grain  was  loaded 
at  Maxilly  and  other  parts  of  the  Saone,  .  .  .  Accordingly, 
we  order  the  release  of  all  the  grain  belonging  to  the  petitioners 
or  to  merchants  supplying  Lyons,  whether  the  grain  is  of  the 
growth  of  Burgundy,  Franche  Comte,  Lorraine,  or  other  lands." 

Meanwhile,  Grolier  and  Guimbre,  the  agents  of  Lyons  in 
Burgundy,  were  doing  their  best  to  overcome  the  insistence  of 
the  Lieutenant,  Villefrancon,  upon  the  dearth  and  the  necessities 
of  Burgundy  itself.  Guimbre  writes  from  Dijon,  March  31,  — 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,  401,  46.     20  Mars  1556-57. 

2  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  401,  46.    31  Mars  1556-57. 


LOCAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE        249 

1  Today,  I  have  presented  M.  de  Villefrancon  with  the  Letters 
of  the  King,  which  he  has  treated  as  he  has  the  previous  Letters. 
Then,  in  accordance  with  your  last  instructions  I  presented 
him  with  the  petition  of  which  I  enclose  a  copy.1  He  would 
give  me  no  reply.  I  asked  for  an  acknowledgement  of  having 
seen  the  Letters  of  the  King,  but  he  refused  that  request  also. 
.  .  .  The  said  Seigneur  was  persuaded  to  grant  permits  for  the 
export  of  your  grain  only  with  great  difficulty,  and  to  secure 
the  permits  for  the  rest  of  the  grain  covered  by  the  first  contract, 
he  has  forced  me  to  sign  another,  agreeing  to  leave  at  Maxilly 
250  mines  of  grain  instead  of  those  that  I  was  to  deliver  at  Dijon 
a  month  hence.  His  reason  for  doing  this  is  that  Dijon  is  not 
adequately  supplied,  and  the  250  mines  are  to  remain  at  Maxilly 
for  six  weeks,  where  the  people  of  Dijon  can  go  to  get  them  if 
they  have  need.  ...  As  for  the  grain  that  Nicholas  Molle 
has  sold  you,  you  cannot  expect  to  receive  it  for  a  long  while. 
Still  less,  the  grain  at  Saint-Jean-de-Losne,  on  account  of  the 
strict  prohibitions  and  the  order  given  the  Lieutenant  of  that 
town  by  Villefrancon,  and  despite  all  these  fears,  there  are 
4000  anees  at  Saint- Jean-de-Losne,  more  than  the  town  could 
consume  in  two  years."  2 

Towards  the  end  of  April  we  begin  to  get  reports  of  the  results 
of  the  Lyonese  attempts  to  execute  the  royal  Letters  Patent 
of  March  31.  They  began  at  Macon  3  and  gradually  worked 
up  the  river,  exhibiting  the  royal  Patents  and  bidding  the  munic- 
ipal authorities  to  publish  their  contents  by  the  public  crier. 
"  We  have  found  the  local  officials  very  respectful  and  obedient 
to  royal  commands  and  by  that  authority  we  have  secured  the 
release  of  much  grain.  It  is  true  that  last  Saturday,  upon 
arriving  at  Auxonne,  we  found  that  Villefrancon,  advised  of 
our  action  on  the  lower  river,  had  sent  a  commission  prohibiting 
exports.  This  was  executed  an  hour  before  our  arrival,  so 

1  This  petition  is  apparently  the  document,  Chappe  IV,  411,  60  bis.  Placet 
de  MM.  les  Echevins  de  Lyon  a  M.  de  Villefrancon,  Lieu,  au  Gouvernement  de 
Bourgogne. 

*  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  AA.  32.    Dijon,  31  Mars  1556-57.     Guimbre. 

3  Ibid.,  AA.  32.  Mascon,  Mardy  de  Pasques,  1557.  Grolier.  Rapport  d'un 
Proces  Verbal  fait  a  Mascon. 


250         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

that  we  left  immediately  for  Dijon  to  speak  with  Villefrancon. 
After  making  the  necessary  remonstrances,  ...  he  finally 
granted  us  the  right  to  export  all  the  grain  that  had  been  pur- 
chased by  the  city  or  by  merchants  for  the  provision  of  the  city. 
.  .  .  Since  the  publication  of  the  right  of  export  several  persons 
have  manifested  much  energy  in  shipping  grain  to  Lyons.  .  .  . 
We  have  sent  copies  of  the  Patents  to  Langres,  and  have  left 
Dijon  for  Maxilly  to  publish  them  there."  l  But  Villefrancon's 
concessions  were  not  as  complete  as  this  letter  would  seem  to 
indicate.  The  commissioners  write  on  May  ist:  "Villefrancon 
permits  the  export  of  1700  mines  of  grain.  Since  that  promise, 
too,  he  has  agreed  to  allow  the  shipment  of  all  the  grain  we  have 
at  Maxilly.  We  expect  that  there  will  be  forty  boats  ready  to 
leave  by  the  sixth  day  of  May,  carrying  more  than  5000  anees, 
belonging  in  part  to  the  city,  in  part  to  merchants."  Then, 
just  as  their  mission  has  succeeded,  they  admit  the  reality  of  the 
apprehensions  which  have  actuated  Villefrancon  and  the  local 
officials.  "  The  Maire  and  fichevins  of  Dijon,"  they  say, 
"  have  agreed  not  to  interfere  with  our  shipments  in  the  future, 
unless  there  is  urgent  need  as  in  this  present  year,  during  which 
they  say  that  they  have  suffered  as  much  from  dearth  as  we 
have.  For  this  reason,  we  have  not  published  our  letters  by 
crier,  as  we  have  in  other  places."  2 

The  Echevins  of  Lyons,  however,  were  anxious  to  bring  suit 
against  Villefrancon  for  his  interference  with  the  trade,  and  the 
commissioners  were  instructed  to  collect  evidence.  Grolier 
replied  to  these  directions  of  the  Echevins  in  a  long  letter  defend- 
ing Villefrancon's  conduct: 

"I  have  received  your  letters  of  April  27,"  he  writes,  "ordering 
me  to  neglect  no  opportunity  of  gathering  information  in  all 
the  places  where  Villefrancon  had  the  grain  boats  stopped. 
In  reply,  I  may  say  that  in  all  the  towns  of  Burgundy  where 
our  Patents  have  been  published  we  have  had  notarial  copies 
made  of  the  orders  and  prohibitions  of  Villefrancon  in  virtue 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  AA.  32.     Auxonne,  27  Avril  1557.     Grolier  et  Guimbre. 
*  Ibid.,  AA.  32.      Auxonne,  i  Mai  1557.      Guimbre  et  Grolier.    Also  AA.  32. 
Auxonne,  2  Mai  1557.    Grolier. 


LOCAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE        251 

of  which  the  merchants  were  stopped.  This  is  incontrovertible 
evidence  of  the  wrongs  done  the  city  of  Lyons,  and  of  his  dis- 
obedience of  royal  commands.  Furthermore,  we  have  taken 
depositions  of  witnesses  at  Saint- Jean-de-Losne  of  the  arrest 
and  seizure  of  the  grain  boats,  and  of  the  exaction  of  illegal 
dues  by  the  measurers  and  other  officers  established  by  Ville- 
francon.  .  .  .  But  I  have  not  wished  to  initiate  any  proceed- 
ings, for  reasons  which  it  will  please  the  Councillors  of  Lyons 
to  consider.  In  the  first  place,  the  principal  object  of  our 
voyage  was  the  prompt  shipment  of  the  grain  purchased  by  the 
town  and  by  merchants.  This  we  could  not  have  compassed, 
if  Villefrancon  had  supposed  that  we  were  inclined  to  proceed 
against  him;  and  it  would  have  been  absolutely  impossible,  if 
he  had  learned  of  such  inquiries  before  the  grain  had  left  Auxonne. 
We  should  then  have  been  in  a  much  worse  position  than  before, 
as  he  has  the  complete  confidence  of  Sieur  d'Aumale,  of  the 
Duchess  of  Valentinois,  and  generally  of  the  brothers  of  the 
House  of  Guise.  They  would  have  supported  him,  as  Burgundy 
is  certainly  suffering  from  dearth,  and  would  have  profited  from  the 
enforcement  of  his  prohibitions.  All  this  we  were  able  to  infer 
from  the  fact  that  mere  publication  of  the  general  permission 
of  export,  without  our  having  first  informed  him,  had  so  irritated 
him  that  he  had  issued  prohibitions  in  all  the  places  we  had  passed 
through.  I  was  thus  constrained  in  much  perplexity  to  follow 
the  maxim  of  the  great  dramatist,  '  Ne  quid  nimis/  which 
proved  to  be  good  policy,  for  by  means  of  the  diplomatic  lan- 
guage that  I  used  with  him,  ...  we  are  sending  down  to  Lyons 
nine  to  ten  thousand  anees,  .  .  .  and  since  my  return  to  Auxonne 
Villefrancon  has  sent  me  several  missives  directed  to  the  officers 
of  all  the  river  towns,  instructing  them  to  allow  the  Lyonese 
boats  free  passage. 

"  Secondly,  I  felt  that  the  Echevins  should  be  satisfied  with 
meeting  the  present  necessity  without  indulging  in  any  formali- 
ties against  a  Governor  of  Burgundy  who  has  the  support  of 
most  of  the  members  of  the  '  Conseil  Prive/  and  who  could 
easily  justify  himself  by  proving  the  dearth  that  existed  in  his 


252         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

provinces.  Furthermore,  after  hearing  the  reasons  which  had 
influenced  Villefrancon,  I  recognized  that  he  is  a  virtuous  man, 
and  that  any  of  the  Echevins  of  Lyons  would  have  done  as  much 
had  they  been  in  his  place."  1 

The  local  prohibitions  in  Burgundy  in  1557  are  the  earliest 
manifestation  of  a  consciousness  of  real  danger  from  the  exports 
of  the  wholesale  merchants.  From  this  time,  the  local  policy 
in  Burgundy  is  the  outcome  of  a  persistent  dread  of  exports  in 
years  of  scarcity.  The  exact  extent  of  the  sufferings  of  Bur- 
gundy cannot  be  known,  for  no  information  was  ever  gathered 
that  could  decide  such  a  question.  None  the  less,  we  are  fre- 
quently confronted  by  such  admissions  as  those  just  cited  from 
the  letters  of  the  Commissioners  of  Lyons.  Grolier  and  Guimbre 
evidently  believed  that  the  dearth  in  Burgundy  was  an  actuality. 
It  was  not,  of  course,  a  wide-spread  famine;  that,  as  we  have 
seen,  was  rare  and  confined  primarily  to  the  infertile  sections 
of  France,  but  dearth  could  bring  many  serious  consequences 
in  its  train,  even  without  becoming  actual  famine.  The  recur- 
rence of  dearths,  more  or  less  acute  in  both  consuming  and 
producing  regions,  is  the  basis  of  all  the  local  regulations  and 
negotiations  concerning  the  grain  trade*  in  this  region. 

In  1559-60  there  was  some  little  difficulty,  and  light  crops 
induced  the  Governor  of  Burgundy  to  issue  prohibitions.  The 
Echevins  of  Lyons  procured  Patents  from  the  King  and  secured 
permits  from  the  Governor.2 

In  1570,  the  old  problem  recurred.  In  September,  the  Parle- 
ment  of  Dijon  prohibited  export  from  the  province,  and  enjoined 
the  officers  of  Auxonne,  Saint- Jean-de-Losne,  Seurre,  and  Cha- 
lons to  prevent  shipments.  The  sergeant  of  the  Parlement 
made  a  trip  to  Maxilly  and  Pontaillier  to  enforce  the  execution 
of  the  ordinance.  He  had  the  local  officials  collect  information 
about  the  merchants  who  were  amassing  stores  or  securing  grain 
for  shipment  by  giving  earnest  money.  He  made  a  tour  of  the 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  AA.  32,  89.  Auxonne,  6  Mai  1557.  Original.    AA.  32,  83. 
Copy  of  above. 

2  Ibid.,  BB.  81,  212,  242,   257.     28  Nov.   1559,  4  Fev.   1559-60,   12  Mars 
1559-60.    Delib.  Consulates. 


LOCAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE        253 

Saone  towns  and  stopped  several  boats.1  The  Echevins  of  Lyons 
endeavored  to  secure  from  divers  local  authorities  permission  to 
export,  but  without  much  success.  The  Syndic  of  Dijon  writes 
in  January:  "  I  have  communicated  your  letters  to  the  Estates. 
They  have  begged  me  to  grant  no  permits,  and,  in  very  truth, 
grain  is  so  dear  in  these  parts  that  any  accident  to  the  coming 
crops  would  reduce  us  to  famine.  Furthermore,  the  Estates 
have  obtained  Letters  Patent  from  the  King  prohibiting  export 
from  the  Province."  2  Lyons  then  proceeded  to  get  Patents 
from  the  Court,  securing,  in  February,  the  right  to  draw  10,000 
anees  of  grain  from  Burgundy.3  These  were  followed  in  April 
by  a  similar  permit  for  Bassigny.4  But  these  were  not  executed 
without  difficulty.  The  Parlement  of  Dijon  refused  (June  20) 
to  register  either  Patent,  "  until  inquiry  had  been  made  into 
the  necessities  of  the  province."  5  A  letter  of  April  8' also  suggests 
that  many  difficulties  were  encountered  by  the  merchants  and 
agents  of  Lyons.  The  municipal  officers  did  not  attach  much 
credit  to  the  royal  Patents.6  In  September,  after  the  harvest, 
the  Patents  were  executed  by  order  of  the  Governor  of  Burgundy.7 
In  1572-73,  the  necessities  of  Burgundy  were  pressing,  but  the 
authorities  seem  to  have  become  more  accustomed  to  the  situa- 
tion and  permitted  limited  exports  to  Lyons  without  quite  so 
much  negotiation.  The  Echevins  of  Lyons  continued  to  keep 
their  agent  at  Court  busy  securing  royal  Patents  to  overrule 
the  action  of  the  Estates  or  of  the  Governor,  and  a  couple  of 
letters  from  this  agent  show  the  devious  method  employed.  But 
these  Patents  granted  by  the  King,  "  a  la  barbe  des  Etats  de 
Bourgogne,"  8  do  not  seem  to  have  had  any  great  effect.  The 
Governor  apparently  felt  free  to  decide  the  case  according  to 

1  Dijon,  Arch.  Mun.,  G.  256.     23  Sept.  1570.    Ord.  du  Parlement. 

2  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  Chappe  IV,  411,  60  bis.     Dijon,  13  Jan.  1571. 

3  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  401,  48.     8    Fev.  1571.    Lettres  Patentes   de  Chas.  IX. 

4  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  401,  49.     6  Avril  1571. 

5  Arret  joined  to  above  piece. 

6  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  AA.  29.    Dijon,  8  Avril  1571.     CMtillon. 

7  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  401,  50.     6  Sept.   1571,  and  letters  of  the  Governor 
annexed. 

8  Ibid.,  AA.  98,  4,  5.    Amboise,  3  Fev.  1572,  5  Avril  1572. 


254         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

his  own  judgment.  "  You  are  such  near  neighbors  of  this 
province,"  he  writes  to  the  Echevins  of  Lyons  (May  20),  "  that 
you  must  know  how  great  the  dearth  is,  and  yet  I  have  en- 
deavored to  close  my  eyes  to  all  this  indigence,  and  have  granted 
you  a  second  permit  for  the  export  of  500  mines  of  wheat  to 
succor  you  in  your  present  need.  But  at  the  same  time,  I 
feel  it  necessary  to  make  this  final,  and  shall  not  grant  any  more 
permits,  as  I  must  prevent  further  exports  from  this  province, 
or  I  shall  soon  be  in  the  midst  of  severe  famine.  You  are  out 
of  the  danger  which  threatened  you,  as  we  have  left  the  trade 
relatively  free,  and  have  not  made  any  very  searching  inquiry 
into  the  quantity  of  grain  shipped  to  Lyons."  1  Evidently, 
the  Governor  is  acquiring  the  habit  of  a  close  regulation  of  the 
grain  trade,  seeking  to  adjust  the  permission  of  export  as  ex- 
actly as  possible  to  the  needs  of  his  own  province,  and  of  Lyons. 
He  endeavors  to  keep  himself  informed  of  local  conditions  as 
far  as  it  was  possible  in  his  time,  and  while  he  recognizes  the 
necessity  of  some  limitation  of  export  to  protect  Burgundy, 
he  does  not  make  his  prohibition  absolute  to  the  detriment  of 
Lyons.  He  seeks  to  reconcile  the  conflicting  interests  of  his 
province  and  the  distant  city. 

In  1573,  there  were  suggestions  of  trouble,  both  in  the  spring 
and  in  November,  after  the  harvest.2  A  letter  of  De  Rubys, 
an  agent  of  Lyons,  speaks  in  strong  terms  of  the  actuality  of  the 
dearth  in  Lower  Burgundy,3  and  the  letter  of  Charny  in  Novem- 
ber discloses  an  equally  serious  condition  and  a  careful  endeavor 
to  adjust  his  policy  to  all  the  necessities  of  the  case. 

There  is  somewhat  more  information  for  1579,  although  the 
situation  seems  to  have  been  hardly  more  serious.  Prohibitions 
had  been  issued  by  the  Estates.  The  Echevins  of  Lyons  had 
obtained  Letters  Close  from  the  Queen  Mother  and  from  Mande- 
lot,  Governor  of  Lyonnais,  urging  the  Burgundians  to  grant 
the  export  of  10,000  mines  of  grain.  The  Parlement  of  Dijon 

1  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  AA.  29,  150.    Paigny,  20  Mai  1572.     Charny,  Lieu,  du 
Gouverneur. 

2  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  401,  51.     14  Mai  1573.    Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  AA.  29,  28. 

3  Ibid.,  AA.  36.     Chalons-sur-Saone,  25  Mai  1573. 


LOCAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE        255 

refused  to  acceed  to  the  petitions  of  the  Lyonese,  and  supported 
the  Estates  in  their  policy  of  prohibition.1  Charny  refused  to 
do  anything  definite.  "  I  will  do  what  I  can,"  he  writes,  "  and 
I  will  add  this  word.  The  necessity  which  you  fear  should  make 
you  henceforth  husband  your  supplies  better  than  you  have 
in  the  past.  Your  town  has  drawn  from  Burgundy  in  the  last 
twelvemonth  quite  enough  to  leave  you  adequately  supplied."  z 

After  the  harvest  of  1585,  there  was  a  similar  stringency  and 
the  same  negotiations  and  conflict  of  authorities,  with  the  dif- 
ference that  the  Parlement  of  Dijon  played  a  larger  part  in  the 
affair  than  previously.3 

From  this  time,  there  is  little  evidence  of  acute  trouble  until 

1628.  Difficulties  continued  for  three  or  four  years,  but  the 
material  is  not  abundant  enough  to  make  it  possible  to  give  a 
definite  account  of  the  period,  even  if  it  were  worth  while. 
There  are  almost  no  new  features,  and  with  the  scattered  informa- 
tion at  hand,  it  is  difficult  to  arrive  at  any  conclusion  as  to  the 
severity  of  the  crisis.4     Prohibitions,  Royal  Patents,  and  Letters 
indicate  spasmodic  trouble  during  the  decades  of  the  forties 
and  fifties,  but  here  again  we  have  not  adequate  basis  for  a 
continuous  narrative,  although  it  is  evident  that  the  problem 
which  was  so  acute  in  the  latter  sixteenth  century  had  reappeared 
in  its  old  form.     From  this  time,  indeed,  the  conflict  of  interest 
between  Burgundy  and  Lyons  became  steadily  more  serious. 
The    consideration    of    this   development,    however,   must   be 
postponed  for  a  later  chapter.     We  have  only  to  observe  that 
the  defence  of   local  interests   in   Burgundy  was  undertaken 
primarily  by  the  Governor  and  by  the  Parlement   of  Dijon, 
the  municipalities  acting  in  subordination  to  the   provincial 
authorities. 

1  All  this  appears  in  the  act  of  Parlement  of  Dijon,  8  Oct.  1579.     Lyon,  Arch. 
Mun.,  AA.  29.    Copy. 

2  Ibid.,  AA.  29.    Paigny,  10  Oct.  1579.    Charny. 

8  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  401,  54,  55,  56,  57-  27  Sept.  1585,  12  Fev.  1586,  13  Fev. 
1586,  27  Fev.  1586.  Ibid.,  427,  i.  14  Juillet  1586.  Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  AA.  71. 
Langres,  2  Dec.  1586.  Maire  et  fichevins.  Dijon,  Arch.  Mun.,  G.  265.  14  Dec. 
1585,  31  Mai  1586,  10  Juin  1586,  24  Oct.  1586. 

4  Ibid.,  Chappe  IV,  61-68;  AA.  72,  82.      26  Fev.  1628.    AA.  78,  8.     20  Nov. 

1629.  AA.  103,  14.    29  Dec.    1629. 


256  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

The  Seine  Basin 

In  the  Seine  Basin  the  different  economic  and  constitutional 
conditions  exerted  a  great  influence  upon  the  form  and  character 
of  local  regulation.  The  fertility  of  the  region  and  the  tendency 
to  foreign  export  transformed  completely  the  economic  aspect 
of  the  grain  trade  problem.  The  weakness  of  the  provincial 
organization  and  the  greater  opportunity  for  direct  royal  control 
had  a  marked  effect  upon  the  power  of  the  governors  of  Cham- 
pagne and  Picardy.  There  were  no  provincial  Estates  and  no 
local  parlement,  so  that  the  governor  was  the  only  local  official 
possessing  jurisdiction  over  a  wide  area.  The  most  cursory 
consideration  of  conditions  in  this  region  suggests  a  greater 
degree  of  political  solidarity  than  existed  between  Burgundy 
and  Lyons,  while  the  conflict  of  interest  in  economic  matters 
was  not  likely  to  be  so  acute.  Furthermore,  the  obvious  political 
preponderance  of  Paris  deprived  the  play  of  political  forces  of 
that  relative  equality  which  gives  such  an  interest  to  the  negotia- 
tions between  Lyons  and  Burgundy.  Then,  too,  the  Court 
was  hardly  an  impartial  arbiter  in  the  affairs  of  the  Seine  Basin. 

The  most  striking  feature  of  local  regulation  here  in  the  early 
sixteenth  century  is  the  effort  of  the  Parisian  authorities  to 
regulate  shipments  from  Paris  to  other  towns  or  to  foreign  parts.1 
The  foreign  exports  in  1501  from  the  sources  of  Parisian  supply 
have  already  been  mentioned.  These  were  met  by  despatching 
letters  from  the  Parlement  of  Paris  to  the  Bailli  of  Amiens  and 
the  Senechal  of  Ponthieu.2  But  at  the  same  time,  there  was 
complaint  that  "  the  inhabitants  of  Melun,  Corbeil,  Etampes, 
and  other  places  in  the  vicinity  purchase  considerable  quantities 
of  grain  at  Paris  daily,  and  also  buy  in  Champagne  and  at 

1  It  is  proper  to  observe  that  there  are  traces  of  such  regulations  at  Lyons, 
especially  in  1580,  when  Lyons  permitted  exports  to  Crest,  Montelimar,  Valence, 
and  other  towns  on  the  river  and  in  Dauphine.    Lyon,  Arch.  Mun.,  BB.  104,  30, 
32,  33.    BB.   105,  35,  65,  89.    Chappe  IV,  401,  53  bis.    There  are  frequent 
instances  of  the  arrest  of  all  boats  endeavoring  to  pass  Lyons.    Chains  were 
stretched  across  the  Saone  near  the  Archeveche,  and  a  keeper  appointed  who  would 
allow  specified  classes  of  trade  to  pass.    But  these  movements  of  grain  from  Bur- 
gundy to  points  below  Lyons  were  rare,  so  that  these  cases  must  not  be  understood 
to  imply  conditions  such  as  existed  around  Paris. 

2  Reg.  du  Bureau,  I,  53,  4. 


LOCAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE        257 

Meaux,  so  that  there  is  ground  to  apprehend  dearth  at  Paris."  1 
These  complaints  were  repeated  at  a  meeting  held  a  few  days 
later.2  In  1504,  the  central  and  eastern  provinces  appealed 
to  Paris  for  grain  to  relieve  their  distress.3  In  1508,  Paris  was 
also  treated  as  an  entrepot  whence  grain  could  be  secured  for 
export  to  points  outside  the  Seine  Basin.  "  The  peasants 
and  others  of  Corbeil,  Melun,  and  Etampes  are  carrying  large 
quantities  of  grain  each  day  from  Paris,  by  wagons  and  other 
means  of  transportation.  They  also  go  to  Champagne  to  buy, 
selling  and  delivering  the  grain  to  merchants  who  export  it. 
Similar  exports  are  made  from  the  Lower  Loire,  so  that  grain 
has  become  dear  at  Paris.  Other  merchants  take  up  all  they 
can  buy  in  Santois  and  ship  down  the  Seine  to  Rouen."  4  Pro- 
hibitions were  issued.  Then,  a  month  later,  the  Provost  of 
Merchants  said  that  he  had  been  importuned  by  divers  mer- 
chants for  permits  to  export  £rain.  The  merchants  asserted 
that  exports  had  been  restricted  sufficiently  to  remove  all 
possibility  of  danger,  so  that  the  Provost  proposed  to  allow 
merchants  to  export  limited  quantities  of  grain  up  or  down  the 
river,  on  the  condition  that  they  should  expose  equal  quantities 
for  sale  at  Paris.5 

In  1521,  there  was  more  trouble  from  exports.  Considerable 
quantities  of  grain  were  being  shipped  from  Paris  under  cover 
of  darkness.  Consequently,  orders  were  issued  against  any 
movements  of  grain  boats  after  dark,  and  chains  were  stretched 
across  the  river.6  Strict  control  of  exports  was  still  maintained 
in  the  following  spring,  when  one  unlucky  merchant  was  caught 
after  getting  his  grain  away  from  the  city.  He  was  brought 
back  and  fined.7 

In  1529,  "  great  crowds  of  people  daily  carried  considerable 
quantities  of  grain  away  from  Paris,  and  by  reason  of  these 

Reg.  du  Bureau,  I,  53.  20  Fev.  1501. 

Ibid.,  I,  54.  27  Fev.  1501. 

Ibid.,  I,  92,  99-100.    9  Aout  1504,  15  Jan.  1505. 

Ibid.,  I,  148.     23  Fev.  1508.     (Parts  of  this  have  been  cited  previously.) 

Ibid.,  I,  150.     23  Mars  1508. 

Delamare,  op  cit.,  II,  354.    Arret  du  Parlement,  7  Avril  1521. 

Reg.  du  Bureau,  I,  272.     27  Mai  1522. 


258  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

exports  dearth  was  feared.  It  was  decided  that  the  inhabi- 
tants of  neighboring  towns  should  be  allowed  to  draw  limited 
quantities  of  grain  from  this  town  for  their  provision,  but  that 
the  gates  should  be  guarded  to  prevent  the  passage  of  any  grain 
without  the  permission  of  the  Provost  off  Merchants."  *  This 
control  was  at  times  exercised  with  too  much  rigor.  In  1532, 
for  instance,  the  municipal  authorities  had  received  royal  orders 
to  permit  no  exports  from  the  town,  which  they  enforced  so 
strictly  that  they  refused  to  allow  a  religious  house  at  Poissy 
to  carry  through  Paris  the  grain  that  came  from  its  farms  at 
Brie.  The  Parlement  interfered  and  the  grain  passed  on.2 

These  regulations  of  passing  grain  were  directed  primarily 
against  shipments  to  Rouen,  which  were  all  too  frequently 
designed  for  export.  In  1528,  there  was  much  dispute  as  to  the 
jurisdiction  over  this  trade.  The  Provost  of  Paris  asserted  that 
it  belonged  properly  to  him,  the  Provost  of  Merchants  declared 
that  this  jurisdiction  had  always  been  exercised  by  the  munici- 
pality and  not  by  the  Chatelet.  The  King  settled  the  dispute 
temporarily  by  instructing  the  Parlement  to  defend  the  munici- 
pality in  the  exercise  of  this  control  of  the  grain  trade.  "  Hence- 
forth they  shall  grant  permits  for  the  export  of  grain,  but  they 
shall  require  security  to  guarantee  that  the  grain  is  not  exported 
from  the  Kingdom."  It  was  this  fear  of  foreign  export  that  led 
to  the  complete  prohibition  of  all  movements  of  grain  down  the 
Seine  in  the  spring  of  1536.  The  Provost  of  Merchants  de- 
clared that  "  heavy  shipments  of  grain  had  been  made  to  Rouen 
and  to  other  parts  of  Normandy,  and  that  the  Norman  mer- 
chants exported  the  grain  amassed  at  Rouen  and  other  places. 
Grain  was  lower  in  Normandy  than  at  Paris.  Permission  to 
export  grain  from  Paris  was  withdrawn.  Letters  were  to  be 
sent  to  the  King  to  inform  him  of  the  trouble  occasioned 
by  these  exports.  All  permits  should  henceforth  be  signed 
by  the  Provost  of  Merchants."  3  Persistence  in  this  resolu- 
tion^is  indicated  by  the  deliberation  of  June  30,  when  it  was 

1  Reg.  du  Bureau,  II,  54.    8  Avril  1529. 

2  Ibify,  II,  140.     1 6  Jan.  1632. 

3  Ibid.,  II,  218.     27  Avril  1536. 


LOCAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE    259 

decided  that  no  general  permissions  to  export  grain  should  be 
granted.1 

This  aspect  of  the  trade  in  the  Seine  Basin  becomes  less  and 
less  important.  During  the  latter  part  of  the  century,  indeed, 
there  is  a  change  in  the  relation  of  the  Parisian  demand  to  the 
available  supply,  which  renders  export  from  the  region  less 
frequent  and  more  obviously  inexpedient.  Prohibitions  of 
export  from  Paris  become  practically  permanent,2  and  only  in 
1596  does  the  permission  of  limited  export  to  neighboring  towns 
reappear.3 

Although  the  conflict  of  interest  between  the  producing 
sections  and  Paris  was  less  intense  than  that  between  Lyons 
and  Burgundy,  there  are  instances  of  prohibitions  in  Champagne 
and  Picardy.  Such  action  by  the  governors  appears  in  1529, 
1530,  1531,  1556,  and  1587,  so  that  it  is  no  exaggeration  to  de- 
scribe this  type  of  regulation  as  extremely  irregular.4 

The  comparative  weakness  of  the  provincial  organization 
and  the  fertility  of  Champagne  and  Picardy  rendered  it  unlikely 
that  the  action  should  be  provincial,  for  quite  apart  from  the 
governor,  there  was  little  probability  that  the  supplies  of  a  whole 
province  would  be  sufficiently  jeopardized  to  warrant  general 
action.  The  distress,  so  far  as  it  existed  at  all,  was  intensely 
localized,  so  that  the  opposition  came  more  naturally  from 
municipalities  than  from  provinces.  This  opposition  is  in  no 
wise  different  from  the  municipal  action  in  Burgundy,  except 

1  Reg.  du  Bureau,  II,  225.    30  Juin  1536. 

2  Ibid.,  V,  93.     21  Mai  1561.    Ibid.,  V,  234.     25  Juin  1563.    Ibid.,  VIII,  579. 
8  Mai  1586.    Ibid.,  VII,  332.    4  Jan.  1576.    In  June,  1563,  an  exception  was 
made  in  favor  of  Meaux. 

3  Ibid.,  XI,  261.     12  Juin  1596.    Circular  letter  to  the  towns  of  the  vicinity 
offering  them  limited  quantities  of  grain. 

4  Ibid.,  II,  59.    Aout  1529.    Prohibition  by  Governor  of  Picardy.    Ibid.,  II,  59. 
2  Sept.  1529.    Prohibition  by  Governor  of  Champagne.    Ibid.,  II,  75.    31  Aout 
1530.     Prohibition  by  Governor  of  Picardy.    Ibid.,  II,  133-134.     24  Nov.  1531. 
Reference  to  Prohibitions  by  the  Governors  of  Champagne  and  Picardy. 

Ibid.,  IV,  45.  Dec.  1556.  Vague  reference  to  prohibitions  in  Picardy,  not 
necessarily  by  the  Governor. 

Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  ion.  3  Juillet  1587.  Decision  to  get  letters  from  the 
King  ordering  the  Governor  of  Champagne  to  permit  export,  hence  suggesting 
prohibition  by  the  Governor  himself. 


260         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

in  its  independence  of  general  provincial  action.  It  is  not 
a  phenomenon  confined  to  the  Seine  Basin,  though  the  absence 
of  other  forms  of  opposition  naturally  throws  the  municipal 
opposition  there  into  stronger  relief.  It  is  perhaps  just  to  dis- 
tinguish two  forms  of  this  interference  with  the  grain  trade, 
the  official  and  the  unofficial:  the  former,  prohibitions  issued 
by  municipal  authorities;  the  latter,  the  manifestations  of 
popular  fear  in  riots  directed  against  the  grain  merchants. 
Properly  speaking,  this  popular  interference  was  illegal,  and 
generally  so  largely  due  to  mere  panic,  that  it  would  be  quite 
unworthy  of  formal  treatment,  it  if  were  not  at  times  the  only 
indication  of  the  unsatisfactory  working  of  the  grain  markets  in 
this  region.  Unfortunately,  this  type  of  opposition  does  not 
attract  much  attention  in  the  scanty  records  that  we  possess 
for  the  sixteenth  century,  and  it  is  only  in  the  early  seventeenth 
century  that  it  becomes  noticeable.1 

Action  by  the  town  becomes  pronounced  in  1 626.  The  Provost 
of  Merchants  was  told  on  April  25  by  divers  merchants  "  that 
their  trade  in  grain  had  been  interrupted,  and  that  all  the  towns 
whence  they  were  accustomed  to  ship  grain  had  issued  prohibi- 
tions against  export,  especially  Rouen,  Chartres,  Soissons, 
Noyon,  Chaulny,  La  Fere,  Roye,  Peronne,  Montdidier,  Saint- 
Quentin,  Vitry-le-Francois,  Chalons,  and  Melun.  The  gover- 
nors and  officers  of  these  aforesaid  towns  were  so  strict  that 
they  could  ship  no  more  grain,  so  that  Paris  would  be  reduced 
to  famine."  2  The  Provost  of  Merchants  repaired  straightway 
to  Fontainebleau  to  secure  Patents  from  the  King  ordering  the 
towns  to  release  the  grain  held  by  Parisian  merchants.  The 
King  acceded  readily  enough,  reiterating  the  prohibitions  to. 
export  from  the  Kingdom  and  ordering  the  local  officials  to  inter- 
fere in  no  wise  with  the  grain  trade. 

These  municipal  prohibitions  are  somewhat  incomprehensible, 
as  the  merchants  declared  that  exports  to  foreign  ports  were 
continuing  from  many  of  the  towns  in  Picardy  which  had  cut 

1  Reg.  du  Bureau,  I,  54.     27  Fev.  1501.    Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  1002.    7  Avril 
1521.    Ibid.,  II,  1009.     i  Juillet  1573.    Ibid.,  II,  1011-1012.     7  Juillet  1587. 

2  H.  1802.    Reg.  du  Bureau,  vii**ii. 


LOCAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE        261 

off  the  trade  with  Paris.  Thus,  one  Sieur  de  Saint-Genis  de- 
posed before  the  officers  of  the  Chatelet:  "  that  the  merchants 
have  made  purchases  in  Champagne  and  Picardy,  that  they  are 
prevented  from  shipping  by  the  governors  and  judges  of  the 
towns  .  .  .  that  there  are  large  quantities  of  grain  at  Saint- 
Quentin,  Peronne,  Montdidier,  and  other  towns  of  Picardy 
which  do  not  cease  to  leave  the  Kingdom,  despite  the  pro- 
hibitions." Sieur  du  Poix  said  that  the  couriers  from  Cambray 
had  informed  him  that  a  considerable  quantity  of  grain  had 
been  sent  from  Peronne  to  Cambray.  Sieur  Ferrand  declared 
that  Vitry,  Chalons,  Chartres,  Noyon,  Soissons,  and  other 
places  had  closed  their  gates.  Another  witness  said  that  there 
were  800  muids  of  grain  in  Vitry,  and  that  the  officers  had  for- 
bidden the  sale  of  more  than  two  bushels  to  any  bourgeois."  l 
Doubtless  the  towns  of  Picardy  regarded  export  as  the  regular 
trade,  and,  finding  it  necessary  to  sacrifice  either  the  Parisian 
or  the  Flemish  market,  preferred  to  give  up  the  relatively  in- 
frequent Parisian  trade.2 

In  March,  1643, tne  merchants  summoned  before  the  Echevins 
of  Paris  mention  prohibitions  in  some  of  the  towns  of  the  Seine 
Basin.  Chartres,  Provins,  Elboeuf,  Pont-de-1'Arche,  and  Oudan 
are  explicitly  mentioned.3  Another  document  enumerates 
Meaux,  Provins,  Saint-Jean-des-Jumeaux,  Lizy,  Rebes,  Coulom- 
miers,  Chateau-Thierry,  and  refers  to  reports  mentioning  other 
towns.4  Doubtless,  there  is  some  confusion  here  between  popu- 
lar violence  and  official  action,  but  much  of  the  opposition  was 
the  work  of  local  officials.  In  1649  the  merchants  say  that 
they  have  made  extensive  purchases,  but  that  they  are  unable 
to  bring  their  gram  down  to  Paris  on  account  of  prohibitions 
and  open  violence.  ""  "  It  will  not  suffice  to  send  parchments," 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21634.     177.    Du  Landy,  27  Avril  1626.    Proces  Verbal  faite 
en  1'Assemblee  de  la  Police  Generate  au  Chatelet. 

2  It  is  fairly  certain  that  Paris  did  not  draw  supplies  regularly  from  the  towns 
mentioned  as  exporting. 

3  H.  1806.    Reg.  du  Bureau,  iiitod.     28  Mars  1643.    Enquete  pourquoi  les 
bleds  sont  si  rares  a  Paris.    Prohibitions  on  the  Oise  are  mentioned  in  1630.    Bib. 
Nat.,  Fr.  21641.    136.     16  Dec.  1630.    Deposition  de  Denis  de  St.  Genis. 

4  Ibid.,  vicvi.     2  Oct.  1643. 


262         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

they  say,  "  and,  unless  the  Grand  Provost  and  a  Company 
of  Archers  are  sent  to  chastise  the  rebels,  there  is  no  hope  of  a 
successful  prosecution  of  the  affair."  L  Further  deliberations 
at  Paris  resulted,  September  12,  in  the  sending  of  a  circular 
letter  to  the  municipal  officers  of  Chalons,  Vitry,  Chateau- 
Thierry,  Meaux,  Nogent-sur-Seine,  Provins,  Montereau,  Melun, 
Soissons,  Noyon,  and  Beaumont-sur-Oise.  The  replies  to 
these  letters  appear,  but  they  are  hardly  more  than  purely  formal 
acknowledgments  of  the  receipt  of  the  circular.2  Chalons  and 
Vitry,  however,  sent  a  more  creditable  excuse  for  their  action: 
"  We  have  too  much  sympathy  for  your  needs  to  deny  you  our 
aid,  .  .  .  but  the  present  exigencies  are  so  obvious  and  so  press- 
ing, that  we  have  been  obliged  to  seek  means  of  obviating  the 
difficulty.  We  interfere  with  our  trade  only  with  regret,  and 
in  order  to  preserve  our  supplies  we  are  forced  to  deny  aid  even 
to  our  farmers,  our  vinegrowers,  and  our  neighbors.  The  eager- 
ness displayed  in  conveying  grain  to  Paris  after  the  opening 
of  the  river  has  so  exhausted  our  town  ©f  wheat  and  rye  that 
we  have  not  enough  to  last  until  the  coming  harvest.  We 
have  no  hope  of  receiving  anything  from  the  country  districts, 
partly  because  of  the  general  sterility  of  the  season,  and  partly 
because  the  merchants  from  the  frontier  are  going  the  rounds 
of  our  villages  and  carrying  off  the  small  reserves  that  remain. 
...  In  order  to  show  you  our  condition  without  any  reserve, 
we  enclose  an  enumeration  of  the  grain  in  the  town  of  Chalons. 
According  to  this  investigation  there  are  13,888  setiers  belonging 
to  bourgeois,  2,740  setiers  in  reserve,  and  9,828  setiers  belong- 
ing to  outsiders  (Forains).  Of  this  we  have  had  tp  contribute 
2,000  setiers  of  rye  to  the  support  of  his  Majesty's  armies,  so 
that  we  have  none  too  much  for  the  support  of  16,000  persons."  3 
The  officials  at  Vitry  write:  "The  sterility  of  the  year  has 
been  so  extraordinary,  and  our  town  has  been  so  exhausted 
that  we  have  not  enough  to  last  the  sixth  part  of  the  year,  and 

1  H.  1809.    Reg  du  Bureau,  iiHix.  10  Sept.  1649.    See  also  ibid.,  iiciiiixxvi. 
20  Aout  1649.     Cites  prohibitions  at  Chalons  and  Montereau. 

2  Ibid.,  iiiclvi.     12  Sept.  1649. 

3  Ibid.,  iiiicxxxi.     i  Oct.  1649.    Maire  et  fichevins  de  Chalons.     Three  or  four 
setiers  were  needed  per  person  each  year. 


LOCAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE        263 

most  of  this  supply  is  in  the  hands  of  the  merchants.  We  have 
thus  been  obliged  to  seize  what  we  could.  We  are  suffering 
from  extreme  dearth.  Even  if  we  wished,  we  could  not  permit 
the  transport  of  grain  to  Paris,  as  the  prohibitions  have  been 
issued  by  our  Bailli  or  his  Lieutenant,  and  in  the  event  of  ship- 
ments the  people  might  well  execute  the  threats  that  have  been 
made  to  rob  the  merchants."  1 

The  Parisian  encroachment  upon  the  sources  of  the  supply 
of  Rouen  in  the  seventeenth  century  led  to  attempts  to  limit 
the  movement  by  means  of  prohibitions.  The  first  of  these 
appear  in  1630  and  1643^  but  this  phase  of  the  grain  trade  does 
not  become  very  striking  until  after  1660. 

Normandy  and  Languedoc 

In  Normandy  and  Languedoc  we  find  the  local  authorities 
playing  still  another  role.  Both  of  these  provinces  were  rela- 
tively independent,  politically  as  well  as  economically.  Their 
commercial  tiqs  with  foreign  countries,  too,  were,  in  some  respects, 
closer  than  their  relations  with  the  rest  of  France.  Local 
regulation  thus  assumed  the  form  of  limiting  the  freedom  of 
export  to  foreign  parts,  so  that  local  policy  was  connected 
with  the  question  of  foreign  rather  than  of  domestic  trade. 
This  independent  local  regulation  of  the  trade  of  the  maritime 
provinces  is  a  valuable  illustration  of  the  great  qualifications 
that  must  be  made  in  regard  to  the  application  of  the  ostensibly 
general  royal  edicts.  In  these  provinces,  as  in  central  France, 
royal  authority  was  exercised  in  large  measure  through  Patents, 
directed  to  the  local  officials,  and,  as*  in  the  other  provinces, 
many  of  these  Patents  were  a  direct  response  to  local  demands 
and  suggestions,  so  that  this  type  of  royal  action  is  hardly  more 
than  local  policy  indirectly  expressed  through  the  medium  of 
royal  orders. 

In  Normandy,  the*  political  situation  was  complicated,  the 
provincial  organization  still  retained  much  vigor,  and  although 

1  H.  1809.    Reg.  du  Bureau,  iiii°xxxiii.    Vitry.     n  Oct.  1649. 
*  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  1014.    Ibid.,  II,  1015.     1630.    H.  1806.    Reg.  du 
Bureau,  iiiicxl.     28  Mars  1643. 


264  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

the  authority  of  the  Estates  declined  in  the  course  of  the  sixteenth 
century,  the  Parlement  continued  to  exert  much  influence. 
The  governor  was  not  a  conspicuous  figure.  The  Bailli  of 
Rouen  and  the  municipal  officers  played  a  relatively  subordinate 
part.  Ordinarily,  the  Estates  confined  themselves  to  sugges- 
tions as  to  grain  trade  policy  in  preference  to  undertaking 
positive  regulation,  so  that  the  appearance  of  royal  control  and 
supremacy  was  maintained  in  form,  if  not  in  reality.  The 
submissiveness  of  these  local  bodies  is  striking.  In  February, 
1500,  we  hear  that  prohibitions  had  been  issued  at  the  time  of 
the  last  meeting  of  the  Estates,  "  at  the  request  of  the  Estates."  l 
On  April  i,  1505,  there  was  a  deliberation  under  the  presidency 
of  Louis  Dare,  Lieutenant  of  the  Bailli.  The  officers  of  the 
baillage  were  present,  and  the  meeting  decided  to  represent 
to  the  Lords  of  the  Exchequer  of  Normandy  the  danger  of  con- 
tinued export  of  grain.  The  following  day,  letters  were  sent  to 
the  King  urging  prohibition  of  export.2  In  June,  1506,  an  assem- 
bly of  the  Estates  of  the  baillage  was  held,  at  which  delegates 
were  present  from  the  Estates  of  the  Vicomte  of  Pont-Audemer 
and  of  the  Vicomte  of  Auge.  All  were  of  the  opinion  that  letters 
should  be  sent  to  the  King  to  secure  prohibition  of  export.3 
There  was  a  constant  dread  of  export  and  these  requests  to  the 
King  or  protests  against  the  action  of  some  officials  in  granting 
special  permits  continued  at  frequent  intervals.  The  full  details 
of  the  internal  politics,  however,  could  be  obtained  only  by  care- 
ful study  in  the  Archives  at  Rouen. 

In  Languedoc,  there  was  less  submissiveness  to  royal  authority. 
The  Estates  issued  positive  prohibitions  in  January,  1496-97, 
January,  1508-09,  November,  1513,  October,  1524,  December, 
1529,  November,  1529,  December,  1530,  November,  1531, 
October,  1532,  November,  1534,  October,  1535,  and  October, 
I538.4  Later  in  the  century,  the  political  relations  of  the  various 
authorities  became  more  complicated,  and  the  Estates  acted 

1  Invent.  Som.  des  Arch.  Mun.,  Rouen,  91.     n  Fev.  1500. 

2  Ibid.,  92.     1-2  Avril  1505. 

3  Ibid.,  94-95-     15  Juin  1506. 

4  Invent.  Som.  des  Arch.  Dept.,  Haute  Garonne,  C.  II,  i,  6,  10,  19,  22,  23,  24,  25, 
26,  27,  28,  32. 


LOCAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE        265 

less  vigorously.  In  this  early  period,  the  Estates  at  times  flatly 
refused  to  obey  royal  orders.  Thus,  in  December,  1504,  they 
would  not  authorize  the  execution  of  the  missives  of  the  King 
permitting  the  export  of  two  hundred  charges  of  grain  for  His 
Holiness  the  Pope.  Likewise,  they  refused  to  permit  the  ship- 
ment of  two  or  three  thousand  charges  by  Florentines  provided 
with  similar  passports.1  The  Estates,  however,  issued  special 
permits  on  their  own  authority.2 

But  the  Estates  were  not  the  only  power  acting  in  Languedoc. 
In  December,  1523,  we  find  a  prohibition  of  export  issued  by  the 
Senechal  of  Carcassonne,  limited,  of  course,  to  his  jurisdiction, 
but  as  this  included  Narbonne,  the  most  considerable  grain 
port  in  Languedoc,  the  act  was  important.3  A  few  scattered 
letters  from  Clermont-Lodeve,  the  Lieutenant  Governor,  indicate 
that  he  also  took  an  active  interest  in  the  grain  trade,  issuing 
permits  and  at  times  prohibitions.4  One  of  these  letters  dis- 
closes the  persistent  effort  to  discover  the  precise  extent  of  the 
available  supply,  and  to  regulate  prohibition  and  permission 
in  such  manner  as  to  dispose  of  the  surplus.  "Despite  a  light 
harvest,"  he  says,  "  divers  merchants  and  others  have  amassed 
large  quantities  of  grain,  and  are  now  endeavoring  by  various 
subtle  means  to  secure  the  right  to  export,  although  it  would 
exhaust  the  country  and  be  highly  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of 
the  inhabitants.  .  .  .  Accordingly,  all  royal  officers  in  each 
town  of  the  diocese  of  Maguelone  are  ordered  to  assemble  the 
consuls,  sindics,  and  procureurs,  bidding  them  to  make  diligent 
search  of  the  quantity  of  grain  available  and  careful  estimates 
of  the  amount  needed.  Reports  shall  be  made  within  a  week, 
and  from  these  a  general  report  for  the  diocese  shall  be  drawn 
up  before  the  Procureur  of  the  Senechaussee  of  Beaucaire,  in 
order  to  acquaint  the  King  with  the  facts,  so  that  he  may  issue 
such  declarations  as  may  seem  proper."  5 

1  Invent.  Som.  des  Arch.  Dept.,  Haute  Garonne,  C.  II,  4. 

2  Ibid.,  C.  II,  6,  15.    Jan.  1508-09,  Nov.  1520. 

3  Vaisette,  Hist.  Gen.  de  Languedoc  (26  Edition),  XII,  389. 

4  Ibid.    (2e  Edition), XII,  405.     40^.1526.    XII,  418.     n  Mai  1527.    XII, 
439.     22  Nov.  1527.    XII,  440.     24  Dec.  1527.    XII,  451. 

5  Ibid.,  XII,  439.     22  Nov.  1527. 


266         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

In  the  latter  part  of  the  sixteenth  century,  the  governor 
became  more  important,  representing  the  increased  influence 
of  the  royal  power.  But  this  is  a  phase  of  constitutional  history 
that  has  little  to  do  with  the  grain  trade  in  particular.1  In 
any  event,  the  policy  is  simply  that  of  limiting  export  by  means 
of  prohibitions  and  special  permits.  When  the  acts  are  royal, 
they  are  suggested  by  various  local  officials  or  bodies,  and  are 
the  outcome  of  immediate  needs,  rather  than  of  visionary  ideas, 
such  as  influenced  so  many  of  the  general  edicts.2 

Judgment  upon  particular  incidents  of  trade  regulation  in 
the  sixteenth  century  is  now  impossible.  Material  is  too  scanty 
and  the  survival  of  what  we  have  has  been  too  much  influenced 
by  special  circumstances  to  make  it  a  safe  basis  for  an  expression 
of  opinion.  Mistakes  there  must  have  been;  in  some  years 
prohibitions  were  doubtless  unnecessary  and  inexpedient. 
Direct  corruption,  too,  played  its  part  in  the  history  of  the 
negotiations  between  merchants  and  officials,  and  between  the 
officials  of  various  sections  and  the  Court.  .  But  there  is  no 
necessity  of  reaching  any  conclusions  upon  these  matters,  all  of 
which  can  safely  and  wisely  be  allowed  to  rest  in  oblivion. 

The  larger  aspects  of  the  situation,  however,  are  not  veiled 
in  this  impenetrable  obscurity.  Our  information  is  sufficient 
to  reveal  the  general  conditions  of  the  period,  and  the  results 
are  an  interesting  chapter  in  the  history  of  the  growth  of  adminis- 
trative control.  Official  action  deserves  commendation  for 
its  perception  of  the  necessity  of  emphasizing  the  fundamental 
community  of  interest  between  different  provinces.  The  hostility 
between  town  and  country  was  restrained  by  the  officials  who 
steadily  became  more  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  close  inter- 
dependence. In  the  absence  of  definite  market  machinery 

1  Invent.  Som.  des  Arch.  Dept.,  Haute  Garonne,  C.  II,  38, 44,  50,  53, 129, 133, 135, 
255,  272,  287. 

2  The  inquiry  could  be  pushed  into  some  other  regions,  notably  the  Lower 
Garonne  and  Lower  Loire  valleys.     Material  for  these  regions,  however,  is  not 
available  in  print,  and  work  in  local  archives  of  these  sections  was  abandoned 
for  want  of  time.    The  results  would  merely  add  to  the  variety  suggested  as 
characteristic  of  local  regulation. 


LOCAL  REGULATION  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE    267 

for  the  adjustment  of  the  interests  of  the  provinces  and  the 
capital,  the  officials  did  their  best  to  secure  the  equable  dis- 
tribution of  grain  that  would  have  been  assured  by  the  existence 
of  centralized  price-making.  The  sixteenth  century  leads  to 
little;  but  a  sound  body  of  tradition  was  developed,  which 
exerted  a  powerful  influence  upon  Colbert  and  upon  the  intend- 
ants  of  the  late  seventeenth  century.  This  early  period  is 
thus  the  foundation  of  all  that  follows,  and  it  is  difficult  not  to 
feel  respect  for  the  individuals  who  labored  sincerely  in  ob- 
scurity to  make  possible  the  accomplishment  of  a  later  genera- 
tion. 


CHAPTER  III 

COLBERT'S  PLACE  IN  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  GRAIN  TRADE 

WHEN  Colbert  obtained  the  King's  favor  in  1660,  he  began 
a  reorganization  of  the  administrative  system  which  soon  gave 
new  meaning  to  the  traditions  of  the  monarchy.      The  grain 
trade  did  not  secure  much  of  the  great  minister's  attention, 
and  may  well  be  considered  one  of  the  least  important  depart- 
ments of  his  activity.     But  the  general  administrative  develop- 
ment was  not  without  effect.      The  centralization  of  control 
included  the  grain  trade  within  its  scope,  and,  while  the  policy 
of  preceding  generations  was  not  radically  modified,  the  change 
in  general  political  conditions  made  the  actual  effect  of  the  old 
policy  somewhat  different.     In  the  sixteenth  century,  we  found 
an  evident  desire  to  regulate  the  foreign  export  trade  in  accord- 
ance with  the  state  of  the  harvests.     At  one  time,  the  judges 
were  required  to  send  reports,  later  a  Bureau  was  established 
to  undertake  both  the  task  of  collecting  information  and  of 
regulating  the  trade.      Then  the  King  proposed  to  discharge 
these  duties  directly  through  his  council.     But  at  no  time  was 
much  accomplished.      Information  was    scanty,    the    central 
officials  had  little  besides  vague  rumors  to  direct  their  policy, 
and  the  exigencies  of  the  case  practically  limited  their  action 
to  the  Seine  Basin.     The  efficient  control  of  the  trade  was  largely 
the  work  of  local  authorities,  acting  indeed  through  royal  Patents, 
but  none  the  less  directing  the  policy  in  accordance  with  the 
local  needs,  of  which  they  alone  possessed  anything  like  accurate 
knowledge.    Lack  of  information  was  thus  the  principal  cause 
for  the  failure  of  royal  efforts  to  control  the  grain  trade  in  the 
sixteenth  and  early  seventeenth  centuries.     There  was  no  dis- 
pute as  to  what  should  be  done,  but  an  efficient  execution  of  the 
policy  was  possible  only  if  the  central  officials  were  furnished 
with  an  intimate  knowledge  of  local  conditions. 

268 


COLBERT  AND  THE  GRAIN  TRADE       269 

It  is  in  this  respect  that  the  significance  of  the  general  ad- 
ministrative changes  becomes  most  apparent.  The  intendant, 
who  had  existed  in  clivers  forms  since  the  days  of  Henry  III, 
finally  became  the  efficient  administrative  officer  that  was  so 
prominent  in  the  last  century  and  a  half  of  the  history  of  the 
monarchy.  Given  charge  of  the  financial  areas,  called  the 
intendancies,  which  were  ordinarily  of  considerable  territorial 
extent,  obliged  to  make  circuits  of  his  district  annually  in  order 
to  apportion  the  direct  taxes,  and  in  close  contact  with  all  the 
various  local  officials,  royal,  seigniorial,  and  municipal,  no  one 
was  better  able  to  obtain  accurate  and  systematic  information 
of  the  condition  of  the  country.  Furthermore,  unlike  any  pre- 
vious royal  officials,  the  intendant  under  Colbert  gradually 
became  charged  with  the  duty  of  regular  correspondence  with 
the  Controleur  General.  The  early  intendants  had  been  special 
commissioners,  ordinarily  sent  out  for  a  specific  object,  so  that 
their  task  consisted  either  in  acting  in  accordance  with  instruc- 
tions given  at  the  beginning,  or  in  reporting  at  the  conclusion 
of  their  mission,  after  the  manner  of  the  maitres  des  requetes, 
from  whose  numbers  these  early  intendants  were  largely  drawn. 
The  intendants  of  the  early  seventeenth  century  were  legally 
under  the  obligation  to  correspond  with  any  secretary  of  state 
demanding  information.1  But  this  obligation  was  never  en- 
forced to  any  appreciable  extent.  Scattered  letters  from  inten- 
dants previous  to  1660  may  be  found,  but  there  is  no  evidence 
of  any  regular  correspondence  in  either  national  or  depart- 
mental archives.  The  history  of  the  office,  too,  would  suggest 
that  it  does  not  present  the  characteristic  blending  of  judicial 
and  financial  functions  until  after  1651.  The  administrative 
correspondence  between  Colbert,  his  brother  Colbert  de  Terron, 
and  a  few  of  the  intendants  in  western  France  was  thus  a  far- 
reaching  innovation.  This  rather  personal  correspondence 
begun  by  Colbert,  just  previous  to  his  rise  into  prominence, 
developed  with  his  gradually  increasing  influence.  During 
the  early  years  of  his  activity,  when  his  official  position  was  ill- 

1  Boyer  de  Sainte  Suzanne,  C.  V.  E.,  Baron  de,  Les  Intendants  de  la  Gineralite 
d 'Amiens,  Paris,  1865,  p.  21. 


270  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

defined  and  his  power  was  dependent  upon  personal  influence, 
this  correspondence  remained  personal.1  Later,  when  his 
personal  power  had  become  more  definitely  connected  with  the 
"  Controle  General,"  he  systematized  the  correspondence, 
and  began  the  formation  of  the  public  administrative  archives.2 
The  development  of  the  informing  function  of  the  intendants 
was  thus  one  of  the  most  direct  results  of  the  personal  influence 
of  Colbert.  Nor  was  any  function  of  the  new  administrative 
official  more  important  or  more  literally  unique.  It  was  a 
phase  of  that  effort  to  create  a  true  administrative  government 
which  was  from  this  time  on  the  primary  object  of  the  monarchy. 
The  novelty  of  the  idea  is  interestingly  revealed  by  the  corre- 
spondence itself.  At  first,  it  is  relatively  barren  the  moment 
the  intendant  takes  leave  of  matters  of  pure  administrative 
routine.  The  much  desired  information  about  agricultural 
and  industrial  conditions  is  merely  a  collection  of  current  rumors. 
At  times  such  letters  passed  without  comment,  but  occasionally 
Colbert  turned  impatiently  upon  the  intendant  and  proceeded 
to  give  him  a  lesson  in  letter  writing.  Thus,  in  1670,  Daguesseau 
had  written  from  Bordeaux  that  frosts  had  injured  the  vines. 
Colbert  replies:  "  I  am  already  informed  that  there  will  surely 
be  less  wine  in  some  of  the  vineyards,  notably  in  Grave  and 
Langon,  but  I  am  told  that  this  diminution  will  be  offset  in  other 
localities  where  there  is  abundance.  It  is  very  important  for 
the  royal  service  that  you  should  rise  above  vulgar  rumor 
to  penetrate  the  real  truth  of  the  situation.  When  I  ask  for 
information,  at  the  King's  instance,  you  must  not  be  satisfied 
by  the  reports  made  by  interested  persons,  or  by  those  mediocre 
minds  that  draw  conclusions  from  the  odds  and  ends  of  informa- 
tion they  happen  to  possess.  In  this  particular  case,  the  King 
is  not  particularly  concerned  with  the  product  of  the  vine- 
yards of  Grave  and  Langon;  the  interest  of  His  Majesty  is 
in  the  welfare  of  his  people,  he  asks  only  if  Frenchmen  and 
foreigners  will  export  more  wine  in  one  year  than  in  another, 
for  that  is  the  only  means  of  bringing  more  or  less  money  into 

1  Preserved  as  the  Melanges  Colbert,  at  the  Bib.  Nat. 

a  The  Series  G7.  at  the  Arch.  Nat.    See  Boislisle,  op.  dt.t  I,  Introduction. 


COLBERT  AND  THE  GRAIN  TRADE       2?I 

the  Kingdom." l  Ordinarily,  no  statistical  information  was 
expected.  The  intendants  wrote  their  general  impressions 
of  the  state  of  the  harvest,  based  either  upon  their  journeys 
in  their  generalite  or  upon  reports  of  merchants  and  officials. 
Tables  of  prices,  however,  appear  from  time  to  time  in  the 
earlier  correspondence,  and  quite  frequently  in  the  letters  of  the 
Controle  General  (i.  e.  after  1677).  In  1693,  there  was  an 
attempt  made  to  collect  systematic  statistics  of  quantities  of 
grain,  population,  and  prices.  Commercial  statistics,  which 
are  almost  non-existent  before  this  time,  were  sent  occasionally 
in  strict  tabular  form.  In  1682-83,  we  have  elaborate  figures, 
month  by  month,  of  all  trade  passing  up  or  down  the  Canal  de 
Languedoc.  We  have  compilations  from  the  registers  of  the 
customs  bureaux  of  grain  passing  the  limits  of  the  Cinq  Grosses 
Fermes.  Some  statistics  of  other  trade  movements  appear, 
but  on  the  whole,  it  is  clear  that  systematic  statistical  com- 
pilations were  impractical  on  account  of  the  irregularity  of  trade. 
In  September,  1677,  f°r  instance  Colbert  had  asked  for  details 
concerning  the  export  of  grain  to  foreign  ports  from  Normandy. 
Le  Blanc  replied  that  "  the  certificates  of  the  clerks  at  the  cus- 
toms houses  of  the  department  of  Rouen  showed  that,  during 
the  months  of  July  and  August,  there  had  been  no  exports  from 
Dieppe,  Havre,  Honfleur,  or  Rouen." 2 

The  persistent  efforts  of  Colbert,  his  ceaseless  criticism  of 
inadequate  reports,  his  constant  emphasis  upon  the  importance 
of  full  information  created  precedents  which  gathered  headway 
gradually,  and  finally  bore  fruit  hi  the  fulness  of  the  reports  and 
letters  of  the  period  1683-1 71 5. 3  The  correspondence  of  the 
intendants  remained  centralized  in  the  Controle  General,  and 
affords  an  insight  into  conditions  of  the  time  rivalled  only  by  the 
elaborate  governmental  publications  which  begin  in  the  prin- 

1  Clement,  Lett.  Inst.  et  Mem.,  II,  567. 

2  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  8751.     203  ff.     Colbert  a  Le  Blanc,  13  Sept.  1677. 

3  The  correspondence  continued  throughout   the  century,  but  became  scat- 
tered between  1715  and  1730.    Most  of  the  later  correspondence  is  in  the  Depart- 
mental Archives,  which  are  doubly  important  as  the  intendants  correspond  with 
their  subdelegues.    The  correspondence  of  an  intendant  in  Dauphine  (1720-40) 
is  preserved  at  the  Bib.  Nat.  as  one  of  the  annexes  au  fonds  Francais.    The  papers 
were  preserved  by  the  intendant  as  private  property! 


272         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

cipal  European  countries  in  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century. 

The  development  of  this  new  source  of  information  was  not 
without  a  far-reaching  influence  upon  the  question  of  grain 
trade  policy.  With  fuller  knowledge  of  local  conditions,  it  be- 
came possible  to  exert  more  effectually  the  influence  that  the 
monarchy  had  aimed  at  since  the  days  of  Henry  III.  The 
main  lines  of  policy  persisted;  the  change  was  primarily  in 
the  degree  of  execution.  But  there  was  one  element  of  novelty. 
The  reduction  of  custom  duties  both  domestic  and  foreign  was 
one  of  Colbert's  most  cherished  projects  for  general  commercial 
reform,  and  it  appears  in  his  regulation  of  the  grain  trade.  From 
May,  1669  to  April,  1674,  exportation  of  grain  was  permitted  for 
the  most  part  without  the  payment  of  any  duties  at  all,  and 
qualification  is  made  necessary  only  by  the  requisition  of  one- 
half  the  ordinary  dues  between  January,  1672  and  April,  1673. 
Thus,  for  nearly  five  years,  the  grain  trade  enjoyed  a  freedom 
that  was  at  that  time  absolutely  unique.  So  far  as  I  am  aware, 
the  idea  of  according  this  degree  of  commercial  liberty  was 
original  with  Colbert.  In  the  grain  trade,  there  had  never  before 
been  any  conception  of  permission  of  export  that  did  not  require 
the  payment  of  all  customs,  royal  and  seignorial.  The  first 
systematic  campaign  against  the  local  duties  was  that  initiated 
by  Colbert,  culminating  in  his  so-called  "  protective  "  tariff 
of  1664.  While  there  is  no  denying  the  "  protective  "  elements 
in  that  edict,  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  it  contains  much  besides. 
It  was  directed  quite  as  much  against  local  duties  as  it  was 
against  foreign  imports,  and  it  is  hard  to  say  whether  we  should 
emphasize  most  the  firm  conception  of  complete  freedom  of 
domestic  trade  that  appears  in  this  treatment  of  local  duties, 
or  the  "  protective  "  duties  levied  on  foreign  imports.1 

The  contradiction  involved  in  this  question  of  policy  is  funda- 
mental. Some  aspects  of  Colbert's  policy  are  unquestionably 

1  A  letter  of  23  Juin  1673,  Colbert  a  de  Ribeyre,  Intendant  at  Tours,  would 
seem  to  connect  this  policy  of  exemption  from  duties  with  "  mercantilist  "  reasons. 
"  La  grace  que  le  Roy  a  faite  a  ses  peuples  de  leur  permettre  I'enlevement  de  leurs 
bleds,  sans  payer  aucuns  droits,  a  eu  pour  fin  d'attirer  Pargent  des  pays  estrangers 
dans  le  royaume."  Clement,  Lett.  Inst.  el  Mem.,  IV,  262. 


COLBERT  AND  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  273 

the  antecedent  of  much  latter-day  "  protectionism,"  but  there 
are  other  elements  in  his  work  which  held  quite  as  high  a  place 
in  his  mind,  and  which  exerted  a  more  direct  influence  upon 
his  time.  In  these  aspects,  he  appears  as  the  keen  economist, 
fully  cognizant  of  elementary  principles,  one  of  the  first  to 
perceive  many  of  these  principles,  and,  as  a  result,  an  ardent 
advocate  of  a  policy  which  was  designed  to  liberate  trade  from 
all  obstacles  hindering  automatic  adjustment.  Colbert  is  at 
once  the  precursor  of  the  modern  protectionist  and  of  the  modern 
free  trader,  both  in  policies  and  in  fundamental  ideas.  The 
conceptions  of  each  school  appear  in  embryo  in  Colbert's  letters, 
and  both  schools  influence  his  policies.  Protectionism  Colbert 
received  as  the  heritage  of  Barthelemy  Laffemas  and  Mont- 
chretien.  The  free  trade  tendency  in  his  thought  seems  to  be  a 
consequence  of  his  perception  of  the  possibility  of  equable 
physical  distribution  of  commodities  through  differences  in 
price.  Both  his  free  trade  policy  and  his  protectionism  are 
results  of  his  firm  belief  in  national  solidarity;  the  former  affects 
his  attitude  toward  domestic  or  inter-provincial  trade,  the  latter 
affects  foreign  trade.  Colbert's  foreign  grain  trade  policy, 
however,  in  so  far  as  it  was  not  purely  traditional,  was  dis- 
tinctly a  free  trade  policy,  and  the  insistence  upon  the  idea  of  a 
trade  that  should  be  free  even  from  customs  duties  was  a  long 
step  toward  free  trade.  The  contribution  of  that  idea  is,  in 
fact,  the  one  element  of  originality  in  Colbert's  treatment  of  the 
grain  trade. 

Except  for  this  period  when  all  duties  were  removed,  Colbert 
followed  the  old  policy  of  permitting  exports  when  crops  were 
abundant,  of  prohibiting  exports  in  times  of  dearth,  of  grant- 
ing freedom  to  the  inter-provincial  trade  at  all  times.  His 
attention  was  primarily  directed  toward  securing  information 
about  crop  conditions,  in  order  to  make  the  necessary  adjust- 
ments. The  variations  of  the  harvests,  however,  fall  into  two 
fairly  defined  periods :  1669-75,  good  harvests  with  continu- 
ous permission  of  export ;  1675-83,  alternations  of  good  and 
indifferent  harvests,  leading  to  a  corresponding  alternation  in 
policy. 


274  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

The  years  preceding  1669  leave  little  trace,  except  for  an  edict 
of  December  2,  1661,  which  is  the  only  instance  of  royal  regula- 
tion of  the  grain  trade  in  this  time.  This  prohibits  export  to 
foreign  countries,  but  makes  very  express  declaration  of  the 
freedom  of  the  inter-provincial  trade.1  No  special  limitation  of 
time  is  mentioned  in  the  edict,  and  as  harvests  were  unfavor- 
able in  1662,  and  for  several  years  following,  this  prohibition 
was  doubtless  applied  for  a  considerable  period,  if  not  to  the 
whole  interval  up  to  1669* 

May  20,  1669,  we  have  the  first  of  the  edicts  permitting 
export.  The  edict  mentions  the  abundance  of  the  harvest 
and  declares  that  "  all  subjects  shall  be  permitted  to  export, 
to  sell,  and  to  transport  their  wheat  and  other  grain  to  such 
kingdoms,  states,  and  provinces,  as  they  please,  up  to  the  first 
of  October  next,  without  paying  any  export  dues." 3  The 
explicit  limitation  in  time  is  new,  and  continues  to  be  one  of 
the  means  by  which  Colbert  maintains  a  close  supervision 
of  the  trade. 

September  27,  1669,  the  edict  of  May  20  was  renewed  for 
a  period  of  six  months,  but  further  limited  to  the  provinces 
of  Poitou,  Touraine,  Anjou,  Normandy,  Picardy,  Soissonnais, 
Champagne,  Burgundy,  Bourbonnais,  and  Berry.4  Further 
continuations  were  issued  in  March  and  August,  1670.  In 
connection  with  this  last  renewal,  it  is  interesting  to  note  the 
circular  letter  of  Colbert  of  August  22:  "As  the  term  of  the 
edict  of  March  18  will  soon  expire,  and  as  His  Majesty  could 
perhaps  grant  a  continuation  of  those  privileges,  do  not  fail 
to  let  me  know  whether  or  not  the  harvest  has  been  good  in 

1  H.  1816.    Reg.  du  Bureau,  iiicxiii.     2  Dec.  1661.     Ext.  des  Reg.  du  Conseil. 

2  See  especially  a  circular  letter  of  Colbert  to  the  intendants,  15  Juillet  1663: 
"  La  saison  qui  a  este  jusqu'a  present  assez  dereglee,  et  les  pluies  frequentes  qui 
sont  arrivees  dans  le  milieu  de  1'este,  diminuant  en  quelque  facon  I'esperance 
qu'on  avoit  concue  de  la  fertilite  de  1'annee,  .  .  .  je  vous  ecris  ces  lignes  pour 
vous  prier  de  m'informer  en  detail  de  1'estat  auquel  sont  a  present  les  biens  de  la 
terre  dans  vostre  generalite,  et  si,  suivant  les  apparences,  la  recolte  sera  bonne;  me 
marquant  ...  les  endroits  du  pays  qui  auront  este  affliges  de  la  gresle  ou  d'autre 
accidens,  et  ceux  qui  n'en  auront  rien  souffert."     Clement,  Lett.  Inst.  et  Mem., 
IV,  216. 

3  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  933.  4  Ibid.,  II,  933. 


COLBERT  AND  THE  GRAIN  TRADE 

your  generalite  this  year.  Send  me  also  the  price  of  grain, 
so  that  His  Majesty  can  decide  what  is  most  advantageous  for 
his  subjects."  l  It  is  difficult  to  be  sure  that  reports  were 
actually  received  from  the  intendants,  but  I  should  be  inclined 
to  think  that  such  was  the  case,  and  that  this,  as  well  as  other 
renewals,  was  granted  only  after  Colbert  had  definite  assurance 
of  the  condition  of  the  harvests.2  Further  continuations  were 
issued  February  28  and  May  30,  1671,  with  the  same  exemptions 
from  duties.  The  exemptions  were  limited  to  half  the  ordinary 
duties  in  the  edicts  of  December  31,  1671,  and  October  26,  1672. 
The  complete  exemption  was  restored  in  April,  1673,  only  to  be 
withdrawn  the  following  year,  in  order  to  obtain  money  for  the 
war.3 

After  1675,  the  condition  of  the  harvests  resulted  in  an  alter- 
nation of  prohibition  and  permission  of  export.  There  are 
prohibitions  issued  July  6,  1675,  September  n,  and  October 
6,  1677,  May  16,  1679,  and  June  24,  1681.  Export  was  per- 
mitted generally  December  31,  1675,  June  4,  1678,  June  i,  1680, 
August  7,  1683 .4  How  closely  these  royal  edicts  were  adapted 

1  Clement,  Lett.  Inst.  et  Mem.,  IV,  233.     22  Aout  1670. 

2  The  bulk  of  material  made  it  impractical  to  note  all  letters,  especially  the 
ordinary  crop  reports,  and  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  many  letters  are 
missing  in  the  collection  preserved. 

3  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  934-937. 

4  Ibid.,  II,  938,  965.    Clement,  Lett.  Inst.  et  Mem.,  IV,  285,  note  (26  Juin  1681). 
A.  D.  XI,  37.    Edicts  of  n  Sept.  and  6  Oct.  1677,  i  Juin  1680,  7  Aout  1683. 

(There  was  a  prohibition  in  August,  1682,  but  the  edict  is  lost.  References  appear 
in  the  letters.)  The  Collection  Rondonneau,  at  the  Archives  Nationales,  is  a  com- 
prehensive collection  of  edicts  and  Letters  Patent,  arranged  chronologically  and 
by  subjects.  It  was  made  by  a  private  person  connected  with  the  Parlement, 
and  even  at  the  time  it  had  a  semi-official  character  and  was  used  by  the  advo- 
cates and  judges.  At  the  death  of  the  collector,  Rondonneau,  it  was  purchased 
by  the  Government.  It  is  now  one  of  the  most  important  and  trustworthy  sources 
for  the  study  of  royal  ordinances  from  1660  to  the  Revolution.  After  1683,  Dela- 
mare is  less  complete,  and  the  series  A.  D.  XI,  37,  adds  many  edicts  to  his  list. 
The  policy,  however,  is  a  simple  continuation  of  that  of  Colbert  in  all  respects,  in- 
cluding the  exemptions  from  duties  and  the  control  of  the  trade,  by  means  of  annual 
or  semi-annual  edicts  that  are  renewed  if  circumstances  permit.  There  is  a  very 
complete  series  of  edicts  from  1683  to  1715.  From  1686  to  1689,  export  is  per- 
mitted and  exemption  is  granted  from  duties.  After  1692,  prohibitions  alternate, 
and  the  serious  crop  failures  make  the  prohibition  most  frequent  till  after  1700, 
when  there  was  another  period  of  free  export. 


276  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

to  local  conditions  is  necessarily  somewhat  uncertain,  but  the 
special  exemptions  of  some  provinces  from  general  provisions, 
and  the  careful  inquiries  made  by  some  intendants  before 
publishing  the  edicts  would  suggest  that  these  measures  were 
much  more  real  regulations  of  trade  than  were  the  royal  edicts 
of  the  sixteenth  century. 

Breteuil,  the  Intendant  at  Amiens,  writes  from  Aire,  June  19: 
"  I  received  the  edict  (of  June  i)  concerning  the  permission 
of  the  export  of  grain  to  foreign  countries.  The  news  gives 
much  pleasure  on  all  sides,  but  before  publishing  it  formally, 
I  have  thought  it  wise  to  write  to  all  the  officers  of  the  baillages, 
elections,  and  towns,  to  inform  me  precisely  of  the  conditions 
of  the  crops  in  their  districts.  While  waiting  for  their  reply, 
the  possibility  of  injury  to  the  harvests  from  hail  or  other  acci- 
dents will  be  past.  I  will  not  publish  the  edict  until  there  is  that 
certainty  concerning  the  harvest  that  your  letter  enjoins"  l  Col- 
bert replies,  June  27:  "You  have  done  well  to  postpone  the 
publication  of  the  edict  for  the  export  of  grain  until  you  are  sure 
of  the  conditions  of  the  harvest.  But  as  I  learn  from  all  parts 
that  the  harvest  will  be  fine,  I  do  not  doubt  that  you  have 
published  it  by  this  time."  2  A  few  days  later,  Colbert  writes 
again:  "  As  you  have  published  the  edict,  and  as  you  feel 
assured  of  an  abundant  harvest,  let  me  know  if  there  is  really 
likelihood  of  considerable  exports  from  your  generalite." 3 
There  are  other  cases  in  which  the  general  edicts  were  suspended 
in  particular  localities,  so  that  it  is  not  unfair  to  conclude  that 
these  edicts  of  Colbert  were  really  executed  in  those  districts 
where  special  reasons  did  not  lead  to  local  exemptions  arranged 
between  Colbert  and  the  intendants. 

Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  repeated  assertion 
of  the  freedom  of  the  inter-provincial  trade.  The  declaration 
appears  formally  in  subsidiary  clauses  of  some  edicts,  as  in 
December,  1661,  more  frequently  it  is  assumed,  as  indicated 
by  divers  letters,  which  are  called  forth  by  local  limitations 

1  G7.    84.    Aire,  19  Juin  1680.     Breteuil  a  Colbert. 

2  Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Clair.,  463,  453.     Colbert  a  Breteuil. 
8  Ibid.,  463,  478.     Colbert  a  Breteuil,  4  Juillet  1680. 


COLBERT  AND  THE  GRAIN  TRADE       277 

upon  freedom  of  circulation.  "  The  grain  trade  between  the 
provinces  of  the  kingdom  has  never  been  restricted,"  says  Col- 
bert in  many  letters  to  intendants.1  Colbert  must  have  real- 
ized that  this  statement  was  by  no  means  justified  by  the  facts, 
but  he  persistently  refused  to  recognize  the  existence  of  any 
problem  in  the  domestic  distribution  of  grain.  Such  blindness 
to  obvious  facts  is  hardly  comprehensible,  as  he  is  singularly 
practical  in  most  political  questions,  and  rarely  misled  by  pre- 
conceived notions.  But  here  he  seems  to  be  hopelessly  in- 
volved in  confusion  by  his  strong  feeling  of  nationality.  At 
all  events,  he  never  gave  any  attention  to  the  domestic  grain 
trade,  dismissing  it  with  the  declaration  that  it  ought  to  be 
perfectly  free  and  upbraiding  any  officials  who  endeavored  to 
restrict  the  freedom  of  movement  within  the  Kingdom.2 

Colbert,  however,  did  not  confine  his  regulation  of  the  foreign 
trade  in  grain  to  purely  general  measures.  His  desire  to  adjust 
policy  to  local  conditions  and  his  perception  of  the  essential 
differences  in  the  interests  of  some  provinces  led  him  to  adopt 
a  means  of  control  more  cognizant  of  local  needs  than  the 
general  edicts  of  his  predecessors.  His  general  edicts  were 
issued  with  the  express  injunction  to  intendants  to  publish 
them  only  if  the  conditions  in  their  generalite  warranted  such 
action.  Consequently,  an  adequate  conception  of  the  regulation 
of  the  trade  requires  study  of  Colbert's  dealings  with  special 
provinces. 

Burgundy 

In  the  history  of  the  trade  in  the  Saone  Basin,  there  are  two 
incidents  of  special  interest.  The  first  was  an  outgrowth  of 
Colbert's  desire  to  reduce  the  obstacles  to  trade  created  by  local 
customs,  the  second  case  is  an  illustration  of  the  working  of  the 
administrative  system  at  times  when  the  slowness  of  communi- 
cation might  have  had  serious  results. 

1  Clement,  Lett.  Inst.  et  Mim.,  IV,  277,  282.     26  Oct.  1679;  18  Dec.  1680. 
Ibid.,  IV,  286.     16  Juillet  1681.    References  of  this  type  can  be  multiplied 

without  difficulty. 

2  Read  in  this  connection  the  letters  cited  in  ch.  I,  of  this  part,  apropos  of 
prices  and  grain  movements. 


278  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

Colbert  was  aware  of  the  importance  of  Burgundy  as  a  source 
of  grain  supply,  and  was  anxious  to  secure  adequate  outlet  for 
the  large  crops  of  1671.  There  had  been  complaint  that  trade 
was  slow,  that  prices  had  fallen  to  such  a  point  that  returns 
were  slight  even  when  it  was  possible  to  sell.  News  of  large 
shipments  from  Provence  and  Languedoc  to  Italian  ports  sug- 
gested the  possibility  of  an  outlet  for  Burgundy,  either  in 
Languedoc  and  Provence,  or  in  export  to  Italy.1  The  intendant 
replied  that  the  trade  proposed  could  not  be  profitably  under- 
taken because  of  the  heavy  tolls  and  local  customs.  Colbert 
then  writes:  "  If  it  is  true  that  the  tolls  on  the  Saone  and 
Rhone  prevent  the  export  of  grain,  some  remedy  can  be  found. 
You  must  look  into  the  matter  with  the  farmers  of  the  customs 
of  the  Saone.  Find  out  how  much  grain  has  actually  been 
shipped  down  the  river  during  the  last  six  months,  and  if  the 
quantity  is  not  considerable,  persuade  the  farmers  to  remit  half 
the  customs,  explaining  to  them  that  by  that  means  they  will 
gain  much  more  than  by  levying  duties  on  the  present  basis. 
As  soon  as  they  have  consented  to  the  diminution,  the  King 
will  issue  an  order  reducing  all  the  tolls  on  the  Rhone  by  one- 
half."  2  Without  waiting  for  any  reply,  an  ordinance  was  issued 
on  April  2,  covering  both  the  town  octrois  and  the  other  tolls 
levied  along  the  rivers  Saone  and  Rhone.3  This  was  followed,  at 
the  end  of  the  month,  by  another  order  removing  the  remaining 
half  of  the  old  dues.4  The  attempt  to  stimulate  this  export 
trade  was  a  failure,  and  the  chief  effect  of  the  acts  was  to 
relieve  the  Lyonese  trade  of  the  burden  of  duties.  This  was  not 
contemplated  in  the  orders,  however,  and  when  it  was  learned 
that  the  merchants  were  availing  themselves  of  this  opportunity, 
interpretative  orders  were  issued  May  31  and  June  3,  expressly 
forbidding  the  application  of  the  exemption  from  duties  to  the 
grain  going  to  Lyons.5 

Clement,  Lett.  Inst.  et  Mem.,  IP,  651-652.     22  Mars  1672. 

Ibid.,  II2,  652,  note  i.     i  Avril  1672. 

Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  934. 

Clement,  Lett.  Inst.  et  Mem.,  II 2,  652,  note  i.     20  Avril  1672. 

Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  935. 


COLBERT  AND  THE  GRAIN  TRADE       279 

In  1678,  the  crops  had  been  fine  and  a  general  permission  of 
export  had  been  issued  June  4.  The  following  harvest  was  less 
abundant,  and  the  inconvenience  and  danger  of  foreign  export 
became  evident  in  the  spring  of  1679.  This  feeling  ultimately 
resulted  in  the  prohibition  of  May  16,  1679,  but  the  difficulty 
in  Burgundy  arising  from  export  over  the  Alsatian  border  had 
already  reached  an  acute  stage  by  May  u.  The  only  royal 
edict  governing  the  case  was  that  of  June  4,  1678.  A  letter  of  the 
Sindic  of  Burgundy  throws  much  light  upon  the  legal  standing 
of  the  edict  in  Burgundy:  "  I  was  extraordinarily  surprised," 
he  writes,  "  when  I  was  shown  the  edict  of  June  4,  1678  by  which 
the  King  permits  the  export  of  grain.  The  edict  was  in  the  hands 
of  the  clerks  of  the  customs  office  at  Bellay.  They  told  me 
that  the  farmers  of  the  Cinq  Grosses  Fermes  had  secured  the 
edict  and  that  the  director  at  Lyons  had  sent  it  to  them.  This 
edict,  like  the  prohibitory  edict,  is  addressed  to  the  intendants, 
but  it  is  not  signed  by  any  of  them.  It  has  never  been  published 
in  Burgundy,1  and  was  issued  upon  the  supposition  that  there 
was  a  large  quantity  of  grain  in  the  various  provinces.  But 
grain  is  scarce  everywhere.  These  reflections,  in  connection 
with  the  dearth  and  the  high  prices  current,  have  obliged  me 
to  oppose  the  execution  of  that  edict,  partly  to  prevent  the 
famine  which  would  be  inevitable  if  exports  were  permitted, 
partly  to  prevent  rioting  and  popular  outbreaks."  2  An  accom- 
panying "  proces  verbal  "  indicates  that  the  sindics  and  officers 
of  the  baillage  of  Bugey  confiscated  large  quantities  of  grain 
that  had  been  prepared  for  export.  The  vigor  of  the  local 
officials  is  thus  beyond  doubt.  Bouchu,  the  Intendant,  was 
less  certain  of  the  proper  course  to  follow.  He  submitted  the 
whole  case  to  Colbert  without,  however,  taking  any  action 
against  the  local  officials.  By  May  31,  Bouchu  had  received 

1  Publication  had  perhaps  been  purposely  withheld  in  Burgundy,  if  we  may 
judge  from  similar  cases  elsewhere.  At  such  times  copies  sent  in  unofficially,  as 
here,  always  made  some  difficulty,  though  it  seems  to  have  been  a  principle  of 
administrative  law  that  no  general  edict  applied  to  any  particular  jurisdiction 
until  published  by  the  officials  to  whom  it  was  addressed. 

2  G7.     156.     St.  Rambert,  n  Mai  1679.     Balme,  Sindic  en  Bourgogne. 


280        THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

the  prohibition  of  the  i6th,  which  of  course  settled  the  whole 
dispute.1 

The  discretion  possessed  by  the  local  authorities  and  the 
diversity  of  the  official  staff  were  important  sources  of  elasticity 
in  the  administrative  system  of  the  seventeenth  century.  The 
officials  were  not  expected  to  be  servile  media  of  central  activity. 
General  edicts  were  to  be  applied  only  if  adapted  to  local  con- 
ditions. 

Picardy,  Champagne,  and  Normandy 

The  northern  province^  furnish  instances  of  both  types  of 
special  action,  both  special  royal  orders  and  exemptions  from 
general  edicts  upon  the  initiative  of  the  intendants. 

In  November,  1672,  a  royal  order  was  issued  discharging 
exports  from  Picardy  and  Champagne  from  the  payment  of 
half  the  ordinary  dues.  There  is  an  implication  that  full  dues 
are  paid  from  other  provinces,  though  the  general  edict  of  October 
26, 1672  seems  to  have  been  still  in  force.2  The  order  of  April  n, 
1676  was  more  explicit.  Export  from  Picardy  and  Champagne 
is  expressly  permitted,  but  strict  prohibitions  are  levied  against 
export  from  other  provinces.3  In  1678,  permission  of  export 
was  granted  in  general  by  the  edict  of  June  4,  but  in  Picardy 
and  Champagne  this  right  was  withdrawn  by  an  edict  of  July  23, 
prohibiting  export.4  Then,  after  the  harvest,  exports  from 
Picardy  and  Champagne  were  permitted,5  by  edicts  of  October 
22,  1678  and  January  7,  1679.  A  letter  to  Miromenil,  Intendant 
in  Champagne,  suggests  that  Picardy  and  Champagne  were 
exempted  from  the  general  prohibition  issued  May  16,  1679. 6 

The  intendants  also  used  their  discretion.  In  June,  1681, 
Faul  trier,  in  Hainault,  issued  a  prohibition  of  export  from  his 

1  G7.     156.    Dijon,  15  Mai  1679.     Bouchu  encloses  the  letter  of  Balme  and 
the  "proces  verbal."    Dijon,  31  Mai  1679.     See  also  Colbert's  letter  of  24  Mai 
1679,  sending  the  edict  of  16  Mai.    Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Clair.,  461,  569. 

2  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  936.  8  Ibid.,  II,  937-938. 
4  Ibid.,  II,  939,  cited  in  edict  of  7  Jan.  1679. 

6  Ibid.,  II,  965,  cited  in  edict  of  16  Mai  1679.  References  in  a  letter  of  Bre- 
teuil  to  Colbert.  G7.  84,  Arret.  31  Oct.  1678.  Breteuil  says  that  the  permission 
will  have  a  good  effect.  Edict  of  7  Jan.  1679.  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  939.  A.  D. 
XI,  37- 

•  Bib.  Nat,  Mel.  Clair.,  462-471-    Colbert  a  M.,  19  Juillet  1679. 


COLBERT  AND  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  28 1 

department  before  the  general  edict  appeared.1  Scarcely  a 
month  later,  Colbert  writes  to  Bazin  at  Metz:  "  As  you  find  it 
inexpedient  to  publish  the  prohibition  of  export,  there  is  no 
reason  why  you  should  not  suspend  it."  2 

In  regard  to  Normandy,  there  is  little  that  is  worthy  of  note. 
Meliand,  at  Caen,  prefers  not  to  publish  the  edict  of  June  i, 
1680,  permitting  export.  "  I  have  received  the  edict  for  the 
permission  of  the  export  of  grain  from  the  Kingdom,  and  I 
should  have  published  it  as  you  order.  But  the  continual  rains 
in  these  parts  for  the  last  six  weeks  render  the  harvest  so  uncer- 
tain that  I  have  felt  obliged  to  defer  the  publication  of  the  edict. 
I  may  say  that  the  grass  in  the  meadows  is  covered  with  water, 
and  that  the  grain  is  lodged  in  many  places.  There  are  no  apples 
anywhere."  3 

The  following  year  conditions  were  reversed.  A  general  pro- 
hibition was  issued  June  24,  but  crops  in  Normandy  were  good. 
Colbert  writes  to  Le  Blanc  at  Rouen:  "  I  am  glad  to  hear  that 
there  will  be  an  abundant  harvest  in  the  generalite  of  Rouen, 
and  that  prices  have  been  falling  each  market  day.  Con- 
sequently, you  can  suspend  the  publication  of  the  edict  to  pro- 
hibit export."  4 

Bordeaux 

In  the  south,  the  necessity  of  special  attention  was  even  more 
marked ;  local  authorities  were  more  independent  and  conditions 
differed  widely  from  those  of  the  northern  provinces.  At 
Bordeaux,  in  1663,  the  municipality  endeavored  to  regulate  the 
grain  trade  in  its  own  interest  by  preventing  the  passage  of 
shipments  from  the  Upper  Garonne.  This  action,  which  was 
hardly  warranted  by  conditions,  evoked  an  immediate  protest. 
In  April,  Colbert  received  an  anonymous  letter  from  Bordeaux, 
stating  the  case  of  the  exporting  merchants:  "This  letter 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Clair.,  464,  323.     C.  a  Faultrier,  18  Juin  1681. 

2  Ibid.,  465,  25  v.     Colbert  a  Bazin,  n  Juillet  1681.     See  also  Letters  between 
Colbert  and  Breteuil.    Ibid.,  467,  no.    Colbert  a  Breteuil,  6  Aout  1682.    G7.    84. 
Amiens,  16  Aout  1682.    Breteuil  a  Colbert. 

3  G7.     213.     Caen,  17  Juin  1683.    Meliand.     A  very  characteristic  report  of 
conditions. 

4  Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Clair.,  465-49  v.    Colbert  a  Le  Blanc,  24  Juillet  1681. 


282         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

is  designed  to  show  you  how  you  can  render  a  great  service 
to  the  provinces  of  Languedoc  and  Guienne.  They«,re  burdened 
with  direct  taxes ;  they  have  an  abundance  of  grain  but  no  hope 
of  selling.  The  Garonne  is  covered  with  loaded  grain  boats. 
The  granaries  of  the  province  are  full,  but  the  municipal  officers 
of  Bordeaux  prevent  the  passage  of  grain.  Numbers  of  English, 
Dutch,  and  Flemish  merchants  have  made  extensive  purchases 
of  grain  that  is  spoiling  in  granaries  on  the  Tarn  and  Garonne. 
They  are  not  likely  to  come  again  after  this  experience.  All 
because  of  the  obstinacy  of  the  Jurats  of  Bordeaux,  which  M.  de 
Saint-Luc  is  unable  to  overcome.  The  King  would  be  sure  of 
the  tax  receipts,  if  the  passage  of  this  grain  were  permitted. 
It  is  to  the  interest  of  His  Majesty  that  money  should  come  into 
the  kingdom  from  foreign  countries."  l  Colbert  took  immediate 
action.  The  question  was  brought  before  the  Council  and  the 
Jurats  of  Bordeaux  were  ordered  to  exhibit  the  titles,  in  virtue 
of  which  they  had  taken  to  themselves  this  authority  over  the 
grain  trade.  The  intendant  was  instructed  to  examine  the 
documents  produced  and  to  terminate  the  affair,  establishing 
freedom  of  trade  on  the  Garonne.2  Le  Jay,  however,  was  much 
less  prompt  than  Colbert  desired  him  to  be,  and  as  no  news 
was  forthcoming,  another  letter  was  despatched  on  the  seventh 
of  June.3  In*the  course  of  the  following  month,  the  case  was 
brought  to  a  conclusion.  The  town  had  practically  no  authority. 
There  was  a  charter  of  Henry  II,  which  Colbert  considered 
quite  irrelevant,  and  a  royal  Patent  of  June,  1662,  giving  the 
city  the  right  to  take  one-third  of  the  grain  passing  the  town, 
upon  condition  of  paying  the  market  price.4  After  the  harvest, 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Colb.,  115,  454.    Avril,  1663.    Bordeaux.     This  is  a  very 
characteristic  form  of  the  so-called  "  Mercantilism  "  of  the  period,  but  it  would 
seem  necessary  to  distinguish  this  from  the  more  systematic  form.    The  immediate 
effects  of  specie  movements  are  alone  in  view  in  these  statements  of  the  necessity 
of  obtaining  specie,  and  it  would  be  difficult  to  prove  that  a  dearth  of  specie  was 
not  sufficiently  common  to  give  great  importance  to  the  current  movements  of 
coin  and  bullion.    Such  a  mercantilism  is  quite  distinct  from  the  money-hoarding 
system  that  is  too  frequently  represented  as  the  universal  economic  doctrine  of  the 
seventeenth  century. 

2  Depping,  Correspondence  Administrative,  III,  26-27.     5  Mai  1663. 

3  Clement,  Lett.  Inst.  et  Mem.,  IV,  207-208.     7  Juin  1663. 

4  Ibid.,  IV,  215.     13  Juillet  1663. 


COLBERT  AND  THE  GRAIN  TRADE       283 

Bordeaux  complained  of  excessive  exports  and  rising  prices, 
and  petitioned  for  authority  to  interfere  with  the  trade  on  the 
river.  Colbert  did  not  attach  much  weight  to  their  complaints, 
but  he  did  urge  the  intendant  and  the  premier  president  of  the 
Parlement  to  look  into  the  matter  to  see  if  there  was  any  ground 
for  the  fear  of  dearth.1  He  desired  above  all  things  to  afford 
Montauban  and  Languedoc  an  adequate  market  for  their  grain, 
so  far  as  it  could  be  done  without  really  imperilling  Bordeaux. 
Le  Jay  writes  very  reassuringly  a  month  later.  He  is  in  corre- 
spondence with  Pellot  at  Montauban,  and  they  are  both  agreed 
upon  the  necessity  of  keeping  the  river  free  for  the  exportation 
of  grain  from  the  upper  waters.  "  If  there  should  be  any  con- 
siderable change  in  conditions,"  he  says,  "or  if  an  excessive 
export  should  cause  prices  to  rise  unduly,  Pellot  and  I  could 
come  to  some  understanding  about  the  proper  means  of  pro- 
ducing such  limitations  of  shipments  as  should  be  necessary."  2 
From  this  time,  the  intendant  at  Bordeaux  was  in  unques- 
tioned control  of  the  grain  trade;  for  the  most  part  he  followed 
the  general  edicts  but  there  are  exceptions.  One  of  the  most 
interesting  cases  arose  in  July,  1675.  A  general  prohibition 
had  been  issued  on  the  sixth,  but  the  weather  was  fine  in  the 
south  and  the  prospect  of  an  abundant  harvest  was  assured. 
On  the  nineteenth,  Colbert  wrote  to  de  Seve,  recommending 
him  to  suspend  the  publication  of  the  prohibition.  De  Seve 
replied  that  he  had  already  done  so,  and  that  he  had  written  to 
Paris  on  the  eighteenth  to  inform  Colbert  of  his  action.3  Similar 
exceptions  to  the  general  edicts  appear  in  1681  and  1682.  In 
1 68 1,  a  prohibition  had  been  issued,  but  crop  reports  from 
Guienne  were  favorable,  so  that  Colbert  wrote:  "  I  am  glad  that 
the  harvest  promises  to  be  abundant  in  Guienne;  there  is  no 
reason  why  you  should  not  suspend  the  order  prohibiting  export. 

1  Clement,  Lett.  Inst.  et  Mem.,  IV,  220.     25  Sept.  1663.     Colbert  a  Pellot,  Int.  a 
Montauban.     Depping,  Corr.  Admin.,  Ill,  341. 

2  Bib.  Nat,  Mel.  Colb.,  117  bis,  817.  22  Oct.  1663,  Bordeaux.    Ibid.,  117  bis, 
818.    Pellot  a  Le  Jay. 

3  Ibid.,  172,  179.    Bordeaux,  25  Juillet  1675.    de  Seve.    Bib.  Nat.,  Me"l.  Clair., 
796,  323.    Colbert  a  de  Seve,  25  et  29  Juillet  1675.     Some  of  the  letters  are  lost, 
but  a  full  account  appears  in  the  letter  of  de  Seve  of  25  Juillet. 


284         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

But  I  doubt  if  that  will  lead  to  trade  with  Spain,  as  the  harvests 
are  good  there."  l  A  similar  prohibition  was  issued  in  1682, 
and  Colbert  was  so  uncertain  as  to  conditions  in  Guienne,  that 
he  practically  left  the  intendant  free  to  publish  it  or  not.  "  I 
send  you  the  edict,"  he  says.  "  You  will  let  me  know  whether 
you  decide  to  publish  it  or  not."  2  Some  of  his  uncertainty 
was  shared  by  de  Ris  and  by  Foucault,  who  was  located  at 
Montauban,  but  made  a  trip  to  Bordeaux  at  this  time.  Foucault 
writes,  on  the  twenty-fourth:  "  I  arrived  here  this  morning, 
and  my  first  care  was  to  confer  with  de  Ris  on  the  condition 
of  the  harvest.  .  .  .  He  tells  me  that  the  crops  have  been  poor 
throughout  his  department.  Nevertheless,  the  price  of  grain 
has  fallen,  and  this  confirms  my  opinion  that  it  is  not  expedient 
to  prohibit  export,  particularly  as  I  have  just  received  letters  from 
Montauban,  which  represent  conditions  there  as  unchanged."  3 
The  hesitation  seems  to  have  continued  for  some  time,  for 
on  the  first  of  October,  we  still  find  Colbert  writing  to  de  Ris: 
"  although  grain  has  gone  up  a  little,  I  do  not  think  it  necessary 
to  prohibit  export."  4 

Languedoc 

Languedoc  necessitated  more  special  treatment  than  any 
other  province  in  the  Kingdom.  The  normal  trade  of  the  prov- 
ince was  with  Spain  and  Italy.  There  was  little  community 
of  interest  with  the  interior;  the  principal,  if  not  the  only,  ques- 
tion was  the  relation  between  Upper  and  Lower  Languedoc. 
Ordinarily  Lower  Languedoc  was  relatively  self-supporting, 
and  as  Upper  Languedoc  had  a  surplus,  it  was  obliged  to  export. 
In  times  of  dearth,  however,  as  we  have  seen  in  a  preceding 
chapter,  Lower  Languedoc  might  suffer  if  export  were  permitted. 
The  frequent  necessities  of  Provence  and  the  difficulty  of  divert- 
ing the  grain  of  Languedoc  thither  are  the  most  interesting 
features  of  the  efforts  to  control  the  trade  of  Languedoc.  It 

1  Bib.  Nat,  Mel.  Clair.,  465,  28.     Colbert  a  de  Ris,  16  Juillet  1681. 

2  Ibid.,  467,  138.     Colbert  a  de  Ris,  17  Aout  1682.    Ibid.,   136.     Colbert  a 
Foucault,  17  Aout  1682. 

3  G7.    390.     Bordeaux,  24  Aout  1682.     Foucault. 

4  Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Clair.,  467,  248.     Colbert  a  de  Ris,  i  Oct.  1682. 


COLBERT  AND  THE  GRAIN  TRADE       285 

is  a  clear  indication  of  the  fact  that  Provence  was  a  group 
of  distinct  markets  which  were  less  favorable,  on  the  whole, 
than  the  equally  distinct  markets  in  Italy  and  Spain. 

In  Languedoc,  too,  the  intendant  enjoyed  much  more  inde- 
pendence than  elsewhere.  Baville  was  dubbed  the  "  King  of 
Languedoc,"  and  the  phrase  does  not  connote  too  much.  But 
it  is  quite  as  important  to  realize  that  the  powers  of  the  inten- 
dant in  Languedoc  were  exceptional  as  it  is  to  remember  that 
the  relative  impotence  of  the  intendant  at  Lyons  is  equally 
exceptional,  on  account  of  the  prestige  of  the  governor  and  the 
power  of  the  municipality. 

The  earliest  information  from  Languedoc  consists  of  a  few 
letters  written  in  the  spring  of  1662,  but  apparently  they  give  us 
only  the  latter  part  of  the  episode.  Bezons  had  been  discussing 
the  expediency  of  prohibiting  export,  and  finally  issued  a  pro- 
hibition on  his  own  authority,  March  20.  There  was  trouble 
in  Upper  Languedoc  in  regard  to  shipments  to  be  sent  down 
the  Garonne,  and,  to  remedy  this,  guards  had  to  be  despatched 
to  protect  the  grain  boats.1 '  Prices  continued  to  rise  at  Nar- 
bonne,  so  that  Bezons  felt  quite  satisfied  with  his  conduct. 
The  harvest  promised  well,  and  there  was  reason  to  hope  for  a 
speedy  termination  of  the  stringency.2  The  weather  continued 
fine,  and  by  the  end  of  July,  Bezons  writes  that  it  will  be  quite 
necessary  to  permit  export,  unless  it  should  be  proposed  to 
divert  the  grain  of  Languedoc  towards  the  interior,  by  shipping 
up  the  Rhone  or  down  the  Garonne.  The  Rhone  presents  many 
difficulties  and  he  would  hardly  care  to  advise  such  a  course.3 

In  1668,  there  were  no  prohibitions,  but  there  was  no  demand 
for  the  grain  of  'Languedoc,  as  Italy  was  supplied,  either  by  her 
own  grain  or  from  other  sources.4  After  1670,  trade  improved 
and  for  three  years  was  carried  on  without  any  official  inter- 
ference.5 In  fact  there  is  little  evidence  of  any  special  regulation 
till  1678. 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Colb.,  107,  20.     Beziers,  20  Mars.  1662.     Bezons  a  Colbert. 

2  Ibid.,  107,  92  v.   28  Mars  1662.  Bezons  a  Colbert.  Pezenas. 

3  Ibid.,  109  bis,  936.     23  Juillet  1662.     Bezons  a  Colbert. 

4  Depping,  Corres.  Adminis.,  I,  378.     10  Nov.  1668,  D'Oppede  a  Colbert. 
6  G7.     295.     Statistics  of  exports,  1670,  Languedoc. 


286         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

The  harvests  in  1677  had  been  deficient  and  general  pro- 
hibitions had  been  issued.  Provence,  however,  declared  that 
the  coasting  trade  with  Languedoc  was  necessary.  Marseilles 
asked  for  permits  to  import  25,000  charges  from  Languedoc. 
But  these  demands  were  treated  very  suspiciously.  December 
17,  Colbert  writes  to  Rouille,  Intendant  in  Provence:  "As 
for  the  grain  that  you  say  is  needed  by  Marseilles,  I  will  say 
that  the  King  has  not  intended  to  interrupt  the  trade  between 
the  provinces  of  the  kingdom.  Express  prohibitions  have 
been  made  against  export  from  frontier  provinces  without 
licenses,  and  it  is  quite  certain  that  Languedoc  will  not  permit 
the  shipment  by  sea  of  the  25,000  charges  that  you  demand. 
The  profit  that  could  be  made  by  carrying  the  grain  to  Genoa 
or  Spain,  instead  of  Marseilles,  is  too  great,  and  it  is  so  easy 
to  change  the  route.  You  ought  not  to  be  surprised  by  the 
strictness  of  the  prohibition.  It  is  hard  to  believe  that  Marseilles 
alone  can  have  need  of  25,000  charges  of  grain.  .  .  .  Further- 
more, as  Marseilles  is  a  free  port,  there  would  be  nothing  to 
prevent  shipment  to  foreign  parts,  once  the  grain  was  landed."  l 
Rouille  replies  that  he  has  not  written  of  the  distress  in  Marseilles 
without  having  made  investigations.  The  town  has  only  enough 
to  last  through  January.  Nor  did  he  intend  to  give  the  impres- 
sion that  the  25,000  charges  were  for  Marseilles  alone.2  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  exports  of  considerable  quantities  of  grain  were 
passing  from  Languedoc  to  Messina,  and  perhaps  to  other  parts 
of  Italy.3 

In  January,  1678,  Rouille  renews  his  demands,  but  this  time 
is  very  humble:  "  If  you  will  do  me  the  favor  to  procure  a  few 
licenses  for  the  export  from  Languedoc  of  a  moderate  quantity 
of  grain  for  the  province,  especially  for  Marseilles  and  Toulon, 
I  will  use  them  only  in  case  of  real  necessity  and  with  all  the 
proper  precautions.  Prices  are  everywhere  one-third  higher 
than  is  usual." 4 

1  G7.     i.     (copie),  17  Dec.  1677.     Colbert  a  Rouille. 

2  G7.    458.     28  Dec.  1677.    Rouille  a  Colbert. 

3  G7.    295.    P&senas,  14  Jan.  1678.    a  Colbert.    G7.    295.    Estats  des  achepts  de 
bleds  fait  par  la  Cie.  de  Commerce  de  Cette,  pour  estre  porte  a  Messine.    Mars,  1678. 

4  G7.    458.    Aix,  25  Jan.  1678.    Rouille\ 


COLBERT  AND  THE  GRAIN  TRADE       287 

The  shipments  to  Italy  from  Languedoc  continued,  and  Dagues- 
seau  discovered  that  the  army  contractors  had  been  shipping 
down  the  Rhone  and  thence  to  foreign  ports,  on  the  strength 
of  licenses  issued  before  the  recent  prohibitions.1  But  it  is 
hard  to  believe  that  there  was  really  any  great  dearth  in  either 
Provence  or  Languedoc,  as  general  permissions  of  export  for 
those  provinces  were  issued  May  14  and  27.*  Bad  weather 
in  Provence,  however,  diminished  the  prospect  of  good  harvests, 
and  these  permits  were  no  sooner  issued  than  Rouille  began  to 
doubt  their  expediency.  This  was  before  he  had  received  the 
edict  of  May  27  for  Provence.3  A  week  later,  he  was  even 
more  firmly  convinced  that  the  permit  should  not  be  published. 
Prices  were  already  above  the  maxima  of  previous  years,  and 
were  still  rising.4  There  is  little  information  from  Languedoc, 
but  apparently  export  was  permitted  only  under  cover  of  special 
licenses.  In  November,  the  Company  at  Cette  asked  for  licenses 
for  export  to  Italy.  Daguesseau  did  not  like  to  grant  them, 
so  that  there  was  doubtless  some  apprehension  in  Languedoc. 
In  January,  we  find  Daguesseau  and  Rouille  entering  into  cor- 
respondence, in  order  to  arrange  exports  to  relieve  distress  in 
Provence.  Colbert  practically  ordered  Daguesseau  to  devote 
his  attention  to  assisting  his  neighbor,5  and  thus  promptly 
quieted  the  fears  of  Provence.6 

Daguesseau,  meanwhile,  had  been  investigating  conditions 
in  his  province.  In  the  producing  regions,  "  I  find  everywhere 
considerable  quantities,"  he  says,  "  more  than  will  be  consumed 
before  the  harvest.  Were  it  not  for  Lower  Languedoc,  where 
prices  are  always  high,  and  for  Provence,  it  would  be  advisable 
to  permit  general  export.  But  as  it  is  necessary  to  harmonize 

1  G7.     295.    Toulouse,  9  Mars  1678.     Daguesseau  encloses  a  list  of  these 
exports.    Toulouse,  16  Mars  1678.    Daguesseau  a  Colbert. 

2  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  938.     Clement,  Lett.  Inst.  et  Mem.,  II,  853.    A.  D.  XI, 
37.     27  Mai  1678. 

3  G7.    458.    Aix,  7  Juin  1678.    Rouille. 

4  G7.  458.  Aix,  14-15  Juin  1678.    Rouille.    See  also  letter  of  Aix,  6  Aout  1678. 
6  G7.     295.    Montpellier,   19  Nov.   1678.    Daguesseau  au  C.   G.  and  other 

letters. 

6  Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Clair.,  461,  37.  13  Jan.  1679.  Colbert  a  Rouille.  Ibid., 
461-479.  Clement,  Lett.  Inst.  et  Mem.,  IV,  271.  Colbert  a  Rouille,  27  Jan.  1679. 


288  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

these  conflicting  interests,  I  think  it  wise  not  to  open  the  door 
completely  by  granting  absolute  freedom  of  export,  and  yet 
on  the  other  hand,  I  would  not  close  the  ports.  In  short,  I 
should  advise  a  qualified  permission,  allowing  shipment  only 
from  Narbonne,  which  is  the  export  point  for  Upper  Languedoc. 
As  the  quantity  of  50,000  setiers  which  you  allowed  for  Provence 
has  all  been  shipped,  I  think  that  His  Majesty  could  now  permit 
the  export  of  100,000  setiers  to  foreign  parts,  on  condition  of 
paying  the  customary  duties.  If  you  will  please  divide  this 
quantity  into  two  licenses  of  50,000  setiers  each,  I  will  use  them 
only  to  facilitate  the  passage  of  grain  from  Upper  to  Lower 
Languedoc  and  will  not  publish  the  second  until  I  see  that  there 
is  plenty  of  grain  in  Lower  Languedoc  to  suffice  for  some  time. 
I  do  not  think  that  I  can  do  more  to  prevent  abuses  than  by 
following  the  course  adopted  last  year.  No  preference  or  per- 
sonal discrimination  is  shown,  those  who  are  first  ready  to  put 
to  sea  receive  the  permits."  1  Colbert  assented  to  these  prop- 
ositions and  forwarded  the  licenses.  "It  is  almost  impossible 
to  prevent  influential  people  from  getting  permits  which  they 
use  as  a  source  of  revenue.  Accordingly,  avoid  using  these 
licenses,  if  you  can,  and  grant  general  freedom  of  trade."2 
A  few  days  later,  Colbert  decided  to  issue  an  edict  permitting 
export  generally  from  Languedoc.3  But  Daguesseau  did  not 
publish  the  royal  edict,  issuing  instead  an  order  of  his  own, 
permitting  export  from  Narbonne  but  from  no  other  ports.4 

Then  come  complaints  from  Provence:  "I  had  hoped  that 
I  would  not  be  obliged  to  write  you  again  about  the  dearth 
in  this  province,"  writes  Rouille,  April  8,  "  but  everything  has 
been  against  us  this  year.  The  severity  and  length  of  the  winter, 
which  still  continues,  has  held  back  the  crops  which  never  in 
the  memory  of  man  gave  less  promise.  The  little  grain  that 
remains  has  been  hoarded,  and  prices  have  risen.  The  people 

1  G7.     295.    Lavaur,  4  Fev.  1679.    Daguesseau  a  Colbert. 

2  G7.    i.     17  Fev.  1679.    Colbert  a  Daguesseau.    Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Clair.,  461, 
158.     17  Fev.  1679.    Passports. 

3  Ibid.,  461,  182-183.     24  Fev.  1679.     Colbert  a  Daguesseau. 

4  Ibid.,  461,  291.     Clement,  op.  cit.,  IV,  272,  note.     24  Mars  1679.     Colbert 
a  Daguesseau. 


COLBERT  AND  THE  GRAIN  TRADE       289 

of  Marseilles  sent  to  Languedoc,  last  month,  but  as  there  has 
been  a  general  permission  of  foreign  export  there,  prices  have 
risen  so  high  that  the  merchants  do  not  engage  in  the  trade 
sufficiently  to  supply  Marseilles.  .  .  .  The  Echevins  of  Mar- 
seilles have  already  been  obliged  to  seize  several  small  boats 
that  were  going  to  Italy."  *  There  was  a  threat  of  a  general 
grain  riot  at  Marseilles,  but  the  crisis  passed  without  actual 
outbreak.2 

These  accounts  from  Provence  mystified  Colbert  completely. 
"  I  am  particularly  surprised/'  he  writes,  "  by  your  statement 
that  the  merchants  have  had  difficulty  in  buying  grain  in  Langue- 
doc, except  at  excessive  prices.  Languedoc  does  not  complain, 
and  is  continually  demanding  freedom  of  export.  You  will 
admit  that  it  is  difficult  to  reconcile  such  conflicting  reports. 
However,  the  King  bids  me  write  in  strong  terms  to  M.  Dagues- 
seau  to  have  him  correspond  with  you  and  consider  if  it  is  neces- 
sary to  prohibit  export  from  Languedoc."3  Colbert  again 
took  matters  into  his  own  hands  without  waiting  for  a  reply; 
a  prohibition  of  export  from  Languedoc  was  issued  April  18. 
This  evoked  a  long  letter  from  Daguesseau  who  insisted  upon 
continuing  his  previous  policy.  "  The  edict  will  do  no  good  to 
Provence  and  will  do  much  harm  to  Languedoc."  4  Colbert 
disliked  to  insist  and  finally  gave  Daguesseau  instructions  to 
act  as  he  thought  best.5  Daguesseau  finally  published  the  pro- 
hibition of  foreign  export,  but  the  coasting  trade  with  Provence 
was  continued  under  bond.6  The  correspondence  is  rather 
voluminous  even  after  this,  but  there  is  nothing  of  importance 
until  the  harvest  introduced  new  elements. 

The  news  that  crops  were  good  in  Languedoc  induced  Colbert 
to  issue  a  special  ordinance,  permitting  export  from  the  province 

1  G7.    458.    Aix,  8  Avril  1679.    Rouille  au  C.  G. 

2  G7.    458.    Aix,  ii  Avril  1679.    Rouille  a  Daguesseau  and  enclosure  of  a 
letter  from  Marseilles,  8  Avril  1679. 

3  Clement,  op.  cit.,  IV,  272,  note.     20  Avnl  1679.     Colbert  a  Rouille'.    Bib. 
Nat.,  Mel.  Clair.,  461,  394.     20  Avril  1679.     Colbert  a  Daguesseau.    Ibid.,  461, 
418.     27  Avril  1679.    Colbert  a  Rouille.. 

4  tj7.     295.    Montpellier,  29  Avril  1679. 

6  Bib.  Nat,,  Mel.  Clair.,  461,  488.     11  Mai  1679.     Colbert  a  Daguesseau. 
8  Ibid.,  461,  521.     18  Mai  1679.     Colbert  a  Daguesseau. 


290  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

but  not  to  foreign  ports.1  This  tended  to  stimulate  the  move- 
ment of  grain  from  Languedoc  to  Provence,  much  to  the  relief 
of  all  concerned.  General  permission  of  foreign  export  from 
Languedoc  was  withheld  solely  on  account  of  the  needs  of 
Provence,2  and  letters  from  Rouille  indicated  that  this  difficulty 
was  likely  to  continue,  as  crops  were  light  in  Provence.3 

Complete  freedom  of  trade  from  Languedoc  was  considered 
seriously,  but  Colbert  warned  Daguesseau  that  even  if  such 
permission  was  granted,  it  must  not  be  published  until  he  had 
assured  himself  that  the  needs  of  Provence  and  Dauphine 
were  adequately  supplied.4  Shortly  after  this,  Daguesseau 
sent  in  a  report  of  conditions  in  his  province:  "There  have 
been  divers  accidents  which  have  rendered  the  harvest  in  Upper 
Languedoc  less  abundant  than  was  expected.  There  are  no 
oats  anywhere,  and  prices  are  high.  There  is  very  little  wheat  in 
the  mountains,  more  in  the  plains,  but  less  than  last  year,  so 
that  wheat  is  high  considering  the  season.  Prices  have  risen 
even  since  the  harvest  in  Lower  Languedoc,  on  account  of  the 
hoards  made  by  merchants  in  hopes  of  complete  freedom  of 
export.  On  the  whole,  there  will  be  no  extraordinary  abundance 
of  grain,  but  there  will  probably  be  enough,  not  only  for  Langue- 
doc but  also  for  the  neighboring  provinces.  Prices  will  doubt- 
less run  high  throughout  the  year.  At  the  same  time,  it  is 
certain  that  the  people  of  Upper  Languedoc  cannot  live  or  pay 
their  taxes,  except  through  the  sale  of  their  grain,  and  I  have 
noticed  that  even  when  there  were  complaints  of  dearth,  Upper 
Languedoc  always  has  some  old  grain  left.  Furthermore, 
there  is  an  unusual  crop  of  millet  in  Upper  Languedoc  and  in 
the  mountains,  and,  as  millet  is  the  ordinary  food  of  the  peasants, 
this  will  compensate  in  some  measure  for  the  light  wheat  crop. 
I  feel  that  it  would  be  advantageous  to  permit  export  until 
October  or  November,  quite  as  much  to  complete  the  sale  of 
the  old  grain,  as  to  give  the  people  some  means  of  procuring 
money.  But  this  permission  should  be  limited  to  Narbonne 

1  Clement,  op.  cit.,  IV,  275,  note.    2  Aout  1679. 

2  Ibid.,  9-10.    Aout,  1679. 

8  G7.    458.    Aix,  15-16.    Aout,  1679.    Rouille*  a  Colbert. 

4  Bib.  Nat.,  Me"l.  Clair.,  462,  151.     17  Aout  1679.    Colbert  a  Daguesseau. 


COLBERT  AND  THE  GRAIN  TRADE       2<)l 

as  an  outlet  for  Upper  Languedoc."  1  Colbert  assented  to  this 
proposition  and  sent  an  edict  permitting  export  from  Narbonne 
until  November  30.* 

The  dearth  in  Provence  continued,3  and  there  was  some 
difficulty  in  other  provinces.  This  revived  Colbert's  old  proj- 
ect of  turning  the  grain  of  Languedoc  inward.  He  writes  to 
Daguesseau,  November  23 :  "I  doubt  if  the  King  will  continue 
the  permission  of  export  from  Narbonne.  There  is  ground 
to  apprehend  a  serious  dearth  in  the  kingdom,  so  that  if  Langue- 
doc has  too  much  it  can  easily  ship  to  the  neighboring  provinces 
by  land  or  by  sea."  4 

Daguesseau,  of  course,  finds  some  basis  for  disagreement. 
He  will  see  that  no  grain  leaves  Narbonne  except  for  other  ports 
of  Lower  Languedoc  or  for  Provence.  But  he  does  not  think 
it  wise  to  allow  exports  from  Lower  Languedoc  even  for  Provence. 
There  is  very  little  grain  in  Lower  Languedoc.5  A  couple  of 
weeks  later,  he  takes  a  new  point  of  view.  The  Estates  have 
asked  for  permission  to  export  from  Narbonne,  Vendres,  Serignan, 
Agde.  He  feels  "  that  His  Majesty -can  safely  grant  this  per- 
mission, for  it  would  take  some  time  for  foreigners  to  learn  of  it, 
even  after  the  permission  were  published  locally.  Then  they 
will  have  to  enter  into  correspondence  with  their  agents,  so 
that  they  could  not  very  well  begin  actual  shipments  before  the 
end  of  March  or  the  first  of  April.  They  would  not  then  have 
a  very  long  time  before  the  harvest.  But  as  regards  Lower 
Languedoc,  from  Beziers  and  Agde  to  the  Rhone,  it  is  important 
not  to  remove  the  prohibitions."  6  This  is  the  special  permission 
from  Narbonne  dressed  up  in  different  words  with  new  excuses. 
But  it  is  as  incomprehensible  as  ever  to  Colbert,  who  evidently 
cannot  conceive  of  the  extreme  specialization  of  trade  routes, 
to  which  Daguesseau's  policy  was  adapted.  Colbert  accordingly 

1  G7.    Toulouse,  23  Aout  1679.    Daguesseau  a  Colbert. 

*  Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Clair.,  462,  220.  7  Sept.  1679.  Colbert  a  Daguesseau.  G7. 
295.  Montpellier,  23  Sept.  1679.  Daguesseau  a  Colbert. 

3  G7.    458.  Marseille,  26  Sept.  1679.  Aix,  17  Oct.  1679.    Bib.  Nat,  M61.  Clair., 
462,  316.    6  Oct.  1679.    Colbert  a  Rouille. 

4  Ibid.,  462,  p.  462.     23  Nov.  1679.    Colbert  a  Daguesseau. 
8  G7.     295.    Pezenas,  4  Dec.  1679.    Daguesseau  a  Colbert. 
6  G7.    295.    Pezenas,  19  Jan.  1680.    Daguesseau  a  Colbert. 


292  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

returns  to  the  charge:  "  I  must  confess  that  the  demands  of 
the  Estates  for  export  from  Narbonne  have  seemed  quite  extra- 
ordinary to  His  Majesty.  He  receives  daily  complaints  of 
dearth  from  Provence,  Dauphine,  and  Burgundy,  and  it  seems 
to  him  that,  if  there  is  too  much  in  Upper  Languedoc,  there  is 
nothing  to  prevent  shipping  to  Provence,  or  up  the  Rhone  to 
those  provinces  which  lack.1  As  prices  are  high  there  it  would 
be  very  advantageous  to  Languedoc,  and  would  not  be  so  prej- 
udicial to  national  interests,  as  export  to  foreign  countries.'' 2 

Daguesseau  replies:  "  As  regards  export  of  grain  from  Upper 
Languedoc,  I  shall  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  there  are 
shipments  daily  from  Narbonne  to  Provence,  but  the  consump- 
tion of  that  province  is  not  sufficient  to  discharge  Upper  Langue- 
doc, which  ordinarily  has  a  great  abundance  of  grain  and  has 
no  other  means  of  obtaining  money  and  paying  taxes.  This 
is  what  obliges  the  Estates  to  demand  freedom  of  export  from 
Narbonne,  even  to  foreign  countries.  To  send  grain  up  the 
Rhone  to  Dauphine  and  Burgundy  is  not  practicable,  on  account 
of  the  great  expenses  of  transportation.  The  Rhone  is  so 
swift  that  a  great  number  of  horses  is  required  to  get  boats 
up  the  river.  TJien,  too,  there  are  frequent  delays  arising 
from  the  contrary  winds  which  are  very  strong  in  the  Rhone 
Valley.  Furthermore,  there  are  heavy  dues,  on  account  of  the 
tolls,  which  are  levied  quite  close  to  each  other.  The  difference 
in  the  price  of  grain  among  these  provinces  is  not  great  enough 
to  cover  all  these  expenses.  This  is  a*  route  that  has  not  been 
tried  except  for  salt ;  as  that  trade  is  regular  and  annual,  a  com- 
pany has  been  formed  which  has  undertaken  that  work  for  a 
fixed  price.  But  that  is  a  great  establishment  and  the  same 
method  could  not  be  applied  to  the  grain  trade. 

"  Accordingly,  Languedoc  has  only  two  routes  for  the  dis- 
posal of  its  grain:  the  sea  which  is  the  usual  outlet  both  for 
Provence  and  foreign  countries,  and  the  Tarn  and  Garonne,  for 
shipment  through  Bordeaux.  But  this  latter  route  is  available 

1  Note  through  here  the  insistence  on  the  idea  of  equable  national  distribution 
as  a  result  of  differences  of  price. 

2  Clement,  op.  cit.,  IV,  278.    i  Fev.  1680.    Colbert  a  Daguesseau. 


COLBERT  AND  THE  GRAIN  TRADE       293 

only  when  there  is  dearth  in  Guienne,  when  that  demand  is 
supplied  before  there  is  any  resort  to  Languedoc.  Thus,  it 
is  necessary  to  facilitate  export  by  sea.  The  uncertainty  of  the 
coming  harvest  can  alone  cause  hesitation.  As  you  have  asked 
for  my  opinion,  I  may  say  that  there  are  only  two  courses  open. 
You  may  permit  export  from  Narbonne,  even  to  foreign  ports, 
with  the  understanding  that  prohibitions  are  to  be  issued  towards 
the  close  of  April,  if  the  news  from  Languedoc  or  Provence 
gives  reason  to  fear  for  the  harvest.  Or  on  the  other  hand, 
you  may  leave  the  present  prohibitions  in  force  until  the  latter 
part  of  April,  deciding  then  to  continue  or  to  remove  them,  in 
accordance  with  the  news  you  receive  at  that  time."  1 

The  letter  had  the  effect  desired;  Colbert  agreed  to  a  per- 
mission of  export  from  Narbonne,  even  to  foreign  ports,  but  to 
take  effect  only  on  March  15.  A  drought  in  Lower  Languedoc 
made  Daguesseau  hestitate  to  publish  the  edict  but,  as  prices 
did  not  rise,  he  finally  issued  it.2  This  drought,  however,  practi- 
cally destroyed  the  crops  of  Lower  Languedoc,  and  that  fact 
exerted  a  great  influence  on  Daguesseau's  policy  in  regard  to 
the  latter  part  of  1680.  Writing  June  5,  he  says:  "  The  crops 
in  the  dioceses  of  Narbonne,  Beziers,  and  Agde  are  entirely 
ruined.  ...  In  some  places,  they  have  ploughed  their  wheat 
fields  and  sown  millet  in  order  to  get  some  crop.  I  have  never 
seen  desolation  equal  to  that  in  some  localities,  and  it  is  certain 
that  most  of  the  farms  in  these  three  dioceses  will  not  yield 
enough  to  serve  as  seed."  3  Conditions  became  more  serious  in 
the  course  of  the  month  and  other  dioceses  were  affected  so  that, 
while  the  crops  were  good  in  Upper  Languedoc,  there  was  practi- 
cally nothing  in  the  rest  of  the  province.  This  made  Daguesseau 
unwilling  to  publish  the  general  edict  for  permission  of  export 
issued  June  4.*  Colbert  assented.  "The  King,"  he  says, 
"  leaves  you  full  discretion  to  publish  the  edict  or  not,  according 

1  G7.     295.    Montpellier,  17  Fev.  1680.    Daguesseau  a  Colbert. 

2  Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Clair.,  463,  137.     22  Fev.  1680.    Colbert  a  RoiiiUe".    Ibid., 
463,  159.     29  Fev.  1680.     Colbert  a  Daguesseau.     G7.     295.    Montpellier,  29 
Mars  1680.    Daguesseau  a  Colbert. 

3  G7.     295.    Toulouse,  5  Juin  1680.    Daguesseau. 

4  G7.     295.    Toulouse,  2  Juin  1680.    Daguesseau. 


294  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

to  the  information  you  secure  in  your  province.  I  should  say, 
however,  that  reports  from  all  the  other  provinces  indicate  a 
considerable  abundance." l  The  difficulties  experienced  in 
Lower  Languedoc,  in  August,  September,  and  October,  fully 
justified  Daguesseau's  policy,  but  the  details  of  these  relief 
works  are  hardly  relevant  here.2 

The  last  three  years  present  little  that  is  new  or  interesting. 
The  correspondence  in  regard  to  crops,  dearth,  and  abundance 
continues,  although  it  is  less  voluminous.  It  is  a  ceaseless 
repetition  of  the  same  theme.  Prohibitions,  in  time  of  dearth; 
permission,  if  there  is  plenty.  The  whole  attention  of  the 
administrative  staff  is  given  to  finding  out  the  facts,  disen- 
tangling the  complicated  commercial  conditions  which  are  of 
influence,  and  seeking  to  achieve  some  crude  adjustment  of 
supply  to  demand.  The  apparent  complexity  of  the  grain 
trade  policy  is  wholly  due  to  its  intimate  connection  with  cur- 
rent conditions.  The  simple  idea,  foreshadowed  vaguely  in 
the  time  of  Francis  I  and  more  clearly  sketched  in  the  edicts 
of  1559  and  1571,  persists  with  little  change  in  form  to  the  close 
of  our  period.  But  the  rather  intricate  mass  of  detail  presented 
in  connection  with  Colbert's  efforts  will  have  failed  of  its  purpose 
if  it  does  not  suggest  that  Colbert  realized,  to  a  considerable 
extent,  the  dreams  and  intentions  of  his  predecessors. 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Clair.,  463,  494.     18  Juillet  1680.     Colbert  a  Daguesseau. 

2  G7.     295.    Toulouse,  21  Aout;  Cette,  2  Sept.  1680;  Montpellier,  7  Sept.  1680; 
Montpellier,  29  Sept.  1680;  Montpellier,  15  Oct.  1680.    Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Clair., 
463,  642.    28  Aout  1680. 


CHAPTER  IV 

REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE,  1683-1709 

AFTER  the  death  of  Colbert,  there  was  a  much  greater  change 
in  the  efficient  regulation  of  the  grain  trade  than  appears  upon 
the  surface.  Royal  edicts  for  the  control  of  foreign  trade 
appear  with  increasing  frequency  and  form  an  almost  unbroken 
chain  throughout  the  remaining  years  of  the  reign.  In  these 
edicts  there  is  no  sign  of  a  new  policy,  and  if  it  is  too  much  to 
assert  that  they  were  without  influence  on  the  trade,  it  is  none 
the  less  true  that  the  relative  importance  of  royal  activity  was 
very  greatly  reduced  by  the  energetic  and  efficient  control 
exerted  by  the  intendants.  Their  policy  must  be  regarded  as 
the  continuation  of  the  efforts  of  the  sixteenth  century  officials 
to  regulate  the  domestic  trade.  The  influence  of  Colbert  is 
manifest,  and,  in  this  sense,  there  is  at  least  an  apparent  con- 
nection with  the  traditions  of  royal  policy.  But  the  influence 
of  the  central  administration  is  not  that  of  an  authority  con- 
trolling export  trade;  it  is  rather  a  new  representative  of  the 
crown  acting  as  arbiter  ^between  conflicting  local  authorities. 
The  intendant  was  a  personal  representative  of  the  Crown, 
and,  although  resident  in  the  district,  in  the  late  seventeenth 
century  he  was  charged  with  the  care  of  general  rather  than 
local  interests.  The  intendants  trained  by  Colbert  were  the 
product  of  many  influences;  they  brought  together  admin- 
istrative traditions  that  were  formerly  entirely  distinct.  They 
inherited  the  policy  of  the  old  local  officials,  many  of  whom 
no  longer  possessed  the  power  whose  trappings  they  still  retained, 
but  they  also  received  the  impress  of  the  powerful  personality 
of  Colbert,  and  were  filled  with  a  solicitude  for  the  commonweal 
that  was  entirely  new  in  a  French  administrative  official. 

It  is  fortunate  that  this  transformation  of  the  administrative 
system  should  have  been  completed  just  before  the  critical  years 


296         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

of  the  late  seventeenth  century.  For  many  years  the  domestic 
grain  trade  had  presented  no  great  problem,  nothing  but  dreary 
persistence  of  old  traditions.  Some  of  the  seeming  quietness  of 
the  early  seventeenth  century  is  probably  due  to  the  accidental 
loss  of  important  records.  But  when  every  qualification  is  made, 
there  seems  to  have  been  no  development  of  importance  in  the 
early  years  of  the  century,  and  even  after  the  rise  of  Colbert, 
the  regulations  of  the  domestic  trade  are  of  the  traditional  type. 

The  relative  fertility  of  the  years  of  Colbert's  ministry  removed 
the  domestic  trade  from  the  sphere  of  active  administrative 
supervision.  There  was  a  recrudescence  of  old  prohibitive  regu- 
lations in  some  places;  the  Parlement  of  Toulouse,  for  instance, 
issued  prohibitions  in  1660,  and  the  Jurats  of  Bordeaux  inter- 
fered with  the  trade,  as  we  have  already  seen.  There  is  some 
indication  of  active  regulation  in  the  Seine  Basin  in  1660,  but 
these  efforts  of  the  Chatelet  and  Echevinage  did  not  assume 
a  sufficiently  positive  character  to  make  them  of  immediate 
importance.  Those  years  were,  indeed,  of  interest  as  regards 
the  extension  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Chatelet,  but  they  do 
not  disclose  any  change  in  administrative  policy.  The  activity 
of  the  officials  in  the  Seine  Basin  in  1660  was  largely  based  on 
the  old  traditions,  presenting  no  novelty,  but  better  informed 
than  previous  similar  efforts.  The  difficulties  arising  from  the 
location  of  Orleans  appear  very  distinctly  in  1662-63,  and  the 
letters  of  the  Intendant  and  of  the  Maire  afford  considerable 
insight  into  conditions.1  With  these  exceptions,  the  administra- 
tion of  Colbert  has  little  significance  from  the  standpoint  of 
domestic  policy.  He  himself  was  but  slightly  interested,  partly 
because  he  felt  that  the  reiteration  of  the  declarations  that  the 
inter-provincial  trade  should  be  free  was  all  that  was  necessary, 
partly  because  the  grain  trade  as  a  whole  was  of  subordinate 
interest  to  him. 

Ten  years  after  the  death  of  Colbert,  the  first  of  the  great 
dearths  created  a  crisis  in  the  regulation  of  the  domestic  trade 
such  as  had  never  before  existed.  There  had  been  failures  of 
the  crops  that  were  almost  as  serious,  although  the  area  affected 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Mil.  Colb.,  108,  188,  passim. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE  297 

in  1693  was  probably  more  extensive.  But  never  before  had 
such  a  dearth  occurred  at  a  time  of  rapid  growth  towards  metro- 
politanism.  The  danger  from  metropolitan  demand  that  had 
ever  been  present  was  rendered  doubly  intense  by  the  great 
change  in  commercial  practice.  The  change  was  apparent 
even  before  1660,  but  there  had  been  no  dearth  sufficiently 
severe  to  reveal  all  the  consequences  of  the  new  developments 
around  Lyons  and  Paris. 

This  crisis  came  upon  France  just  as  the  changes  in  the  ad- 
ministrative system  had  created  new  officials  admirably  suited 
to  grapple  with  the  new  problem.  The  intendants  were,  for 
the  most  part,  in  control  of  the  trade,  but  there  were  other 
officials,  too,  who  had  acquired  new  powers.  The  struggle 
between  the  Chatelet  and  the  Echevinage  at  Paris  had  smoul- 
dered for  generations,  without  notable  results  of  any  kind. 
There  are  signs  of  change  as  early  as  1630.  The  Chatelet  was 
gaming  in  prestige,  and  by  1660  was  definitely  in  the  possession 
of  new  powers  which  made  it  one  of  the  most  important  influences 
in  the  Seine  Basin.  The  Echevinage  made  a  futile  attempt 
to  regain  its  old  authority,  but  the  general  control  of  the  grain 
trade  passed  to  the  Chatelet.  The  time  demanded  new  policies 
and  new  officials,  or  old  officials  with  new  powers,  prepared 
for  the  crisis. 

The  character  of  the  official  body  precluded  the  possibility 
of  any  definite  scheme  for  the  regulation  of  the  trade.  The 
need  was  not  for  men  with  preconceived  ideas,  whether  favoring 
restriction  or  complete  freedom  of  trade;  it  was  a  time  that 
called  for  men  conversant  with  all  the  details,  provided  with 
the  authority  and  the  will  to  do  whatever  a  concrete  case  de- 
manded. Openness  of  mind,  the  administrative  rather  than  the 
theoretical  temperament  was  needed.  It  is  this  spirit  that  was 
most  conspicuous  in  the  intendants,  and  in  this  they  exhibited 
most  strongly  the  finer  qualities  of  Colbert.  But  there  was 
great  diversity  of  opinion  and  policy.  Intendants  in  different 
districts  pursued  distinct  policies.  The  one  believed  in  pro- 
hibitions under  certain  conditions ;  the  other  asserted  the  advis- 
ability, nay,  even  the  necessity,  of  complete  liberty. 


298  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

Advocacy  of  freedom  of  inter-provincial  trade  was  not  un- 
common. We  find  de  la  Bourdonnaye  writing  from  Bordeaux, 
that  grain  is  a  "  commodity  that  cannot  be  given  too  much 
freedom  of  circulation."  ...  "  Only  complete  freedom  of 
trade  can  produce  abundance."  "The  least  constraint  will 
spoil  everything."1  D'Argenson  at  Paris  says:  "Freedom  of 
trade  in  grain  is  a  public  benefit,  restraint  alarms  and  ordinarily 
produces  nothing  but  unfortunate  results."  He  makes  some 
concession  to  the  old  views,  but  persists  in  his  belief  that  freedom 
is  essential.  "  If  it  be  necessary  to  prohibit  at  times  the  trans- 
port of  grain  from  province  to  province,  it  would  seem  best  to 
exempt  the  large  towns  like  Paris  and  Lyons  from  the  effect  of 
such  restriction."2  Bouchu  says  that  prohibitions  are  unwise 
in  any  case,  since  "  they  are  always  the  cause  of  the  increase 
in  prices,  and  even  of  the  scarcity  of  grain  in  the  markets,  because 
they  render  the  people  more  inclined  to  hoard.  The  object 
of  the  prohibition,  too,  is  rarely  attained,  fol*  the  officials  charged 
with  the  execution  of  the  orders  are  easily  corrupted."3  In 
1709,  the  Controleur  General  writes:  "  The  first  thing  that  the 
King  deemed  necessary  when  the  lightness  of  the  harvest  of 
1708  became  known  was  to  establish  an  entire  and  absolute 
freedom  of  trade  in  grain  from  province  to  province,  so  that  those 
having  too  much  might  succor  those  that  lacked.  His  majesty 
has  never  approved  of  having  his  intendants  shut  themselves 
up  in  their  departments,  preventing  the  export  of  grain."4 
This  was  apparently  a  very  bold  assertion  of  the  old  policy  of 
freedom  for  the  inter-provincial  trade,  but  it  is  nevertheless  an 
indication  of  the  persistence  of  the  old  idea,  with  perhaps  an 
increased  vitality.  Notwithstanding  these  wide-spread  and  force- 
ful assertions  of  the  liberal  ideal,  the  effective  policy  retains,  as 
before,  a  very  considerable  element  of  restraint.  Sanson,  writ- 
ing from  Soissons,  states  the  policy  that  is  most  successfully 
applied  to  the  grain  trade.  "  I  think,"  he  says,  "  that  the  trade 
cannot  be  stimulated  too  much  in  times  of  abundance  nor  watched 

1  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  II,  103,  358.     19  Jan  1702. 

8  Ibid.,  I,  509,  1811.     24,  27  Dec.  1698. 

8  Ibid.,  II,  2,  4.     1 8  Sept.  1699. 

*  Ibid.,  Ill,  204,  532.    8  Sept.  1709.    C.  G.  a  Le  Gendre. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE    299 

too  closely  in  time  of  dearth.  It  is  necessary  to  go  from  one 
extreme  to  the  other,  according  to  the  different  circumstances." l 

This  course  advocated  by  Sanson  was  not  new.  It  is  funda- 
mentally the  idea  of  the  local  officials  of  the  sixteenth  century, 
but  its  adaptation  to  circumstances  led  to  progressive  modifi- 
cation. There  had  long  been  a  feeling  that  the  trade  must  be 
regulated,  the  great  question  was,  How  ?  In  the  sixteenth 
century,  the  prohibition  and  an  assertion  of  the  old  market 
regulations  were  the  only  modes  of  regulation  proposed.  At 
the  close  of  the  seventeenth  century,  the  prohibition  became 
a  more  flexible  instrument,  by  reason  of  a  systematic  develop- 
ment of  special  licenses.  The  purely  reactionary  endeavor  to 
maintain  the  old  markets,  too,  gave  way  to  attempts  to  regulate 
the  markets  on  an  entirely  new  principle.  The  old  system  had 
sought  to  preserve  the  independence  of  the  local  market  from 
metropolitan  influence.  The  new  attempts  were  in  the  direction 
of  subordinating  the  local  markets  to  the  metropolitan  market. 
Prices,  instead  of  being  made  on  the  local  market,  were  to  be 
determined  by  the  metropolitan  market.  This  idea  appears 
most  clearly  in  a  letter  of  Daguesseau  where  the  preponderant 
influence  of  Paris  is  treated  as  an  established  fact:  "  Paris, 
so  to  speak,  determines  the  prices  of  grain  for  a  great  part  of 
the  Kingdom.  When  Paris  is  sufficiently  supplied  and  grain 
is  reasonable  there,  less  is  drawn  from  the  provinces,  and  local 
prices  follow  approximately  the  prices  at  Paris."  2 

The  prohibition  and  the  license  system  were  designed  to 
perform  the  work  that  would  be  done  by  a  well-organized  metro- 
politan market;  they  were  to  assure  an  equable  distribution 
of  available  supply.  The  new  regulations  for  the  markets  were 
steps  towards  the  metropolitan  market  itself.  One  was  a 
temporizing  policy,  the  other  was  a  constructive  policy;  in  the 
one  case,  the  intendant  acted  constantly  as  Deus  ex  machina, 
in  the  other  case,  he  sought  to  render  trade  independent  of 
external  interference.  The  license  system  was  much  less  novel 
than  the  new  market  regulations.  Licenses  had  been  issued 

1  Boislisle,  op.  tit.,  II,  125,  444.     19  Oct.  1702. 
*  Ibid.,  Ill,  102,  313.     24  Fev.  1709. 


300         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

quite  generally  throughout  the  sixteenth  century,  and  the 
abortive  projects  for  the  regulation  of  foreign  trade  present 
in  full  the  idea  of  regulation  by  prohibition  and  license  as  it 
was  realized  in  the  domestic  trade  in  the  late  seventeenth  century. 
The  license  system,  then,  is  new  chiefly  in  respect  to  the  high 
degree  of  systematization,  and  in  the  actual  application  of  the 
policy  to  the  concrete  facts. 

But  while,  in  a  general  sense,  these  two  modes  of  regulation 
appear  during  this  period,  they  do  not  appear  in  the  same 
regions,  nor  have  they  an  equal  degree  of  historical  significance. 
The  effort  at  constructive  market  regulation  was  practically 
confined  to  the  area  described  in  previous  chapters  as  the  upper 
Seine  Basin.  This  was  the  primary  supply  area  of  Paris.  Here 
the  trade  was  relatively  regular.  *  Supplies  were  seldom  actually 
inadequate,  and  it  wa§  fairly  well  realized  that  the  chief  problem 
was  to  distribute  the  grain  equably.  Downright  prohibitions 
were  infrequently  resorted  to,  and  a  careful  control  of  markets 
was  ordinarily  adequate.  In  Burgundy,  the  possibility  of 
exhaustion  was  greater;  the  fertile  area  of  the  province  was  not 
extensive,  local  needs  were  considerable,  the  Lyonese  demand 
insistent  and  heavy.  A  short  crop  was  really  a  just  cause  for 
apprehension.  Prohibitions  and  licenses  consequently  play 
a  great  part  in  the  Rhone  Valley  trade.  Conditions  were  not 
very  different  in  Brittany  and  Languedoc,  where  there  was  an 
additional  complication  by  reason  of  the  frequency  of  export 
to  foreign  countries. 

The  other  parts  of  France  present  somewhat  different  prob- 
lems. There  is  nothing  that  is  worthy  of  the  name  of  grain 
trade  policy  except  at  Orleans,  where  conditions  are  very  curious. 
Situated  on  the  southern  edge  of  the  Beauce,  with  a  possibility 
of  securing  additional  supplies  from  Saumur,  Brittany,  or  even 
from  Auvergne,  it  might  seem  as  if  Orleans  enjoyed  a  singular 
security  in  respect  to  its  food  supply.  But  Paris  exerted  so 
great  an  influence  on  all  these  sources  that  Orleans  was  often 
seriously  affected.  The  city  was  not  possessed  of  the  legal 
right  to  interfere  with  the  movements  of  trade  on  the  river, 
where  the  shipments  were  designed  for  Paris.  In  the  producing 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE    30! 

regions,  there  was,  of  course,  the  possibility  of  buying,  but  only 
in  competition  with  Paris.  This,  too,  was  less  easy,  as  the  city 
could  usually  be  supplied  from  the  Beauce,  so  that  the  merchants 
of  Orleans  were  not  accustomed  to  buy  regularly  in  the  lower 
Touraine.  In  times  of  dearth,  too,  the  grain  of  the  Beauce 
tended  to  flow  toward  Paris  rather  than  to  Orleans.  The  city 
was  thus  occasionally  placed  in  the  curious  situation  of  being 
in  want,  when  an  abundance  was  floating  by  on  its  way  to  Paris. 

Our  consideration  of  policy  will  fall  naturally  into  three 
divisions:  the  attempt  at  constructive  market  regulation  in 
the  Seine  Basin;  the  development  of  licenses  in  Burgundy, 
Languedoc  and  Brittany;  the  policy  of  the  officials  at  Orleans, 
the  most  typical  enclave. 

The  Seine  Basin 

In  the  Seine  Basin,  some  peculiarities  are  presented  by  the 
presence  of  the  Chatelet  and  the  Echevinage.  The  munici- 
pality of  Paris  retained  much  of  the  power  enjoyed  in  the  six- 
teenth century,  and  the  Provost  of  Paris  continued  to  occupy 
a  unique  place.  He  and  his  lieutenants  increased  their  authority, 
despite  the  appearance  of  the  intendants.  The  Intendance  of 
Paris,  indeed,  was  created  later  than  most  of  the  others,  and  the 
intendant  there  never  possessed  the  wide  field  of  activity  that 
characterizes  the  office  in  the  more  distant  sections  of  France. 
The  proximity  of  the  Court  and  the  extensive  jurisdiction  of 
the  municipality  and  of  the  Chatelet,  all  conspired  to  render  the 
intendant  of  Paris  inconspicuous. 

Besides  this  complicating  fact  that  the  trade  of  the  region 
was,  in  part,  controlled  by  the  Chatelet  and  the  Echevinage 
of  Paris,  the  history  of  the  latter  part  of  the  seventeenth  century 
is  somewhat  confused  by  the  keen  rivalry  of  the  two  Parisian 
authorities.  The  Chatelet  was  reaching  out  for  more  power, 
the  Echevinage  was  striving  to  retain  at  least  its  old  prestige 
and  influence. 

This  question  of  jurisdiction  is  not  without  significance  as 
it  throws  light  on  the  character  of  the  authority  of  the  Chatelet, 
which  was  quite  different  from  that  of  the  intendant,  and  there 


302         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

can  be  little  doubt  but  what  the  nature  of  its  power  had  an  im- 
portant influence  upon  the  policy  of  the  Chatelet  and  upon  the 
development  of  new  means  of  controlling  the  grain  trade.  The 
Chatelet  had  the  supervision  of  the  trade  on  land;  the  Echevin- 
age  had  the  regulation  of  the  river  trade.  The  jurisdiction  of 
the  Chatelet  covered  infringements  of  the  market  regulations  in 
the  immediate  vicinity  of  Paris  and  any  illegal  conduct  occurring 
during  the  transportation  of  the  grain  to  Paris.  The  old  market 
regulations  were  primarily  ordinances  fixing  market  hours  for 
bourgeois  and  merchants,  excluding  merchants  from  markets 
within  ten  leagues  of  Paris,  reserving  specified  markets  to  bakers, 
prohibiting  the  buying  of  grain  off  the  markets,  along  the 
roadside  or  in  the  streets  of  the  town,  and  also  prohibiting 
partnerships  among  the  merchants.  Violence  on  the  part  of  the 
inhabitants  toward  the  grain  merchants  fell  naturally  within  the 
criminal  jurisdiction  of  the  Chatelet.  This  authority  was  not 
unlike  that  exercised  by  the  baillis  and  senechaux  of  the  fifteenth 
and  sixteenth  centuries,  when  these  functions  were  acquired  by 
the  Chatelet.1 

The  Echevinage  of  Paris,  represented  primarily  by  the  Pro- 
vost of  Merchants,  had  gradually  acquired  jurisdiction  over 
all  water-borne  traffic.  With  the  grain  trade,  this  involved  the 
right  to  prevent  the  passage  of  grain  through  Paris,  and  even 
the  right  to  control  all  the  movement  on  the  river  down  to  the 
bridges  at  Mantes,  which  were  the  boundary  between  the 
Rouenese  and  the  Parisian  spheres  of  influence.  The  most 

'  V 

characteristic  features  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Provost  of 
Merchants  were  his  right  to  require  the  shipment  of  grain  pur- 
chased with  the  intention  of  bringing  it  to  Paris,  to  prevent 
the  stopping  of  the  grain  at  intermediate  points  by  the  mer- 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21624.  53.  Le  sommaire  des  moyens  allegues  par  M.  le 
Prevot  des  Marchands  et  fichevins  en  1'assemblee  qui  se  faisoit  19  Dec.  1660. 
H.  1805.  Reg.  du  Bureau,  vii^vii.  sans  date;  H.  1825.  Ibid.,  cxxx.  31  Jan. 
1675;  H.  1826.  Ibid.^xxxi.  21  Jan.  1678;  H.  1835.  Ibid.,  161.  28  Juin  1695; 
passim.  G7.  1632.  Paris,  20  Sept.  1693.  Dubois.  Memoire  pour  les  Prevot 
des  Marchands  et  fichevins,  de  Paris.  G7.  1635.  Dec.  1694.  Petition  au 
Parlement  de  Paris.  Many  other  references  can  be  given  for  details  of  this  interest- 
ing episode  in  constitutional  history.  The  story  runs  along  through  the  Registres 
du  Bureau. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN   TRADE     303 

chants  themselves  or  by  the  officials  or  inhabitants  of  river 
towns,  and  to  regulate  the  sale  of  grain  from  the  boats  at  the 
ports  of  Paris.  These  powers  involved  incidental  acts  which 
were  less  precisely  determined.  Thus,  the  Provost  of  Mer- 
chants had  some  oversight  of  the  quality  of  grain  sold,  of  the 
measures  used,  and  of  the  various  circumstances  which  might 
prevent  shipment  from  the  point  of  origin.  The  merchants 
were  not  supposed  to  store  their  grain  after  it  was  bought, 
longer  than  was  necessary  to  accumulate  a  boat-load.  The 
execution  of  this  provision  of  course  involved  some  interference 
with  the  trade  on  land  in  the  river  towns.  Similarly,  when 
market  dues  were  exacted  in  these  shipping  points,  the  merchants 
could  appeal  to  the  Echevinage  of  Paris,  representing  that  such 
dues  were  not  properly  levied  on  grain  that  was  purchased 
in  the  country  and  merely  brought  into  the  river  town  for  ship- 
ment. This,  of  course,  raised  the  question  of  the  right  to  buy 
outside  the  market. 

This  confusion  as  to  the  nature  of  the  incidental  powers  of 
the  Echevinage  was  the  basis  of  the  whole  conflict  of  jurisdiction 
with  the  Chatelet.  The  officials  of  the  latter  body  asserted 
that  they  had  authority  over  the  grain  trade  as  long  as  it  was 
on  land,  whether  it  was  to  be  shipped  to  Paris  by  land  or  by 
water.  The  Echevinage  declared  that  its  authority  covered 
the  trade  entering  Paris  by  water,  from  the  time  and  place  of 
purchase  to  the  sale  on  the  ports  at  Paris. 

The  merits  of  the  case  presented  a  rather  nice  point  of  law. 
Appeal  to  precedent  was  useless,  as  there  had  been  in  the  past 
little  effort  to  regulate  the  up  river  trade  before  it  reached  the 
river  town.  Furthermore,  there  was  scarcely  any  means  of 
settling  the  question  legally,  so  that  in  practice  the  jurisdiction 
over  the  up  river  trade,  while  on  land,  ultimately  fell  to  the  body 
most  capable  of  exercising  this  new  branch  of  trade  regulation. 

In  the  respect  of  possessing  means  of  executing  its  policy 
the  Chatelet  had  an  overwhelming  advantage.  The  type  of 
regulation  was  practically  the  same  as  that  applied  to  the  land 
trade  near  Paris,  so  that  the  accustomed  measures  could  be  easily 
extended  to  this  wider  field  which  lay  equally  within  the  general 


304         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

jurisdiction  of  the  Chatelet.  The  special  commissaries  and  the 
Huissiers  d  cheval  were  efficient  agents  for  the  execution  of  the 
policy  and  orders  of  the  Lieutenant  Civil,  who  was  the  principal 
official  representing  this  aspect  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Chatelet. 
The  Provost  of  Merchants,  on  the  other  hand,  found  himself 
confronted  by  a  relatively  new  problem,  and  without  any  means 
of  executing  his  policy,  save  commissioners  whose  effectiveness 
depended  largely  upon  the  good  will  of  the  local  officials  invited 
to  execute  their  orders.  Besides  these  advantages,  the  Chatelet 
obtained  additional  hold  upon  this  jurisdiction  through  the 
union  in  one  person  of  the  offices  of  Lieutenant  Civil  and  Pro- 
vost of  Merchants.  This  happened  several  times  in  the  middle 
of  the  century,  and,  as  the  office  of  Lieutenant  Civil  was  the 
more  important  of  the  two,  the  functions  of  the  Provost  of 
Merchants  were  confused  with  those  of  the  Lieutenant  Civil, 
establishing  precedents  which  were  later  extremely  awkward  for 
the  Echevinage.  In  this  rather  devious  manner,  then,  the  Chate- 
let extended  its  authority  and  its  traditional  regulation  of 
markets  to  the  whole  area  of  Parisian  supply. 

This  novel  extension  of  an  old  power  was  not  without  signifi- 
cant effects.  The  Chatelet  proposed  to  control  the  Parisian 
grain  trade,  and  to  exercise  this  control,  not  through  the  system 
of  prohibitions  and  licenses  devised  by  the  provincial  authorities 
and  inherited  by  the  intendants,  but  by  a  systematic  regulation 
of  the  local  markets  and  the  grain  merchants.  This  policy 
was  not  undertaken  as  result  of  any  scheme  conceived  at  one 
time  by  any  individual,  but,  by  a  process  of  evolution,  it  came 
to  be  the  policy  of  the  Chatelet.  It  was  a  projection  of  the  oldest 
ideas  of  .grain  trade  regulation  into  an  entirely  new  sphere, 
in  which  these  old  ideas  were  transformed  under  stress  of  cir- 
cumstance. The  Chatelet  ultimately  gave  definite  form  to 
commercial  customs  which  became  the  basis  of  a  new  type  of 
market  organization. 

The  control  of  the  trade  in  the  Seine  Basin  was  thus  in  the 
hands  of  three  distinct  types  of  authority:  the  Chatelet;  the 
municipality  of  Paris,  and,  to  some  extent,  other  municipal 
officers;  and  lastly,  the  intendants.  At  times,  they  worked 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE     305 

harmoniously,  more  frequently  there  was  considerable  friction, 
so  that  the  ultimate  result  was  quite  different  from  that  con- 
templated by  any  official  or  group  of  officials.  The  history  of 
this  complicated  tangle  of  policies  and  authorities  will  be  clearer 
if  we  include  in  our  study  the  years  1660-63.  The  situation  at 
that  time  is  a  sort  of  interlude  between  the  older  local  regulation 
and  that  of  the  three  great  dearths  that  mark  the  closing  years 
of  the  century.  There  were  no  general  provincial  prohibitions, 
but  many  of  the  towns  interfered  with  shipments  of  grain. 
There  was  also  much  trouble  arising  from  the  disorganization 
of  the  local  markets. 

In  1660,  there  was  no  serious  difficulty  until  early  summer. 
Then  the  towns  on  the  Marne,  Oise,  and  Seine  began  to  interfere 
with  the  movement  of  grain.  At  Meaux,  Crecy,  and  a  few 
other  places,  the  townspeople  pillaged  the  boats  of  the  mer- 
chants.1 The  interruption  of  traffic  soon  became  so  serious 
that  the  Chatelet,  in  October,  sent  commissioners  to  many  river 
towns  to  discover  the  cause  of  the  cessation  of  traffic.  They 
went  up  the  Oise  to  Noyon,  up  the  Marne  to  Chalons,  up  the 
Seine  to  Port-Moutain,  in  the  vicinity  of  Bray  and  Provins. 
In  each  town  the  granaries  were  inspected,  formal  reports  drawn 
up,  and  the  officials  and  townspeople  were  questioned.2  Con- 
siderable quantities  of  grain  were  found,  and  the  inquiry  sug- 
gested that  the  trouble  arose  primarily  from  the  improper 
conduct  of  merchants  and  municipal  officials.  In  the  minds 
of  the  commissioners,  both  merchants  and  officials  were  equally 
guilty.  At  Chalons,  they  were  told  by  the  Lieutenant  General 
of  the  town,  "  that  there  were  400,000  setiers  which  could  be 
exported  without  inconveniencing  the  town.  The  cause  of 
disorder  in  sale  of  grain  was  that  the  Parisian  merchants,  after 
buying,  would  not  remove  their  grain  from  the  granaries  in 
the  time  agreed  upon.  They  obliged  the  sellers  to  bring  suits 

1  H.  1815.     Reg.  du  Bureau,     cciiiix^iv,  24  Juillet  1660. 

2  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.     190  ff.     Delamare's  papers.     Original  Proces  Verbaux, 
copies,  and  extra.cts. 

The  commissions  are  of  16  Oct.  1660,  and  appear  in  Delamare's  Traiti  de  la 
Police,  2d  ed.,  II,  376.  The  commissioners  were  divided  into  three  groups,  one 
for  each  river  valley. 


306         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

against  them  to  force  them  to  clear  the  granaries."  l  At  Soissons, 
the  commissioners  learned  of  serious  abuses  in  regard  to  the 
marketing  of  the  grain.  The  Parisian  merchants  bought  in 
the  streets  of  the  town,  or  on  the  highways  outside  the  gates.2 
In  both  places  there  was  evidence  of  partnerships  among  the 
merchants,  and  at  Soissons  there  were  many  assertions  that  the 
town  officials  were  engaged  in  the  trade  and  used  their  official 
position  to  further  private  ends.3  A  more  elaborate  description 
of  these  associations  and  the  accompanying  practices  appears 
in  an  order  of  July,  1660".  It  declares  in  the  preamble  that 
information  has  been  given  "  that  certain  merchants  have  re- 
cently formed  granaries  at  Paris  and  disseminated  divers 
false  rumors,  although  the  grain  is  in  good  condition  in  the 
principal  provinces.  And  to  contribute  to  the  success  of  their 
pernicious  design,  they  have  made  agreements  to  buy  all  the 
grain  of  the  provincial  merchant  immediately  upon  arrival, 
for  fear  that  the  latter  would  be  satisfied  with  the  ordinary 
honest  gain  of  a  merchant.  Once  possessed  of  the  grain,  they 
could  sell  at  whatever  price  they  pleased.  Not  content  with 
all  these  illegal  practices,  they  have  ridden  post  through  the 
provincial  towns  to  spread  the  false  rumors,  and  to  make  them 
more  credible  they  have  purchased  small  quantities  of  grain 
at  high  prices  to  keep  prices  up.  In  consequence  of  these 
actions,  the  inhabitants  of  some  towns  have  risen  and  endeavored 
to  prevent  shipment  to  Paris.  Then,  to  profit  by  their  malice, 
the  merchants  bring  their  grain  to  market  a  little  at  a  time."  4 
All  these  acts  were  prohibited  again  and  again,  both  by  the 
Chatelet  and  by  the  Echevinage.  The  ordinance  of  the  Provost 
of  Paris  was  followed,  August  7,  by  an  ordinance  of  the  Provost 
of  Merchants.  The  merchants  were  enjoined  to  ship  their  grain 
to  Paris  without  any  delays  in  transit,  and  to  sell  the  whole 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21641.     190.     Oct.  1660.     Chalons-sur-Marne.         , 

2  Ibid.,  250,  254.    6  Nov.  1660.    Le  Proc.  du  Roy  au  Sr.  Martinet,  fermier  du 
droit  d'estallage. 

3  Ibid.,  Soissons. 

4  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  16743.      Io8-     29  Juillet  1660.      Delamare,  op.  cit.,   2d   ed., 
11,374- 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE  307 

boat-load  at  one  price.1  October  26,  the  Echevinage  again 
took  this  matter  in  hand:  "All  partnerships  and  associations 
in  the  grain  trade  are  hereby  annulled  and  cancelled.  Mer- 
chants are  forbidden  to  enter  into  any  contracts  of  this  nature 
in  the  future.  They  are  enjoined  to  make  their  purchases 
separately,  each  on  his  own  account,  and  to  divide  within  a 
month  all  grain  which  they  now  hold  in  common."  2  In  Novem- 
ber, the  Chatelet  issued  an  ordinance  on  the  same  subject.3 

This  dread  of  associations  dominates  all  the  evidence  taken 
by  the  commissioners  of  the  Chatelet  in  1660.  They  were 
searching  eagerly  for  just  such  abuses,  and  it  is  hardly  surprising 
that  they  found  what  they  were  looking  for. 

The  chief  result  of  these  inquests  was  the  shipment  of  large 
quantities  of  grain  to  Paris  and  the  accumulation  of  information 
that  showed  the  Parisian  officials  the  necessity  of  regulating 
the  trade.  The  conflict  of  jurisdiction  between  Chatelet  and 
Echevinage  became  more  intense.  The  Echevinage  resented 
the  action  of  the  Chatelet  and  the  whole  case  was  presented 
to  the  Council.4  The  immediate  decision  favored  the  Echevin- 
age, and  when  difficulties  arose  in  the  following  year,  com- 
missioners were  sent  out  by  that  body  to  regulate  all  aspects 
of  the  river  trade.  These  commissions  are  the  first  indication 
of  trouble;  two  were  sent  up  the  Seine  and  Oise  to  Soissons, 
and  two  up  to  Chalons.  Their  commissions  were  very  similar 
to  those  of  the  Chatelet  of  the  preceding  year.5  Shortly  after 
these  commissions  were  issued,  the  Provost  at  Chalons  pro- 
ceeded to  limit  the  export  from  the  town  to  such  quantities 
as  he  should  permit.  All  the  merchants  were  inscribed  on  a  roll, 
and  permits  were  issued  in  order,  as  the  Provost  deemed  expe- 
dient.6 In  the  following  month  there  were  similar  restrictions 

1  H.  1815.    Reg.  du  Bureau,  ccclvi.     7  Aout  1660. 

2  H.  1815.     Ibid.,  v°iiii"vii.     22  Oct.  1660. 

3  Delamare,  op.  tit.,  2d  ed.,  II,  377-378.     26  Nov.  1660. 

4  H.  1815.    Reg.  du  Bureau,  vii^vii.    Long  account  of  both  sides  of  the 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  fichevinage. 

Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21642.     53.    Similar  statement  of  the  case  by  the  Chatelet. 

5  H.  1816.    Reg.  du  Bureau,  clxi.     18  Juin  1661;  Ibid.,  clxiii.     18  Juin  1661. 

6  H.  1816.    Ibid.,  ix"xix. 


308         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

Sit  Vitry.1  Other  towns  followed  their  example,  and  the  trade 
suffered  from  this  species  of  interference  for  the  rest  of  the 
season.  Ordinances  were  issued  both  by  the  Chatelet  and  by 
the  Council,  cancelling  the  prohibitions  of  the  local  officials 
and  ordering  immediate  shipment  to  Paris.  But  these  measures 
were  not  entirely  successful.2  In  September,  more  commissioners 
were  sent  out  by  the  Echevinage  to  go  up  the  rivers  to  send 
down  grain.3  Difficulties  at  Chalons  continued,  and  finally, 
in  January,  1662,  one  of  the  Echevins  was  commissioned  to 
travel  through  "  the  provinces  of  Brie  and  Champagne,  ac- 
companied by  four  horsemen,  to  execute  the  ordinance  of  Decem- 
ber 2,  and  in  consequence,  to  cause  to  be  shipped  to  Paris  such 
grain  as  merchants  of  Paris  or  others  shall  have  in  store,  des- 
tined for  the  provision  of  this  town.  He  shall  also  see  to  it 
that  the  merchants  are  not  prevented  or  hindered  in  any  way 
in  the  purchase  and  transport  of  grain.  He  shall  cause  the 
granaries  to  be  opened  and  have  the  grain  placed  on  sale,  and 
to  that  end,  if  need  be,  have  it  carried  to  the  neighboring  markets. 
He  shall  also  inquire  into  the  acts  of  violence  which  are  com- 
mitted to  prevent  shipments  of  grain.  Similarly,  he  shall 
investigate  the  associations,  monopolies,  or  other  evil  practices, 
and  the  transport  of  grain  from  the  kingdom."  4  He  was  given 
plenary  power  to  act  in  the  name  of  the  town  and  to  call  upon 
any  judicial  officers  for  assistance.  The  commission  is  interest- 
ing because  of  the  inclusion  of  the  power  to  regulate  the  markets, 
and  the  recommendation  of  an  investigation  of  the  practices 
of  the  merchants.  But  it  was  an  undertaking  which  was  not 
really  carried  out.  The  principal  prohibition  of  export  was  at 
Chalons;  and  there,  despite  all  that  had  been  done  in  the  fall  of 
1 66 1,  despite  the  plenary  powers  of  Mouthers,  the  Echevin  of 
Paris,  the  restrictions  were  maintained  at  least  as  late  as  May  6. 
The  merchants  were  still  compelled  to  dispose  of  a  large  pro- 
portion of  their  grain  to  the  Echevins  of  Chalons,  as  a  condition 

1  H.  1816.    Reg.  du  Bureau,  clxxii.     5  Juillet  1661. 

2  H.  1816.    Ibid.,  iMiiii,  cites  arret  of  2  Sept.  1661.    Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  382, 
2ded. 

*  H.  1816.     Ibid.,  iMiiii.     20  Sept.  1661. 
4  H.  1816.     Ibid.,  iiicxxxvii.     14  Jan.  1662. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE  309 

of  being  allowed  to  export  the  rest.1  The  conclusion  of  the 
episode  does  not  appear,  but  the  mission  of  Mouthers  was  appar- 
ently a  failure. 

These  years  are  instructive  because  they  made  the  Parisian 
authorities  realize  that  the  delayed  shipments  and  prohibitions 
might  be  due  even  more  largely  to  defective  market  organization 
than  to  the  actual  lack  of  grain  so  frequently  alleged  by  the 
officials  in  the  producing  regions.  The  minute  investigations 
of  the  Chatelet  in  1660  were  entirely  new,  and  revealed  a  situa- 
tion that  was  quite  unlike  the  Utopian  dreams  of  Colbert  and 
his  predecessors.  The  necessities  of  Paris  made  them  feel 
the  vital  importance  of  uninterrupted  trade,  and  their  careful 
investigation  of  the  causes  of  the  municipal  prohibitions  was 
destined  to  inaugurate  great  changes.  The  main  lines  of  the 
policy  of  the  future  appear  in  the  Proces  Verbaux  of  the  Chatelet, 
and  more  definitely  in  the  commission  of  Mouthers.  It  is  to 
be  a  policy  of  regulation  of  merchants  and  markets,  which  are 
to  be  made  to  work  without  the  constant  interference  of  admin- 
istrative officials.  But  these  years  do  no  more  than  suggest 
the  break  with  the  old  traditions.  The  details  of  the  policy 
are  not  clear ;  the  active  agents  in  its  execution  are  uncertain. 

After  1662,  there  is  a  long  interval  during  which  there  are 
few  incidents  worthy  of  note.  The  Echevinage  had  petty 
cases  brought  before  it  from  time  to  time,  but  the  regulation 
of  the  grain  trade  does  not  again  become  important  until  1693. 
Then,  all  the  issues  of  1662  reappeared.  The  officials  in  Cham- 
pagne declared  that  dearth  was  such  an  immediate  menace 
that  prohibitions  were  necessary.  The  Parisian  officials  were 
more  inclined  to  believe  that  the  real  source  of  all  the  trouble 
lay  in  the  disorganization  of  the  markets  and  in  the  associations 
of  merchants  designed  to  create  corners  and  to  control  prices. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  was  probably  some  truth  on  both  sides. 

The  general  history  of  the  years  1693-94  differs  slightly  from 
that  of  other  years  of  dearth.  Apprehensions  arose  in  part  from 

1  H.  1816.  Reg.  du  Bureau,  iiittiii**.  14  Fev.  1662.  H.  1816.  Ibid.,  iiiicxix. 
12  Avril  1662.  H.  1816.  Ibid.,  iiiicxxii.  13  Avril  1662.  H.  1816.  Ibid.,  iiiMxvii. 
6  Mai  1662. 


310         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

the  light  crop  of  1693,  and  the  poor  prospects  for  the  succeeding 
harvest  filled  the  summer  and  fall  with  violence  and  unrest. 
In  January,  1693,  the  first  complaints  began  to  come  in  from 
the  outer  edge  of  the  Beauce.  The  Lieutenant  of  the  Prevote 
at  Montargis  writes :  "  There  is  a  man  here  acting  for  M.  Berthe- 
lot  of  Plaineuf,  who  is  shipping  all  the  wheat  in  our  province. 
He  says  that  it  is  for  the  Invalides.  Every  one  complains  of 
the  granaries  he  is  forming,  for  it  is  certain  that  we  shall  be  with- 
out grain  in  a  month.  If  I  had  not  taken  pains  to  stop  six 
grain  boats  last  year,  we  should  have  suffered  from  famine, 
and  the  situation  is  much  more  serious  this  year  as  there  is  no 
old  grain  from  the  preceding  harvest."  l  The  Procureur  du 
Roy  writes  about  the  same  time:  "  We  are  all  persuaded  that 
this  grain  of  M.  Berthelot  cannot  be  shipped  without  causing 
a  dearth  in  this  little  province  which  scarcely  raises  enough  for 
its  own  maintenance."2  In  May,  the  Provost  of  Merchants 
issued  an  ordinance  which  refers  to  interference  with  the  grain 
trade  in  "  many  places  of  Brie,  Burgundy,  and  Gatinais." 
"  The  inhabitants  have  even  maltreated  the  merchants  and 
cut  the  ropes  of  the  boats." 3  The  violence  is  especially  notable 
at  Montargis  and  vicinity.  "  At  Rogin,  three  or  four  peasants, 
or  rather  their  wives,  took  twenty  to  thirty  bushels  of  grain 
from  the  blatiers  who  had  come  to  buy  in  that  parish."  4  In 
August,  the  local  authorities  at  Chalons  were  roused  to  the  point 
of  taking  measures  to  secure  grain  on  the  account  of  the  munici- 
pality. Much  of  this  was  for  the  indigent,  but  the  pressure 
of  dearth  was  beginning  to  be  felt  generally.  Larcher,  the 
Intendant,  also  complained  of  high  prices  and  danger  of  scar- 
city.5 Shipments  were  prevented  at  Nogent-sur-Seine.6  In 
January,  1694,  there  was  real  suffering  at  Rheinis:  "  Out  of 

1  G7.   1632.  Montargis  (Jan.-Fev.)  1693.  Gaillard  a  Creil,  Intendant  a  Orleans. 

2  G7.     1632.    Ibid.    M.  Le  Proc.  du  Roy  a  Creil. 

3  H.     1834.    Reg.  du  Bureau,  204.     15  Mai  1693. 

4  G7.     1632.    Montargis,  30  Mai  1693.     Monard,  Prevot  des  Marechaux,— 
i.  e.  chief  police  officer. 

6  G7.     1630.     Chalons,  26  Aout  1693.      fichevins  de  Chalons.      Chalons,  27 
Aout  1693.    Henri,  fiveque  de  Chalons.     Chalons,  8  Sept.  1693.    Larcher. 
6  H.  1834.    Reg.  du  Bureau,  340.     9  Sept.  1693. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN   TRADE    31 1 

the  25,000  or  26,000  persons,  of  which  the  town  is  composed, 
1 1,000  or  12,000  are  reduced  to  begging,  and  have  to  be  supported 
by  alms.  But  all  the  pains  that  have  been  taken  have  not 
prevented  the  death  of  4,000  within  the  last  six  months."  1 
About  the  same  time,  Chalons  and  Vitry  were  hard  pressed. 
There  was  no  prohibition  at  Vitry,  but  the  port  of  Chalons 
was  closed  by  the  Echevins.2  The  other  details  may  be  easily 
inferred,  but  as  the  bulk  of  the  information  is  not  large,  it  is 
hardly  safe  to  imagine  a  very  extensive  dearth.  There  were 
no  general  prohibitions  and  the  municipal  interference  came 
more  largely  from  the  inhabitants  than  from  the  officials.  On 
July  10,  thaChatelet  sent  out  commissioners.  The  commission 
declared  "  that  several  ill  disposed  people  had  made  divers 
monopolies  to  evade  the  royal  ordinances,  and  had  diverted 
from  its  proper  course  much  of  the  grain  that  should  have  been 
brought  to  Paris  or  to  neighboring  markets."  3  MM.  Poiret 
and  Chevalier  went  through  Hurepoix,  the  Beauce,  and  Vexin, 
MM.  le  Maistre  and  du  Mesnil,  through  France,  Valois,  and 
Picardy,  Delamare  and  le  Page,  through  Brie,  Burgundy,  and 
Champagne.  "  The  results  of  these  investigations  confirmed 
the  conjecture  that  the  malice  of  men  had  been  much  more 
truly  the  cause  of  the  dearth  than  actual  scarcity  of  grain. 
The  commissioners  found  the  grain  of  the  preceding  harvests 
on  all  sides,  in  the  farms,  in  the  houses  of  the  wealthy  bourgeois, 
and  in  the  granaries  of  the  merchants.  They  enjoined  each 
individual  to  carry  a  certain  quantity  of  grain  to  the  nearest 
market  and  to  bring  back  a  certificate  from  the  judge.  They 
attended  the  markets  themselves,  as  far  as  their  itinerary  would 
permit,  and  they  had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  abundance 
reestablished  by  the  grain  they  had  sent  to  market." 

The  commissioners  Delamare  and  le  Page  reached  Sens, 
Thursday,  July  22.  Saturday  they  were  told  that  there  was 
a  riot  in  the  central  square  where  the  market  was  held.  "  They 

1  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  I,  349,  1272.     13  Jan.  1694.     Lieu8.  Gen*,  du  Conseil,  et 
fichevins  de  Reims. 

2  G7.     1634.    Chalons,  17  Jan.  1694.    Larcher.    G7.    227.    Placet  des  Maire  et 
fichevins  de  Chalons. 

3  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  2d  ed.,  II,  1053.     10  Juillet  1694. 


312         TEE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

went  thither  .  .  .  and  finally  discovered  that  a  rich  cultivator 
of  a  village  near  Sens,  who  worked  his  farm  himself,  had  his 
barns  filled  with  old  grain,  but  nevertheless  came  each  market  day 
to  buy  more.  He  always  paid  more  than  the  current  price  and 
forced  prices  up.  ...  That  day,  at  the  opening  of  the  market, 
the  man's  wife  had  come  and  forced  prices  up  three  sous  per 
bichet,  which  had  caused  the  people  to  attack  her  and  to  besiege 
the  house  to  which  she  had  fled.  .  .  .  The  woman  was  sent  to 
prison.  .  .  .  The  Provost  of  Sens  went  to  the  village  where 
she  lived,  and  found  the  grain  as  indicated.  A  part  was  con- 
fiscated and  the  farmer  fined. 

"  All  these  pains  that  the  commissioners  took  in  the  provinces 
had  indeed  for  their  object  the  relief  of  all,  but  their  principal 
intention  and  care  was  always  to  reestablish  abundance  on  the 
markets  of  Paris.  The  movement  which  they  gave  to  trade, 
getting  the  grain  out  of  the  places  in  which  it  was  hoarded  and 
having  it  brought  to  market,  gave  the  merchants  and  Uatiers 
an  opportunity  to  buy,  and  made  the  grain  work  its  way  down 
towards  the  capital.  The  discovery  and  the  opening  of  the 
granaries  on  or  near  the  rivers,  the  great  numbers  of  boats  which 
they  had  loaded  and  sent  down  to  Paris,  were  a  great  aid.  Fur- 
thermore, they  spread  a  terror  among  the  merchants  by  their 
investigations  of  the  practices  of  those  who  had  caused  high 
prices  by  their  usuries  1  and  monopolies,  by  the  imprisonment 
of  some  of  the  principal  offenders  and  the  suits  against  others. 
.  .  .  The  merchants  were  thus  obliged  to  confine  themselves 
within  the  limits  of  legitimate  trade. 

"By  these  means  the  price  of  grain  diminished  at  Paris, 
ten  days  after  the  departure  of  the  commissioners,  from  54 
per  setier  to  36U.  Two  days  later  prices  fell  to  32^  and  in  the 
same  week  to  28,  27,  26;  at  the  end  of  the  month  wheat  was 
at  20.  This  fall  in  prices  continued  to  Martinmas  when  the 
best  wheat  was  selling  at  15  to  i6n.  Thus  ended  that  apparent 
dearth  and  that  period  of  high  prices  which  lasted  nearly  two 

1  Doubtless  purchases  on  earnest  money,  which  enabled  a  man  to  control  a 
large  supply  by  means  of  a  small  sum  of  ready  money.  The  right  to  the  crop 
was  frequently  secured  by  loans  to  the  farmers. 


REGULATION  OF  TEE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE    313 

years."  l  The  fall  in  prices  was,  of  course,  due  in  part  to  the 
harvest,  which  naturally  relieved  much  of  the  pressure.  How- 
ever, it  is  probable  that  Delamare's  interpretation  of  this  par- 
ticular year  in  this  region  is  just.  The  element  of  panic  was 
always  great,  even  in  regions  where  there  was  little  serious 
trouble,  and  this  unreasoning  fear  which  disorganized  trade 
was  doubtless  the  whole  basis  of  such  difficulties  in  1693-94 
as  were  not  directly  due  to  the  illegal  conduct  of  the  grain 
merchants. 

The  fichevinage  had  also  made  an  attempt  to  enforce  the 
market  regulations  and  to  restrain  the  grain  merchants.  In 
December,  1693,  fines  of  500  apiece  were  imposed  upon  Philipon, 
the  widow  Cressy,  Channes,  Mercier,  the  widow  Chaillot  and 
de  la  Noue,  all  of  Bray,  "  for  having  purchased  grain  in  the 
country  districts  of  the  peasants  and  farmers,  both  threshed 
and  un threshed,  and  for  having  gone  out  of  town  to  meet  the 
peasants  bringing  grain  to  the  markets,  and  for  having  bid  up 
prices  one  against  another,  both  outside  and  on  the  markets, 
and  for  having  set  prices  higher  than  that  of  the  opening  of 
the  market."  2  There  are  also  orders  against  the  delaying  of 
shipments  on  their  way  to  Paris,  and  against  associations  of 
merchants.3  The  principal  denunciation  of  these  practices 
is  that  of  October  19,  1694.  "  The  excessive  dearness  of  grain 
having  forced  us  to  investigate  its  causes,  we  have  recognized 
that  several  provincial  merchants,  expecting  that  their  con- 
traventions would  not  come  to  our  notice,  have  formed  associa- 
tions to  increase  prices.  Furthermore,  they  did  not  ship  to  Paris 
the  grain  that  they  had  purchased  in  Champagne,  Brie,  and 
other  provinces,  intending  to  buy  and  sell  amongst  themselves, 
for  great  profits  were  made  in  that  way.  They  accordingly 

1  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  1054-55,  2d  ed. 

Some  of  the  Proces  Verbaux  of  these  commissions  are  now  in  Delamare's  papers 
at  the  Bib.  Nat.,  and  some  of  this  evidence  has  been  used  previously.  But  I 
do  not  feel  sure  that  all  the  Proces  Verbaux  are  now  in  Delamare's  collection. 
Some  may  have  been  lost,  the  rest  might  perhaps  be  found  in  the  Serie  Y  at  the 
Arch.  Nat. 

2  H.  1834.    Reg.  du  Bureau,  382.     i  Dec.  1693. 

3  H.  1834.    Ibid.,  482.     18  Mars  1694.    H.  1834.    Ibid.,  494.     2  Avril  1694. 


314  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

neglected  to  bring  their  grain  to  Paris,  so  that  it  reached  Paris 
only  after  having  passed  through  divers  hands  and  after  the 
price  had  been  very  considerably  increased.  Furthermore 
divers  persons,  induced  by  reprehensible  avarice,  preferred 
the  grain  trade  to  more  honorable  professions  in  which  they 
were  engaged,  and  made  extensive  purchases  in  the  said  prov- 
inces both  in  the  towns  and  in  the  country;  this  they  do  by 
means  of  agents  who  compete  with  the  ordinary  merchants." 
The  intentions  of  the  Echevinage  were  thus  quite  as  far-reaching 
as  those  of  the  Chatelet,  but  its  lack  of  executive  power  was  a 
serious  obstacle.  In  order  to  enforce  the  ordinances  which  the 
merchants  had  infringed  in  the  manner  described,  the  Lieutenant 
General  of  the  Baillage  of  Vitry  was  ordered  to  enforce  the 
regulations  in  Champagne.1  An  ordinance  was  actually  issued 
November  15,  1694,  by  the  Chatelet.  The  activities  of  the 
Chatelet  appear,  in  part,  in  Delamare's  description  of  his  tour, 
but  even  more  distinctly  in  the  account  of  the  prosecution  of 
Jean  Roger. 

Roger  had  been  engaged  in  the  grain  trade  since  1656,  when 
he  established  himself  at  Paris.  He  had  long  been  one  of  the 
principal  merchants  of  Paris,  and  it  is  beyond  question  that 
he  changed  the  character  of  his  business  considerably  in  1693. 
Up  to  that  time,  he  had  bought  principally  in  the  vicinity  of 
Soissons.  In  that  year,  he  transferred  his  operations  to  the 
upper  Seine  Valley.2  As  early  as  January,  1693,  Roger  is 
accused  of  being  the  most  unprincipled  and  most  avaricious 
of  the  grain  merchants.  "  He  is  absolute  master  in  all  the 
markets  where  grain  is  exposed  for  sale,  and  of  the  farmers, 
cultivators,  and  the  minor  merchants,  to  whom  he  gives  the 
law  personally  or  through  his  factors.  ...  It  is  known  that 
the  said  Roger,  since  the  months  of  May  and  June  (1692)  has 
taken  up  grain  in  the  markets  of  Provins,  Mary-sur-Seine, 

1  H.  1835.    Reg.  du  Bureau,  63.     19  Oct.  1694.     See  G7.     1635.    Letter  of 
De  la  Reynie,.4  Dec.  1694,  apropos  of  Le  Blanc's  Ordonnance  of  15  Nov. 

2  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21642.    368.     Factum  pour  Jean  Roger  (imprime).    This  is 
a  defence  of  Roger.    There  is  a  reference  to  him  in  H.  1816.    Reg.  du  Bureau, 
Ixxxvii.     5  Avril  1661. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN   TRADE    315 

Bray,  Nogent,  Sergines,  Pont,  Montereau,  Sens,  Melun,  and 
other  places,  in  farms,  in  tithe  barns,  and  in  the  houses  of  private 
individuals.  It  is  a  prodigious  quantity  in  all,  which  would 
have  sufficed  to  supply  Paris  for  a  year.  It  would  be  impossible 
to  imagine  what  has  become  of  it  all,  were  it  not  for  the  immense 
granaries  which  he  has  in  divers  places.  .  .  . 

"  Viard,  whom  every  one  knows,  is  also  under  agreement 
with  Roger  and  Crecy,  to  subject  France  to  famine.  They  en- 
gage in  (commercial)  war  with  the  provincial  merchants  both 
in  the  provinces  and  at  the  Port  de  la  Greve,  trying  to  render 
themselves  masters  of  their  grain.  Viard,  Roger,  La  Bague, 
and  Tournois  write  to  their  factors  to  ship  no  grain  by  land 
or  water,  except  by  their  express  orders."  l 

These  were  the  general  accusations  against  Roger,  and  the 
presence  of  these  memoirs  in  Delamare's  papers  doubtless  indi- 
cates that  they  furnished  the  initial  impulse  in  the  suit  against 
Roger.  At  all  events,  proceedings  were  well  under  way  in  the 
middle  of  July,  1694,  shortly  after  the  departure  of  Delamare 
on  his  commission  of  July  10.  De  la  Reynie,  Lieutenant  de  la 
Police  at  Paris,  writes  on  the  fifteenth:  "  I  have  seen  by  what 
we  are  doing  in  the  Roger  affair  that  Colmet,  farmer  of  the 
'  minage '  at  Bray,  has  done  much  to  cause  the  disorders 
there.  It  is  important  that  you  should  amass  as  much  evidence 
as  possible  against  him,  not  only  as  regards  his  doings  at  Bray, 
but  in  other  places.  .  .  .  He  has  come  to  Paris  since  the  im- 
prisonment of  Roger  to  confer  and  receive  instructions.  He 
will  return  to  Bray  Saturday,  and  you  can  have  him  arrested 
on  the  writ  that  I  have  issued  against  him."  2 

Delamare  reached  Bray  at  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening,  on 
the  eighteenth.  The  next  morning,  Colmet  was  arrested  and  his 
papers  confiscated.  Besides  ten  letters  of  Roger  to  Colmet, 
accounts  of  all  their  dealings  were  found.  These  indicate  that 
the  size  of  the  business  of  Roger  was  hardly  exaggerated: 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21642.     290  et  293.     15  Jan.  1693.     Memoire  des  auteurs  de 
la  Cause  de  la  Cherte  des  Bleds,  par  Leger  de  la  Verbissonne. 

2  Ibid.    309.    Paris,  15  Juillet  1694.     De  la  Reynie  a  Delamare. 


3l6         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 


27  Aug.  1692  —  15  Jan.  1693  .... 

Remittances 
of  money 

73,595  » 

Shipments 
of  grain 

4^,298  U 

Grain  in  Bray 
and  vicinity 

28  298  U 

15  Jan.   1693  —  30  April 

e<r,4Q7 

T*0  ?      V^ 

AQ   78^ 

.&U,  ^.\^^j 
57IO 

30  Apr.  1693  —   6  Nov 

08  01  3 

T~y  ?  /   o 

96,988 

it  *y 

I  526 

6  Nov.  1693  —  15  Mar.  1694  .  .  .  . 
15  Mar.  1694  —  13  June    

yu>wj->5 
....         60,480 

65,128 

56,655 
62,626 

3,825 
2,$021 

The  next  day  witnesses  were  summoned  to  testify  in  regard 
to  the  case.  Much  of  this  testimony  has  been  used  in  another 
connection  and  a  repetition  here  is  needless;  suffice  it  to  say 
that  there  was  abundant  evidence  that  Colmet  had  disorganized 
the  trade  at  Bray  and  in  the  surrounding  towns,  buying  in  the 
country,  forming  granaries  at  Bray  and  buying  much  that  was 
offered  at  the  market.  The  trade  of  the  region  was,  to  a  great 
degree,  in  his  control.  The  general  accusations  were  thus  justi- 
fied in  large  measure. 

The  principal  point  legally,  however,  was  the  question  of 
partnerships  and  agreements  with  other  merchants.  On  this 
subject  the  accusations  are  admitted  even  by  the  "  Factum  pour 
Roger."  "  Asked  if  it  was  not  true  that  the  partnership  with 
Huge  had  been  kept  secret  in  order  to  raise  the  price  of  grain, 
the  defendant  replies  that,  if  this  was  kept  secret,  it  was  only 
because  the  l  Commissionaires  Facteurs  '  might  have  claimed 
30  sous  per  muid  as  fee,  although  the  merchants  of  Paris  have 
always  been  exempt  from  this  due.2  Furthermore,  these  part- 
nerships between  merchants  have  always  been  practised,  and  it 
would  be  difficult  to  furnish  the  ports  without  clerks  or  partners 
in  the  provinces,  and  inasmuch  as  the  grain  has  always  been 
sold  at  the  price  current  when  the  boat  arrived,  the  public  has 
suffered  no  injury.  ...  If  the  partnership  had  been  formed 
by  several  merchants  of  the  same  province  to  buy  all  the  grain 
and  thereby  render  themselves  masters  of  the  price,  .  .  .  that 
would  be  a  case  contemplated  as  illegal  by  the  law.  .  .  .  Fur- 
thermore, if  the  defendant  has  entered  into  partnerships,  they 
are  with  provincial  merchants  more  than  ten  leagues  from  Paris. 
The  utility  of  this  type  of  establishment  is  so  well  recognized 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  2 1642.    300.    Notes  f aites  par  Delamare  des  "  Papiers  trouvges 
Chez  Colmet."     19  Juillet  1694. 

2  This  form  of  question  and  answer  seems  to  be  adopted  merely  for  convenience. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE    317 

at  the  Hotel  de  Ville,  that  when  disputes  arise  between  the 
merchants  of  Paris  and  their  partners  in  the  country,  the  Pro- 
vost of  Merchants  decides  the  case  in  accordance  with  the  clauses 
of  the  partnership  agreement." 

The  question  of  delaying  shipments  with  reference  to  the 
condition  of  the  market  was  more  difficult.  A  specific  case  was 
alleged,  and  no  effort  was  made  to  deny  the  fact,  but  a  defence 
of  a  rather  slippery  character  was  forthcoming. 

"  By  a  letter  written  by  the  defendant  to  Huge,  to  delay 
for  a  few  days  the  shipment  of  100  muids  of  grain  which  they 
had  put  into  partnership,  the  defendant  shows  that  this  was 
done  not  with  the  intention  of  making  a  great  gain,  but  merely 
because  he  had  other  grain  on  the  ports.  ...  As  for  the  gain 
on  that  100  muids,  it  is  true  that  it  came  to  1800  apiece, 
but  that  profit  ought  not  to  be  considered  unjust  if  all  the  risks 
of  the  trade  are  considered."  l 

The  defense  set  forth  in  this  little  pamphlet  is  extremely 
clever  and  very  well  calculated  to  calm  the  popular  feeling  against 
the  defendant.  But  the  evasiveness  of  the  answers  is  signif- 
icant. The  one  point  that  was  really  sound  was  the  assertion 
that  partnerships  had  become  legal  through  the  tacit  recogni- 
tion by  the  Provost  of  Merchants.  That  was  the  crucial  ques- 
tion. The  law  of  the  case  ultimately  depended  upon  the  legality 
or  illegality  of  the  trading  partnerships  and  associations  of  mer- 
chants ;  the  merchants  could  produce  decisive  evidence  to  prove 
that  such  partnerships  had  long  existed;  the  authorities  could 
produce  a  long  series  of  prohibitions.  The  case  is  important 
for  bringing  a  definite  issue  between  the  traditional  prohibition 
of  partnerships  and  the  actual  development  of  partnerships 
among  the-  merchants.  Both  the  Chatelet  and  Echevinage  had 
cried  out  against  these  associations  of  merchants  in  1660-63, 
and  again  in  the  years  1693-94,  to  say  nothing  of  spasmodic 
outbursts  in  the  interim.2  Both  official  bodies  were  inclined 

1  All  these  citations  are  from  the  Factum  pour  Jean  Roger.     Bib.  Nat.,  Fr. 
21642.     368.     ch.  7  of  the  Factum. 

2  It  is  possible  that  the  edict  of  Sept.  1690  for  the  creation  of  60  grain  brokers 
at  Paris  should  be  cited  in  this  connection.    The  measure,  however,  seems  to  be 


318         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

to  attribute  much  of  the  trouble  to  the  dealings  of  these  associ- 
ated merchants.  On  the  whole,  they  were  probably  right  in 
their  judgment  of  the  situation,  but  they  did  not  have  any  means 
of  distinguishing  between  legal  and  proper  partnerships  and  the 
partnerships  formed  with  a  distinct  intention  to  manipulate 
the  Parisian  market.  Roger  had  doubtless  been  engaged  in 
wholesale  manipulation  of  the  local  and  the  Parisian  markets, 
but  the  most  that  could  be  done  was  to  impose  a  fine.  In  short, 
officials  had  put  their  hands  on  the  real  difficulty,  but  they 
had  not  found  the  true  remedy.  The  practices  of  Roger  and 
his  associates  were  made  possible  by  the  inadequacy  of  market 
organization.  The  creation  of  wholesale  markets  was  the  most 
effective  means  of  keeping  the  merchants  within  proper  bounds. 
Visibility  of  supply  and  a.  proper  correlation  of  local  and  metro- 
politan interests  were  the  true  solution  of  the  problem. 

After  1693,  the  effort  to  suppress  partnerships  ceased  to  play 
an  important  part  in  the  regulation  of  the  trade.  The  old 
laws  remained  on  the  registers,  but  there  was  no  such  serious 
attempt  to  enforce  them  as  in  1693,  though  the  popular  dread 
of  monopolies  always  kept  the  subject  in  view. 

The  years  1698  and  1699  served  to  emphasize  an  element 
that  the  Parisian  officials  were  disposed  to  overlook,  the  possi- 
bility of  a  serious  depletion  of  local  supplies  in  the  producing 
regions.  There  had  been  prohibitions  in  Soissons  in  1693-94, 
but  Soissons  was  not  one  of  the  most  important  sources  of  supply, 
and  the  Parisian  officials  were  more  impressed  by  the  quantity 
of  grain  on  the  Seine  and  Marne  than  they  were  by  the  scarcity 
in  Santerre  and  Soissonnais. 

Our  information  for  these  years  is  singularly  incomplete; 
the  Chatelet  and  Echevinage  do  little  in  the  Upper  Marne, 
so  that  we  have  nothing  but  scattered  letters  from  Larcher, 
the  Intendant  in  Champagne.  He  had  been  strongly  impressed 
by  conditions  in  1697,  when  the  markets  had  been  very  notably 
disturbed  in  November  by  activity  of  the  merchants  and  blatiers. 

more  or  less  of  a  financial  expedient,  and  I  do  not  like  to  take  it  too  seriously.  See 
Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  967,  970.  H.  1834.  Reg.  du  Bureau,  75,  147,  272-282. 
G7.  1630.  Chalons,  1693. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE  319 

The  high  prices  lasted  only  three  or  four  markets  at  Chalons 
and  Vitry,  however,  and  although  he  resorted  to  prohibitions 
at  Sedan  and  Mezieres,  he  did  not  interfere  with  the  Parisian 
trade.  But  he  was  disposed  towards  a  prohibitive  policy. 
Otherwise  he  would  hardly  have  been  so  ready  with  his  general 
prohibition  in  September,  1698:  "  I  have  been  through  the  can- 
tons of  Rheims,  Rethel,  and  Sainte-Menehould  where  I  have 
found  that  there  is  very  little  grain  and  that  prices  are  rising 
daily.  .  .  .  Here  in  Vitry,  which  has  the  largest  grain  trade 
of  any  town  in  the  province,  and  the  only  town  where  the  mer- 
chants have  granaries,  I  discovered  by  means  of  an  inquiry  that 
there  is  about  30,000  seders,  Parisian  measure.  This  is  hardly 
sufficient  for  the  subsistence  of  Vitry,  and  the  succor  of  Rheims, 
Chalons,  Saint-Dizier,  and  Joinville.  I  have  given  or*ders  that 
none  should  leave  Vitry  except  for  those  towns,  and  I  have  sent 
word  to  the  Provost  of  Merchants,  so  that  he  may  not  be 
surprised  if  the  merchants  of  Vitry  send  no  grain  to  Paris, 
where  I  hear  there  is  abundance  and  lower  prices  than  here  in 
Champagne."  1 

The  Controleur  General  thought  that  Larcher  was  somewhat 
over-anxious,2  but  the  difficulties  in  Champagne  increased. 
Prices  rose  steadily.  There  were  constant  complaints,  and  many 
of  the  larger  towns  had  sent  deputations,  representing  that  there 
had  been  no  wheat  at  the  markets  for  several  weeks.  Larcher 
did  his  best  to  meet  the  trouble,  but  he  could  not  do  much,  as 
the  wheat  crop  had  been  a  failure  and  there  was  little  old  wheat. 
The  best  farms  had  scarcely  yielded  enough  to  serve  as  seed. 
Fortunately,  barley,  oats,  rye,  and  buckwheat  were  plentiful 
and  three-quarters  of  the  rural  population  was  living  on  those 
grains.  But  even  these  were  excessively  high,  and  it  was  to 
be  feared  that  supplies  would  be  exhausted  before  the  end  of 
the  year.  The  common  people  were  becoming  anxious,  and 
distributions  of  public  grain  were  necessary  to  allay  the  fear. 
At  his  suggestion,  indeed,  Troyes,  Rheims,  Sedan  and  other 
towns  had  held  several  markets  with  grain  brought  in  from 

1  G7.     228.    Vitry,  21  Sept.  1698.    Larcher. 
*  Apostille  sur  la  lettre. 


32O         THE  GRAIN' TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

outside.  Other  towns  would  have  liked  to  adopt  the  same  policy, 
but  lacked  the  necessary  funds,  and  could  find  none  to  under- 
take the  enterprise.  Besides,  they  did  not  know  where  to  pro- 
cure grain  and  they  feared  violence. 

At  the  end  of  the  month,  Larcher  issued  an  ordinance  pro- 
hibiting export  from  the  province,  cancelling  all  contracts  "  for 
the  delivery  of  grain,  and  urging  the  peasants  to  thresh  and 
bring  their  grain  to  market."  A  copy  was  sent  to  the  Controleur 
General,  who  replied:  "  There  is  no  desire  to  condemn  the 
ordinance,  but  it  cannot  be  approved.  The  essential  thing 
is  that  the  prices  of  grain  diminish."  l  Despite  the  ordinance, 
difficulty  was  experienced  at  Troyes; 2  in  February,  Chalons  was 
obliged  to  purchase  grain  on  public  security.3 

There  was  little  positive  regulation  on  the  part  of  the  Chatelet 
that  is  of  great  importance.  Delamare,  however,  was  not 
inactive,  and  a  trip  to  Bray,  made  in  January,  1699,  seems  to 
have  been  influential.  The  object  of  the  trip  was  doubtless 
the  same  as  in  1694,  but  although  the  grain  merchants  were 
found  to  be  guilty  of  various  illegal  practices,  nothing  seems 
to  have  been  done.  The  ordinary  market  at  Bray  was  com- 
pletely disorganized,4  but  an  informal  market  had  grown  up 
and  the  significant  fact  is  Delamare 's  acquiescence  in  this 
illegal  commercial  custom.  He  says,  in  his  Traite  de  la  Police: 
11  The  market  is  held  Friday,  but  the  peasants  and  blatiers 
have  become  accustomed  to  bring  their  grain  to  town  on  all 
days  of  the  week,  exposing  it  for  sale  at  the  Halle,  so  that  there 
is  a  sort  of  continuous  market.  This  extension  of  the  market 
is  not  authorized  by  any  regulation.  Custom  alone  has  estab- 
lished it,  but  according  to  the  testimony  of  the  officers  and 
inhabitants  experience  has  shown  that  it  is  useful  to  the 
trade."  5 

1  All  the  above  in  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  II,  500,  1787.     Nov.  16. 

2  G7.     228.    Troyes,  7  Dec.  1698.    Maire  et  Echevins,  23  Dec.  1698. 

3  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  I,  518,  1838.     8,  16  Nov.  1699. 

4  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21643.    317.    Proces  Verbal  a  Bray-sur-Seine,  3  Jan.  1699.     I 
infer  that  this  is  the  basis  of  the  notice  on  the  market  at  Bray  in  the  Traite  de  la 
Police. 

6  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  977,  2d  ed.     Bray-sur-Seine. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN   TRADE 

The  perception  of  the  practical  value  of  a  continuous  whole- 
sale market  was  of  importance,  because  it  exerted  a  controlling 
influence  upon  the  policy  pursued  by  Delamare  at  Vitry  in 
1709,  where  conditions  were  gradually  tending  in  the  same 
direction.  The  suppression  of  partnerships  was  abandoned 
as  a  policy,  and  there  was  an  obvious  unwillingness  to  interfere 
very  much  with  the  trade.  Even  the  prohibitive  policy  of  the 
Intendant  was  very  mildly  criticized,  and  Delamare,  the  princi- 
pal agent  of  the  Chatelet  in  this  phase  of  its  action,  was  more 
than  ever  inclined  to  adopt  a  purely  empirical  policy,  founded 
on  commercial  usages. 

By  1708,  de  Harouys  had  become  Intendant  in  Champagne, 
a  man  much  less  inclined  to  use  prohibitions  than  Larcher  had 
been.  Harouys  could  not  escape  entirely  from  the  idea  of  a 
control  of  trade  by  licenses,  but  his  intentions  were  liberal. 
This  is  indeed  the  striking  feature  of  the  policy  pursued  in 
the  grain  trade  in  the  latter  part  of  1708  and  the  first  six  months 
of  1709,  when  the  Intendant  and  the  Controleur  General  had 
control. 

Some  little  pressure  had  appeared  soon  after  the  harvest  of 
1708,  but  Harouys  was  determined  not  to  issue  prohibitions. 
In  November,  1708,  he  told  the  merchants  of  Vitry  and  Perthois 
that  they  would  be  allowed  to  continue  their  trade  with  Paris, 
on  the  basis  of  licenses.1  This  policy  was  continued  throughout 
December,  January,  and  February.  Harouys  considered  it 
eminently  successful  and  wrote,  February  13:  "After  having 
prevented  the  merchants  from  scouring  the  country  and  selling 
to  each  other,  I  have  established  a  complete  freedom  for  the 
circulation  of  grain  by  means  of  licenses.  I  have  had  the  satis- 
faction of  seeing  prices  fall,  at  a  season  when  every  one  expected 
them  to  rise.  The  markets  are  adequately  furnished.  ...  I 
have  been  opposed  in  this  policy  only  by  the  officers  of  police, 
most  particularly  by  a  regulation  issued  by  the  Lieutenant 
of  Police  at  S6zanne.  .  .  .  '  The  grain  of  one  Robert  was 
seized,  a  part  confiscated,  and  a  general  order  issued,  prohibit- 

1  G7.  1642.  Chalons,  9  Dec.  1708.  De  Harouys.  G7.  1642.  Chalons,  21 
Jan.  1709.  De  Harouys.  G7.  1642.  Chalons,  n  Fev.  1709.  De  Harouys. 


322         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

ing  trade  in  grain  in  the  Baillage  of  Sezanne.  Harouys  annulled 
the  order  of  the  Lieutenant  of  Police.1  The  Parisian  officials, 
however,  did  not  approve  of  this  act,  and  their  criticism  induced 
Harouys  to  abandon  the  policy  of  giving  licenses.2  The  trade 
was  left  to  itself  for  a  while,  but  the  license  system  was  ultimately 
restored. 

At  Vitry,  the  local  officials  found  it  necessary  to  make  some 
provision  for  the  needs  of  the  town  itself,  and  in  March  all 
merchants  were  ordered  to  sell  to  the  town  at  the  market  price 
5  se tiers  of  every  100  exported.  This  was  sold  to  the  indigent 
by  the  Subdelegue  at  Vitry.3 

These  were  the  measures  proposed  by  the  general  administra- 
tive staff  to  avert  distress.  It  is  merely  the  result  of  the  dis- 
trust of  the  traditional  prohibitive  policy.  The  merchants 
were  left  almost  entirely  to  their  own  devices,  with  a  slight 
restraint  designed  to  safeguard  the  local  interests.  The  only 
constructive  element  in  the  policy  was  this  endeavor  to  enforce 
upon  the  wholesale  trade  its  responsibility  for  local  wants. 

This  policy  was  shown  to  be  inadequate  by  the  course  of 
events  in  April,  May,  and  June.  The  first  sign  of  trouble  came 
from  Bassigny.  "  The  subdelegues  of  Langres  and  Chaumont 
write  me,"  says  de  Harouys  April  i,  "  that  since  you  have  deemed 
it  expedient  to  suspend  the  use  of  licenses,  the  merchants  of 
Burgundy  and  other  provinces  have  entered  Bassigny  and  are 
carrying  off  all  the  grain,  without  regard  to  the  prices  they  have 
to  pay.  That  little  district  which  is  usually  one  of  the  surest 
resources  of  Champagne  will  soon  be  exhausted."  4 

Two  weeks  later,  disasters  affecting  the  crop  increased  the 
apprehension  throughout  the  province.  "  All  the  municipal 
corporations  come  to  me  to  demand  grain  for  public  granaries. 
From  Perthois  to  the  Meuse  on  one  side  and  to  Troyes  on  the 
other,  Vitry  is  the  only  town  that  can  furnish  them  with  supplies. 

1  G7.     1642.     Chalons,  13  Fev.  1709.     De  Harouys. 

2  G7.     1642.   Paris,  26  Fev.  1709.     Daguesseau  au  C.  G.    G7.     1642.    Chalons, 
28  Fev.  1709.    De  Harouys. 

3  G7.     1642.     Paris,  14  Mars  1709.    Lallement.     G7.     1642.     Vitry,  26  Mars 
1709.    M.  le  Subdelegue"  a  Vitry. 

4  G7.     1642.     Chalons,  i  Avril  1709.     De  Harouys. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE    323 

But  quite  apart  from  the  fact  that  there  are  only  30,000  setiers 
in  Vitry,  the  merchants  of  Paris  and  several  factors  .  .  .  have 
purchased  so  large  a  quantity  that  the  granaries  of  Vitry  will 
be  exhausted  if  some  measures  are  not  taken  at  once.  I  am 
quite  well  aware  that  the  provinces  should  succor  Paris,  but 
in  order  to  prevent  the  exhaustion  of  Champagne,  the  matter 
must  be  conducted  with  some  system."  l  An  additional  com- 
plication appeared  in  the  necessity  of  securing  provisions  for 
the  armies  in  the  Low  Countries.  These  purchases  were  made 
almost  entirely  through  the  intendants,  and  generally  quota 
were  levied  on  the  various  towns.2 

The  town  of  Chalons  considered  itself  seriously  threatened. 
An  exact  enumeration  of  all  the  grain  in  the  town  was  made, 
and  it  was  found  that  there  was  only  enough  for  six  or  seven 
months.  No  grain  was  then  coming  in  from  the  country,  and 
the  neighboring  villages  were  quite  dependent  upon  Chalons.3 
A  committee  of  nineteen  had  been  formed  to  take  charge  of 
the  grain  trade.  They  were  to  fix  the  price  of  grain  and  of 
bread,  to  decide  what  villages  should  be  allowed  to  buy  bread 
and  grain  in  the  town,  and  to  determine  the  quantity  of  grain 
which  should  be  assigned  each  week  to  the  inhabitants.4 

All  these  provisions  indicate  the  fallacy  underlying  the  whole 
policy  of  prohibitions,  the  notion  that  the  true  basis  of  calcula- 
tion is  the  condition  at  any  one  moment,  supposing  that  all 
trade  were  stopped.  The  town  that  could  not  see  within  its 
walls  enough  grain  to  last  till  the  harvest  was  sure  to  raise  the 
cry  of  dearth,  or,  even  as  at  Chalons,  when  there  was  just  about 
enough  to  last  till  after  the  harvest  (six  months  from  April). 
The  conception  of  a  continuous  flow  of  trade  was  entirely 
foreign  to  the  thought  of  the  ordinary  bourgeois  of  the  time, 
and  it  is  only  fair  to  say  that  trade  was  hardly  regular 
enough  to  warrant  much  general  confidence.  Still,  the  main- 
tenance of  trade  with  proper  market  regulations  was  the  only 

1  G7.     1642.     Chalons,  14  Avril  1709.     De  Harouys. 

2  G7.     1642.     Chalons,  1 6  Avril  1709.     De  Harouys. 

3  G7.     1642.     Chalons,  27  Avril  1709.     De  Harouys. 

4  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21648.     234.    Imprime.     Chambre  Particuliere  pour  la  police 
des  bleds  dans  la  Ville  de  Chalons. 


324         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

remedy.     The  mere  shutting  of  the  gates  of  each  town  was 
quite  inadequate. 

In  a  sense,  it  is  unfair  to  insinuate  that  a  continuous  circula- 
tion of  trade  was  not  desired.  The  more  accurate  statement 
would  be  that  the  trade  was  forever  stopping  in  times  of  dearth, 
and,  as  no  one  seemed  to  be  able  to  keep  it  moving,  every  one 
proceeded  to  hold  what  he  had.  This  all  appears  in  a  letter 
of  de  Harouys  of  April  30:  "As  regards  the  15,000-20,000 
sacks  of  wheat  and  rye  that  you  ordered  me  to  buy  to  be  sent 
to  Charleville,  I  must  tell  you  that  the  agents  I  sent  to  the 
elections  of  Vitry  and  Sainte-Menehould  have  just  come  back 
without  having  been  able  to  buy  a  single  sack.  At  first,  when 
every  one  feared  an  extreme  dearth,  which  is  now  only  too 
certain,  those  who  had  grain  in  store,  whether  from  their  farms 
or  from  purchases,  made  no  difficulty  about  selling.  The  only 
obstacle  was  the  violence  shown  by  the  people.  But  now  matters 
have  come  to  such  a  pass  that  those  who  have  grain  are  afraid 
to  sell,  for  fear  of  the  violence  with  which  they  are  threatened."  1 
Rheims  was  threatened  seriously  by  this  general  cessation 
of  trade.  "  Here,  we  are  all  in  the  throes  of  dearth,"  write  the 
Lieutenant  General  and  the  Echevins.  "  Not  one  grain  of 
wheat  comes  to  the  market.  The  little  that  we  have  is  being 
consumed,  and  even  the  grain  grown  in  our  election  is  stopped 
everywhere.  Yesterday  we  sent  some  carters  to  Pouilly  and 
Hery,  with  an  escort  of  fifteen  men  to  get  120  setiers  of  wheat, 
that  we  had  bought.  All  in  vain.  The  peasants  assembled 
with  arms  and  prevented  the  passage  of  the  grain.  .  .  .  Sieur 
de  Vige,  whose  grain  has  already  been  a  great  aid,  told  us  that 
he  had  a  large  quantity  at  Verdun  and  in  that  vicinity,  but  that 
it  would  be  impossible  to  get  it  here  without  an  escort  of  regular 
troops."  2  It  is  the  same  story  at  Troyes.  "  Yesterday  we 
sent  a  convoy  of  twenty  wagons  with  a  company  of  archers  to 
Chavange,  to  bring  in  the  grain  that  we  have  bought  for  the 

1  G7.     1642.     Chalons,  30  Avril  1709.     De  Harouys. 

2  G7.     1642.    Reims,  20-30  Avril  1709.    Lieu.  Gen.  du  Conseil  et  fichevins 
de  R.,  a  Harouys. 

G7.  1642.  Reims,  30  Avril  1709.  M.  le  Lieu.  Ge"n.;  Savary,  Ancien  Maire; 
et  d'Origny,  Avocat  du  Roy  au  C.  G. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE    325 

provision  of  our  town.  We  had  reason  to  believe,  too,  that  the 
licenses  and  orders  of  the  intendant  would  be  respected  and 
would  facilitate  the  passage  of  the  grain.  But  things  were 
carried  to  such  a  point  that  not  only  were  the  sacks  of  grain 
stolen,  but  the  archers  and  carters  were  quite  unable  to  resist 
the  force  of  three  villages  combined  in  a  body  of  three  thousand 
strong,  so  that  our  men  were  obliged  to  seek  safety  in  flight 
after  being  exceedingly  misused."  l 

Meanwhile,  exports  to  Paris  continued  from  Vitry  and  to 
some  extent  from  Chalons.2  This  trade  was  carried  on  under 
cover  of  licenses,  and  violence  did  not  manifest  itself  there  as 
soon  as  in  the  country  districts.  It  is  this  factor  that  rendered 
the  situation  really  serious,  —  a  continuance  of  exports  from  the 
shipping  ports,  despite  a  cessation  of  the  movement  from  the 
country  districts.  But  riots  soon  began  in  Vitry  and  Chalons. 
The  first  trouble  at  Vitry  was  on  May  10,  when  the  people 
endeavored  to  prevent  shipments  to  Rheims  and  to  Paris.3 
De  Harouys  immediately  began  to  assemble  troops;  in  the  course 
of  a  fortnight  regiments  were  sent  up  from  the  Beauce  to  main- 
tain order.  There  was  a  tumult  at  Chalons,  but  no  one  was 
killed.4 

This  seems  to  have  been  the  crisis.  The  month  of  June  passed 
more  quietly,  and  although  the  promise  of  the  harvest  was  not 
great,  it  inevitably  tended  to  relieve  pressure.  It  was  at  this 
time  that  Delamare  made  his  first  trip  to  Champagne,  after 
the  worst  period  of  congestion,  but  while  trade  was  still  com- 
pletely disorganized.  Up  to  that  time,  there  had  been  no 
successful  attempt  to  restore  the  normal  conditions  of  circu- 
lation, and  this  was  the  problem  to  which  Delamare  addressed 
himself. 

Among  the  papers  now  at  the  National  Library,  there  is  a 
memoir  of  1709,  which  seems  to  contain  an  outline  of  the  policy 
Delamare  proposed  to  adopt.  If  it  was  not  drawn  up  before 

1  G7.     1642.    Troyes,  8  Mai  1709.     Maire  et  fichevins.     See  also  letter  of  the 
Notables  of  Troyes,  n  Mai  1709.     G7.     1642. 

2  G7.     1642.     Chalons,  9  Mai  1709.    De  Harouys. 

3  G7.     1642.     Chalons,  12  Mai  1709.     De  Harouys. 

4  G7.     1642.     Chalons,  1 8  Mai  1709.     De  Harouys. 


326         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

he  actually  reached  Vitry,   it  must  have  been  written  soon 
after  his  arrival: 

"  In  order  to  maintain  the  continuity  of  trade  between  Lorraine,  Bar, 

Alsace,  and  Vitry,  and  between  Vitry  and  Paris,  three  things  must  be  done: 

i*  The  foreign  (i.  e.  to  Vitry)  merchants  must  be  given  facilities  for 

selling  their  grain  on  the  day  of  its  arrival. 

2*  The  grain  purchased  by  merchants  of  Vitry,  which  they  now  retain 
in  granaries  or  storehouses  in  concert  with  merchants  of  Paris, 
must  be  set  in  motion  towards  Paris. 
3*  The  Bourgeois  must  be  prevented  from  making  stores,  and  must  be 

compelled  to  carry  their  grain  to  market. 
"  To  succeed  in  this: 

"  It  will  be  necessary  to  have  at  Vitry  a  fund  of  6o,ooou  in  charge  of  a 
trustworthy  and  solvent  man,  who  shall  act  as  if  he  were  a  private  merchant. 
"  Freedom  of  trade  must  be  guaranteed  the  merchants. 
"  The  commission  agent  shall  buy  only  such  grain  as  shall  be  left  at 
the  end  of  the  market,  at  the  market-place,  the  Halle,  or  the  central  square. 
"  As  soon  as  a  merchant  of  Vitry  shall  have  a  boat-lod  of  grain,  he  shall 
be  obliged  to  load  it  at  once  and  ship  to  Paris,  or  sell  to  the  commissioner, 
who  shall  appear  as  a  merchant  willing  to  buy. 

' '  The  commissioner  may  go  to  Lorraine  and  Bar  or  elsewhere  if  the 
Royal  agent  shall  consider  it  expedient. 

"  The  commissioner  shall  have  granaries  at  Vitry  to  store  his  grain,  until 
he  shall  have  enough  for  a  boat."  l 

The  document  thus  has  all  the  aspects  of  being  a  detailed 
project  of  the  policy  to  be  followed,  and  in  general  it  was  followed. 
The  buyer  was  never  established,  but  the  significant  feature 
of  the  project  is  its  emphasis  upon  market  organization,  and 
the  obvious  intention  to  solve  the  difficult  problem  by  direct 
commercial  machinery,  rather  than  by  external  administrative 
regulation.  It  was  a  project,  first  and  last,  to  keep  the  trade 
moving,  and  to  make  the  markets  work. 

The  execution  of  the  task  involved  many  unforeseen  difficulties, 
but  most  of  these  were  surmounted.  "  The  merchants  of  Paris 
were  then  at  Vitry.  They  had  already  sent  five  to  six  hundred 
muids  to  our  ports,  at  my  instance.  I  secured  a  continuance 
of  this  assistance  by  visiting  again  the  granaries  and  storehouses 
of  the  merchants.  I  drew  up  a  Proces  Verbal  of  the  quantity 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21646.    94. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE    327 

of  grain  still  held  by  them,  and  they  agreed  to  sell  it  for  the  sus- 
tenance of  Paris. 

"  This  increased  demand  revived  trade.  I  saw  several 
foreign  merchants  come  to  Vitry  bringing  grain  in  carts  or  pack 
saddles.  I  spoke  to  them,  and  assured  them  of  protection 
whenever  they  should  have  need  of  it.  I  permitted  them  to 
sell  daily  in  the  central  square,  which  had  not  been  done  before. 1 
They  then  brought  so  great  a  quantity  of  grain  that  they  did 
not  find  a  ready  sale  for  all  of  it.  This  forced  me  to  hire  granaries 
for  them  in  order  not  to  have  them  become  disgusted  with  the 
trade."  2 

But  Delamare  did  not  propose  to  confine  his  attention  to 
Vitry,  and  hearing  of  difficulties  at  Troyes  and  at  Sezanne 
he  went  thither,  — first  to  Troyes,  and  not  without  misgivings: 

"  When  I  left  Vitry,  I  was  afraid  that  the  trade  there  would 
languish.  It  can  be  kept  in  movement  only  by  force.  Every 
one  has  an  idea  that  wheat  will  be  worth  ioou  at  Easter.  Here 
(Troyes)  the  people  are  ready  to  rise  at  the  slightest  provocation. 
The  houses  of  the  magistrates  and  of  several  of  the  richest 
inhabitants  have  already  been  invested  twice  with  threats  of 
incendiarism.  ...  It  must  be  confessed  that  the  disorder 
of  the  market  contributed  much  to  maintain  these  movements. 
There  was  scarcely  any  attempt  at  control.  I  restored  order 
and  enforced  the  regulations,  especially  that  requiring  all  per- 
sons to  bring  grain  to  market.  Eagerness  to  secure  grain  and 
the  desire  on  the  part  of  some  to  form  hoards  impelled  them 
to  go  out  to  meet  the  grain  on  the  highways.  All  was  stopped 
in  the  suburbs  so  that  little  reached  the  market  place.  I 
now  send  squads  of  archers  out  on  the  highways  on  market 
days.  All  comes  in  to  the  market.  I  give  the  '  menu  peuple  ' 
preference  for  two  hours,  and  the  minor  grains  have  gone  down 
by  a  half."  3  Similar  reforms  were  made  at  Sezanne.  A  trip 
was  made  down  the  Aube,  and  another  to  Bray  and  Provins.4 

1  Note  the  influence  of  the  investigation  at  Bray  in  1699. 

2  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  2d  ed.,  Ill,  Supp.  39. 

8  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21647.    86.    Troyes,  4  Sept.  1709.     Copie  avec  apostilles. 
4  Ibid.    Sezanne,  16  Sept.  1709.     Copie. 


328         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

11  But  while  I  was  at  Sezanne,  I  learned  that  the  inhabitants 
of  Vitry  kept  the  grain  in  their  granaries  and  wished  to  sell  at 
the  excessive  price  of  6ou  some  even  for  seventy  and  eighty. 
This  obliged  me  to  return  to  Vitry.  I  found  three  to  four  hun- 
dred muids  of  wheat  and  had  a  part  delivered  to  our  merchants 
of  Paris  and  to  their  agents.  I  fixed  the  price  of  this  wheat  at 
50  per  setier,  founding  my  action  on  that  clause  in  the  ordi- 
nances which  forbids  selling  at  higher  prices  in  granaries  than 
in  the  market,  for  50"  was  then  the  market  price. 

"The  grain,  which  I  was  thus  drawing  from  the  granaries 
of  Vitry,  was  replaced  literally  every  day  by  the  Lorraine  mer- 
chants. They  bring  in  grain  continually,  and  scarcely  a  week 
passes  without  the  arrival  of  eight  or  ten  muids.  They  are 
beginning  to  bring  barley  also,  of  which  there  is  an  abundance 
in  their  country.  This  grain  from  Lorraine  is  purchased  by  the 
merchants  of  Vitry  for  the  provision  of  Paris."  1 

Delamare  seems  to  have  then  returned  to  Sezanne  and  con- 
tinued the  investigations  interrupted  by  the  bad  news  from 
Vitry.  But  no  letters  were  preserved.  October  20,  he  is  back 
in  Vitry.  "  I  have  learned,"  he  writes,  "  that  the  measures 
I  had  taken  to  prevent  the  bourgeois,  the  merchants,  and  the 
people  from  going  out  to  meet  the  grain  were  successful,  and 
have  caused  a  considerable  diminution  in  price.  .  .  .  The 
people  are  much  pleased  .  .  .  but  the  wealthy  bourgeois  and 
merchants  are  not.  I  have  learned  since  my  return  from  Sezanne, 
that  divers  persons  have  been  harrassing  the  Lorraine  merchants 
and  other  foreigners,  even  to  the  point  of  refusing  to  buy  their 
grain.  The  foreigners,  having  learned  of  my  return,  came  to 
me.  I  reassured  them  and  helped  them  to  sell  their  grain  for 
a  price  with  which  they  are  well  satisfied.  .  .  .  Others  continue 
to  arrive  daily.  There  are  continual  convoys  from  Lorraine, 
Bar,  the  bishoprics  of  Toul  and  Verdun,  some  from  Alsace  and 
I  am  even  told  that  some  are  en  route  from  Tranche  Comte. 

1  G7.  1643.  Vitry,  29  Sept.  1 709.  Delamare,  original.  Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21647. 
3.  Same  letter.  Copy.  This  duplication  indicates  that  Delamare  kept  copies 
regularly,  but  that  some  of  the  originals  sent  were  lost,  and  so  do  not  appear  in 
the  Series  G7.  It  is  possible  that  some  of  these  Delamare  letters  may  be  in  the 
cartons  of  the  Serie  G7.  called  "  Lettres  Communs." 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE  329 

All  the  foreigners,  with  whom  I  have  spoken,  have  told  me 
that  there  was  no  town  more  convenient  for  them."  l 

The  ordinance  of  October  2 1 ,  which  we  have  already  discussed 
in  a  previous  chapter,  concluded  the  practical  work  of  the 
first  visit  to  Champagne.  The  influence  of  the  energetic 
commissioner  can  hardly  be  denied.  His  untiring  persistence, 
his  great  knowledge,  both  of  the  old  regulations  and  of  the  con- 
ditions of  trade,  his  desire  to  do  nothing  unpractical,  to  keep 
the  trade  moving  at  any  cost,  all  combined  to  render  his  work 
singularly  important  at  this  critical  moment  in  the  history  of 
the  grain  trade. 

But  after  Delamare  had  left  Vitry,  the  old  jealousies  and  the 
avarice  of  the  merchants  of  Vitry  interrupted  the  steady  flow  of 
trade  that  he  had  started.  This  necessitated  a  second  visit, 
and  Christmas  Eve,  1709,  found  Delamare  again  at  Vitry.  The 
Lorraine  merchants  had  left  Vitry  almost  entirely,  bringing 
their  grain  to  Saint-Dizier.  Delamare  purchased  grain  in 
Lorraine  by  his  agents  and  had  it  shipped  to  Vitry.  This  started 
the  stream  again,  and  by  means  of  coaxing  and  negotiation 
the  trade  was  completely  revived.  Various  ordinances  were 
issued  both  at  Vitry  and  other  places  to  regulate  the  markets, 
but  there  was  little  in  his  policy  that  did  not  appear  in  his  work 
on  the  first  visit.  He  also  made  a  hurried  trip  to  Lorraine, 
and  that  trade  continued  to  be  the  basis  of  the  relief  afforded, 
not  only  to  Paris,  but  to  the  larger  towns  of  Champagne,  especially 
Rheims  and  Chalons.  The  work  of  the  commissioner  was  thus 
of  immediate  value,  as  well  as  being  the  most  significant  step  his- 
torically in  the  organization  of  the  wholesale  market  in  grain.2 

The  regulation  of  trade  in  the  Seine  Basin  was  thus  largely 
controlled  by  the  Chatelet.  The  difficulties  were  primarily 
difficulties  of  marketing,  and  as  early  as  1660  there  was  a  mani- 
fest desire  to  abandon  mere  prohibitions  for  measures  regulating 
the  conduct  of  merchants,  without  actually  stopping  trade. 
The  first  attempt  of  the  Chatelet  was  directed  against  the 

1  Bib.  Nat,  Fr.  21647.     129  v.    Vitry,  20  Oct.  1709.     Delamare. 
1  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  2d  ed.,  II,  Supp.  41  ff.    Also  letters.     Bib.  Nat.,  Fr.  21648. 
J»  3>  9>  34,  282.     G7.     1643.     i  Jan.  1710,  23  Mars  1710. 


330        THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

associations  of  merchants.  The  old  prohibitions  were  renewed, 
and  commissioners  were  sent  out  to  collect  evidence  for  prosecu- 
tions. The  investigations  of  1660-63  produced  no  immediate 
effect,  but  prosecutions  were  undertaken  on  a  larger  scale  in 
1693.  The  troubles  of  that  year  were  certainly  due  in  no  small 
measure  to  the  operations  of  Jean  Roger  and  his  associates. 
He  was  selected  as  the  most  conspicuous  offender  and  a  deter- 
mined effort  was  made  to  secure  a  conviction  that  would  serve 
as  an  example  to  other  merchants.  The  legal  intricacies  of 
the  case  were  too  considerable,  however,  and  no  decisive  action 
resulted.  The  failure  of  this  policy  left  the  Chatelet  with  no 
precise  scheme  for  the  regulation  of  the  trade,  but  at  this  point, 
the  personality  of  Delamare  became  important.  In  his  work 
at  Bray  in  1693  and  later  in  1699,  he  became  acquainted  with 
modifications  of  the  market  system  which  had  developed  there 
under  the  stimulus  of  a  growing  volume  of  trade.  The  old 
market  regulations  were  no  longer  strictly  observed,  and  instead 
of  trade  being  confined  to  two  days  of  the  week,  buying  and 
selling  of  grain  became  a  daily  event.  This  informal  market, 
too,  was  a  wholesale,  rather  than  a  retail,  market.  In  these 
new  practices,  Delamare  saw  the  solution  of  the  problem.  The 
cessation  of  trade  in  time  of  dearth  could  be  overcome  by  sound 
market  regulations,  above  all,  by  increased  facilities  for  daily 
buying  and  selling.  The  great  desideratum  was  movement 
rather  than  regulation.  Both  the  provinces  and  Paris  would 
be  secure  against  dearth  so  long  as  the  grain  could  be  kept  in 
motion.  This  was  a  natural  outgrowth  of  the  earliest  policy 
of  the  Chatelet.  It  is  the  fundamental  feature  of  all  the  regula- 
tions from  that  source  throughout  the  century.  But  the  means 
of  securing  the  much  desired  continuity  of  movement  were  not 
perceived  until  Delamare  furnished  the  excellent  example  of 
his  visits  to  Vitry,  in  1709  and  1710.  His  measures  not  only 
relieved  distress  in  the  Seine  Basin,  but  led  to  a  great  advance 
in  market  organization.  All  the  fundamental  conceptions  of 
wholesale  marketing  appear  in  his  letters  and  orders  of  1709, 
and  it  is  the  first  time  such  ideas  had  been  applied  to  the  market- 
ing of  a  bulky  commodity  of  relatively  uniform  character. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE     331 

• 

Burgundy  and  Lyons 

In  Burgundy,  the  traditional  policy  of  the  sixteenth  century 
underwent  little  change.  Although  intendants  assumed  many 
of  the  functions  previously  discharged  by  provincial  and  munici- 
pal officials,  the  new  officers  did  not  bring  new  policies  as  in  the 
Seine  Basin.  Every  factor  in  the  Parisian  supply  area  led 
administrative  activity  into  new  channels,  in  Burgundy  every- 
thing tended  toward  the  persistence  of  the  old  traditions. 

In  Champagne,  greater  quantities  of  grain  were  available, 
and  the  possibility  of  securing  additional  supplies  from  Lorraine 
gave  the  trade  of  Vitry  and  Chalons  a  very  broad  basis.  Dela- 
mare's  policy  was  founded  on  these  features  of  the  trade,  and 
it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  his  liberal  policy  would  have 
been  equally  successful  in  the  absence  of  such  resources  for  the 
large  markets. 

In  Burgundy,  there  was  little  concentration  of  trade,  no  possi- 
bility of  securing  supplementary  resources,  such  as  those  of 
Lorraine,  and  a  smaller  general  surplus  in  the  producing  region 
itself.  None  of  the  Saone  Valley  towns  controlled  as  large  a 
volume  of  trade  as  Vitry,  or  Bray,  though  there  is  a  perceptible 
tendency  towards  concentration  at  Gray.  The  Saone  Valley 
was  able  to  draw  grain  only  from  Burgundy  proper  and  Bassigny ; 
the  Vosges  and  the  Jura  cut  off  communication  with  other  grain- 
raising  sections,  and  the  foot-hills  were  more  suitable  for  vines 
than  for  wheat.  Wheat  culture  was  thus  confined  to  the  favored 
regions  of  the  province  that  contributed  regularly  to  the  supplies 
of  Lyons.  Then  too,  Lyons  was  more  dependent  upon  Bur- 
gundy than  Paris  upon  the  Upper  Marne.  Paris  could  and 
did  draw  grain  from  several  other  regions.  Lyons  could  pro- 
cure supplies  elsewhere  only  with  difficulty,  so  that  the  demand 
of  Lyons  pressed  upon  Burgundy  with  even  greater  severity 
in  years  of  dearth  than  in  years  of  plenty.  This  difference  in 
the  intensity  of  metropolitan  demand  inevitably  produced  a 
degree  of  apprehension  in  Burgundy  that  seldom,  if  ever,  existed 
in  Champagne.  The  province  was  barely  capable  of  supplying 
the  Lyonese  in  times  of  average  fertility,  in  times  of  dearth  all 
were  skeptical.  Under  such  conditions  a  policy  of  market 


332         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

• 

regulations  designed  to  keep  the  grain  in  motion  was  not  sure 
of  success.  There  was  less  grain  to  move  and  it  was  never 
possible  to  be  sure  that  enough  remained  to  support  trade  till 
the  next  harvest. 

A  sweeping  condemnation  of  the  prohibitive  policy  in  Bur- 
gundy is  unwarranted.  The  province  possessed  only  a  rela- 
tively small  surplus,  and  the  Lyoriese  demand  was  great  enough 
seriously  to  deplete  the  Burgundian  supply.  The  only  remedy 
was  the  prohibition.  The  expediency  of  the  measures  is  largely 
a  question  of  the  particular  circumstances.  The  intendants 
are  to  be  judged  only  by  the  accuracy  of  their  perception  of 
the  extent  of  the  available  supply.  A  crude,  haphazard  appli- 
cation of  prohibitions,  merely  on  account  of  popular  rumor, 
is  hardly  defensible.  But  if  the  extent  of  the  depletion  is  care- 
fully investigated,  and  the  prohibitive  measures  are  issued 
only  after  thoughtful  consideration,  it  is  fairly  evident  that  the 
intendant  was  doing  all  that  was  humanly  possible  to  meet  a 
trying  situation. 

In  the  spring  of  1693,  prohibitions  were  issued  in  Burgundy, 
much  to  the  disappointment  of  the  Lyonese.  Berulle,  the 
Intendant  at  Lyons,  was  very  much  put  out.  He  declared  that 
the  prohibitions  were  not  justified  by  conditions,  and  that  it 
was  a  device  to  enable  the  Burgundian  officials  to  make  illicit 
gains  in  the  grain  trade.  The  prohibitions  were  ostensibly 
the  outcome  of  an  investigation  made  by  the  intendant,  which 
showed  only  32,000  charges  beyond  local  needs.1 

"  If  it  were  true,"  says  Berulle,  "  that  there  were  only  32,000 
charges  left  in  Burgundy,  I  could  but  approve  of  what  they  have 
done.  But  this  memoir  is  not  accurate.  There  are  still  more 
than  300,000  charges  in  Burgundy  as  will  appear  by  the  enclosed 
memoir.  The  commissioners  sent  to  investigate  the  quantity 
of  grain  in  most  of  the  towns  were  satisfied  with  taking  the 
declarations  of  the  owners  of  the  granaries,  without  having  the 
grain  measured.  They  did  not  visit  the  villages  near  the  Saone, 
and  were  content  to  accept  the  common  reports  of  the  quan- 

1  G7.  1631.  Estat  contenant  la  quantit6  de  bleds  qui  se  sont  trouves  dans  la 
province  de  Bourgogne  au  mois  de  Mars. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE    333 

titles  there.  The  subdelegues,  who  are  all  engaged  in  the  grain 
trade,  have  concealed  the  truth  from  M.  d'Argouges,  in  order 
to  oblige  the  merchants  who  had  large  stores  to., sell  to  them 
at  low  figures."  1  Berulle  enclosed  an  estimate  prepared  by 
"  a  rich  merchant  of  Burgundy."  2  The  accusations  against 
Burgundian  officials  are  even  more  sweeping  in  a  letter,  written 
in  June.  He  then  tells  the  Controleur  General  that  the  Sindics 
of  Burgundy  have  imposed  upon  him  by  their  false  reports 
that  there  were  only  32,000  charges  of  grain  in  the  province. 
"  They  are  all  engaged  in  the  grain  trade,  as  well  as  most  of  the 
Councillors  of  the  Parlement  of  Dijon.  They  have  even  bought 
standing  grain  by  giving  earnest  money.  I  have  just  been  told 
that  the  Sindic  of  Bugey,  Sr.  de  Blame,  a  man  of  whom  many 
complain,  was  the  real  author  of  the  tumult  at  Louhans.  It 
was  stirred  up  by  him  to  prevent  the  Lyonese  merchants  from 
shipping-  theii^  grain,  so  that  he  could  buy  it  cheap.  That  is 
the  way  it  is  done  in  Burgundy."  3 

On  the  whole,  there  would  seem  to  be  some  foundation  in 
Berulle's  contention  that  the  Burgundians  under-estimated  the 
available  supply,  but  the  course  of  events  indicated  that  he  had 
over-estimated  the  supply  considerably.  He  acted  on  the  assump- 
tion that  there  was  plenty  of  grain  in  Burgundy,  and  issued  many 
certificates  to  merchants.  Cherishing  the  hope  that  the  Con- 
troleur General  would  be  brought  round  to  his  point  of  view, 
he  neglected  to  make  any  great  efforts  to  obtain  supplies  from 
the  south. 

These  certificates  did  not  give  the  Lyonese  merchants  the 
right  to  export  from  Burgundy,  but  they  were  an  assurance 
that  those  merchants,  would  be  given  the  benefit  of  any  permits 
that  should  be  issued.  Feeling  confident  that  they  would  get 
the  grain  out  in  some  way,  these  merchants  bought  extensively 
in  Burgundy.  They  proceeded  to  accumulate  large  hoards, 
"  and  rendered  themselves  the  masters  of  all  that  remained  in 
the  country."  "  These  monopolists,"  says  Le  Noble,  "  together 

1  G7.     1631.    Lyon,  14  Mai  1693.    Be"rulle. 

*  Ibid.     See  besides  the  memoire,  the  letter  of  30  Mai  1693. 

8  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  I,  325,  1199. 


334         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

with  the  Lyonese  bakers  are  the  cause  of  all  the  disorders  which 
have  occurred.  Having  a  common  understanding,  the  grain 
which  is  permitted  to  be  exported  is  sent  down  only  when  the 
need  is  most  pressing,  so  that  the  highest  prices  are  realized."  l 

The  high  prices  and  the  panic,  which  were  the  outcome  of 
these  practices,  made  it  very  difficult  to  ship  grain  from  Burgundy. 
As  the  "  munitionnaires  "  enjoyed  special  privileges,  contracts 
were  made  with  them.  But  they  were  hindered  both  by  the 
officials  and  the  people.  In  June,  a  shipment  was  seized  by 
the  subdelegues.2  In  July,  the  boats  were  stopped  at  Chalons.3 
In  August,  grain  boats  were  stopped  at  Macon  and  at  Tournus.4 
This,  too,  is  but  a  slight  indication  of  the  violence. 

At  the  end  of  the  month,  the  officials  at  Seurre  write  to  Dijon 
"  to  find  out  what  it  is  best  to  do  in  their  extremity." 5  An  agent 
of  the  municipality  of  Dijon  writes:  "I  come  from  Bassigny 
where  the  dearness  of  grain  frightened  me.  At  Langres,  where 
I  am  at  present,  I  do  not  dare  to  make  offers  to  buy  grain.  There 
are  more  buyers  than  there  is  grain,  and  I  assure  you  that  if 
it  were  worth  twenty  ecus  per  mine,  and  people  dared  to  ship, 
I  scarcely  know  where  I  could  go  to  buy.  ...  In  these 
parts  every  one  trembles  for  the  future,  and  resolutions  are 
formed  to  let  no  grain  leave  the  province  until  every  one  is 
supplied."6 

Lyons  was  also  in  distress.  In  the  middle  of  August,  the  last 
100  sacks  in  the  granaries  of  the  Abondance  were  distributed, 
and  1500  charges  were  taken  from  the  royal  quartermaster 
at  Lyons,  despite  his  protests.7 

Inasmuch  as  every  one  was  suffering  to  a  considerable  extent, 
each  endeavored  to  shift  all  the  blame  to  the  other's  shoulders. 

1  G7.     1631.     Auxonne,  3  Mai  1693.     Le  Noble  au  C.  G. 

2  G7.     1631.     Lyon,  18  Juin  1693.     Berulle,  notes  letter  of  15  Juin. 

3  G7.     1631.     Chalons-sur-Saone,  14  Juillet  1693.     Le  Noble. 

.  4  G7.     1631.    Lyon,  5  Aout  1693.     Berulle.     17  Aout  1693.     Berulle.     (Other 
cases  passim.} 

6  Dijon,  Arch.  Mun.,  G.  256.     Seurre,  28  Aout  1693.    Maire  et  fichevins  de 
Seurre. 

8  Ibid.,  G.  266.    Langres,  30  Aout  1693.    Mosseur. 

7  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  I,  330,  1216.     18  Aout  1693. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE    335 

The  Controleur  General,  however,  was  not  inclined  to  conceal 
his  opinion  that  the  main  trouble  lay  in  the  conduct  of  Berulle, 
the  Intendant  at  Lyons,  and  in  the  activity  of  the  municipality. 

"  The  whole  trouble,"  he  writes,  "  comes  from  the  obstinate 
perseverance  with  which  Berulle  and  the  Consulate  have  en- 
deavored to  draw  grain  from  Burgundy,  neglecting  to  procure 
supplies  in  Provence,  despite  the  orders  that  I  gave  them  from 
the  King.  Both  are  worthy  of  blame,  with  this  difference, 
that  the  former  is  at  fault  by  reason  of  his  rash  confidence  in 
the  promises  of  Le  Noble,  and  in  his  hope  of  an  abundant  har- 
vest in  Burgundy.  In  addition  to  this,  some  of  the  Consuls 
have  shown  an  extraordinary  desire  to  make  themselves  masters 
of  the  purchases  of  grain  needed  for  the  sustenance  of  the  town. 
They  continue  to  manifest  the  desire  in  regard  to  the  purchases 
in  Provence. 

"  Throughout  the  late  spring  I  received  complaints  from 
Burgundy  almost  daily,  mostly  from  d'Argouges,  who  declared 
again  and  again  that  Burgundy  was  being  exhausted  by  the 
Lyonese  merchants.  This  obliged  me  to  write  to  Lyons,  order- 
ing them  to  cease  to  buy  in  Burgundy  and  to  go  to  Provence. 
By  my  express  orders,  M.  Le  Noble  (the  munitionnaire)  was 
charged  with  furnishing  Lyons  with  the  small  quantities  of 
Burgundian  grain  that  would  be  needed  until  the  grain  arrived 
from  Provence.  If  sufficient  pains  had  been  taken  at  that  time 
to  secure  grain  in  Provence,  only  eight  or  ten  thousand  anees 
would  have  been  needed  from  Burgundy,  and  these  Le  Noble 
was  to  furnish.  But  the  officials  at  Lyons  neglected  to  make 
purchases  in  Provence,  and  subjected  themselves  to  the  necessity 
of  continuing  to  depend  on  Burgundy;  to  cover  this  second 
mistake,  a  third  was  made,  in  contracting  with  Le  Noble  to 
procure  in  Burgundy  such  grain  as  they  might  need."  l 

The  crisis  was  so  severe  at  Lyons  and  delays  in  the  south  were 
so  considerable  that  the  grain  already  purchased  in  Burgundy 
had  to  be  shipped  to  assist  the  town.  The  boats  stopped  at 

1  G7.  1631.  Lyon,  30  Aout  1693.  Canaples  a  Barbezieux,  Copie  avec  apostilles 
faits  par  le  C.  G.  The  authorship  of  the  marginal  notes  is  placed  beyond  doubt  by 
a  letter  of  Canaples,  Lyon,  22  Sept.  1693. 


336         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

Chalons,  Macon,  and  Tournus  were  released,  and  some  small 
lots  allowed  to  pass  on  new  permits.1 

But  there  is  almost  no  note  of  any  shipments  from  Burgundy 
after  November,  1693.  Until  the  following  harvest,  Lyons  was 
obliged  to  seek  sustenance  elsewhere.  The  qualified  prohibitions 
in  March,  1693,  thus  seem  to  have  been  justified  whether  the 
inquiry  of  d'Argouges  was  accurate  or  not.  Berulle's  insistence 
upon  the  possibility  of  considerable  exports  from  Burgundy 
did  nothing  but  increase  the  distress  and  violence. 

After  the  harvest  of  1694,  trade  began  again,  though  the 
intendants  kept  it  under  close  supervision.  Ferrand  had  issued 
a  prohibition  in  August.2  The  authorities  at  Lyons  protested, 
and,  at  the  command  of  the  Controleur  General,  negotiations 
between  the  intendants  began.3  Ferrand  agreed  to  allow  the 
shipment  of  a  limited  quantity,  but  did  not  feel  sure  of  the 
exact  amount.  He  was  certain,  however,  that  it  would  be 
unwise  to  allow  the  merchants  liberty  to  buy  as  they  chose. 
"  To  avoid  the  export  of  a  larger  quantity  than  is  permitted, 
d'Herbigny  should  choose  those  whom  he  desires  to  charge  with 
the  undertaking.  A  list  should  be  sent  to  Ferrand,  and  each 
week  these  persons  should  submit  a  statement  of  their  purchases."4 

This  was  the  more  ordinary  state  of  affairs,  for  the  lack  of 
concert  between  the  intendants  in  1693  was  unusual.  This 
is  the  outcome  of  the  conflict  of  interests.  The  intendant 
in  Burgundy  is  in  favor  of  a  relatively  complete  prohibition. 
The  officials  at  Lyons  insist  upon  having  the  right  to  make 
some  shipments  from  Burgundy.  The  intendant  in  Burgundy 
recognizes  the  necessity  of  some  concessions  and  proceeds  to 
negotiate  in  regard  to  the  amount.  Licenses  are  then  issued 
through  the  Lyonese  officials  to  the  merchants. 

1  G7.     1631.    Lyon,  i  Sept.  1693.     Berulle,  Lyon,  4-5  Sept.  1693.     Canaples, 
passim.    G7.     1631.     6  Sept.  1693.     G7.     1630.     Buxy,  7  Sept.  1693,  d'Argouges, 
etc. 

2  Boislisle,  op.  cit.,  I,  374,  1360.     16  Aout  1694. 

3  G7.     1633.    Lyon,  8  Sept.  1694.     Berulle,  enclosed  letter  of  Ferrand  to  him. 

4  G7.     1634.     Dijon,  27  Nov.  1694.     Ferrand. 

G7.  1633.  Me"  moire  sur  les  Bleds  necessaires  pour  la  ville  de  Lyon.  (Envoy6 
avec  la  lettre  de  M.  d'Herbigny.  23  Nov.  1694.) 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE    337 

This  system  is  somewhat  less  crude  than  the  sixteenth  century 
system.  The  latter  was  more  or  less  haphazard.  There  was 
little  feeling  of  community  of  interest  between  the  divers  groups 
of  local  officials.  The  intendants  were  less  attached  to  their 
locality,  and  were  always  controlled  to  some  extent  by  the 
Controleur  General  at  Paris.  Everything  rendered  negotiation 
easier  in  the  seventeenth  century,  and  there  was  a  conscious 
effort  to  discover  the  real  extent  of  the  exportable  surplus. 

Soon  after  the  harvest  of  1698,  Ferrand,  the  Intendant  in 
Burgundy,  found  it  advisable  to  prohibit  the  export  of  grain. 
The  Controleur  General  took  the  special  precaution  of  writing 
to  the  Consuls  of  Lyons,  instructing  them  to  place  little  reliance 
upon  Burgundy.  Ferrand  sent  word  that  he  could  permit 
the  export  of  only  9,500  anees,  a  quantity  that  was  considered 
to  be  sufficient  to  enable  Lyons  to  wait  for  aid  from  Languedoc, 
Provence,  and  foreign  countries.  The  licenses  for  this  grain 
were  divided  between  the  Abondance  and  the  merchants.1 
These  shipments  were  all  to  be  discharged  at  Lyons  before 
Christmas. 

In  January,  d'Herbigny  was  begging  Ferrand  to  restore 
complete  freedom  of  trade  between  Lyons  and  Beaujolais, 
Maconnais,  and  Brionnais.  Ferrand  was  not  at  all  disposed 
to  accede  to  the  request.  "  Grain  is  cheaper  in  every  part  of 
the  department  of  M.  d'Herbigny  than  it  is  in  Burgundy," 
he  writes  to  the  Controleur  General.  "If  we  have  any  grain, 
it  is  much  better  for  us  to  keep  it  to  assist  you  in  case  of  need 
(i.  e.  for  the  army),  than  to  send  it  to  a  province  where  it  is 
desired  merely  to  create  greater  abundance  and  to  decrease 
the  price  of  grain,  but  where  prices  are  continually  lower  than 
in  Burgundy."  2  Later  in  the  month,  prices  fell  notably  at 
Lyons,  and  the  Abondance  discontinued  its  purchases  in  Bur- 
gundy.3 From  this  time,  we  hear  little  of  Burgundy  till  July. 

1  G7.    358.    Lyon,  25  Juillet  1699.     Relation  tres  sincere  a  M.  le  Mare"chal  de 
Villeroy  de  la  conduite  des  Prevot  des  Marchands  et  fichevins  de  Lyon  et  des 
Directeurs  de  1'Abondance. 

2  G7.     159.     Dijon,  5  Jan.  1699.     Ferrand.     The  statement  about  comparative 
prices  is  questionable,  though  it  is  quite  possible  that  prices  in  parts  of  Burgundy 
should  be  higher  than  at  Lyons. 

3  G7.     358.    Lyon,  18  Jan.  1699.     d'Herbigny. 


THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

Then,  there  were  many  demands  for  freedom  of  trade  between 
Burgundy  and  Lyons.  This  was  readily  explained  by  Ferrand. 
"It  is  because  I  have  been  very  careful  to  give  no  permits 
except  in  concert  with  d'Herbigny.  The  merchants  of  Burgundy 
see  themselves  on  the  eve  of  the  harvest  and  apprehend  a  con- 
siderable loss  from  the  decline  in  price  that  will  follow  the  harvest. 
Some  have  shipped  to  Lyons  without  licenses,  through  the  con- 
nivance of  the  farmers  of  the  octrois.  I  stopped  this  abuse 
by  new  orders.  It  will,  of  course,  be  necessary  to  remove  the 
prohibition  after  the  harvest,  but  storms  may  injure  the  crops, 
and,  as  Lyons  is  in  no  need,  it  is  well  not  to  take  any  steps  until 
the  harvest  is  assured."  l 

The  presence  of  this  supply  available  for  exportation  just 
before  the  harvest  may  well  be  cited  as  an  indication  that  exports 
to  Lyons  might  have  been  more  freely  permitted.  It  is  indeed 
a  case  that  illustrates  the  crudity  of  the  device,  but  we  must 
remember  that  there  was  literally  no  means  of  knowing  how 
much  these  merchants  had  secreted,  just  as  there  was  never 
any  evidence  to  show  that  they  really  possessed  a  considerable 
quantity.  Relatively  small  amounts  might  easily  give  rise 
to  a  rather  marked  demand  for  licenses.  This  ignorance  of  the 
available  supply  was  the  most  dangerous  feature  of  conditions 
in  Burgundy,  and  that  alone  would  justify  prohibitions  at  such 
a  time. 

The  years  1708-09  present  no  new  phases  of  grain  trade 
policy,  so  that  a  detailed  treatment  may  be  omitted. 

The  history  of  the  dearths  in  Burgundy,  then,  points  rather 
strongly  to  the  conclusion  that  prohibitions  were  necessary 
to  assure  the  satisfaction  of  the  needs  of  the  province.  In  1693, 
when  the  evidences  of  dearth  were  not  taken  seriously  at  Lyons, 
the  substantial  accuracy  of  the  judgment  of  local  officials  in 
Burgundy  was  abundantly  confirmed  by  subsequent  events. 
Despite  all  the  confidence  of  Berulle,  Lyons  was  not  able  to 
secure  any  great  quantity  of  grain  in  Burgundy  during  the  late 
season.  Supplies  had  to  be  procured  hurriedly  in  the  south, 

1  Boislisle,  op.  tit.,  I,  535,  1894.  20  Juillet  1699.  On  the  23d,  freedom  of 
export  was  granted. 


REGULATION  OF  TEE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE    339 

and  the  inevitable  delays  reduced  Lyons  to  sore  straits.  In 
1698,  and  in  1709,  the  intendants  limited  exports  from  Burgundy. 
Lyons  sought  provisions  in  the  south,  and  little  difficulty  was 
experienced  in  the  north.  The  expediency  of  the  prohibitions 
in  Burgundy  can  hardly  be  doubted.  They  were  the  only  means 
of  forcing  the  Lyonese  to  enlarge  the  area  of  their  supply  market. 

Languedoc 

Most  of  the  features  of  the  policy  characteristic  of  Languedoc 
have  appeared,  either  in  the  discussion  of  Colbert's  relations 
with  Daguesseau,  or  in  connection  with  the  study  of  the  exhaus- 
tion produced  by  uncontrolled  trade.  The  policy  in  regard 
to  the  exports  of  grain  to  maritime  ports  is  not  notably  different 
under  Baville.  In  1709,  however,  the  severity  of  the  dearth 
obliged  Baville  to  undertake  the  general  direction  of  the  internal 
trade  of  the  province.  In  August  and  September,  1708,  he 
found  it  necessary  to  send  away  the  Italians  who  had  come  to 
buy  at  Narbonne,  and  other  coast  ports.  Then  the  demands 
of  Lyons  and  Provence  must  needs  be  satisfied.  After  much 
effort,  the  Lyonese  were  driven  out  of  the  districts  along  the 
Rhone,  and  forced  to  go  to  Narbonne.  The  supplies  of  the 
province  were  next  attacked  in  the  Upper  Garonne,  by  a  move- 
ment down  towards  Bordeaux.  This  was  limited  like  the  trade 
with  Lyons  and  Provence  to  a  trade  with  licenses.  By  March 
and  April,  1709,  the  distress  in  Lower  Languedoc  was  extreme. 
All  the  markets  were  disorganized  and  the  regular  circulation 
of  trade  completely  suspended.  Baville  was  obliged  to  take 
measures  to  assist  the  larger  towns,  opening  granaries  in  the 
dioceses  of  Toulouse,  Lavaur,  and  Alby,  to  supply  the  most 
pressing  wants  in  Lower  Languedoc.  Besides  this,  he  issued 
divers  market  ordinances,  though  he  did  not  adopt  anything 
like  Delamare's  policy.  His  treatment  of  conditions  in  Langue- 
doc was  indeed  the  exact  antithesis  of  Delamare's.  The  latter 
endeavored  to  restore  the  normal  conditions  of  a  trade  passing 
properly  through  the  markets.  Baville  went  to  the  other 
extreme,  practically  running  the  trade  himself.  His  personal 
control  went  to  the  length  of  procuring  grain  from  the  Levant, 


340         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

partly  on  the  security  of  the  province,  partly  on  the  security 
of  divers  towns.1 

Lebret,  in  1693,  plays  a  different  part  in  the  trade.  The 
Lyonese  merchants  were  buying  freely  around  Aries  and  Taras- 
con,  and  the  needs  of  Lyons  were  so  pressing  that  he  perceived 
the  necessity  of  permitting  these  purchases.  But  at  the  same 
time,  he  proposed  to  stimulate  imports  of  Barbary  grain,  and 
with  that  in  view  he  secured  control  of  a  quantity  of  grain 
which  he  proposed  to  place  on  the  markets  in  such  way  that 
both  ends  should  be  gained.2  Thus,  in  one  way  or  another, 
the  intendants  supplied  the  defects  of  the  imperfect  market 
organization.  Here,  helping  to  determine  the  quantity  that 
was  really  available  for  export,  there  distributing  grain  when 
the  markets  had  broken  down,  in  a  third  place,  trying  vainly 
to  make  the  towns  realize  the  meaning  and  significance  of  a 
steady  flow  of  trade. 

Brittany 

In  Brittany,  licenses  were  used  extensively  to  authorize 
domestic  trade  at  times  when  foreign  export  was  prohibited. 
The  regularity  of  trade  had  reduced  the  granting  of  licenses 
to  a  system.  The  merchants  of  Quimper,  Concarneau,  and 
other  towns  sent  the  intendant  a  statement  of  their  projected 
shipments  immediately  after  the  harvest.  He  then  secured 
royal  licenses  for  carrying  these  amounts  to  the  domestic  ports 
indicated  by  the  merchants.3  Even  Nantes  could  draw  supplies 
from  Lower  Brittany  only  upon  royal  licenses,  and  the  corre- 
spondence of  the  years  of  dearth  is  filled  with  the  details  of 
the  administration  of  this  license  system.  When  other  towns 
were  dependent  upon  coastwise  grain  trade,  they,  too,  were 
obliged  to  secure  licenses  to  permit  shipment.4 

1  This  whole  episode  will  be  found  in  part  I,  ch.  IV. 

2  See  part  I,  ch.  IV. 

3  G7.     181.    Hennebont,  22  Sept.  1699.     Dutel,  Commis.  du  Roy. 

4  G7.     181.     Rennes,  4  Oct.   1699.     De  Nointel.    Letter  enclosing  a  list  of 
licenses  needed  by  Nantes  and  Saint-Malo. 

G7.     181.    Saint-Malo,  7  Nov.  1699.     Sainte-Marie. 

G7.     181.    Nantes  (28  Nov.  1699,  date  of  receipt).     De  Mianne. 

G7.     181.     ii  Dec.  1699.     De  Nointel.     Says  he  has  delivered  the  licenses; 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE    341 

In  1709,  to  expedite  matters,  it  was  arranged  that  "  Ferrand 
should  issue  permits  upon  the  presentation  of  certificates  from 
the  Provost  of  Merchants  of  Paris.  When  supplies  for  the  army 
were  needed,  Ferrand  should  be  given  notice  of  the  quantity 
necessary."1  In  the  course  of  a  year  or  so,  the  care  taken  at 
first  was  no  longer  used.  Ferrand  began,  after  a  while,  "  to 
charge  his  subdelegues  with  the  issue  of  the  necessary  permits." 
Then  these  subdelegues  began  to  commission  their  inferiors  for 
the  same  duty,  "  so  that  there  was  a  great  opportunity  for  abuses 
in  the  granting  of  licenses."  2 

Furthermore,  general  permissions  that  were  issued  at  Paris 
were  not  always  promptly  received  and  enforced.  Not  infre- 
quently the  merchants  learned  of  the  ordinance  through  their 
correspondents,  so  that  we  have  the  curious  situation  described 
in  a  letter  of  May  5,  1702:  "  I  take  the  liberty  to  address  Your 
Excellency  apropos  of  the  loading  of  certain  barques  and  other 
vessels  with  barley  and  wheat.  The  masters  demand  sailing 
papers  to  carry  this  grain  to  Spain  and  Portugal,  on  the  strength 
of  an  Order  in  Council  of  March  28  which  permits  export. 
In  this  jurisdiction  (admiralty  of  Nantes)  we  have  heard  nothing 
of  such  an  Order,  and  as  there  are  several  orders  prohibiting 
export,  I  have  thought  it  wise  to  write  to  you."  3  The  order 
of  March  28  had  been  sent  to  Brittany,  but  for  some  inexplicable 
reason,  it  had  not  been  sent  around.  It  was  finally  published 
in  the  middle  of  May,  too  late  to  be  of  any  value  to  the  mer- 
chants.4 

similar  details  for  the  year  1701  will  be  found  in  the  letters  G7.  182.  Rennes,  27 
Avril  1701,  and  many  other  letters. 

1  G7.  1641.  3  Oct.  1709.  Deliberation  d'une  assemblee  tenue  chez  M. 
Daguesseau.  See  also  G7.  1642.  Saint-Malo,  17  Oct.  1710.  Ferrand,  with 
enclosed  memoir  of  licenses  granted. 

*  G7.  1642.  17  Nov.  1710.  Clairambault.  See  also  G7.  1642.  6  Nov. 
1710.  Laurencin,  Marchand  a  Nantes  a  M.  Ferrand.  Speaks  of  clandestine 
export  to  Spain.  G7.  1642.  Rennes,  3  Dec.  1710.  Ferrand  acknowledges 
receipt  of  letter  apropos  of  the  abuses  mentioned  by  Clairambault.  Says  that  he 
has  reprimanded  the  two  subdelegues. 

3  G7.     182.     Nantes,  5  May  1702.     Dangy,  Lieu,  de  la  Marine  a  Nantes. 

4  G7.     182.     Paris,  ii  Mai  1702.    de  Messureaume.     G7.     182.    Nantes,   16 
Mai  1702.     Dangy. 


342  THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

Orleans 

It  is  extremely  difficult  to  give  any  definite  conception  of 
the  policy  followed  at  Orleans,  because  there  is  so  little  positive 
action  and  so  much  discussion  and  negotiation.  But  the  position 
of  the  town  brings  out  strongly  one  feature  of  the  seventeenth 
century  trade,  and  the  conduct  of  the  officials  illustrates  the 
gradual  break-down  of  the  old  ideas  and  the  development  of 
new  commercial  usages. 

The  custom  among  the  Marne  Valley  merchants  of  bringing 
their  grain  down  to  a  point  near  Paris  and  then  storing  the  grain 
to  wait  for  a  good  market  had  produced  among  the  Parisian 
officials  a  strong  determination  to  enforce  the  old  regulation 
requiring  the  immediate  and  continuous  shipment  of  all.  grain 
from  the  point  of  purchase  to  the  ultimate  destination.  A 
regulation  of  this  sort  was,  of  course,  calculated  to  preserve  the 
independence  of  trades  supplying  different  towns  from  the  same 
source  of  supply.  In  the  Marne  Valley,  this  was  of  little  con- 
sequence, as  there  was  no  large  town  between  the  shipping 
points  and  Paris.  In  the  Loire  Valley,  it  was  quite  another 
matter.  The  slight  surplus  of  Auvergne,  coming  down  the  river, 
might  either  stop  at  Orleans  or  continue  to  Paris.  Grain  coming 
up  from  Saumur  or  Nantes  could  likewise  be  applied  to  supply 
the  demand  of  either  Orleans  or  Paris.  The  rigorous  enforce- 
ment of  the  provision  requiring  continuous  shipment  made  it 
necessary  to  decide  upon  the  final  destination  before  the  grain 
was  shipped.  This,  of  course,  prevented  any  very  exact  ad-» 
justment  to  the  conditions  at  Orleans  or  Paris,  especially  as 
there  was  an  additional  factor  in  the  more  energetic  punishment 
of  violence  done  to  shipments  destined  for  Paris.1  If  strict 
law  were  followed,  the  trade  supplying  Orleans  must  have  been 
entirely  distinct  from  the  trade  supplying  Paris.  The  Parisian 
grain  passed  through  Orleans,  but  only  physically,  without  influ- 
encing the  market,  and  was  technically  incapable  of  being  applied 
to  the  satisfaction  of  the  demand  of  Orleans.  This  limitation 
of  the  movements  of  grain  was  favorable  to  Paris,  but  prejudicial 

1  G7.     1632.    Orleans,  20  Dec.  1693.    De  Creil. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE    343 

to  intermediate  points,  and  in  this  respect,  the  Parisian  officials 
stood  in  the  way  of  that  fusion  of  the  entire  wholesale  trade 
which  would  be  the  final  result  of  the  completed  wholesale 
market  system.  The  persistent  protest  of  Orleans  against 
this  rigid  specialization  of  lines  of  trade  is  thus  one  of  the  forces 
tending  to  break  down  the  old  medieval  system  and  to  sub- 
stitute for  it  the  more  highly  organized  market  system,  which 
seeks  to  meet  the  needs  not  only  of  a  tyrannical  metropolitan 
demand  but  also  the  local  demands  of  all  parts  of  the  area. 
In  the  upper  Seine  Basin,  no  town  was  large  enough  to  protest 
with  effect,  and  ordinarily  there  was  no  need.  Orleans,  however, 
was  naturally  an  entrepot  of  the  Loire  Valley  trade,  and  its 
own  needs  were  such  that  it  was  quite  essential  that  the  whole 
trade  of  Loire  should  pass  through  the  market  at  Orleans. 
The  separation  of  Parisian  trade  from  that  of  Orleans* could  not 
be  maintained. 

Some  of  these  aspects  of  the  relation  between  Orleans  and 
Paris  appear  in  1662,  in  the  letters  of  Brachet,  the  Maire  of 
Orleans.1  But  the  significance  of  the  case  can  be  perceived 
only  by  reading  between  the  lines.  In  1694,  the  situation  is  more 
completely  revealed  by  the  letters  of  Bouville,  the  Intendant. 
"  The  whole  country  between  La  Charite  and  Chateauneuf 
will  suffer  severely,  because  no  grain  leaves  Berry  or  Bour- 
bonnais,  and  of  that  coming  up  the  river  none  passes  Orleans 
except  for  Paris.  There  is  also  great  dearth  towards  Montargis 
and  around  Blois  and  Beaugency,  as  I  do  my  best  to  prevent 
them  from  stopping  boats.  However,  sir,  as  most  of  the  mer- 
chants of  Orleans  have  marked  Paris  as  the  destination  of  their 
grain,  it  is  certain  that  Orleans  will  be  without  grain  in  a  short 
time,  if  we  are  obliged  to  allow  all  grain  to  pass  that  is  billed 
for  Paris  in  the  Lettres  de  Voiture.  All  the  rural  districts  will 
suffer,  as  they  draw  their  provisions  from  the  large  towns."  2 
Later  he  writes:  "  I  beg  you  not  to  compel  the  merchants  to 
carry  their  grain  to  Paris;  I  am  persuaded  that  this  liberty 

1  Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Colb.,  108,  246,  380,  382,  464,  475,  543,  557,  653,  745- 

2  G7.     1635.    Orleans,  17  Avril  1694.    Bonyille;   La  Charite,  27  Avril  1694. 
Bouville. 


344         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

will  procure  aid  for  us  here,  and  that  more  will  even  be  shipped 
to  Paris  than  the  quantity  promised  by  the  merchants.  Once 
the  Loire  towns  are  supplied  the  people  will  not  be  inclined  to 
interfere  with  the  passage  of  boats.  I  am  acting  in  concert 
with  the  merchants  here,  and  if  Miromenil  does  as  much  at 
Tours,  I  hope  that  all  the  Loire  towns  will  be  supplied  and  that 
the  rural  districts  will  feel  the  benefit.  Paris  will  also  find  much 
assistance,  for,  besides  the  grain  that  passes  daily  on  the  Canal, 
all  the  grain  that  comes  into  the  country  towns  in  the  Beauce 
will  go  to  Montlhery,  and  then  to  Paris.  Everything  depends 
upon  freedom  of  trade."  l 

In  1699  and  1709,  there  was  little  real  trouble  at  Orleans. 
The  harvests  had  been  fairly  abundant  and  the  town  served  as 
an  entrepot.  So  far  as  there  was  any  apprehension,  it  was  more 
like  what,  we  find  in  any  producing  region.  In  this  case,  the 
fear  was  of  excessive  shipments  from  the  Beauce,  where  much 
of  the  town's  supply  was  procured. 

In  general,  two  distinct  types  of  policy  appear  in  these  clos- 
ing years  of  the  seventeenth  century.  The  new  constructive 
market  regulations  of  the  Chatelet  in  the  Seine  Basin,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  development  of  the  old  sixteenth  century 
policy  in  the  hands  of  the  intendants  in  the  other  parts  of 
•France.  The  policy  of  the  Chatelet  was  not  without  its  tra- 
ditional basis,  but  novel  results  were  obtained.  A  well-organized 
wholesale  market  was  created  at  Bray  and  at  Vitry;  the  trade 
was  kept  moving ;  and  this  idea  of  continuous  circulation  through 
the  markets  was  definitely  adopted  as  the  basis  of  future  regula- 
tion of  the  Parisian  trade. 

The  trade  in  other  sections  of  France  was  less  highly  organ- 
ized. The  local  markets  still  played'  so  large  a  part  in  the  distri- 
bution of  grain  that  the  policy  adopted  by  the  Chatelet  would 
have  been  impossible.  In  Burgundy,  in  Languedoc,  and  in 
Provence  the  local  markets  were  still  the  basis  of  trade,  and 
in  every  crisis  this  market  machinery  proved  inadequate.  The 

1  Boislisle,  op.  «/.,  I,  360,  1309.  18  et  23  Avril  1694.  Bouville.  See  also  G7. 
1635.  Orleans,  27  et  28  Avril  1694.  Bouville. 


REGULATION  OF  THE  DOMESTIC  GRAIN  TRADE     345 

old  relief  measures  of  the  sixteenth  century  were  applied,  but 
with  more  care,  a  better  knowledge  of  conditions,  and  a  more 
accurate  perception  of  the  character  of  the  problem.  In  1698 
and  1709  the  regulations  of  the  intendants  in  Burgundy  and 
Languedoc  were  on  the  whole  distinctly  successful.  These  regu- 
lations may  have  been  a  poor  substitute  for  improved  market 
organization,  but  in  the  absence  of  the  metropolitan  market, 
these  inferior  substitutes  were  necessary. 


CHAPTER  V 

CONCLUSION 
Political  Theory  and  the  Administrators 

THROUGHOUT  our  period,  grain  trade  policies  fall  into  two  dis- 
tinct types.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Crown  insists  on  the  essential 
harmony  of  interest  between  different  parts  of  the  kingdom; 
on  the  other,  the  local  officials  are  ever  harrassed  by  the  imperfect 
adjustment  of  inter-provincial  interests.  The  Crown  declares, 
in  edict  after  edict,  that  "  France  is  more  fertile  than  any  other 
kingdom  in  Christendom,  that  a  dispensation  of  kind  providence 
has  granted  to  one  province  what  its  neighbor  lacks,  so  that  by 
mutual  succor  the  wants  of  all  are  supplied. "  The  correspon- 
dence of  local  authorities,  however,  instead  of  depicting  this 
harmonious  exchange  of  the  blessings  of  Heaven,  reveals  a  bitter 
strife,  accompanied  by  mutual  recrimination,  abuse,  and  violence. 
The  Crown  endeavors  to  bring  home  to  its  recalcitrant  subjects 
the  ideal  of  interdependence. 

\\11  royal  measures  were  designed  to  bring  about  the  ideal 
social  state  that  hovered  before  the  eyes  of  sixteenth  century 
statesmen  as  the  goal  of  human  endeavor.  No  province  should 
be  utilized  for  the  relief  of  some  other  kingdom  until  the  needs 
of  France  had  been  supplied.  No  province  should  be  allowed 
to  impose  any  obstacles  to  complete  freedom  of  trade  between 
different  parts  of  the  kingdom.  No  unpatriotic  merchants 
should  be  allowed  to  increase  their  private  fortune  at  the  expense 
of  the  commonweal,  by  selling  grain  to  foreigners  when  dearth 
was  possible. 

The  local  officials  were  not  concerned  with  ideals,  with  the 
growth  of  nationalism,  or  with  any  large  conceptions  of  social 
interdependence.  They  saw  only  a  discordant  conflict  of  man 
with  man,  of  town  with  town,  of  province  with  province.  The 
one  motive  apparent  to  them  was  self-interest,  a  determined, 

346 


CONCLUSION  347 

rapacious  effort  on  the  part  of  each  man,  or  each  group,  to  secure 
the  complete  satisfaction,  of  its  wants  without  reference  to  the 
needs  of  others.  The  large  towns  sought  grain  in  the  provinces, 
and  carried  off  great  quantities,  usually  regardless  of  the  needs 
of  the  locality.  The  peasantry  plundered  grain  boats  destined 
for  the  large  towns,  assaulted  and  abused  local  merchants. 
The  merchants  sought  their  own  ends  without  consideration 
for  town  or  country.  The  country  people  suffered  at  times 
from  depletion  of  local  supply,  but  as  long  as  there  was  no  actual 
violence  the  merchant  gave  their  situation  no  thought.  Paris 
or  Lyons  might  be  reduced  to  intense  distress,  but  the  merchant 
would  delay  his  grain  boats  another  day  or  another  week,  if 
he  could  secure  an  additional  sou  per  bichet. 

But  the  theoretical  and  practical  points  of  view  were  not  in 
antagonism.  While  the  Crown  and  such  writers  as  Laffemas  and 
Montchretien  were  developing  trie  idea  of  the  state  as  a  social 
organism,  the  administrators  were  actually  organizing  the  ill- 
coordinated  feudal  monarchy  into  the  firmly-knit  national  state. 

The  earliest  expression  of  the  idea  of  this  new  nationalism 
is  the  preface  of  an  edict  of  Henry  II.  It  possesses  more  dis- 
tinction of  style  than  most  of  the  effusions  of  the  chancellries 
of  the  sixteenth  century,  but  the  constructions  are  still  labored 
and  awkward.  This  edict  of  February  14, 1557  granted  complete 
freedom  of  trade  in  all  commodities  except  grain,  —  a  change 
of  policy  that  was  considered  to  be  so  great  a  departure  from 
ordinary  custom  that  some  explanation  was  deemed  necessary. 
The  preface,  accordingly,  proceeds  to  an  elaborate  defence  of 
free  trade.1 

"  It  has  always  been  known  by  common  experience  that  the 
principal  means  of  making  the  people  of  a  kingdom,  country,  or 

1  There  are  occasional  expressions  of  similar  sentiments  in  the  provinces, 
notably  a  passage  from  the  papers  of  the  Estates  of  Languedoc.  A  resolution  of 
14-25  Sept.  1501  reads:  "  Que  pour  prevenir  la  famine,  requete  soit  fait  aux 
Commissaires  du  Roy,  afin  qu'ils  empeschent  plusieurs  seigneurs,  nobles,  et  mar- 
chands  d'amasser  les  bleds,  et  de  les  vendre  hors  du  pays,  attendu  que  les  trois 
senechaussees  sont  tout  un  carps  mystique,  que  1'une  pourra  bailler  ses  bleds  a  1'autre 
pourveu  que  les  bleds  soient  portes  par  terre."  Invent.  Som.  des  Arch.  Dept., 
Haute  Garonne,  Serie  C,  vol.  II,  p.  2. 


348         TEE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

province,  well-to-do,  rich,  and  opulent,  is  freedom  in  the  trade 
and  commerce  in  which  they  are  engaged  with  their  neighbors. 
They  sell,  barter,  and  exchange  the  goods,  merchandise,  and 
commodities  which  they  bring  from  their  country,  to  bring  back 
others  which  they  lack,  together  with  gold,  silver,  and  other 
things  useful  and  necessary.  If  it  were  not  for  trade,  the  com- 
modities and  fruits  of  each  kingdom,  country,  province,  all  their 
specialties  and  manufactures  must  needs  be  consumed  by  the 
subjects  and  inhabitants,  so  that  the  greater  part  of  their  com- 
modities and  fruits  would  be  relatively  useless,  so  that  the 
landlord  would  be  disappointed  in  his  hopes  of  profit,  and  the 
laborers  and  artisans  would  receive  no  return  for  their  indus- 
try. Consequently,  upon  the  petition  of  the  Third  Estate 
at  the  last  general  assembly  of  the  principal  Estates  of  our 
kingdom,  that  they  should  be  allowed  to  enjoy  the  freedom 
of  trade  needed  during  this  time  of  war,  and  the  exemption 
from  the  export  duties  recently  levied,  we  have  remembered 
that  God,  by  his  blessed  grace,  has  given  us  a  kingdom  composed 
of  divers  countries  and  provinces,  each  of  which  is  in  itself  as 
fertile  as  any  lands  in  Christendom,  abounding  in  a  variety 
of  commodities,  so  that  what  is  lacking  in  one  is  found  in  another. 
The  inhabitants  of  this  kingdom,  indeed,  are  constrained  by  no 
necessity  of  food  or  other  useful  articles,  to  ask  assistance  of  their 
neighbors,  or  of  foreigners.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  more 
reasonable  that  each  should  (freely)  seek  his  gain  from  his  land, 
his  labor,  his  industry,  or  his  commerce,  and  that  in  doing  this 
he  should  serve  himself,  his  country,  and  others,  by  the  benefits 
flowing  from  trade.  .  .  ."  1 

Here  is  a  fairly  clear  conception  of  a  country  within  which 
there  is  a  certain  territorial  division  of  labor,  potentially  a  self- 
sufficing  economic  entity,  and  yet  engaging  freely  in  trade  with 
other  nations  because  there  is  a  greater  advantage  in  complete 
freedom  of  trade  than  in  restriction,  even  within  national  boun- 
daries. There  is  no  tinge  of  the  narrow-minded  hatred  and 
distrust  of  foreigners,  no  trace  of  the  delusion  that  the  gain 
of  one  party  necessarily  involved  loss  on  the  other  side,  no  hint 

1  Fontanon,  Ordonnances  des  Rois  (1610),  I,  pp.  958  f. 


CONCLUSION  349 

of  the  short-sighted  confusion  between  money  and  the  real 
wealth  of  a  country.  The  short,  highly  abstract  passage  sug- 
gests the  conception  of  the  metropolitan  area  and  that  freedom 
of  trade  which  is  most  expedient  between  such  areas. 

The  same  type  of  "  free  trade  "  doctrine  appears  in  Bodin 
and  in  an  anonymous  tract  ordinarily  ascribed  to  du  Haillan. 
Their  statements  are  interesting  as  they  reveal  more  completely 
the  ideas  underlying  their  views.  In  the  Discours  sur  le  rehausse- 
ment  et  la  diminution  des  Monnoies  (1578),  Bodin  says  that 
trade  with  foreign  nations  is  indispensable,  and  then  proceeds: 
"  Even  if  we  could  do  without  their  goods,  we  should  nevertheless 
trade,  buy,  sell,  exchange,  lend;  nay  we  should  give  some  of 
our  goods  to  foreigners,  if  it  were  only  to  maintain  intercourse 
and  friendship  between  them  and  us.  ...  We  owe  them  that 
charity  by  a  natural  obligation.  We  must  share  with  them 
the  goods  with  which  God  has  blessed  us."  l  The  treatise  of 
du  Haillan,  which  appeared  in  1586,  expresses  similar  views:' 
"  Every  one  knows  that  trade  consists  in  the  interchange  of 
commodities,  and  although  certain  people  of  rank  have  en- 
deavored to  restrict  the  freedom  of  trade,  supposing  that  we 
can  dispense  with  foreign  commodities,  it  is  really  impossible, 
.  .  .  and  even  if  it  were  possible,  we  sho.uld  none  the  less  share 
what  we  have  with  our  neighbors,  as  much  from  the  duty  of 
charity,  which  commands  us  to  succor  others,  as  to  maintain 
friendship  with  them."  2  In  this  sixteenth  century  "  free  trade," 
the  economic  question  is  judged  entirely  in  the  light  of  religious 
and  philosophical  cosmopolitanism. 

This  conception  of  a  community  of  interest  appears  in  various 
kinds  of  local  material.  In  such  cases,  Christian  duty  is  supple- 
mented by  the  sentiment  of  nationality.  Thus,  in  1504,  Lyons 
and  certain  towns  of  Burgundy  and  Auxois  desired  to  purchase 
grain  at  Paris  to  relieve  their  distress.  A  meeting  of  the  municipal 
authorities  of  Paris,  held  November  29,  1504,  resolved  that 
something  should  be  done  to  aid  their  neighbors.  A  more 

1  Cited  in  Baudrillart,  Bodin  et  son  temps,  p.  176.     I  have  been  unable  to  obtain 
the  use  of  a  full  text  of  the  Discours. 

2  Fournier,   Varietes,  Historiques,  et  Litteraires,  VII,   185.     Discours  de  1'Ex- 
tresme  Cherte.     1586. 


350        THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

general  meeting  was  called  to  consider  the  matter  further. 
On  January  15,  it  was  finally  decided  that  it  was  proper  to  assist 
their  fellow-countrymen  in  time  of  trouble,  but  that  it  would 
not  be  wise  to  allow  strangers  to  go  to  Santerre  and  other  places 
where  the  Parisian  merchants  buy,  so  that  it  was  arranged  that 
the  purchases  should  be  made  by  Parisian  merchants  and  turned 
over  to  the  Lyonese  at  Paris.1 

The  last  decade  of  the  sixteenth  century  reveals  a  change 
in  contemporary  ideas.  In  1596,  Barthelemy  Laffemas  pub- 
lished his  first  treatise,  and  began  his  energetic  struggle  to  secure 
the  adoption  of  his  policies.  His  proposals  were  fundamentally 
different  from  anything  suggested  by  previous  sixteenth  century 
politicians;  the  active  measures  suggested  were  new,  the  pre- 
dominance of  purely  economic  over  political,  religious  and 
cosmopolitan  motives  was  notable,  the  conception  of  the  eco- 
nomic unity  of  the  State  was  more  aggressively  and  clearly  as- 
serted.2 The  influence  of  Sully  in  the  ministry  of  Henry  IV 
long  made  the  efforts  of  Laffemas  unavailing,  but  the  persistence 
and  energy  of  the  man  finally  resulted  in  the  appointment  of  a 
commission  to  consider  his  projects  for  the  encouragement  of 
industry  and  commerce  and  to  take  such  action  as  was  neces- 
sary. The  work  of  Laffemas  falls  into  two  general  divisions: 
the  treatises,  stating  his  doctrines,  and  the  papers  of  the  Council 
of  Commerce,  which  embody  his  views. 

He  advocated  the  exclusion  of  foreign  goods  and  of  foreign 
influence  as  far  as  possible,  the  stimulation  of  domestic  industries, 
the  improvement  of  means  of  communication,  the  encourage- 
ment of  more  careful  stock  breeding,  the  protection  of  inventors 

1  Reg.  du  Bureau,  I,  98-100.     See  also  letters  between  Rouen  and  Paris,  1528. 
Ibid.,  II,  1 6.    References  can  easily  be  multiplied  in  the  local  material. 

2  The  inaccessibility  of  the  treatises  of  Laffemas  makes  this  account  of  his  work 
general  in  character,  but  the  complete  publication  of  his  political  acts  in  connection 
with  the  Conseil  de  Commerce  reveals  the  larger  elements  of  his  policy.    See 
Champollion-Figeac,  Documents  Historiques  Inedits,  tires  des  Collections  Manu- 
scrites  de  la  Bib.  Nat.  et  des  Archives,  ou  des  Bibliotheques  des  Departements ,  IV  torn. 
Paris,   1848.      Coll.  des  Docs.   Inedits    pour    servir  a  1'Hist.  de   France.    The 
papers  of  Laffemas  are  published  in  Vol.  IV.     For  a  complete  catalogue  of  the  works 
of  Laffe'mas,  see  Boyer  de  Sainte  Suzanne,  Les  Intendants  de  la  Generality  d'Amiensf 
P-  552- 


CONCLUSION  351 

of  mechanical  labor-saving  appliances.  Except  for  the  financial 
reforms  of  Colbert,  there  is  almost  no  phase  of  Ris  activity 
which  does  not  find  its  counterpart  in  the  "  Proces  Verbaux  " 
of  the  Conseil  de  Commerce  of  1601.  In  fact,  most  of  the 
industries  encouraged  by  Colbert  were  marked  out  by  Laffemas 
for  attention,  and,  in  many  cases,  much  was  done.  Underlying 
this  policy  was  a  strong  consciousness  of  nationality;  in  a  word 
he  advocated  "  Colbertism  "  before  Colbert. 

The  views  of  Laffemas  were  like  those  of  his  contemporary, 
Montchretien.  Litterateur,  bon-vivant,  and  duellist,  Mont- 
chretien became  interested  in  the  economic  problems  of  his 
time  after  a  residence  in  England  rendered  necessary  by  his  skill 
with  the  rapier.  He  returned  to  France  determined  to  urge  the 
government  to  adopt  measures  to  promote  the  industrial  and 
commercial  prosperity  of  France,  and  thus  impose  a  much- 
needed  check  upon  the  growing  preponderance  of  English  and 
Dutch  industry  and  commerce.  Poet  by  nature,  familiar 
with  the  political  works  of  the  Greek  philosophers,  he  writes 
with  ari  elegance  and  breadth  of  view  that  gives  his  penetrating 
analysis  a  rare  distinction.1 

Montchretien  has  a  real  perception  of  the  reciprocal  economic 
interests  of  the  community.  In  one  passage,  he  likens  the 
interdependent  arts  and  industries  to  "a  marvellous  chain 
of  interlacing  rings  of  gold,  vitalizing  and  attracting  within 
its  scope  all  affairs  of  this  world,  as  did  the  chain  which  the 
poet  Homer  puts  in  the  hands  of  Zeus."  2  In  another  passage, 
he  suggests  the  analogy  that  inspired  much  of  Spencer's  sociologi- 
cal work,  and  that  still  haunts  the  literature  of  the  subject. 
"  There  is  a  great  similarity  between  the  well-organized  state 
and  the  bodies  of  animals.  Animals  are  controlled  by  three 
faculties,  which  are  different  manifestations  of  one  force,  rather 
than  distinct  forces.  The  doctors  call  these  faculties,  spirits. 
The  first  is  the  vegetative,  possessed  in  common  with  trees  and 
plants;  this  force  has  its  seat  in  the  liver  and  the  blood.  It 

1  Antoyne  de  Montchretien,  Traitt  de  V Economic  Politique,  d6die"  au  Roy  et  la 
Reyne,  en  1615.     Reimprime  par  Funck-Bretano.     Paris,  1889. 
8  Montchr^tien,  op.  cit.,  p.  17. 


352         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

nourishes  the  body,  and  is  dispersed  through  the  members 
by  the  veins.  The  laborers  and  farm  hands  correspond  to  this 
element  in  the  body  politic.  The  second  faculty,  that  of  feeling 
('  sensitive  '),  has  its  seat  in  the  heart.  It  is  the  source  of  the 
natural  heat  of  the  body  and  is  diffused  by  the  arteries.  In 
the  state,  the  artisans  and  journeymen  represent  this  faculty. 
The  third  is  the  animal,  and  has  its  seat  in  the  brain,  where  it 
directs  the  instincts  and  actions,  and  by  means  of  the  nerves 
imparts  movement  to  the  whole  body.  To  this  faculty  may 
be  compared  the  merchants. 

"By  these  three  types  of  men,  —  laborers,  artisans,  merchants, 
—  the  whole  state  is  nourished  and  sustained.  Through  them, 
all  profit  comes  and  is  made,  and  in  the  various  digestions,  as 
in  the  natural  body,  it  is  always  transformed  with  advantage."  l 

Dropping  the  metaphor,  in  another  passage,  he  emphasizes 
the  national  character  of  this  economic  entity.  "  France  is 
the  most  complete  '  corps  du  Royaume  '  that  the  sun  can  behold 
from  his  rising  in  the  East  to  his  setting  in  the  West.  The 
members  are  more  diverse  and  yet  more  perfectly  arranged 
in  the  symmetry  demanded  of  a  finely  organized  state."  Then' 
after  enumerating  various  natural  sources  of  wealth,  he  continues, 
"  the  greatest  of  these  is  the  inexhaustible  abundance  of  men, 
if  they  can  only  be  properly  directed.  .  .  .  Indeed,  the  spec- 
tacle of  France,  teeming  with  men,  might  lead  one  to  believe 
that  she  was  burdened  and  in  distress,  but  it  is  only  a  lack  of 
order.  Its  greatest  blessing  may  become,  through  ignorance 
or  neglect,  its  greatest  curse.  But  who  does  not  know  that 
organization  is  the  prime  requisite  for  the  efficient  functioning 
of  a  state  ?  The  exquisite  harmony  of  their  constituent  ele- 
ments is  the  primal  manifestation  of  the  power  of  great  organic 
bodies."  z 

While  conceiving  economic,  as  well  as  political  interdependence, 
it  is  clear  that  Montchretien's  political  ideas  led  him  to  suppose 
that  the  areas  coincided.  He  failed  to  perceive  that  complete 
economic  interdependence  exists  only  within  the  limits  of  the 
market. 

1  Montchretien,  op.  cit.,  32-33.  z  Ibid.,  23-24. 


CONCLUSION.  353 

The  immediate  influence  of  Montchretien  was  very  slight. 
The  Court  of  the  Regency  had  other  interests.  But  Colbert's 
connection  with  Laffemas  is  involved  in  little  doubt.  The 
papers  of  the  Council  of  Commerce  form  a  part  of  the  collection 
of  manuscripts  at  the  Bibliotheque  Nationale  coming  from  the 
library  of  Colbert.  The  only  uncertainty  attaches  to  the  date 
of  acquisition,  and  this  may  well  be  supposed  to  be  relatively 
early  in  Colbert's  ministry,  when  he  was  most  busily  assembling 
documents  of  previous  administrations.  On  the  whole,  it  is 
highly  probable  that  Colbert  was  acquainted  with  the  ideas 
of  both  Montchretien  and  Laffemas.  The  influence  of  this 
early  seventeenth  century  writing  upon  Colbert  was  probably 
considerable,  and  may  be  regarded  very  properly  as  the  beginning 
of  the  policies  and  ideas  grouped  under  the  term,  "  Colbertism." 

Although  the  fundamental  conceptions  that  seem  to  underlie 
seventeenth  century  policies  are  outlined  by  Montchretien, 
there  is  nevertheless  a  marked  development  in  the  precision 
of  the  ideas,  and  many  subsidiary  points  are  brought  to  light. 
Our  own  studies  of  the  market  system  have  revealed  the  impor- 
tance of  the  machinery  for  the  distribution  of  commodities  over 
the  market  area.  This  diffusion  of  material  things  is  the  most 
direct  manifestation  of  economic  organization.  The  laws  of 
price,  value,  and  price-making  are  the  basis  of  the  economic 
structure  of  society.  Some  perception  of  the  nature  of  these 
problems  accordingly  might  well  be  expected  of  these  early 
theorists.  Bodin  had  disposed  of  one  of  the  mysteries  in  regard 
to  money  and  prices,  but  he  contributed  little  to  an  under- 
standing of  the  importance  of  the  subject  of  value  and  price. 
Montchretien  proceeded  a  step  further,  drawing  distinctions 
between  real  wealth  and  money,  and  between  value  and  price. 
"It  is  not  the  abundance  of  gold  and  silver,  or  the  quantity 
of  diamonds  and  pearls  that  makes  a  state  wealthy  —  it  is  the 
ease  of  producing  the  necessities  of  life  and  articles  of  clothing. 
The  more  of  these  commodities  possessed,  the  greater  the 
wealth." l  Elsewhere  we  find:  "  The  real  value  of  com- 
modities is  immovable,  but  not  the  momentary  price,  which 

1  Montchr6tien,  op.  cit.,  241. 


354         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

depends  upon  many  factors.  Nothing  is  dear  which  has  not 
been  cheap  and  nothing  is  cheap  that  may  not  become  dear. 
Nor  do  prices  always  follow  the  changes  in  the  value  of  money."  1 
But  he  does  not  get  beyond  these  elementary  distinctions.  The 
importance  of  differences  of  price  in  stimulating  movements 
of  commodities  is  clearly  perceived  by  Colbert,  though  seldom 
well  stated.  The  idea  appears  frequently  in  his  letters,  and  he 
is  often  mystified  by  the  absence  of  the  movements  he  expects. 
March  22,  1672,  he  writes  to  Bouchu,  Intendant  at  Dijon: 
"  I  am  informed  that  there  have  been  heavy  shipments  of  grain 
from  Provence  and  Languedoc  to  relieve  the  dearth  in  Italy 
and  Naples.  These  exports  have  rendered  grain  very  dear  in 
those  provinces,  which  should  result  in  the  movement  of  a  great 
quantity  of  grain  from  Burgundy  and  Champagne.  As  I  do 
not  hear  from  you  of  any  shipments  down  the  Saone,  and  as 
there  is  nothing  more  important  for  all  of  these  provinces  than 
the  relief  of  the  dearth  in  Provence  and  Languedoc  and  a  move- 
ment of  specie  to  Burgundy  and  Champagne,  I  beg  you  to  go  to 
one  of  the  river  towns,  and  establish  yourself  there  as  perma- 
nently as  your  affairs  permit.  Procure  information  of  everything 
that  is  going  on,  urge  the  merchants  to  ship,  enter  into  corres- 
spondence  with  Provence  and  Languedoc  with  that  in  view, 
remove  all  obstacles  that  the  merchants  may  encounter,  and  if 
necessary,  let  me  know  and  I  will  send  any  orders  of  which 
you  have  need."2 

This  little  -incident  reveals  the  conceptions  of  Colbert.  The 
nation  is  an  economic  unit,  and  within  it  there  is  complete 
mobility  of  commodities  in  response  to  differences  in  prices. 
Prices  should  differ  in  the  various  provinces  only  by  the  amount 

1  Montchretien,  op.  cit.,  257. 

2  Clement,  Lett.  Inst.  el  Mem.,  II,  651-652.     See  also  ibid.,  IV,  298.    Letter 
of  15  Avril  1683.    "  Lorsque  les  bleds  sont  chers  dans  une  ville,  1'industrie  de 
tous  les  hommes,  francois  et  estrangers,  consiste  a  porter  des  marchandises  dans 
les  lieux  ou  elles  sont  cheres."    See  also  G7.  i.     8  Nov.  1679.     Colbert  a  M. 
d'Herbigny,  Int.  en  Dauphine".  "  La  grande  application,  que  les  particuliers  ont  a 
tirer  les  bleds  de  la  province  de  Dauphine,  est  une  preuve  constante  qu'il  est  plus 
cher  dans  les  lieux  ou  on  le  veut  porter  que  dans  cette  province,  ainsy  vous  voyez 
que  cela  prouve  une  chose  contraire  a  celle  que  Ton  veut  vous  prouver.  .  .  ." 
Also  Bib.  Nat.,  Mel.  Clair.,  462,  423.    Colbert  a  M.  Bouchu.    8  Nov.  1679. 


CONCLUSION  ^     355 

of  the  cost  of  transportation.  In  short,  he  has  in  mind  the  fully 
organized  metropolitan  area.  He  assumes  its  existence,  al- 
though the  evidence  of  facts  might  well  have  disillusioned  him. 

These  ideas  were  rapidly  disused  and  at  the  close  of  the  cen- 
tury were  very  generally  known.  The  best  indication  appears 
in  the  interesting  discussion  of  the  fixation  of  the  price  of  grain 
in  1709.  The  inadequacy  of  some  impracticable  proposals  was 
clearly  explained  in  the  course  of  the  controversy.  One  anony- 
mous writer  points  out  that  the  chief  difficulties  lie  in  the  impos- 
sibility of  an  absolutely  uniform  price,  and  in  the  diversity  of 
measures.  "  The  merchants  are  stimulated  to  buy  and  sell 
only  through  the  hope  of  gaining  through  the  transport  of  their 
grain.  If  the  price  is  uniform  they  will  find  no  profit  in  moving 
grain. 

"  Unless  a  uniform  measure  is  introduced,  the  merchants 
will  evade  the  established  prices  by  means  of  the  diversity  of 
measures.  But  if  it  be  supposed  that  these  Hiffir.n1t.ies  were 
surmounted  by  fixing  the  price  of  grain  with  reference  to 
the  distance  of  the  sources  of  supply  from  the  consuming 
area,  and  by  a  reduction  of  measures  to  weight,  it  would  still 
be  necessary  to  overcome  the  disposition  to  form  granaries."  l 

The  other  most  important  aspect  of  metropolitan  organization 
is  suggested  by  the  mercantilistic  idea  of  the  balance  of  payments. 
This  is,  of  course,  an  anticipation  of  the  results  of  the  perfected 
use  of  negotiable  paper.  The  system  was  rapidly  taking  shape 
during  the  closing  years  of  the  century,  although  it  had  hardly 
attained  the  completeness  that  is  connoted  by  the  mercantilistic 
idea  of  a  definite  balance  of  payments  between  countries,  to 
liquidate  their  commercial  dealings.  This  element  of  mer- 
cantilism is  significant  as  it  emphasizes  the  unity  of  the  metro- 
politan or  national  area  as  against  other  areas.2 

1  G7.     1635.     Memoire  centre  la  fixation  des  bleds. 

2  I  have  not  been  able  to  trace  the  history  of  this  idea  of  a  balance  of  payments. 
The  mercantilist  doctrine  is  generally  said  to  begin  in  the  late  sixteenth  century. 
I  have  seen  little  real  evidence  of  it  in  French  sources,  and  no  definite  conception 
of  a  balance  of  payments,  prior  to  Colbert.    It  appears  in  his  "  Memoire  sur  le 
Commerce,"  Lett.  Inst.  et  Mem.,  II,  cclxix,  but  he  does  not  lay  so  much  stress  upon 
the  idea  as  do  later  writers. 


356  i       THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

The  larger  aspects  of  the  metropolitan  distributive  organiza- 
tion were  thus  conceived  by  the  last  generation  of  the  seven- 
teenth century.  This  anticipates  by  nearly  one  hundred  years 
the  full  realization  of  the  idea.  But  it  does  not  necessarily 
follow  that  this  anticipation  enabled  the  politicians  materially 
to  accelerate  the  growth  towards  the  new  form  of  organization. 
Questions  of  policy  are  decided  upon  the  supposition  that  certain 
organic  relations  already  exist,  and  the  policy  is  necessarily 
vitiated  to  a  great  degree  by  the  failure  to  adjust  policy  to  fact. 
Under  such  conditions  the  energies  of  the  statesman  may  be 
misdirected.  The  encouragement  of  domestic  industry  by 
Colbert,  for  instance,  could  exert  relatively  little  influence 
upon  the  growth  of  the  economic  area,  though  the  industrial 
side  of  his  policy  was,  to  him,  one  of  his  most  important  spheres 
of  activity.  So  far  as  he  exerted  any  influence  by  those  efforts, 
the  results  differed  considerably  from  his  expectations. 

The  economic  policy  of  the  Crown  was  thus  based  upon 
unfounded  assumptions,  since  it  failed  to  appreciate  the  strength 
of  the  centrifugal  forces  in  the  community.  The  Crown  was 
ever  prone  to  assume  that  the  state  was  a  closely  organized 
national  unit,  when  in  reality  the  degree  of  territorial  inter- 
dependence was  far  less  considerable  than  was  supposed. 

The  edicts  of  1559  and  1567  illustrate  the  general  tendency 
in  its  extreme  degree.  The  Crown  assumed  that  it  possessed 
an  administrative  system  that  could  carry  out  a  general  ordi- 
nance involving  a  vast  amount  of  executive  detail.  That  was 
a  less  comprehensible  mistake  than  the  assumption,  in  the  royal 
edicts,  that  the  problem  of  grain  trade  regulation  was  primarily  a 
question  of  excessive  exports  to  foreign  ports,  and  that  an  asser- 
tion of  complete  freedom  of  inter-provincial  trade  was  all  the 
regulation  that  was  needed  in  the  domestic  trade.  This  false 
view  of  the  situation  was  due  to  a  belief  in  a  national  economic 
unity  that  did  not  exist.  The  policy  was,  therefore,  necessarily 
ineffective. 

The  policy  of  Colbert  conveys  the  same  moral.  But  Colbert 
is  two  different  men:  he  was  at  once  a  theorist  and  a  man  of 
action;  he  had  a  capacity  for  setting  aside  all  general  ideas 


CONCLUSION  357 

when  it  was  necessary  to  act.  His  general  ideas  led  him  astray 
only  in  regard  to  the  regulation  of  domestic  trade.  He  always 
assumed  complete  freedom  of  inter-provincial  trade  and  probably 
never  understood  the  seriousness  of  the  problems  presented 
by  the  domestic  trade. 

The  growth  of  a  national  policy  of  regulation  in  the  hands 
of  the  "  practical  men,"  the  local  administrators,  is  difficult 
to  trace.  But  despite  the  confusion  caused  by  conflicts  of 
interests  and  opinions,  several  periods  may  be  distinguished. 
In  the  first,  two  groups  appear  in  conflict,  the  producing  regions 
and  the  large  consuming  center.  At  Paris,  an  additional  com- 
plication is  introduced  by  the  energy  and  wealth  of  the  whole- 
sale merchants.  They  perceived  opportunities  for  profit  that 
frequently  subjected  both  town  and  country  districts  to  severe 
strain.  In  this  first  period,  opinions  are  influenced  almost 
exclusively  by  the  interests  of  the  group  with  which  the  official 
is  most  intimately  concerned.  In  this  manner,  an  issue  is 
joined,  and  the  clash  of  interest  becomes  evident  to  all.  Once 
the  difficulty  is  clearly  seen,  there  is  a  distinct  change  in  the  char- 
acter of  official  regulation.  The  more  conscientious  officials 
seek  means  of  harmonizing  the  discordant  interests  and  no 
longer  insist  stubbornly  upon  the  complete  satisfaction  of  the 
desires  of  the  group  they  represent.  This  leads  to  much  groping 
and  tentative  experimentation,  most  of  it  fruitless,  but  ulti- 
mately a  solution  is  discovered.  Then,  the  new  idea  is  applied 
systematically  and  all  the  consequences  and  details  are  worked 
out.  The  clearest  instance  of  the  first  stage  of  this  process  is 
the  history  of  the  relations  between  Lyons  and  Burgundy  in  the 
sixteenth  century.  For  twenty  or  thirty  years  the  presence 
of  the  Lyonese  excited  little  comment  in  Burgundy,  but  after 
1529  the  conflict  of  interests  gradually  appeared.  The  Bur- 
gundian  officials  were  prone  to  seek  refuge  in  prohibitions. 
The  Lyonese  secured  from  the  King  full  permission  to  buy  grain 
in  Burgundy.  Soon  the  right  to  seek  supplies  along  the  Upper 
Saone  was  regarded  as  one  of  the  privileges  of  the  town.  In 
the  producing  region,  meanwhile,  the  prohibition  became  more 


358         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

frequent.  Finally,  an  unusually  severe  failure  of  crops  produced 
an  acute  crisis  in  '1557.  The  Lyonese  proposed  to  buy  exten- 
sively, but  the  people  of  Burgundy  were  bitterly  opposed  to  the 
action  of  the  Consuls  of  Lyons.  On  the  one  hand  there  was 
refusal  to  permit  further  exports,  on  the  other,  defiant  assertion 
of  intention  to  carry  off  the  grain  under  cover  of  royal  privileges. 
The  divergence  of  interest  is  hard  for  us  to  understand,  but  the 
bitter  recrimination,  the  threats  of  the  Lyonese  to  prosecute 
Villefrancon,  the  violence  all  along  the  river,  all  testify  to  the 
intense  reality  of  the  discord. 

The  acute  crisis  of  1557  was,  in  itself,  the  beginning  of  a  new 
departure  in  policy.  The  necessities  of  Lyons  led  to  the  sending 
of  Grolier  and  Guimbre  to  Burgundy.  They  started  with  a 
firm  conviction  of  the  justice  of  the  complaints  of  Lyons;  they 
returned  with  a  realization  that  there  was  much  to  be  said  on 
the  other  side.  Their  long  association  with  Villefrancon  brought 
both  sides  to  an  appreciation  of  the  difficulties  of  the  situation. 
A  compromise  was  made;  Villefrancon  abandoned  his  policy 
of  absolute  prohibition,  and  the  agents  of  Lyons  contented 
themselves  with  securing  carefully  restricted  permissions  of 
export. 

The  difficulties  of  the  situation  of  Burgundy  were  not  suffi- 
ciently great  to  lead  to  a  complete  solution  of  the  grain  trade 
problem.  The  intermittent  character  of  the  problem  and 
the  tolerable  success  of  official  regulation  established  this  tem- 
porary expedient  as  the  fixed  policy  of  the  region.  The  discord 
between  the  groups  called  for  no  delicate  remedy,  and  after 
1557  and  1573  there  is  no  further  progress  in  the  regulation 
of  the  grain  trade  in  the  Rhone  Basin. 

If  the  records  of  the  Parisian  Echevinage  were  still  extant, 
we  should  probably  be  able  to  trace  a  similar  clash  of  interest 
between  Rouen  and  Paris  in  the  fifteenth  century.  Paris  was 
habitually  buying  grain  in  the  vicinity  of  Rouen.  Merchants 
from  Rouen  were  buying  in  the  Valley  of  the  Oise  for  foreign 
export.  This  cross  movement  of  trade  was  inconsistent  with 
the  spheres  of  influence  that  had  been  created  by  the  "  Com- 
pagnie  Franchise  "  of  the  Parisian  merchants,  and  by  the 


CONCLUSION  359 

"  Compagnie  Normande  "  of  the  Rouenese.  After  a  period  of 
recrimination  and  rivalry,  both  parties  became  reconciled  to  the 
inevitable,  compromised,  and  applied  the  idea  of  distinct  spheres 
of  influence  to  the  grain  trade. 

In  neither  of  these  instances  is  the  increase  in  social  harmony 
and  the  promotion  of  closer  economic  interdependence  the  result 
of  vague  general  ideas  deduced  from  theological  precept  or 
national  sentiment.  In  each  case,  the  increasing  economic  unity 
of  the  community  is  brought  about  by  an  empirical  solution, 
more  or  less  complete,  of  a  concrete  difficulty.  The  conflict  of 
interest  reveals  the  necessity  of  cooperation  and  interdepen- 
dence, and  the  concentration  of  attention  upon  the  question 
ultimately  results  in  the  discovery  of  some  means  of  reconciling 
the  hostile  groups,  and  bringing  them  together  as  parts  of  a 
larger  group.1 

The  later  history  of  the  trade  in  the  Seine  Basin  is  more  inter- 
esting. There,  the  conflict  of  interest  was  more  complicated. 
The  old  territorial  antagonism  persisted.  Champagne  felt 
in  some  measure  the  hostility  towards  Paris  .that  Burgundy 
felt  towards  Lyons.  But  the  feeling  in  Champagne  was  so 
weak  that  it  serves  merely  to  emphasize  the  lack  of  close  relations 
between  the  province  and  the  capital.  In  this  region,  the 
development  of  close  economic  interdependence  was  the  result 
not  of  "the  conflict  of  territorial  groups,  but  of  Parisian  groups: 
the  merchants  and  the  general  public. 

The  problem  was  peculiarly  fitted  to  bring  about  a  general 
reconciliation  of  conflicting  interests.  The  merchants  forced 
the  Parisian  authorities  to  regulate  the  trade  with  reference 
to  Paris,  but  the  ubiquity  of  the  wholesale  merchants  made  it 
impossible  to  found  any  adequate  regulations  upon  Parisian 

1  Ratzenhofer  lays  down  as  a  social  law  that  small,  relatively  independent 
groups  are  constantly  being  merged  into  larger  groups.  Undoubtedly  a  true 
observation,  but  historically  the  interest  centers  upon  the  manner  in  which  the 
fusion  of  small  groups  is  brought  about.  It  is  not  a  process  that  accomplishes 
itself.  It  is  the  result  of  persistent  efforts  of  individuals  to  reduce  social  discord 
and  to  promote  harmony.  The  absence  of  human  volition  in  the  operation  of 
Ratzenhofer's  laws  is  purely  fictitious.  It  is  the  result  of  an  exclusion  of  the 
concrete  details,  which  is  justifiable  only  if  the  exclusion  is  constantly  borne  in 
mind.  Ratzenhofer,  Zweck  und  Wesen  der  Politik. 


360         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

interests  alone.  The  merchants  exerted  quite  as  much  influence 
upon  conditions  in  the  producing  regions  as  they  did  upon  the 
Parisian  markets.  Any  regulations  would  have  to  cover  the 
activity  of  the  merchants  from  the  time  grain  was  bought  in 
the  farms  or  on  the  local  markets  to  the  final  sale  at  the  Halle 
or  Ports  of  Paris.  If  the  regulations  were  to  be  successful,  they 
must  obviously  command  the  sympathy  of  the  provinces. 
Thus,  the  solution  of  difficulties  which  were  primarily  Parisian 
involved  the  working  out  of  a  general  reconciliation  of  all  the 
groups  affected  by  the  grain  trade  throughout  the  Seine  Basin. 

Within  the  period  covered  by  this  study,  we  find  the  first 
two  phases  of  the  solution  of  the  problem.  The  years  1630-60 
reveal  the  sharp  conflict  of  interest  between  the  great  wholesale 
merchants  and  the  Parisian  public.  The  latter  part  of  the 
century  is  marked  by  the  persistent  efforts  of  the  Chatelet  to 
find  the  proper  means  of  controlling  the  grain  merchants,  and 
of  confining  them  within  proper  limits. 

The  uncertainty  of  the  officials  in  1660,  the  adoption  of  the 
policy  of  prohibiting  associations  and  partnerships,  the  failure 
of  the  policy,  —  all  this  administrative  muddle  has  been  related 
at  length.  From  1660  to  1693,  little  was  accomplished  beyond 
the  collection  of  information.  The  officials  gained  a  deeper 
insight  into  the  details  of  the  situation,  but  the  grain  trade  prob- 
lem was  no  less  acute  than  it  had  been  in  1660.  Then,  this 
aimless  groping  was  suddenly  brought  to  an  end  by  Delamare's 
perception  of  the  importance  of  the  development  of  the  general 
wholesale  market  at  Bray.  The  solution  of  the  problem  by 
the  establishment  of  wholesale  markets  had  occurred  to  no  one; 
it  was  too  great  a  departure  from  old  precedents;  but  therein 
lay  the  possibility  of  ending  the  discord  and  unrest  in  the  trade 
of  the  Seine  Basin.  Once  a  steady  flow  of  trade  was  established, 
all  the  panic  and  distrust  in  the  producing  regions  disappeared; 
the  merchants  shipped  more  regularly  to  Paris,  because  of  the 
certainty  that  no  exorbitant  profits  could  be  realized  by  delay- 
ing the  boats.  The  visits  of  Delamare  to  Vitry  in  1709  and 
1710  sealed  the  victory  of  administrative  regulation.  Thence- 
forth, it  was  only  necessary  to  carry  out  the  brilliant  idea  which 


CONCLUSION  361 

would  make  possible  the  national  unity  that  had  so  long  been 
the  dream  of  theorists  and  politicians. 

The  development  of  social  institutions  seems  to  be  the  result 
of  conscious  individual  effort  to  diminish  the-  intensity  of  social 
conflict,  and  this  effort  is  much  more  than  an  automatic  reaction 
upon  the  environment.  There  is  not  any  inherent  reason  for 
assuming  the  presence  of  this  desire  to  improve  the  physical 
and  social  conditions  of  life.  In  fact,  the  fatalistic  attitude 
is  the  more  natural,  and  actually  the  more  wide-spread.  Plague, 
disease,  and  famine  are  regarded  in  primitive  society  as  a  divine 
judgment,  an  act  of  God  from  which  man  should  not  seek 
to  escape.  If  there  be  any  truly  spontaneous  reaction  between 
men  and  their  physical  surroundings,  this  fatalism  must  be 
regarded  as  the  true  social  law.1  The  individual  feels  helpless 
in  the  presence  of  the  great  forces  of  nature. 

The  fatalistic  attitude  discloses  its  value  as  a  social  power 
in  the  oriental  countries.  The  famines  recur  periodically, 
sweeping  off  vast  numbers  of  individuals  who  accept  their  doom 
with  resignation.  The  difficulties  in  those  countries  may  have 
been  more  or  less  acute  than  the  similar  troubles  in  France 
during  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries.  The  actual 
extent  of  physical  distress  is  not  the  significant  feature.  The 
recurring  famines  in  the  Orient  lead  to  no  change.  The  market 
system  that  is  adequate  for  the  ordinary  years  breaks  down 
regularly  under  the  stress  of  dearth,  but  nothing  is  done  to  create 
a  market  system  that  shall  work  even  in  time  of  dearth.  It 
is  the  will  of  God  that  misfortunes  come,  the  efforts  of  men 
cannot  avail,  wherefore  struggle  against  the  powers  of  nature  ? 

If  this  attitude  had  prevailed  in  Europe  none  of  the  modern 
structure  of  western  civilization  would  have  come  into  being. 
There  was  no  social  law  necessarily  bringing  about  an  allevia- 
tion of  the  intensity  of  conflicting  interests.  Progress  is  not 
inherent  in  the  environment;  it  is  the  result  of  conscious  human 
effort  to  deal  with  concrete  problems.  The  true  background 
of  the  history  of  the  grain  trade  is  the  firm  conviction  that  the 
troubles  of  the  famine  years  could  and  ought  to  be  remedied. 

1  Townsend,  M.,  Asia  and  Europe,  1901. 


362         THE  GRAIN  TRADE  IN  FRANCE 

In  this  respect,  this  chapter  in  history  is  merely  typical  of  the 
history  of  Western  Europe.  It  is  the  record  of  an  extraordinary 
mastery  of  the  physical  and  social  environment  by  the  resolution 
and  acumen  of  many  relatively  obscure  individuals,  lawyers, 
administrators,  and  statesmen. 

It  is  a  gradual  process,  a  series  of  victories  over  the  environ- 
ment that  begins  in  those  regions  where  the  difficulties  are  least 
serious.  Thus,  in  the  grain  trade,  the  most  fruitful  develop- 
ment occurs  in  the  Seine  Basin,  where  the  actual  physical  dis- 
tress of  famine  was  least  intense.  In  Burgundy,  where  distress 
was  greater,  nothing  of  permanent  importance  was  done.  In 
the  infertile  regions,  the  history  of  years  of  dearth  is  merely  a 
harrowing  record  of  disease  and  death.  But  the  solution  of 
the  problem  discovered  in  the  Seine  Basin  was  subsequently 
applied  to  the  relief  of  distress  throughout  France.  The  per- 
fection of  distributive  machinery  both  as  regards  market  tech- 
nique and  physical  transportation  made  dearth  a  tradition 
handed  down  from  "  the  good  old  times." 


APPENDICES 


APPENDIX  I 

FRENCH  DRY  MEASURES  OF  THE  OLD  REGIME 

WEIGHTS  and  measures  of  the  old  regime  present  a  problem  of  great 
difficulty,  partly  on  account  of  their  diversity,  partly  on  account  of 
the  difficulty  of  securing  information.  Some  of  the  official  standards 
still  exist,  and  these  together  with  documentary  evidence  constitute 
the  basis  of  our  information.  The  principal  documentary  evidence 
is  the  royal  examination  of  measures  in  Northern  France  made  hi 
1673.  This  had  special  reference  to  the  grain  trade,  and,  as  it  is 
summarized  by  Delamare  in  his  Traite  de  la  Police,  it  is  easily  acces- 
sible. Commercial  dictionaries  of  the  period  also  give  considerable 
information.  The  relation  of  the  old  measures  to  the  metric  system 
has  been  worked  out  by  the  Vicomte  d'Avenel  in  his  Histoire  £cono- 
mique  de  la  Propriete,  des  Salaires,  des  Denrees,  et  de  tons  les  Prix  en 
General ,  depuis  Van  1200  jusqu'en  1800.  (Paris,  4  torn.,  1894-98.) 
He  nowhere  gives  a  detailed  account  of  the  method  followed  in  con- 
versions, and  the  omission  is  unfortunate,  to  say  the  least.  In  the 
conversions  given  here,  all  equivalents  are  based  on  his  figure  of 
1.56  hectoliters  per  setier  of  Paris. 

The  complexity  of  measures  before  the  Revolution  was  of  two  kinds : 
differences  in  content  of  measures  having  the  same  name,  differences 
in  the  names  of  the  measures  used.  Differences  in  the  names  of  meas- 
ures were  not  unrelated  to  sectionalism  based  on  cultural,  political, 
and  commercial  bonds.  In  most  cases,  each  district  used  the  same 
names  for  measures.  Barring  minor  exceptions,  there  was  a  distinct 
system  of  measures  in  the  Seine  Basin;  three  systems,  in  the  basin  of 
the  Rhone  and  Saone;  a  distinct  system  in  Brittany,  in  Guienne, 
and  in  Gascony.  Sometimes,  the  system  was  distinct  throughout, 
sometimes,  the  smaller  measures  had  the  same  name  while  the  larger 
measures  of  account  were  different  in  name  and  content. 


366  APPENDIX 

Dry  Measures  of  Paris  and  the  Seine  Basin1' 

i  boisseau  of  wheat  weighed  20  livres. 

3  boisseaux  =   i  minot  =       60  livres. 

4  minots        =   i  setier    =     240  livres. 
12  setiers        =   i  muid    =     2  2  80  livres. 

The  setier  and  the  muid  were  measures  of  account,  the  boisseau  and 
the  minot  were  actual  measures.  These  names  prevailed  throughout 
the  Seine  Basin  and  nearly  always  bore  the  same  relation  to  each  other, 
though  the  content  of  the  measures  differed  widely  in  different  towns. 
In  a  few  towns  different  primary  units  were  used,  the  bichet  and  the 
mine.  The  bichet  contained  40  livres  when  filled  with  wheat,  and  the 
mine,  50  livres.  But  even  in  these  places,  quantities  of  wheat  are 
usually  given  in  setiers  or  muids. 

Taking  d'AvenePs  figure  of  1.56  hectoliters  for  the  Paris  setier, 
we  have  the  following  table  of  English  equivalents:  — 

i  boisseau  =  20  livres  =  .3575  bushels, 

i  minot  =  60  livres  =  1.0725  bushels. 

i  setier  =  240  livres  =  4.29     bushels, 

i  muid  =  2880  livres  =  51.48      bushels,  3120  pounds. 

The  measures  of  Paris  were  somewhat  larger  than  the  measures 
of  the  same  name  used  in  the  provinces.     Delamare  gives  a  list  of 
rough  equivalents  for  most  of  the  towns  of  the  Seine  Basin.     The 
most  important  differences  for  the  purposes  of  this  study  are:  — 
Soissons, 

i  setier  =  80  livres 

3  setiers  de  Soissons  =   i  setier  de  Paris. 

Chalons-sur-Marne, 

i  setier  =   12  boisseaux  du  pays, 

i  setier  de  Paris  =   13^  boisseaux  du  pays. 

Vitry-le-Franoois, 

i  setier  =12  boisseaux  du  pays, 

i  setier  de  Paris  =   14^  boisseaux  du  pays. 
Bray, 

i  setier  =  8  boisseaux  du  pays, 

i  setier  de  Paris  =  9  boisseaux  du  pays. 

1  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  744-745.  These  are  presumably  the  wheat  measures. 
For  the  other  grains  the  measures  were  somewhat  different.  See  H.  1823.  Reg.  du 
Bureau,  iicxxix.  24  Mars  1671.  Resolution  that  oats  should  be  sold  by  wheat 
measure  of  24  boisseaux  per  setier,  instead  of  the  former  oats  measure:  H.  1822. 
Reg.  du  Bureau,  29  Aout  1669.  Assembly  to  consider  the  reform  of  measures: 
H.  1822.  Reg.  du  Bureau,  iiclvii.  Text  of  Royal  Ordinance  of  October  1669. 


APPENDIX  367 

At  Orleans  the  names  were  similar,  but  the  system  was  dif- 
ferent:— 

i  mine     =   50  livres  of  wheat. 
12  mines  =     i  muid  =  600  livres. 

The  muid  at  Orleans  wa?  thus  equivalent  to  2\  setiers  of  Paris. 

In  Brittany,  grain  was  usually  sold  by  the  tonneau.  This  measure 
varied  in  different  ports.  According  to  Posthelwayt's  Universal 
Dictionary  of  Commerce, 

The  tonneau  at  Auray  contained 2200  livres. 

The  tonneau  at  Hennebont    295°  livres. 

At  other  towns  the  measure  lay  between  these  extremes. 

In  the  Rhone  Basin,  there  were  three  sets  of  measures;  those  of 
Burgundy,  represented  by  Dijon,  those  of  Lyons,  and  those  of 
Languedoc  and  Provence.  The  Lyonese  were  so  active  that  the 
Lyonese  measures  were  used  frequently  both  hi  Burgundy  and  in 
Languedoc. 

The  measures  of  Dijon  were:  —  * 

1  quatranche     =42  livres  of  wheat. 

4  quatranches  =     i  quartau  =   168  livres. 

2  quartaux        =     i  bichot      =  336  livres. 
2  bichots  =     i  emine       =  672  livres. 

Assuming  these  weights  to  be  given  according  to  Paris  standards, 
the  equivalents  would  be :  — 

i  quatranche  =  2  livres  more  than  2  boisseaux  de  Paris. 

i  quartau  =  8  boisseaux  de  Paris  (Approx.)   =   2.86  bushels. 

i  bichot  =  1 6  boisseaux  de  Paris  (Approx.)   =   5.72  bushels. 

i  emine  =  \  muid,  mesure  de  Paris  (Approx.)   =   11.44  bushels. 

At  Lyons,  the  unit  was  the  boisseau.  Six  boisseaux  made  one 
anee,  and  this  was  the  ordinary  gram  measure. 

i  anee  =  8  setiers  de  Paris  or  §  muid  =  34.32  bushels. 

In  Languedoc  and  Provence,  quantities  were  usually  given  in 
"  charges."  The  system  of  measures,  according  to  Posthelwayt, 
was:  — 

i  seder    =     90    livres. 

4  setiers  =  360    livres  =   i  charge. 

1  Delamare,  op.  cit.,  II,  745. 


368  APPENDIX 

The  equivalents  cannot  be  figured  with  certainty  as  it  is  not  clear 
what  kind  of  weights  Posthelwayt  has  in  mind.  He  uses  "  pounds," 
but  I  doubt  if  he  means  English  pounds.  I  presume  the  unit  intended 
is  the  local  unit,  as  the  figures  are  in  round  numbers.  The  livre 
in  the  Rhone  Valley  was  somewhat  less  than  the  livre  of  Paris.  At 
all  events  the  setier  of  Languedoc  was  a  much  smaller  measure  than 
the  setier  of  Pa,ris. 


APPENDIX  II 

GLOSSARY  OF  ADMINISTRATIVE  TERMS 

ADMINISTRATIVE  terms  have  not  been  translated  in  the  text,  as 
there  are  no  English  equivalents  that  would  not  be  more  misleading 
than  helpful.  In  the  second  part,  a  brief  treatment  of  certain  phases 
of  administrative  history  has  been  deemed  essential,  but  it  has  not 
been  possible  to  discuss  these  topics  comprehensively  in  the  text, 
and  some  recognition  of  the  constitutional  problem  is  necessary.  The 
constitutional  history  of  the  period  is  singularly  involved,  and, 
in  the  light  of  new  material,  much  of  it  is  being  rewritten.  The 
dictionaries  of  Dareste  de  Chavannes  and  of  Cheruel  are  already 
obsolete  in  many  respects.  The  recent  monographs  are  not  always 
at  hand.1  Some  terms  frequently  used  in  this  study  do  not  receive 
much  attention  from  the  general  historian.  Consequently,  a  few 
concise  descriptions  of  the  functions  of  officials  may  assist  the  reader, 
though  it  is  impossible  to  do  more  than  call  attention  to  the  historical 
problems  involved. 

Awcat  du  Roi.  —  A  member  of  the  staff  of  the  baillage  supposed 
to  give  advice  on  legal  matters.  His  functions  seem  to  have  been 
essentially  advisory. 

Bailli.  —  The  bailli  was  the  administrator  or  steward  of  some  part 
of  the  royal  domain  or  of  a  seigniorial  domain.  In  the  south,  the 
official  of  tnis  type  was  called  senechal,  but  the  functions  were  sub- 
stantially the  same.  In  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries,  the 

1  Dupont-Ferrier,  G.,  Les  Officiers  royaux  des  baillages  et  senechaussees.  Paris, 
1902. 

Jacqueton,  G.,  Documents  rdatifs  a  V administration  financiere  en  France  de 
Charles  VII  a  Francois  I.  1443-1523.  Paris,  1891. 

Hanotaux,  Gabriel,  Les  Origines  de  V institution  des  Intendants  des  Provinces. 
Paris,  1884. 

Arbois  de  Jubainville,  Henri  d',  L 'Administration  des  Intendants  d'apres  les 
Archives  de  I'Aube.  Paris,  1880. 

Jouvencel,  Henri  de,  Le  Controleur  General  des  Finances  sous  Vancien  regime. 
Paris,  1901. 

Delamare,  Traite  de  la  Police,  gives  many  details  not  easily  found  elsewhere, 
and  many  references  are  given  in  Viollet,  P.  Histoire  des  Institutions  Politiques  et 
Administrative*  de  la  France.  3  vols.  Paris,  1890-1903. 

369 


370  APPENDIX 

bailli  or  senechal  was  a  general  administrative  officer  not  unlike  the 
steward  of  the  English  manors.  The  growth  of  the  royal  domain, 
and  the  increase  in  royal  power  made  thej3ailli  more  of  an  adminis- 
trative official.  He  possessed  both  financial  and  judicial  functions. 
In  all  respects  he  was  accountable  to  the  Parlement.  He  managed 
the  revenue  of  the  royal  domain,  and,  as  a  judicial  officer,  he  exercised 
the  rights  of  the  Crown.  Within  the  confines  of  the  domain,  he  had 
final  jurisdiction  over  petty  cases,  and,  subject  to  appeal  to  the  Parle- 
ment, jurisdiction  in  first  instance  over  nearly  all  other  matters. 
As  representative  of  the  Crown,  he  possessed  an  ill-defined  juris- 
diction over  the  seigniorial  courts.  The  "  cas  royaux  "  were  in  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  bailli,  and  as  they  received  the  fees  they  were  anxious 
to  extend  the  royal  authority.  In  1498,  the  bailli  were  forbidden  to 
exercise  judicial  functions  in  person.  The  authority  still  remained 
vested  in  the  office,  but  the  actual  exercise  devolved  upon  the  lieu- 
tenants of  the  bailli.  In  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries,  the 
financial  functions  of  the  bailli  were  overshadowed  by  the  develop- 
ment of  new  taxes  and  a  financial  system  in  which  the  domain  was 
no  longer  the  administrative  unit. 

Baillage.  —  The  area  under  the  jurisdiction  of  a  bailli.  The  com- 
plications in  regard  to  the  baillages  arose  from  the  fact  that  the 
administrative  boundaries  had  little  relation  to  local  geography.  The 
baillage  included,  in  most  cases,  all  portions  of  the  royal  domain  in  a 
given  region.  Frequently,  as  the  result  of  historic  accident,  a  village 
would  be  attached  to  one  baillage  when  every  fact  of  geography  or  con- 
venience would  place  it  more  naturally  in  another.  Then,  too,  there 
were  frequent  disputes  over  jurisdiction.  Even  in  1789,  the  Crown 
did  not  possess  precise  knowledge  of  the  confines  of  the  baillages. 

Chatelet.  —  The  castle  used  as  official  residence  by  the  Provost  of 
Paris.  The  term  is  used  in  a  general  sense  to  refer  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Provost.  It  is  particularly  appropriate  after  1498,  when  the 
office  of  Provost  was  put  into  commission. 

Consul.  —  The  title  given  the  members  of  the  municipal  corpora- 
tion in  the  south  of  France.  In  a  general  way,  they  may  be  com- 
pared to  the  Echevins  of  the  north,  and  the  aldermen  of  the  English 
boroughs. 

Contrdleur  General  des  Finances.  —  It  is  scarcely  too  much  to  say 
that  no  two  Controleurs  Generaux  had  the  same  authority  or  power. 
The  title  was  old  even  in  Colbert's  day.  In  the  sixteenth  century, 
the  Controleur  was  merely  an  auditor.  The  title  was  given  to  Colbert 


APPENDIX  371 

to  conceal  the  fact  that  he  was  to  exercise  the  functions  of  Surin- 
tendant  des  Finances.  The  Surintendant  was  the  principal  minister 
of  finance,  and  Sully  had  exercised  a  predominant  influence  while 
he  held  that  office.  Colbert's  authority  was  the  result  of  a  combina- 
tion of  several  offices  in  his  hands.  Some  of  these  functions  became 
definitely  associated  with  the  Controle  General  and  were  included 
in  later  commissions.  Some  of  the  offices  were  regularly  conferred 
upon  the  Controleur  General.  After  the  death  of  Louis  XIV  the 
Controle  General  became  the  center  of  the  constitutional  struggle. 

Echevin.  —  The  title  of  a  member  of  the  municipal  corporation 
in  the  north  of  France. 

Election.  —  A  division  created  in  the  fourteenth  century  to  facili- 
tate the  assessment  and  collection  of  the  direct  taxes.  The  assessors 
were  originally  elected  by  the  land-owners  of  the  district,  hence  the 
name,  but  the  election  soon  ceased  to  have  any  real  meaning.  In 
the  later  period,  the  election  is  an  administrative  division  of  the 
generalite. 

Generalite.  —  An  area  formed  originally  with  reference  to  the 
collection  of  the  direct  taxes.  By  a  very  complicated  process  of 
growth,  the  division  came  to  be  the  general  administrative  area 
under  the  supervision  of  the  intendant.  The  number  of  generalites 
was  constantly  changing.  The  boundaries  were  at  times  the  old 
provincial  boundaries,  but  more  frequently  their  limits  bore  no 
relation  to  any  of  the  older  administrative  divisions. 

Intendant.  —  The  title  intendant  is  used  in  several  distinct  mean- 
ings during  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries.  The  Inten- 
dants  de  Justice  of  the  sixteenth  century  were  royal  officers  sent 
from  Paris  to  attend  to  fairly  specific  judicial  matters.  During 
the  Wars  of  Religion,  Intendants  d'Armee  were  frequently  attached 
to  the  armies.  In  the  early  seventeenth  century,  the  intendant 
developed  new  functions  in  connection  with  the  taxes.  This  change 
was  really  a  fusion  of  offices  that  had  formerly  been  distinct.  The 
Intendant  de  Justice  was  given  the  functions  of  the  Receveurs  Gene- 
raux.  The  change  is  difficult  to  trace  in  detail,  but  it  was  this  new 
development  that  brought  the  intendant  into  close  contact  with 
the  generalites,  and  made  him  a  local  administrative  officer.  Colbert 
emphasized  these  administrative  functions  and  made  the  intendant 
an  efficient  agent  of  the  central  administration.  Under  Louis  XV, 
the  authority  of  the  central  administration  diminished  and  the 
intendants  became  more  independent.  Apart  from  the  differences 


372  APPENDIX 

in  the  powers  of  the  intendants  at  different  periods,  there  are  impor- 
tant differences  in  their  authority  in  different  places.  In  Languedoc, 
the  intendant  enjoyed  a  large  measure  of  discretion.  Baville  was 
called  the  "  King  of  Languedoc."  At  Paris,  the  intendant  was  not 
very  important.  At  Lyons,  local  influences  were  strong  and  the  inten- 
dant complained  at  times  that  he  scarcely  knew  what  was  being  done. 

Lieutenant  Civil.  —  In  1498,  the  judicial  authority  was  taken 
from  the  Provost  of  Paris  and  given  to  the  Lieutenants  at  the  Chatelet. 
Both  the  lieutenant  civil  and  the  lieutenant  criminel  claimed  prece- 
dence. The  dispute  remained  undecided  until  1630,  when  the  lieuten- 
ant civil  was  given  precedence.  He  thus  exercised  general  supervision 
over  all  the  work  of  the  tribunal. 

In  some  of  the  baillages,  there  was  an  official  with  this  title. 

Lieutenant  Criminel.  —  After  1630,  the  lieutenant  criminel  exercised 
the  criminal  jurisdiction  of  the  Chatelet,  subject  to  the  general  control 
of  the  lieutenant  civil.  In  the  absence  of  the  lieutenant  civil  the 
lieutenant  criminel  presided. 

This  title  also  appears  in  some  of  the  baillages. 

Lieutenant  General.  —  The  lieutenant  general  was  a  resident  of 
prominence  empowered  to  discharge  all  the  functions  of  the  bailli 
throughout  the  baillage,  when  the  bailli  was  absent.  As  the  duties 
of  the  bailli  increased,  more  and  more  of  his  power  passed  to  the 
lieutenant.  In  the  larger  baillages,  there  were  lieutenants  generaux 
in  all  of  the  important  towns.  Technically,  they  had  jurisdiction 
throughout  the  baillage;  in  practice,  they  did  little  outside  of  their 
immediate  vicinity.  They  discharged  the  functions  of  the  bailli, 
not  only  when  he  was  absent  from  the  baillage,  but  also  when  he 
was  merely  occupied  in  some  other  part  of  his  baillage.  After  1498, 
the  lieutenants  generaux  were  the  real  administrators  of  the  baillages. 

Lieutenant  Particulier.  —  This  lieutenant  was  a  subordinate  of 
the  lieutenant  general,  and  had  jurisdiction  only  within  the  portion 
of  the  baillage  most  immediately  subject  to  the  lieutenant  general. 
The  lieutenant  particulier  was  not  supposed  to  act  if  the  lieutenant 
general  could  be  found,  and  the  lieutenant  general  was  supposed  to 
be  accessible  at  all  times.  If  all  went  well,  there  would  be  nothing 
for  the  lieutenant  particulier  to  do. 

Parlement. — The  Parlements  of  French  history  were  judicial 
and  administrative  bodies,  in  which  the  judicial  functions  steadily 
gained  the  upper  hand.  Legislative  power,  in  the  true  sense  of  the 
term,  they  never  possessed.  The  Parlement  of  Paris  was  somewhat 


APPENDIX  373 

different  in  attributions  and  organization  from  the  provincial  Parle- 
ments  of  Toulouse,  Grenoble,  Bordeaux,  and  Dijon.  For  the  purposes 
of  this  study,  the  most  important  feature  of  the  activities  of  the 
provincial  Parlements  is  their  resistance  to  the  increase  of  the  power 
of  the  Crown  in  the  provinces.  Although  these  Parlements  technically 
possessed  no  legislative  authority,  refusal  to  publish  unpopular 
royal  edicts,  and  the  enforcement  of  edicts  more  in  accord  with  local 
interests,  gave  them  the  means  of  exerting  much  real  influence.  The 
Parlement  of  Paris  did  not  come  into  conflict  with  the  Crown  in  any 
matters  pertaining  to  the  grain  trade.  It  seldom  did  anything  more 
than  confirm  the  measures  of  others. 

Procureur  du  Roi.  —  A  royal  attorney  attached  to  the  staff  of  the 
baillages  to  defend  and  supervise  the  judicial  interests  of  the  Crown. 

Provost  of  Merchants  (Prevot  des  Marchands).  —  At  Paris,  Lyons, 
and  some  other  cities  the  chief  municipal  officer  was  called  Provost 
of  Merchants.  This  was  a  souvenir  of  the  origin  of  the  municipal 
charter  in  a  grant  of  privilege  to  the  merchants  of  the  town.  The 
jurisdiction  varied  in  accordance  with  the  charter,  and  the  actual 
importance  of  the  office  was  largely  dependent  upon  the  political 
situation  in  the  locality. 

Provost  of  Paris  (Prevot  de  Paris).  —  The  Provost  of  Paris  was  an 
administrative  officer  of  the  royal  domain  possessing  roughly  the 
same  attributions  as  a  bailli.  The  resemblance,  however,  does  not 
extend  far.  The  influence  of  the  Crown  in  the  Isle  de  France  was  so 
strong  that  the  character  of  the  official  and  of  the  office  were  excep- 
tional in  many  ways.  The  edict  of  1498  withdrew  all  direct  judicial 
administration  from  the  hands  of  the  Provost  and  assigned  it  to  the 
lieutenants  civil  and  criminel.  There  was  no  specific  division  of 
powers,  and  the  struggle  for  precedence  that  ensued  was  not  settled 
until  1630. 

Senechal.  —  See  Bailli: 

Senechaussee.  —  See  Baillage. 

Subdelegue.  —  The  subdelegue  was  an  agent  of  the  intendant, 
appointed  by  him  and  directly  subject  to  his  authority  in  all  respects. 
There  were  subdelegues  in  some  of  the  generalites  early  in  the  seven- 
teenth century,  but  it  was  not  until  1709  that  they  became  universal. 
From  that  time  on  they  become  increasingly  important.  The  powers 
of  the  subdelegue  cannot  be  described  very  definitely,  variations  in 
different  localities  were  considerable,  and,  even  in  the  same  generalite, 
their  powers  changed  in  many  important  respects. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

MANUSCRIPT  MATERIAL 

THIS  statement  of  manuscript  material  should  not  be  treated  as 
a  comprehensive  manuscript  bibliography.  A  complete  list  of  the 
sources  that  might  be  used  in  a  study  of  the  grain  trade  would  be 
too  voluminous  in  extent  and  too  general  in  character  to  be  of  any 
assistance.  The  sources  for  such  work  are  almost  entirely  official 
documents,  and  the  variety  of  jurisdictions  coming  in  contact  with 
trade  was  so  considerable  that  research  can  be  continued  indefinitely. 
In  some  "  depots  d'archives  "  there  are  cartons  of  material  entirely 
devoted  to  the  subject  of  grain  trade  regulation;  such  collections  of 
material  are  of  value  as  indicating  the  jurisdiction  that  is  most  active 
in  the  locality,  and  as  affording  some  general  ideas  of  conditions. 
But  these  selections  of  material  are  seldom  to  be  trusted,  and  it  is 
generally  necessary  to  examine  all  the  general  documents  of  the 
authorities  acting. 

The  quantity  of  material  that  was  available  forced  me  to  limit 
my  work  to  what  may  be  called  the  Parisian  and  the  Lyonese  manu- 
scripts. The  Parisian  material  included  the  correspondence  of  the 
central  authorities  at  Paris  from  1657-1710;  the  extant  records  of  the 
Echevinage  of  Paris,  and  the  records  of  the  Chatelet  in  so  far  as  they 
were  collected  by  Delamare. 

Of  these  three  sources  of  information,  the  general  correspondence 
of  the  Controleur  General  with  the  intendants  is  least  satisfactory. 
The  letters  contain  an  extraordinary  variety  of  information,  but  most 
of  it  is  irrelevant  and  letters  are  most  infrequent  in  the  regions  of 
the  most  active  development. 

This  correspondence  has  an  involved  and  curious  history  which 
still  appears  in  the  manner  in  which  it  is  preserved.  It  is  divided 
into  three  large  masses,  and  small  volumes  of  letters  may  be  found 
where  they  are  least  suspected. 

i.  The  "Melanges  Colbert,"  preserved  at  the  Bibliotheque  Nation- 
ale,  consist  of  the  letters  addressed  to  Colbert  by  intendants,  private 
persons,  and  various  officials  with  whom  an  incidental  correspondence 
developed.  This  covers  the  years  1658-77.  Many  of  these  letters 

374 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  375 

have  been  published  by  Depping,  in  his  Correspondence  Adminis- 
trative,1 but  the  publication  by  no  means  exhausts  the  letters  of 
general  interest,  and  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  selection  was 
not  made  with  great  care.  Judgment  of  the  value  of  Depping's  pub- 
lication is  doubly  difficult  because  of  a  change  in  the  classification 
of  MSS.  at  the  Bibliotheque.  The  bulk  of  the  Colbert  Correspon- 
dence figured  at  that  time  as  "Volumes  Vert,"  and  if  we  may  judge 
by  the  numbers  reported  by  Depping  in  his  bibliography,  the  present 
collection  of  correspondence  has  been  augmented  by  the  addition 
of  other  volumes.  Exactly  what  has  happened,  the  present  staff 
at  the  Bibliotheque  does  not  seem  to  know.  For  the  purposes  of 
the  present  study  the  volumes  "  Melanges  Colbert,"  101-126,  were 
examined  carefully,  but  on  account  of  the  apparent  barrenness  of 
this  material,  the  remaining  volumes,  126-176  bis,  were  covered  by 
the  selection  of  the  correspondence  for  May  and  June  of  each  year. 
The  letters  addressed  to  Colbert  in  the  "  Melanges  "  stop  at  1677. 
The  letters  of  the  intendants  to  Colbert  after  that  date  are  preserved 
at  the  Archives  Nationales,  serie  G7.  The  correspondence  in  these 
later  years  is  even  more  extensive  than  in  the  early  period,  as  well 
as  being  more  general  in  character.  The  letters  in  the  "  Melanges  " 
represent  a  correspondence  with  only  a  few  of  the  intendants,  those 
included  in  the  Department  of  Colbert,  as  Secretary  of  the  "  Maison 
du  Roi,  etc."  2 

2.  The  most  extensive  mass  of  letters  written  by  Colbert  is  now 
preserved  at  the  Bibliotheque  Nationale,  in  the  "  Melanges  Clairam- 
bault,"  vols.  461-468.  These  are  copies  in  a  secretarial  hand  of 
letters  written  between  1679  and  1681.  Nearly  all  of  these  have  been 
published  by  Clement  in  his  Lettres,  Instructions,  et  Memoires  de 
J.  B.  Colbert.  Scarcely  anything  of  importance  has  been  omitted. 
These  letters  are  supplemented  at  times  by  collections  made  by  the 
intendant  to  whom  letters  were  addressed.  At  the  Bibliotheque 
Nationale,  Fonds  Francais,  8751-52,  there  are  the  original  letters 
addressed  by  Colbert  to  Le  Blanc,  Intendant  at  Rouen,  1681.  At 
Amiens,  in  the  Bibliotheque  Communale,  four  volumes  of  letters 

1  Depping,  G.  B.,  Correspondence  Administrative  sous  le  Regne  de  Louis  XIV, 
torn.  IV,  Paris,  1850-55. 

2  The  history  of  the  Departments  of  State  at  this  period  is  most  helpfully 
treated  by  A.  de  Boislisle,  in  the  Introduction  to  the  Correspondence  des  Controleurs 
Gtneraux,  and  in  the  appendices  on  the  Council  of  State  in  his  edition  of  the  M&- 
moirs  of  St.  Simon,  vol.  IV,  377~4395  V,  437-482;  VI,  477-512;  VII,  405-443. 

f 


376  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

addressed  to  Breteuil  are  preserved.  (Amiens,  Bib.  Comm.,  508. 
Letters  1680-83.)  Other  collections  could  probably  be  found.  It 
is  wise  to  observe  that  we  posses,  ^nly  the  letters  of  the  closing  years 
of  Colbert's  ministry,  and  that  our  judgments  of  his  work  are  probably 
affected  by  this  ill-balanced  preservation  of  material. 

3.  The  Papers  of  the  Controle  General  des  Finances  which  now 
constitute  the  serie  G7.  at  the  "  Archives  Nationales  "  are  the  most 
voluminous  mass  of  general  material  connected  with  the  period. 
Both  sides  of  the  correspondence  appear:  the  letters  of  the  Controleur 
General  and  the  letters  of  the  intendants.  Beginning  in  1677,  the 
correspondence  gradually  becomes  more  voluminous  until  1715,  and 
then  diminishes  in  value  until  it  ceases  in  1733.  After  that  date, 
most  of  the  letters  are  to  be  found  in  the  Departmental  Archives. 
The  publication  of  documents  from  this  correspondence  by  the  late 
A.  de  Boislisle,1  is  excellent  in  every  respect.  The  documents  are 
well  selected  and  the  indications  of  what  it  was  necessary  to  omit 
are  singularly  complete.  But  the  mass  of  material  is  so  great  that 
the  printed  volumes  can  do  no  more  than  give  the  reader  an  accurate 
conception  of  what  can  be  done  with  the  MSS.  This  fonds  consists 
of  general  correspondence,  classified  by  generalites:  Cartons,  1-537. 

In  addition  to  this,  there  is  much  material  classified  by  subjects, 
including  35  cartons  on  the  grain  trade:  Nos.  1630-65.  This  separa- 
tion of  material  was  made,  at  the  time,  to  facilitate  the  work  of  the 
administrative  staff.  The  special  cartons  on  the  grain  trade  contain 
all  the  correspondence  of  the  years  1693-94  and  1709-10. 

In  this  series  it  was  possible  to  utilize  only:  — 

(1)  Cartons  1630-65. 

(2)  General  cartons  containing  the  correspondence  for  the  last  years 
of  Colbert's  ministry:   1667-83. 

(3)  General  cartons  containing  the  correspondence  of  the  years  1698- 
1 700,  a  period  of  dearth  only  slightly  less  important  than  the  years 
1693-94,   1708-09.     The  letters  on  this  dearth  were  originally 
collected  with  the  other  grain  material,  but  were  spread  through 
the  general  cartons  by  Boislisle. 

No  attempt  was  made  to  cover  the  years  1683-93, 1695~98,  1700-08. 
It  is  certain  from  other  evidence  that  there  was  little  pressure  from 
scarcity  in  those  years,  and  so  little  information  appears  in  years  of 
plenty  that  it  was  not  deemed  expedient  to  spend  time  in  searching 
the  MSS.  of  those  periods. 

1  Correspondence  des  ContrSleurs  Generaux  des  Finances  avec  les  Intendants  des 
Provinces,  3  torn.,  Paris,  1874-97. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  377 

The  General  Cartons  actually  examined  were:  —  i,  15-16,  71,  79, 
84,  87-89,  101,  112,  124,  131-132,  137-141,  156-157,  i59~l62> 
171-172,  178-187,  213,  223-224,  227-232,  239,  243,  257,  276,  294- 
309,  337-338,  345,  355,  358-36i,  374,  39°,  394,  405,  417-420,  425, 
429-433,  449,  451-453,  45M59,  463-471,  49i,  495-496,  5°6,  5*2- 
513,  518-527,  551. 

The  most  serious  omission  is  the  neglect  of  the  letters  addressed 
to  the  intendants  by  individuals.  For  the  period  1683-1730  there 
are  eighty  cartons  (Nos.  552-634).  During  the  years  of  dearth  in- 
formation of  importance  might  be  contributed  by  individuals.  Lack 
of  time  rendered  the  exploitation  of  that  material  impossible. 

The  local  Parisian  material  is  associated  with  the  Echevinage 
and  the  Chatelet,  and  here  the  difficulties  of  research  reach  a  maximum. 
The  archives  of  the  Echevinage  were  almost  completely  destroyed 
by  the  Commune  in  1871;  only  the  "  Registres  du  Bureau  de  la 
Ville  "  remain,  a  very  brief  record  of  the  principal  activities  of  the 
fichevins  after  I499.1  These  are  preserved  at  the  Archives  Nationales 
as  part  of  "  serie  H."  These  have  been  printed  down  to  1610,  though 
one  or  two  volumes  are  still  in  press.  The  manuscript  registers 
were  used  for  the  period  1610-1710,  Nos.  H.  1796  and  ff.  The 
registers  are  practically  duplicated  by  a  series  of  notes  and  papers 
on  loose  sheets,  which  were  used  by  the  secretary  as  the  basis  of  the 
registers,  but  as  these  are  more  difficult  to  handle,  the  latter  were 
used.  The  registers  were  indexed  by  the  secretary,  year  by  year, 
so  that  there  is  little  trouble  in  using  these  records. 

The  records  of  the  Chatelet  have  survived  intact,  but  the  jurisdic- 
tion was  so  comprehensive  and  the  organization  of  work  so  slight  that 
it  is  wellnigh  impossible  to  find  one's  way  around  in  these  MSS.  The 
trouble  is  increased  by  the  extremely  difficult  notarial  hand  in  which 
these  records  are  written.  The  Chatelet  was  unquestionably  the 
jurisdiction  most  intimately  in  touch  with  the  grain  trade  in  the 
seventeenth  century,  but  the  difficulty  of  utilizing  the  material  at 
first  hand  made  it  necessary  to  depend  largely  upon  Delamare.  All 
his  papers  are  preserved  at  the  Bibliotheque  Nationale,  so  that  it  is 
possible  to  supplement  his  printed  volumes  in  many  respects.  My 
confidence  in  Delamare  for  the  more  important  grain  trade  material 
contained  in  the  records  of  the  Chatelet  is  based  upon  two  facts. 

1  Histoire  Generate  de  Paris.  Registres  des  Deliberations  du  Bureau  de  la  Ville  de 
Paris.  1499-1610.  torn.  XIV,  Paris,  1883-1908. 


37$  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

In  the  first  place,  the  general  registers  of  the  Chatelet,  the  "  Ban- 
nieres,"  were  certainly  utilized  by  him  in  preparing  his  Traite  de  la 
Police.  Consequently  we  can  trust  him  for  the  larger  outlines  of  the 
activity  of  the  Chatelet,  even  prior  to  his  own  day.  He  knew  as 
much  as  anyone  can,  without  an  extraordinary  acquaintance  with 
this  complicated  jurisdiction.  In  the  second  place,  after  1660,  Dela- 
mare  is  indubitably  the  best  informed  man  in  France  in  regard  to 
grain  trade  regulation.  In  addition  to  his  historical  or  antiquarian 
knowledge,  he  possessed  first  hand  knowledge  of  conditions  throughout 
the  Seine  Basin,  acquired  as  commissioner  of  the  Chatelet. 
Delamare's  information  is  accessible  in  several  forms:  — 

(1)  The  general  material  in  the  second  volume  of  the  Traite  de  la 
Police. 

(2)  The  description  of  the  two  visits  to  Champagne  in  1709-10,  in 
the  supplement  to  the  2d  edition  of  the  third  volume.      (Paris, 
1722.) 

(3)  The  papers  at  the  Bibliotheque  Nationale.     These  papers  fall 
into  three  classes: — notes  for  the   Traite  de  la  Police,  which 
seldom  contain  anything  not  printed;    letters  passing  between 
Delamare  and  various  people,  both  private  individuals  and  public 
officials;    lastly,   "  proces  verbaux "   which   should  properly  be 
at  the  Archives  Nationales  among  the  papers  of  the  Chatelet. 
These  letters  and  "  proces  verbaux  "  are  scattered  through  several 
volumes  —  Bibliotheque   Nationale,    Fonds   Francais,    21641-50. 
The  other  volumes  among  Delamare's  papers  are  of  little  value  for 
the  study  of  the  grain  trade,  though  there  is  much  on  commerce 
and  industry.     But  although  it  is  safe  to  trust  Delamare  for  the 
general  results  of  the  work  of  the  Chatelet  and  for  many  facts, 
it  i?  probable  that  a  careful  utilization  of  the  papers  at  the  archives 
would  yield  much.      Research  will  be  difficult,  and  it  is  possible 
that  nothing  might  come,  even  of  protracted  search.     All  the  clues 
to  be  found  in  Delamare  were  traced  down  without  result  in  the 
papers   of   the   commissioners,  but   those   particular   documents 
had  been  abstracted  by  Delamare  and  are  among  his  papers. 
None  the  less,  the  most  considerable  possibility  of  discovering 
new  material  is  presented  by  the  archives  of  the  Chatelet.      It 
remains  to  be  seen  if  Delamare's  work  is  to  be  the  only  attempt 
to  master  this  material.1 

In  addition  to  these  general  deposits,  much  scattering  material 
was  examined,  both  at  the  Bibliotheque  Nationale  and  at  the  Ar- 
chives. At  the  Bibliotheque,  the  MSS.  on  "  Commerce  "  and  "Police" 

1  The  Bannieres  have  already  been  worked  over  by  M.  Tu6ty,  but  little  has 
been  added  to  Delamare. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  379 

in  the  "  Fond  Francais  "  were  inspected,  for  the  most  part  without 
result.  The  most  important  MSS.  were  the  volumes  in  the  "  Collec- 
tion Moreau."  1061.  Pieces  sur  le  Commerce  de  Paris.  1062. 
Regis tres  des  Compagnies  Francaises,  1449-67.  There  are  three 
volumes  of  Compagnies  Francaises,  1532-61,  but  the  entries  are  so 
brief  that  they  have  no  historical  value  for  the  purposes  of  this  study. 

The  famous  "  Memoires  sur  les  Generalites,"  of  1698,  were  left 
untouched  chiefly  from  a  lack  of  time,  and  partly  from  the  idea  that 
they  were  not  particularly  important  for  this  study.  At  the  Archives 
Nationales,  the  most  useful  of  the  small  groups  of  material  was  the 
"  Bibliotheque  Administrative  "  (Rondonneau).  This  is  a  collection 
of  ordinances,  edicts,  and  letters  patent,  beginning  in  the  middle 
of  the  seventeenth  century.  There  are  two  series,  one  arranged 
chronologically,  the  other  by  subjects.  The  grain  edicts,  A.  D.  XI, 
37-40  supplement  Delamare  at  many  points. 

The  work  in  the  Municipal  Archives  at  Lyons  was  less  difficult 
in  one  sense,  because  there  was  no  doubt  as  to  which  authorities 
were  acting,  but  here  again  it  was  necessary  to  utilize  the  general 
records,  so  that  a  large  mass  of  material  had  to  be  searched  for  the 
requisite  data. 

The  importance  01  the  grain  trade  at  Lyons  resulted  in  the  collection 
of  many  papers  on  this  subject,  and  these  are  still  catalogued  inde- 
pendently. But  these  documents  would  not  be  a  safe  guide  for 
a  knowledge  of  Lyonese  conditions.  The  one  entirely  trustworthy 
source  of  information  is  the  series  of  municipal  registers.  These 
are  much  more  voluminous  than  the  Paris  registers,  and,  as  they  begin 
almost  a  century  earlier  (1428),  it  was  impossible  to  examine  this 
material  thoroughly.  The  difficulty  of  research  is  increased  by  the 
inadequacy  of  the  inventaire  sommaire  of  the  Registers,  which  the 
archivists  warned  me  not  to  trust. 

The  papers  which  relate  especially  to  the  grain  trade  are  of  three 
kinds:  — 

(i)  Serie  HH.     Chappe  IV.    Letters  Patent  of  the  Crown,  or  of 

Provincial  Governors. 
(2)  Serie  GG.     Chappe  IV.     Papers  relating  to  the  Chambre  d'Abon- 

dance.     Some  concern  its  organization;  some  are  the  papers  of  the 

Chambre:   accounts,  records  of  the  deliberations  of  the  Chambre, 

and  letters  from  its  agents,  1667-69. 
(3)  Serie  FF.  HH.     Chappe  VII.     Various  papers  concerning  the 

detailed  regulation  of  the  trade,  Assizes  of  Bread,  ordinances 

concerning  bakers,  the  ports,  etc. 


380  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The  Letters  Patent  are  a  valuable  and  interesting  source.  The 
documents  of  the  Abondance  are  of  unequal  value.  The  accounts  are 
of  little  use  historically,  except  as  indicating  the  degree  of  regularity 
in  the  functioning  of  the  Chambre.  The  Registers  of  Deliberations 
are  valuable,  and  should  have  been  utilized  more  carefully.  The 
letters  of  Du  Pradt  to  the  Directors  of  the  Abondance  constitute 
one  of  the  most  important  pieces  of  evidence  in  regard  to  the  seven- 
teenth century  grain  trade.  But  on  the  principal  question,  the  history 
of  the  Chambre,  these  special  papers  were  uncertain  and  vague. 
Still,  it  was  evident  that  the  critical  years  in  the  history  of  the  trade 
were  the  years  that  left  some  trace  in  these  scattered  papers.  The 
main  body  of  facts  could,  therefore,  be  obtained  by  reference  to  the 
Consular  Registers  for  the  years  indicated  in  Letters  Patent,  accounts 
of  the  Abondance,  and  such  other  incidental  references  as  suggested 
notable  occurrences. 

The  third  class  of  material  was  of  no  value  for  this  study. 

The  Consular  Registers  for  the  critical  years  were  examined,  and 
as  there  were  frequent  references  to  deputies  charged  with  regulation 
of  the  grain  trade,  it  was  deemed  expedient  to  seek  fuller  details 
among  their  letters.  Some,  important  letters  thus  came  to  light. 

Citations  in  the  municipal  archives  at  Lyons  present  a  few  unusual 
features.  The  documents  were  very  carefully  inventoried  and  classi- 
fied in  the  eighteenth  century  by  one  Chappe,  and  his  work  is  still 
the  basis  of  the  arrangement  of  the  parts  of  the  archives  inventoried 
by  him.  Documents  are  cited  by  the  letters  of  the  series  and  by 
the  volume  and  page  of  the  manuscript  Inventaire.  The  Consular 
Registers  of  the  Serie  BB.,  and  the  Letters  in  Serie  AA.  were  not 
included  in  Chappe 's  Inventory. 

Work  at  Lyons  covered  the  following  material:1  — 

(1)  Letters  Patent,  etc.     Serie  HH.     Chappe  IV,  381,  393,  401,  411, 
422,  427.    Each  liasse  is  cited  by  the  reference  to  the  first  docu- 
ment. 

(2)  Papers  of  the  Abondance:  — 

General,  GG.     Chappe  IV,  443,  448,  450,  45i-452»  453,  460, 

461-642. 

Accounts,  GG.     Chappe  IV,  481. 
Deliberations,  GG.     Chappe  IV,  538. 

(3)  Registres  Consulaires.    BB.  19.    352,  24,  47,  61,  81,  82,  85,  91, 
105,  116. 

1  Here,  as  elsewhere,  I  cite  only  those  MSS.  which  proved  to  be  of  value. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  381 

These  Registers  exist  in  duplicate  for  the  most  part,  there  being 
the  minutes  taken  during  meetings  and  the  copy  prepared  later. 
The  latter  are,  of  course,  most  convenient. 

(4)  In  Serie  AA.,  of  thirty-three  liasses  examined,  only  two  contained 
letters  of  importance  for  the  grain  trade  —  Nos.  29,  32. 

A  few  days'  work  was  done  in  the  Municipal  Archives  at  Dijon 
to  clear  up  the  early  history  of  the  Lyonese  in  Burgundy  and  Bassigny. 
In  the  time  available  it  was  possible  to  examine  only  such  material 
as  lay  on  the  surface:  letters  patent,  extracts  from  the  municipal 
records,  vouchers  turned  in  by  commissioners  stating  work  done,  etc. 
These  results  should  be  controlled  by  study  of  the  municipal  registers, 
but  for  the  purpose  in  view  the  scattered  documents  were  probably 
trustworthy.  The  work  covered  Serie  G.  241,  256-266  inclusive. 

I  trust  that  this  statement  will  indicate  the  general  character  of 
the  material  that  can  be  utilized  for  a  study  of  the  grain  trade.  The 
subject  necessitates  constant  reference  to  general  municipal  registers 
and  to  administrative  correspondence.  Furthermore,  it  is  essential 
to  cover  a  large  territory,  so  that  comprehensiveness  of  research  is 
almost  impossible.  The  necessity  of  abandoning  any  hope  of  com- 
prehensive treatment  made  me  neglect  price  statistics.  Materials 
exist  for  the  preparation  of  interesting  figures,  but  the  general  state- 
ment of  the  conditions  of  the  time  seemed  to  be  essential  to  a  proper 
interpretation  of  such  statistics,  and  it  was  evident  that  there  would 
only  be  time  for  the  prosecution  of  this  first  stage  in  the  work. 

PRINTED  LITERATURE 

The  extent  of  the  MS.  sources  available  for  the  treatment  of  this 
subject  made  the  printed  literature  relatively  less  important,  as  regards 
the  completed  book.  The  studies  of  Araskhaniantz,  Afanassiev, 
and  Naude  were  exceedingly  helpful  at  the  beginning,  but  concentra- 
tion on  the  market  problems  of  the  domestic  grain  trade  carried  the 
work  into  a  different  field,  and  the  results  suggested  a  somewhat 
different  account  of  royal  policy.  The  influence  of  these  authors 
was  thus  of  a  nature  that  cannot  easily  be  indicated  by  footnotes 
in  the  text,  and  for  that  reason  I  take  this  occasion  to  recognize  an 
indebtedness  that  is  real  even  if  it  cannot  be  precisely  indicated. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Works  Relating  Specifically  to  the  History  of  the  Grain  Trade 
during  the  Sixteenth  and  Seventeenth  Centuries    . 

Araskhaniantz,  A.  Die  Franzosische  Getreidehandelspolitik  bis  zum  Jahre 
178(2  in  ihrcm  Zuzammenhange  mit  der  Land-,  Volks-,  und  Finanzwirth- 
schaft.  Leipzig,  1883.  In  Schmoller:  Staats  und  Social wissenschaftliche 
Forschungen,  IV.  This  is  the  most  considerable  attempt  at  mono- 
graphic treatment  of  the  history  of  the  grain  trade  in  the  sixteenth  and 
seventeenth  centuries,  but  it  is  only  proper  to  add  that  it  is  unfinished. 
The  author's  studies  were  interrupted  after  two  years'  work,  and,  as 
there  was  little  prospect  of  a  resumption  of  the  task,  the  results  obtained 
were  published.  The  magnitude  of  the  project  was  such  tha  t  the  author 
was  scarcely  more  than  well  started  when  work  was  discontinued.  He 
was  able  only  to  bring  together  the  material  that  lay  on  the  surface,  and 
as  the  questions  of  policy  are  most  conspicuous,  his  attention  is  largely 
absorbed  by  the  political  aspect  of  the  trade.  His  treatment  is  not  very 
helpful  as  he  does  not  read  the  edicts  critically  and  does  not  realize  the 
necessity  of  a  sharp  distinction  between  the  "  foreign  "  and  the  "domes- 
tic "  trade.  There  is  no  indication  of  a  perception  of  the  preeminent 
importance  of  the  problem  of  distribution  within  the  confines  of  the 
kingdom. 

Bethouart,  A.  Histoire  du  Ble  dans  la  Beauce.  Chartres,  1888.  A  com- 
pilation of  a  few  scattering  notices  of  prices,  dearths,  and  crop  conditions. 
Of  no  serious  value. 

Biollay,  L.  Les  anciennes  Halles  de  Paris.  Memoires  de  la  Soc.  de  1'Hist. 
de  Paris  et  de  ITsle  de  France,  III  (1876). 

Boislisle,  A.  de.  Le  Grand  Hyver  de  1709.  Revue  des  Questions  Historiques. 
Avril,  1903,  p.  445.  An  excellent  account  of  the  external  aspects  of  the 
episode  which  played  so  large  a  part  in  the  crisis  of  the  history  of  the 
grain  trade.  Contains  references  to  the  material  available  for  study  of 
the  meteorological  conditions,  as  well  as  the  most  important  general 
descriptions  in  contemporary  material. 

Boissonade,  P.  La  Production  et  le  Commerce  des  Cereales,  des  Vins,  et  des 
Eaux  de  Vie  en  Languedoc,  dans  le  seconde  moitie  du  XVIIs  siecle.  An- 
nales  du  Midi,  XVII  (1905).  Also  published  separately.  32pp.  A 
very  interesting  study  of  the  agricultural  side  of  the  subject,  but  so 
brief  in  the  portions  devoted  to  the  commercial  movement  that  it  was  of 
little  assistance.  Although  local  material  was  utilized,  little  information 
is  given  on  the  commercial  aspect  of  the  subject  that  does  not  appear  in 
greater  detail  in  the  MSS.  consulted  for  the  present  study. 

Chassaigne,  M.  Essai  sur  Vancienne  police  de  Paris:  V  approvisionnement. 
Revue  des  fitudes  Historiques,  1906.  (Mai,  Juin,  Juillet,  Aout.) 
Largely  concerned  with  the  regulation  of  the  retail  trade  in  food 
stuffs. 

Gras,  L.  J.  Prix  du  Ble  a  St.  Etienne  pendant  trois  siecles  (1640  a  nos 
jours)  d'apres  les  mercuriales.  1906.  Soc.  d'agriculture  de  la  Loire. 
(This  work  has  been  inaccessible.) 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  383 

Louandre,    Charles.    De  V alimentation  publique  sous  Vancien  monarchic 

francaise.     (This  I  have  not  seen.) 
Marsy,  Comte  de.    Lapprovissionnement  de  Paris  sous  Louis  XII.    Diffi- 

cultes  au  sujet  a" acquisitions  de  ble  faites  a  Noyon,  1501-03.    Bulletin  de 

la  Soc.  de  1'Histoire  de  Paris  et  de  ITsle  de  France  (1877). 
Naude,    Wilhelm.    Die    Getreidehandelspolitik    der    Europaischen    Staaten 

vom  I3ten  bis  zum  i8ien  Jakrhundert.    Berlin,  1896.     A  well  considered 

statement,  but  necessarily   brief.     The   explanations   of   the  French 

policy  are  hardly  supported  by  detailed  study, 
de  la  Porte,  Guillaume.    Avis  de  G de  la  P Eotteux  es  Holies  de 

Paris.     Paris,    1621,   Fournier:    Varietes,  Historiques,  et  Litteraires, 

torn.  III. 

Works  Relating  to  the  History  of  the  Grain  Trade  in  the 
Eighteenth  Century 

These  books  were  consulted  and  many  of  them  exerted  an  indirect 
influence  upon  the  present  study. 

Afanassiev,  Georges.  Le  Commerce  des  Cereales  en  France.  Paris,  1894. 
Traduit  du  Russe  sous  le  direction  de  Paul  Boyer.  An  interesting  be- 
ginning of  a  study  of  the  most  difficult  period  in  the  history  of  the  grain 
trade.  There  is  evidence  of  much  patient  research,  but  the  main  prob- 
lems of  the  period  are  scarcely  touched. 

Babeau,  A.     La  lettre  de  VEtat  contre  la  cherete  en  1724.     Paris,  1892. 

Biollay,  Leon.    Les  Prix  de  Ble  en  17 go.    Paris,  1885. 

Biollay,  Paul.  Etudes  economises  sur  le  XVIII"  siecle.  Le  Pacte  de 
Famine.  Paris,  1885.  Disposes  of  the  charges  against  Louis  XV  in 
regard  to  the  alleged  syndicate  for  the  control  of  grain  prices. 

Boisguillebert,  Pierre  le  Pesant  de.    Ouevres  diver ses. 

Bond,  G.  Le  Pacte  de  Famine.  Histoire  du  Ble  en  France.  Paris,  1889. 
A  more  popular  statement  of  the  case  than  Biollay 's,  but  no  less  destruc- 
tive of  the  old  legend. 

Frotiere  de  ia  Messeliere,  M.  Boisguillebert  et  la  liberte  des  grains.  Paris, 
1903. 

Galiani.     Dialogues  sur  les  Bles.     1770. 

Gazier,  A.  La  Guerre  des  Farines.  (Mai,  1775.)  Memoires  de  la  Soc. 
d'Hist.  de  Paris  et  de  1'Isle  de  France,  VI,  1879. 

Herbert,  Claude  Jacques.  La  Police  des  Grains:  Essai  sur  la  Police  Generale 
des  grains,  sur  leurs  prix,  et  sur  les  effets  de  V agriculture.  Berlin,  1755. 

Letaconnoux,  J.  Le  Commerce  des  Cereales  dans  la  Bretagne.  The  proofs 
of  this  work  were  kindly  placed  at  my  disposition.  Its  publication  is 
announced. 

Le  Trosne.  La  Liberte  du  Commerce  des  Grains  toujours  utile  et  jamais 
nuisible.  Paris,  1784. 

Marion,  M.  Une  Famine  en  Guyenne,  1747-48.  Revue  Hjstorique, 
XLVI,  pp.  241-287. 

Mercier  de  la  Riviere.  L'Interet  Gentrale  de  VEtat,  ou  la  liberte  du  Commerce 
des  Bles.  Amsterdam,  1770. 


384  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Morellet.  Refutation  de  Vouvrage  qui  a  pour  litre  "  Dialogues  sur  le  Commerce 
deBlts."  1770. 

Roubaud.  Recreations  economiques,  ou  Lettres  de  Vauteur  des  Representa- 
tions aux  Magistrals  a  M.  le  Chevalier  Zanobi,  principal  interlocuteur  des 
Dialogues  sur  le  Commerce  des  Bles.  1770. 

Valran,  G.    Miser e  el  Charlie  en  Provence  au  XVIII6  siecle.    Paris,  1899. 

Vaudin,  Bataille.    Histoire  de  la  Charitejusqu'en  1789.    Paris,  1897. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Ableiges,  Gilles  de  Maupeou,  Comte  <T, 
Intendant  in  Auvergne  (1691-95)  and 
at  Poitiers  (1695-1702),  25!.,  28  f., 
32,  63. 

Acier,  Sr.  d',  grain  merchant  of  Aux- 
onne,  146. 

Admiral,  the,  see  Bonnivet. 

Agde,  market  town  hi  Languedoc,  183, 
194,  195,  196,  291. 

Agde,  diocese  of,  293. 

Agen,  town  hi  Guienne,  30. 

Agen,  Madame  d',  grain  hoarder,  142. 

Agenois,  district  in  Guienne,  195. 

Aigneus,  the,  grain  merchants,  168, 
169. 

Aigueperse,  market  town,  3?,  61. 

Aire,  to\vn  hi  northern  France,  276. 

Airvault,  market  town,  24. 

Aix,  in  Provence,  17. 

Alby,  diocese  of,  in  Languedoc,  184,  196, 

339- 

Alencon,  election  of,  206,  207, 
Alencon,  vicomte  of,  207. 
Alencon,  d',  Lieutenant  General,  77. 
Alexandrin,  Barthelemy,  grain  merchant 

of  Lyons,  247,  248. 

Allier,  the,  river  hi  central  France,  63. 
Alps,  the,  128. 
Alsace,  114,  325,  328. 
Alsatian  border,  the,  279. 
Amant,  Nicolas,  testimony  of,  no  f. 
Amboise,  market  town,  67. 
Amiens,  47,  81,  276. 
Amiens,  Bailli  of,  256. 
Amiens,  generality  of,  708. 
Anconville,  town,  30,  n.  4. 
Andelys,  market  town,  19,  20,  49,  50,  57, 

59- 

Angers,  capital  of  Anjou,  68. 
Angouleme,  chief  town  of  Angoumois, 

216. 


Angoumois,  province  in  southwestern 
France,  204,  208. 

Anjou,  province,  24,  274. 

Appert,  Charles,  grain  buyer,  76. 

Apples,  281. 

Apremont,  Balan  d',  grain  commission 
merchant,  167  f. 

Archers,  262,  324  f.,  327. 

Archin,  Claude,  grain  merchant,  95. 

Arcis-sur-Seine,  market  town,  101,  102, 
103. 

Argences,  town,  19. 

Argenson,  Marc  Rene  de  Voyer  de 
Paulmy,  Marquis  d',  lieutenant  gen- 
eral of  police  at  Paris,  64,  298. 

Argenton-Chateau,  25. 

Arginot,  gram  merchant,  145. 

Argouges,  Florent  d',  Intendant  in 
Burgundy  (1688-94),  333,  335,  33°- 

Aries,  city  hi  Provence,  139,  174,  183, 
197,  198,  340. 

Armagnac,  district  hi  Gascony,  211,  214. 

Armies,  supply  of  grain  for  the,  117,  262, 

323  337- 
Arras,  36,  78. 
Arras,  grain  factor,  86. 
Artois,  province,  23,  37,  78. 
Asphodel  bread,  208. 
Assais,  market  town,  24. 
Attichy,  village  in  Soissonnais,  6,  99. 
Aube,  the,  river,  86,  327. 
Aube  valley,  the,  102,  103. 
Auch,  Archbishop  of,  211. 
Audiger,  grain  merchant  of  Paris,  87, 

95- 

Auge,  vicomte"  of,  hi  Normandy,  264. 
Aumale,  Comte  d',  7. 
Aumale,  Sieur  d',  251. 
Aumones  Generales,  the,  213. 
Aunay,  town  near  Vitry,  102. 
Aunis,  province,  28,  238. 


387 


388 


INDEX 


Aurard,  merchant  of  Marans,  28. 

Auray,  Breton  port,  33,  34. 

Aurillac,  election  of,  in  Upper  Auvergne, 
206. 

Ausgans,  Robert,  grain  merchant,  47. 

Auvergne,  province,  62,  63,  64,  67,  129, 
135,  138,  140,  147,  iS3,  154,  156,  158, 
165,  166,  184,  205,  206,  245,  246,  300, 
342. 

Auxois,  mediaeval  countship  in  Bur- 
gundy, 349. 

Auxonne,  town  on  the  Saone,  140,  144, 
145,  146,  152,  168,  186,  188,  189,  202, 
n.  2,  247,  249,  251,  252. 

Auxonne,  vicomte  of,  146. 

Avignon,  147,  149,  204,  232. 

Axsery,  140. 

Baillage,  nature  of  the,  243. 

Balme,   Sindic  in  Burgundy,  letter  of, 

279. 

Bapaume,  market  town,  36,  78. 
Bar,  duchy,  dependent  on  Lorraine,  113, 

114,326,328. 

Barbaron,  Jean,  testimony  of,  102  f. 
Barbary  grain,  340. 
Barbe,  attorney,  77. 
Barbier,  boatman,  123. 
Barley,  78,  n.  2,  205,  319,  341;   demand 

for,  in  Champagne,  116  f.;  abundance 

of,  in  Lorraine,  328. 
Barre,  Antoine  le  Fevre  de  la,  Intendant 

hi  Auvergne,  63. 
Barres,  des,  grain  hoarder,  142. 
Bar-sur-Seine,  town,  15,  16. 
Bassigny,  small  district  hi  Lorraine  and 

Champagne,  129,  136,  138,  143,  144, 

145,  157,  158,  167,  169,  186,  191,  244, 

248,  253,  322,  334. 
Baville,    Nicolas     de    Lamoignon    de, 

Intendant  in  Languedoc  (1685-1718), 

174,  183,  184,  185,  193,  194,  195,  196, 

209,  242,  285,  339  f. 
Bayonne,  17. 
Bazin,  Francois,  Sieur  de  Brandeville, 

Intendant  at  Metz,  281. 
B6arn,  province  in  southwestern  France, 

213- 


Beaucaire,  sene"chauss6e  of,  in  Languedoc, 
265. 

Beauce,  the,  district  in  northern  France, 
23,  47,  n.  i,  48,  53,  54,  55,  57,  64,  65, 
7i,  73,  74,  106,  118,  132,  133,  135,  138, 
148,  153,  158,  165,  166,  300,  301,  310, 
311,  325,  344;  destruction  of  the  old 
market  system  in,  88-94,  99. 

Beaugency,  town  near  Orleans,  343. 

Beaujolais,  district  in  Lyonnais,  131, 133, 
135,  138,  187,  211,  337. 

Beaumont,  town  in  Burgundy,  142. 

Beaumont-de-Lomagne,  town  in  south- 
ern France,  36. 

Beaumont-sur-Oise,  town  near  Noyon, 
36,  79,  262. 

Beaune,  town  in  Burgundy,  145. 

Beauvoisis,  district  in  northern  France, 
81,  225. 

Bellay,  physician  at  Blois,  210. 

Bellay,  town  in  Burgundy,  279. 

Belleme,  village,  143. 

Belleton,  Claude,  grain  merchant,  148. 

Belleville,  market  town,  245. 

Benedictins  de  Calvaire,  the,  at  Paris, 
84,  n.  i. 

Benigny,  Gerard,  grain  factor,  142. 

Benne,  Jacques,  grain  merchant  of  Lan- 
gres,  143- 

Bergerac,  town  in  Perigord,  216. 

Bernage,  official,  215  f. 

Berry,  province  in  central  France,  18, 
68,  215,  274,  343. 

Berthelot,  grain  merchant,  310. 

Berulle,  Pierre  de,  Intendant  in  Au- 
vergne (1684-87)  and  at  Lyons  (1687- 
94),  and  first  president  of  the  Parle- 
ment  of  Dauphine  and  Commandant 
of  the  province  of  Dauphine  (1694- 
1723)1  i73  f-,  176,  183,  201,  217,  332, 
333,335,336,338. 

Besancon,  city  in  Tranche  Comte,  185. 

Bessin,  district  in  Normandy,  50. 

Beure,  parish  in  Champagne,  16. 

Beuvron,  Marquis  de,  Lieutenant  Gen- 
eral to  the  government  of  Lower 
Normandy,  59. 

Be"ziers,  diocese  of,  293. 


INDEX 


389 


Beziers,  district  of,  in  Languedoc,  184. 

Beziers,  market  town  in  Languedoc,  183, 
195,  291. 

Bezons,  Claude  Bazin  de,  Intendant  in 
Languedoc,  285. 

Bezons,  Louis  Bazin  de,  Intendant  at 
Bordeaux  (1686-1700),  216. 

Bibliotheque  Mazarin,  the,  83. 

Bigorre,  county  of,  207. 

Bilain,  Jean  de,  grain  merchant  of 
Rouen,  51. 

Billy,  grain  merchant  of  Vannes,  35. 

Billy,  Philippe  de,  grain  merchant  of 
Bray,  no,  in. 

Blame,  Sr.  de,  Sindic  of  Bugey,  333. 

Blatters,  4,  10  f.,  21,  23,  25,  27,  36,  37,  40, 
42,  45,  46,  47,  59,  60,  69,  89,  90,  99, 
101,  102,  103,  104,  105,  106,  107,  108, 
in,  114,  116,  117  131,  168,  169,  206, 
312,  318;  their  operations  described, 

13-19- 
Blois,  city  on  the  Loire,  23,  62,  63,  66,  67, 

204,  210,  343. 

Blot,  Pierre,  grain  merchant  of  Bray,  no. 

Bobinet,  Andre,  prebend,  143. 

Bodin,   Jean,   political   economist,   349, 

353- 
Boileau,   Etienne,   author   of  Livre  des 

Metiers,  46, 47, 129. 
Bolbec,  industrial  town  in  Normandy, 

19. 

Bonnardot,  grain  merchant,  202,  n.  2. 
Bonnivet,  Guillaume,  Admiral  of  France, 

142. 
Bordeaux,  29,  30,  31,  32,  45,  195,  199, 

205,  214,  215,  216,  270,  281-284,  292, 
298,  339- 

Bordeaux,  Jurats  of,  282,  296. 

Bossuet,  Antoine,  Intendant  at  Soissons 

(1685-94),  97  f. 
Bouchu,  Claude,  Intendant  in  Burgundy, 

279  *•>  354- 

Bouchu,  fitienne  Jean,  Intendant  in 
Dauphine  and  Savoy  and  to  the  army 
of  Italy  (1686-1705),  extraordinary 
letter  of,  209  f.;  letter  of,  explaining 
market  conditions,  217  ff. 

Boue,  town,  30,  n.  4. 


Bouille,  market  town  in  Normandy,  51. 

Boulevard  Saint-Michel,  the,  at  Paris,  83. 

Bourbonnais  (or  Bourbonnois),  province, 
13,  63,  64,  153,  158,  245,  246,  274,  343- 

Bourdonnaye,  Yves  Marie  de  la,  Inten- 
dant at  Bordeaux  (1700-09),  30,  195, 
298. 

Bouret,  town,  30,  n.  4. 

Bourgachard,  market  town,  20,  n.  i,  60. 

Bourganeuf ,  town  hi  central  France,  206. 

Bourges,  13  f.,  211. 

Bourges,  Claude  de,  agent  of  the  Lyons 
consulate,  147,  152. 

Bourgoin,  town  in  Dauphine,  217. 

Boutet  de  Nailliers,  agent  of  Jouet,  28  f. 

Bouville,  Michel  Andre  Jubert  de, 
Marquis  de  Bizy,  Intendant  at 
Limoges  (1689-94)  and  at  Orleans 
(1694-1709),  14,  64,  66,  213,  214, 343  f. 

Bouyn,  Antoine,  agent  of  the  Lyons  con- 
sulate, 153  f. 

Brachet,  Maire  of  Orleans,  343. 

Braine,  village  near  Soissons,  7,  99. 

Bray,  market  town,  8,  48,  72,  80,  107, 
305>  313,  3i5.  3i6,  327,  33i;  new  type 
of  market  first  appears  at,  39-43,  99, 
108,  109,  no,  in,  112,  118,  127;  320, 
344,  360;  Delamare's  description  of 
the  market  quoted,  42  f.,  320. 

Bresse,  district  hi  Burgundy,  128,  135, 
138,  231,  246,  247. 

Bfessuire,  town,  25. 

Bret,  Jean  Baptiste,  brigand,  192. 

Breteniers,  town  near  Dijon,  143. 

Breteuil,  Francois  le  Tonnelier  de,  In- 
tendant in  Picardy,  Artois,  etc.  (1674- 
83),  276. 

Breton  merchants,  large  resources  of,  33. 

Brianconnais,  district  hi  Dauphine",  217. 

Brie,  district  in  northern  France,  23, 
42  f.,  48,  71,  72,  74,  80,  108,  119,  122, 
258,308,310,311,313. 

Brie-Comte-Robert,  market  town  near 
Paris,  119,  1 20. 

Briel,  parish  in  Champagne,  16. 

Brie-sur-Marne,  river  port,  119. 

Brigandage,  192  f. 

Brilhouet,  see  Martineau. 


390 


INDEX 


Brionnais,  small  district  in  Burgundy, 

337- 
Brioude,  election  of,  in  Upper  Auvergne, 

206. 
Brittany,  20,  33,  34,  35,  56,  64,  66,  67, 

68,  215,  216,  238,  300,  301,  340  f. 
Brive,  election  of,  in  Angoumois,  205. 
Brun,  Charles  le,  merchant  of  Noyon,  36. 
Brussels,  36,  78. 
Buckwheat,  200,  205,  319. 
Bugey,  district  in  Burgundy,  129,  279, 

333- 

Bureau  of  1559,  the,  230  ff.,  268,  294; 
abandoned,  223. 

Burgundian  grain,  inferior  in  quality  to 
that  from  the  lower  Rhone  valley,  162, 
217. 

Burgundy,  15,  212,  n.  3,  310,  311,  362; 
export  of  grain  to  Lyons,  129,  134,  135, 
136,  137,  138,  139,  140,  144,  146, 
147,  148,  152,  156,  157,  158,  165,  166, 
167,  170,  177,  178,  181,  182,  183,  185, 

200,   201,   202,  n.  2,   232,   241,   244-255, 

256,  259,  300,  331-339,  357  f->  3595  to 
Bray,  42,  108;  to  Genoa,  139;  to  the 
Hospitalers,  139;  dearth  of  1504  in, 
349;  poor  harvest  of  1693  in,  182,  183, 
332-336;  dearth  of  1709  in,  71,  185- 
193,  344;  loose  organization  of  the 
grain  trade,  141  ff.;  Retif's  experi- 
ments with  herbs,  208  f.;  edicts  and 
policy  of  Colbert,  274,  277-280,  292, 
354;  regulation  of  the  grain  trade 
through  licenses,  301,  322,  331-339. 

Burgundy,  county  of,  136. 

Burgundy,  duchy  of,  146. 

Burgundy,  Estates  of,  253,  254. 

Bursars,  at  Lyons,  135. 

Caen,  city  in  Normandy,  19,  51,  59. 

Cahors,  town  in  Guienne,  214. 

Cahors,  election  of,  215. 

Cajon,  Louis,  testimony  of,  no. 

Calonges,  town,  30,  n.  4. 

Cambray,  town  in  northern  France,  261. 

CambrSsis,  district  in  French  Flanders, 

23.  37- 
Canal  de  Briare,  the,  62,  64,  n.  2,  65. 


Canal  de  Languedoc,  the,  see  Canal  du 

Midi. 

Canal  d'Orleans,  the,  65,  67  f.,  344. 
Canal  du  Midi,  the,  204,  271. 
Canis,  Thibaut,  grain  merchant  of  Lyons, 

136. 
Capelle,  Sr.  de  la,  grain  commissioner  at 

Lyons,  154. 

Carabin,  Pierre,  grain  porter,  79. 
Carcassonne,    city   in   Languedoc,    183, 

184,  265. 

Cardinals,  College  of,  12. 
Carmelite  convent,  the,  at  Blois,  210. 
Castelmoron,  town,  30,  n.  4. 
Castelnaudary,  town  in  Languedoc,  196. 
Castres,  diocese  of,  in  Languedoc,  184. 
Caudebec,  market  town,  19,  59,  60. 
Caumont,  market  town  in  Normandy, 

51- 
Caux,  Pays  de,  district  in  Normandy,  20, 

50- 
Cavalier,  Jean,  leader  of  the  Camisards 

in  the  Cevennes,  193. 
Cette,  seaport  in  Languedoc,  194,  287. 
Cevennes,   the,   mountains  in  southern 

France,  193,  209. 
Chaillot,  the  widow,  grain  merchant  of 

Bray,  no,  in,  313. 
Chains,  stretched  across  the  Saone,  256, 

n.  i. 
Chaiz,  deputy  of  the  Lyons  consulate, 

198;    indiscreet  conduct  of,  in  1693, 

173-176, 183. 

Chalindrey,  town  in  Bassigny,  143. 
Chalons,     Pierre,    grain    merchant    of 

Chalons-sur-Marne,  76. 
Chalons-sur-Marne,  city  in  Champagne, 

48,  76,  77,  80,  86,  87,  101,  102,  103, 

104,  106,  112,  116,  118,  122,  123,  260, 

261,  262,  305,  307,  308,  310,  311,  319, 

320,  323,  325,  329,  331. 
Chalons-sur-Marne,  baillage  of,  104. 
Chalons-sur-Saone,    city    in    Burgundy, 

145,  146,  189,  192,  204,  247,  252,  334, 

336. 
Chalons-sur-Saone,    Bishop    of     (Henri 

Felix  de  Tassy),  letters  of  (1709),  190- 


INDEX 


391 


Chamlay,  Louis  Jules  de  Bole  de,  quar- 
termaster-general of  the  French  armies, 
carries  samples  of  nutshell  bread  to  the 
King,  210. 

Chambre  d'Abondance,  at  Lyons,  see 
Lyons. 

Chambre  d'Abondance  at  Paris,  see 
Bureau  of  1559. 

Champagne,  province,  42,  48,  50,  n.  2,  79, 
80,  88,  103,  225,  236,  257,  259,  261, 

274,  308,  309  3",  3i3,  3H,  318,  319, 
321,  322,  323,  325,  329,  331,  359;  de- 
pendence of,  upon  the  market  at  Vitry, 
in  1708-10,  116,  117;  as  a  source  of 
grain  supply  for  Lyons,  136,  138,  141, 
144,  167,  169,  248;  grain  purchased  in, 
for  the  Hospitalers,  139;  dread  of 
dearth  in,  181,  186;  famine  in  (1694), 
212,  n.  2;  relations  with  the  central 
power,  256,  280;  regarded  as  a  source 
of  supply  for  Provence  and  Languedoc, 
354- 

Champyer,  sketches  outline  of  a  Chambre 
at  Lyons,  152. 

Channes,  gram  merchant,  313. 

Chanoinesses  de  Saint-Sepulcre,  the,  at 
Paris,  84,  n.  i. 

Chapeyron,  gram  merchant  of  Lyons, 
175,  n.  3. 

Charles  VIII,  king  of  France  (1483-98), 
229,  n.  4. 

Charles  IX,  king  of  France  (1560-74), 
edicts  of,  relative  to  the  grain  trade, 
232-235. 

Charleville,  market  town,  104,  324. 

Charlieu,  town  near  Roanne,  148. 

Charmes,  town  in  Burgundy,  142. 

Charny,  letters  of,  254,  255. 

Charollais,  county  in  Burgundy,  153, 
158,  211. 

Charolles,  town  in  Burgundy,  211. 

Charreton,  Jehan,  grain  merchant,  139. 

Chartres,  chief  town  in  the  Beauce,  53, 
88,  89,  90,  93,  118,  228,  260,  261. 

Chassigney,  village,  143. 

Chateau,  the,  at  Soissons,  95. 

Chateaufort,  market  town,  47,  48. 

Chateauneuf,  town  near  Orleans,  343. 


Chateau-Regnault,  town,  18. 

Chateau-Thierry,  market  town,  80, 122  f., 
261,  262. 

Chatelain,  grain  merchant,  112. 

Chatelet,  the,  at  Paris,  79,  85,  243,  258, 
261,  296,  297;  its  activities  in  the 
regulation  of  the  grain  trade,  301-330, 

344,  360- 

Chatelleraud,  market  town,  25. 
Chatelnaudry,  market  town,  80. 
Chatillon,  market  town,  68  f. 
Chaulnes,  Due  de,  governor  of  Brittany, 

34- 

Chaulny,  market  town,  36,  98,  260. 
Chaume,  village,  143. 
Chaumont,  market  town,  322. 
Chaumont,  election  of,  60. 
Chauvort,  village  hi  Burgundy,  192. 
Chefaine,  parish  in  Champagne,  15. 
Cheminee,  Trois,  25. 
Chenoist,  country  gentleman,  77  f. 
Chestnuts,  as  a  staple  food,  184,  205, 

209. 
Chevalier,  commissioner  of  the  Chatelet, 

3". 
Chevalier,  the  widow,  gram  merchant, 

79- 

Cheverny,  village  near  Blois,  210. 
Chevigny,  village,  142. 
Cheyreuse,  market  town  in  the  Beauce, 

91. 

Chinon,  town  in  Touraine,  18,  25. 
Chortophagy,  189,  211,  214. 
Christendom,  346,  348. 
Christianot,  grain  buyer,  186. 
Cinq  Grosses  Fermes,  the,  271,  279. 
Claye,  market  town,  47,  48. 
Clayrac,  town,  30,  n.  4. 
Clement,   grain   merchant   of   Chalons- 

sur-Marne,  101. 
Clerc,  Pierre  de,  grain  merchant  of  Paris, 

86. 

Clereau,  Sr.,  grain  merchant,  28. 
Clermont-Ferrand,     market     town     in 

Auvergne,  61,  129,  154. 
Clermont-Ferrand,  election  of,  206. 
Clermont-Lodeve,    lieutenant    governor 

of  Languedoc,  265. 


392 


INDEX 


Cloos,  Hughes  de,  grain  merchant  at 
Paris,  86. 

Coetmadeu,  grain  merchant,  35. 

Cogirnon,  village  in  Bassigny,  143. 

Coin  de  Saint-Paul,  bread  market  in 
Paris,  1 20,  n.  2. 

Colbert,  Jean  Baptiste,  French  states- 
man, 227,  239,  267,  339;  his  place  in 
the  history  of  the  grain  trade,  268-294, 
295,  296,  297;  Utopian  dreams  of, 
309;  his  place  in  the  history  of  eco- 
nomic theory,  351,  353,  354-35 7- 

Colbert  de  Terron,  official,  269. 

Colbertism,  350,  353. 

Collection  Rondonneau,  the,  275,  n.  4. 

Collinet,  grain  merchant  of  Chalons-sur- 
Marne,  123. 

Colmet,  grain  buyer,  8, 109,  no,  111,315, 
316;  his  wife,  8,  109. 

Colombier,  town  in  Dauphine",  130. 

Colonger,  see  Calonges. 

Combe,  Jehan,  baker  of  Lyons,  136. 

Combray,  grain  factor,  86. 

Commissionaires  Facteurs,  316. 

Commune,  the,  75. 

Compagnie  de  Commerce  of  Cette,  the, 
286,  n.  3,  287. 

Compagnie  Nonnande,  the,  359. 

Compagnies  Fran^aises,  the,  49,  50,  51, 
52,  358. 

Compiegne,  market  town,  36,  52,  97. 

Conac,  town,  30,  n.  4. 

Conart,  miller  at  Juvisy,  92. 

Concarneau,  seaport  in  Brittany,  340. 

Conseil  Prive,  the,  251. 

Controle  General,  the,  212,  270,  271. 

Controleur  General,  the,  170,  172,  174, 
178,  194,  217,  269,  298,  319,  320,  321, 

333,  335,  336,  337- 
Coq,  Pierre,  testimony  of,  76. 
Corbeil,  market  town  in  the  Beauce,  89, 

119,  225,  256,  257. 
Cormery,  town,  18,  69. 
Corners,  309. 

Cotentin,  the,  district  in  Normandy,  50. 
Cottereau,  grain  merchant  of  Bray,  no, 

in. 
Coucy,  village  near  Soissons,  7,  99. 


Coudrey,  town,  67. 

Coulommiers,  market  town,  76,  77,  261. 

Council,  the,  307,  308. 

Council  of  Commerce,  the,  350,  351,  353. 

"Country  buying,"  20 ff.,  24,  25,  41, 
51,  n.  2,  87,  88,  91,  101,  102,  103,  105, 
107,  108,  109. 

Coupenage,  146. 

Courier  of  Champagne,  the,  88. 

Courson,  Lamoignon  de,  31  f. 

Courtenot,  parish  in  Champagne,  15  f. 

Courtiers  (grain  brokers),  31. 

Couserans,  town,  30,  n.  4. 

Craignat,  grain  merchant,  145. 

Crecy,  town  near  Paris,  305. 

Crecy,  grain  merchant,  315. 

Creil,  town,  14,  36,  79. 

Creil,  Jean  de,  Marquis  de  Creil-Bour- 
naizeau,  Intendant  at  Orleans  (1686- 
94),  65- 

Crepy-en-Valois,  market  town,  23,  97. 

Crepy,  measure  of,  52. 

Cressy,  the  widow,  grain  merchant,  313. 

Crest,  town  in  Dauphine,  256,  n.  i. 

Creuse,  valley  of  the,  23,  25. 

Crevecoeur,  town  near  Soissons,  95. 

Crown,  the,  356;  and  the  grain  trade, 
238  f.;  fosters  the  ideal  of  interde- 
pendence, 346  f. 

Cusset,  town,  32. 

Daffodil  bread,  208. 

Daguesseau,  Henri,  Intendant  at  Bor- 
deaux, later  (1673-85)  in  Languedoc, 
270,  287,  288,  289,  290,  291,  292,  293, 
294,  299,  339. 

Dallegre  de  St.  Herent,  grain  shipper,  32. 

Dammartin,  market  town,  23,  47,  48. 

Dammartin,  Geoffroi  of,  grain  merchant, 

45  ^ 

Dandin,  Symon,  grain  merchant,  46. 

Dare,  Louis,  Lieutenant  of  the  Bailli  of 
Rouen,  264. 

Dauphine,  province,  16,  198,  209,  216- 
219,  229,  n.  4,  256,  n.  i,  271,  n.  3, 
292,  354,  n.  2;  as  a  source  of  grain 
supply  for  Lyons,  129,  130,  132,  134, 
138, 149, 156, 245;  dearth  in  (1499),  135- 


INDEX 


393 


Dean,  Michel,  fined,  45. 

Decapelle,  agent  of  the  Lyons  consulate, 

153- 

Delamare,  Nicolas,  official  and  juris- 
consult, 39,  43,  97,  108,  in,  119,  232, 
311  ff.,  314,  315,  320,  331,  339;  de- 
scribes the  market  at  Bray,  42  f.,  320; 
establishes  a  wholesale  market  at 
Vitry  (1709),  112-118,  321,  325-330, 
360. 

Demasses,  councillor  at  Lyons,  155. 

De  Neufville,  special  commissioner, 
228  f. 

De  Poix,  letter  of,  on  buying  by  sample, 
91  f. 

De  Rubys,  agent  of  Lyons,  254. 

Desgrassieres,  royal  official  in  Brittany, 

35- 

Desperrieres,  letter  of,  90  f. 
Dieppe,  seaport  in  Normandy,  271. 
Dijon,  city  in  Burgundy,  140,  141,  142, 

143,  144,  145,  187,  188,  189,  248,  249, 

250,  334,  354- 
Dijon,  Parlement  of,  188,  252,  253,  254, 

255,  333- 

Dijon,  Syndic  of,  253. 
Dog-bane,  mixed  with  grain  as  food,  209. 
Dombes  (Pays  de  Dombes),  district  in 

Burgundy,  134,  138,  158,  246,  247. 
Donne-Marie,  village  near  Bray,  no. 
Doubs,  the,  river  in  eastern  France,  192. 
Doue,  market  town,  24,  25. 
Dourdan,  market  town  in  the  Beauce,  65, 

89,  92. 

Douzy,  town,  212. 
Duclair,  town,  19,  20. 
Du  Clere,  market  town,  59,  60. 
Dugas,  grain  merchant,  168, 169. 
Du  Lieu,  Provost  of  Merchants  at  Lyons, 

174. 
Du  Pradt,  deputy  of  the  Chambre  d' 

Abondance,  letters  of,  167  ff. 
Duquesnoy,  Louise,  grain  merchant  of 

Paris,  86. 

Dutch  grain  merchants  in  Guienne,  282. 
Dutch  industry  and  commerce,  351. 
Dutenot,  grain  merchant,  145. 
Du  Terrail,  grain  shipper,  32. 


fichevinage,  the,  at  Paris,  296,  297,  301- 

3"- 

Effey,  vicomte  of,  207. 
Ehrenberg,  Richard,  political  economist, 

viii. 
Elboeuf,  market  town,   19,  49,  50,  51, 

52,  57,  58,  59,  261. 
Embrunois,  district  in  Dauphine,  217. 
Empire,  the,  247. 
England,  n,  351. 
English   grain   merchants,   in   Guienne, 

282. 

English  industry  and  commerce,  351. 
Engrossing,  141,  190  f. 
fipernay,  market  town,  80,  103,  117. 
fipernon,  market  town  in  the  Beauce,  89. 
Eseville,  market  town,  69. 
Estain  Ribeyre,  d',  grain  shipper,  32. 
Estates  of  France,  the,  348. 
Estrees,  Marechal  d',  95. 
Etablissement  Hospitalier,  the,  at  Paris, 

84,  n.  i. 

fitampes,  market  town  in  the  Beauce,  57, 
,  65,  80,  88,  89,  225,  256,  257. 
Etats  des  Bleds,  199  f. 
Eucheve,  Nicolle,  testimony  of,  86. 
Europe,  34,  361;  western,  362. 
fiv£que,  Antoine  1',  grain  merchant,  95. 

Factum  pour  Jean  Roger,  pamphlet,  314, 

n.  2,  316  f. 

Falconneau,  grain  buyer,  35. 
Famine,  extreme  instances  of,  208-215. 
Farez  of  Chalons,  grain  buyer,  76. 
Faubourg  Saint-Antoine,  the,  at  Paris, 

119. 
Faubourg  Saint  Germain,  the,  at  Paris, 

83,  84;  bread  market  in,  120,  n.  2. 
Faultrier,  Joachim,  Abbe,  Intendant  in 

Hainault,  etc.  (1678-88),  280  f. 
Fegnet,  grain  commission  merchant,  167. 
Fere-en-Tarlenois,  village  near  Soissons, 

7,99- 

Fer-en-Tretenois,  town  near  Soissons,  95. 
Ferns,  ground  up  to  make  flour,  211.   . 
Ferrand,  Sieur,  testimony  of,  261. 
Ferrand,  Antoine  Francois,  Intendant  in 

Burgundy  (1694-1705),  178,  336,  337, 


394 


INDEX 


338;  Intendant  in  Brittany  (1705-15), 

34i. 

Ferre,  Charles,  grain  merchant,  75. 
Ferre-en-Tarlenois,  see  Fere-en-Tarlenois. 
Figeac,  town  in  Guienne,  214. 
Fimes,  market  town,  86. 
Firloix,  de,  grain  hoarder,  142. 
Flanders,  38,  78. 
Flemish  grain  merchants,  in   Guienne, 

282. 
Flemish     market,     the,     valuable     to 

Picardy,  261. 
Florentines,  265. 

Foliot,  St.  Vast,   wholesale  grain  mer- 
chant, 34. 

Fontainebleau,  18,  260. 
Fontaine-Frangaise,  town  in  Burgundy, 

142. 

Fontenay,  town,  28,  29. 
Forez,   district  in  Lyonnais,   131,   133, 

i35,  138,  153,  245. 
Foucault,  Nicolas  Joseph,  Intendant  at 

Montauban  (1675-84),  30,  284. 
Foulle  de  Martangis,  fitienne  Hyacinthe 

Antoine,  Marquis  de  Martangis  et  de 

Prunevaux,    Intendant    at    Bourges 

(1708-20),  14. 
Fournier,    Robert,    grain    measurer    at 

Chateau-Thierry,  123. 
Fralignes,  parish  in  Champagne,  15. 
France  (He  de  France),  50,  71,  72,  74,  86, 

122,  311. 

France,  grain  buyer,  97. 
Tranche  Comte,  province,  114,  136,  138, 

144,  167,  169,  185,  186,  187,  247,  248, 

328. 
Francis  I,  king  of  France  (1515-47),  230, 

237,  294;  edicts  of,  relative  to  the  grain 

trade,  228  ff.,  235. 
Free  trade,  272  f.,  347  ff. 
Freres  de  la  Charite,  the,  at  Paris,  84, 

n.  i. 
Froissart,    Marguerite,    testimony   of, 

86. 
Froisses,  Gilles  des,  grain  merchant  of 

Rouen,  54. 
Frosts,  233,  270. 
Froyses,  see  Froisses. 


Gaillac,  town,  30. 

Gaillard,  grain  factor  at  Bray,  109  f. 

Galdy,  grain  merchant  of  Lyons,   175, 

n.  3. 

Gap,  town  in  Dauphine,  16,  17. 
Gap,  Bishop  of,  17. 
Gapengois,  district  in  Dauphine,  217. 
Garonne,    the,    river    in    southwestern 

France,  2*04,  282,  285,  292. 
Garonne  basin,  the,  see  Garonne  valley. 
Garonne  valley,  the,  20,  29-32,  206,  281- 

284,  339- 
Gastebois,    Jehan,    grain    merchant    of 

Langres,  141. 
Gatinais,  district  in  north-central  France, 

310. 

Genoa,  139,  175,  n.  3,  286. 
Genoese,  the,  193  f. 
Genvry,  market  town,  98. 
Germany,  128. 

Gigors,  Maci  de,  grain  merchant,  45. 
Gigue,  Nicole,  laborer  at  Soissons,  87. 
Gillecourt,  village  near  Crepy-en-Valois, 

97- 

Gimont,  town,  30. 
Gisors,  market  town,  20,  47,  50,  60. 
Gisors,  Matthew  of,  grain  merchant,  47. 
Givey,  143. 
Gizors,  see  Gisors. 
Godet,  grain  merchant  of  Chalons-sur- 

Marne,  87. 

Goix,  village  near  Bray,  in. 
Gonesse,  market  town,  23,  36,  47,  48. 
Goudouin,    Magdelaine,    testimony    of, 

101. 

Gracay,  town,  13,  14. 
Granary  trade,  the,  37  ff.,  41. 
Grand  Provost,  the,  262. 
Grands  Boulevards,  the,  83. 
Grape  pips,  used  as  food,  211. 
Grave,  district  in  Guienne,  270. 
Gray,  market  town  in  Burgundy,  168, 

1 86,  188,  331. 

Gray,  Remain,  grain  factor,  87  f. 
Great  Schism,  the,  12. 
Greek  philosophers,  the,  351. 
Grenade,  town,  30. 
Grenoble,  town  in  Dauphine,  217,218,219. 


INDEX 


395 


Grenoble,  Parlement  of,  217,  245. 
Grignon,  merchant  of  Marans,  28. 
Grolier,  agent  of  Lyons  in  Burgundy, 

248-252, 358. 
Guidor,  grain  merchant  of  Nogent-sur- 

Seine,  102. 
Guienne,  province,  17,  193,  194,  195,  196, 

204,  282,  283,  284,  293. 
Guignier,  grain  merchant  of  Lyons,  175, 

n.3- 
Guimbre,   Henry,   grain  buyer  for   the 

Lyons  consulate,  152,  245. 
Guimbre,  Jacques,  agent  of  Lyons,  247, 

248,  249,  250,  252,  358. 
Guise,  Due  de,  247. 
Guise,  House  of,  251. 

Haillan,  Bernard  de  Girard,  Seigneur  du, 
historian,  349. 

Hainault,  province  in  French  Flanders, 
78,  280. 

Halle  au  Ble,  the,  at  Paris,  72-75,  84,  90, 
n8f.,  360. 

Ham,  market  town,  36,  78. 

Harouys,  Andre  de,  Intendant  in  Cham- 
pagne (1702-11),  117,  321,  322,  323, 

324,325- 

Haussmann,  Baron,  83. 

Haut,  market  town,  98. 

Havre,  seaport  hi  Normandy,  271. 

Haynault,  see  Hainault. 

Hemary,  grain  buyer,  76. 

Hendelot,  Nicholas,  grain  merchant  of 
Langres,  141. 

Hennebont,  Breton  port,  33, 34, 35. 

Henry  II,  long  of  France  (1547-59),  282; 
edict  of,  expressing  the  new  na- 
tionalism, 347  f. 

Henry  III,  king  of  France  (1574-89), 
edicts  of,  relative  to  the  grain  trade, 
234,  235,  237,  269,  272. 

Henry  IV,  king  of  France  (1580-1610), 
227,  236  f.,  350. 

Herbigny,  Henri  Francois  Lambert  d', 
Intendant  in  Dauphine  and  Lyonnais 
(1679-83),  354,  n.  2;  Intendant  at 
Lyons  (1694-1701),  336,  337,  338. 

Heresy,  dread  of,  12. 


Hery,  village  near  Rheims,  324. 
Homer,  351. 

Honfleur,  seaport  in  Normandy,  271. 
Hospital,  the,  at  Lyons,  191. 
Hospital,  the,  at  Paris,  68. 
Hospitalers  of  St.   John  of  Jerusalem, 
Order  of  the,  139;    Grand  Master  of, 

139- 

Hotel  de  Ville,  the,  at  Lyons,  171. 
Hotel  de  Ville,  the,  at  Paris,  79,  85,  118, 

317- 

Hotman,  grain  buyer,  200. 
Houdan,  market  town  in  the  Beauce,  89, 

90,  n.  2. 
Huge,  317. 

Huissiers  d  cheval,  304. 
Hurepoix,  district  in  northern  France, 

311. 

Ice,  as  a  hindrance  to  river  navigation, 

iS7,  191- 
Imbellot,  Guillaume,  grain  merchant  of 

Chalons-sur-Saone,  145. 
Incendiarism,  threats  of,  327. 
Intendant,  development  of  the  office  of, 

269-272,  295. 
Intendants    d'    Abondance,    at    Lyons, 

158-161. 

Invalides,  the,  310. 
Isle-Bouchard,  town,  25. 
Isle  de  Re,  28. 

Isle  Saint-Louis,  the,  at  Paris,  118. 
Issoire,  election  of,  hi  Lower  Auvergne, 

206. 

Italian  ports,  278. 
Italians,  come  to  Lyons,  131  f.;  attempt 

to  ship  grain  to  Savoy  and  Piedmont, 

244;  sent  away  from  Languedoc,  339. 
Italy,  128,  278,  284,  285,  287,  289,  354. 

Janot,  or  Jannot,  agent  of  the  Lyons 

consulate,  153,  154. 

Janville,  market  town  hi  the  Beauce,  90. 
Javelins,  river  port  on  the  Marne,  119. 
Joigny,  grain  hoarder,  142. 
Joinville,  town  hi  Champagne,  319. 
Joubert,    Francois,   syndic  des   &ats   of 

Languedoc,  196. 


396 


INDEX 


Jouet,    Sr.,   Receiver   of   the  Taille   at 

Fontenay,  28,  29. 
Jourdan,  grain  merchant,  174,  175,  notes 

i  and  3. 
Jura,   the,   mountain   range  in  eastern 

France,  127,  128,  130,  331. 
Juvisy,  town  near  Paris,  92. 

La  Bague,  grain  merchant,  315. 
Labbe,  Isabelle,  testimony  of,  86. 
La  Chapelle,  town  near  Dijon,  143. 
La  Charite,  town  near  Orleans,  14,  343. 
La  Fere,  market  town,  98,  260. 
La-Fere-Champenoise,  market  town,  102, 

103. 

La-Ferte-Bernard,  market  town,  68. 
La-Ferte-Gaucher,  market  town,  76,  122. 
La  Ferte-sous-Jouarre,  market  town,  87, 

122. 
Laffemas,  Barthelemy,  protectionist,  273, 

347,  350 f.,  353. 
La   Fontaine,   agent   of   Martineau   de 

Brilhouet,  28. 

Lagny,  market  town  near  Paris,  119. 
La  Haye,  town,  26. 
Lallement,  Louis,  testimony  of,  76. 
La  Maillerage,  market  town,  59. 
La  Maire,  merchant  of  Noyon,  36. 
Lambert,  grain  buyer,  76,  77. 
Lamy,  grain  merchant  of  Bray,  no,  in. 
Langeais,  town,  18. 
Langon,  town  on  the  Garonne,  270. 
Langres,  market  town  in  Burgundy,  141, 

142,  143,  144,  167,  168,  186,  189,  248, 

250,  322,  334- 
Languedoc,  province  in  southern  France, 

129,  132,  133,  136,  137,  138,  147,  152, 

153,  165,  166,  170,  173,  174,  175,  n.  3, 

177,  199,  204,  209,  218,  238,  278,  282, 

283,  300,  301,  337,  344,  345,  3545 
dearth  of  1693  in,  182-185;  dearth 
of  1709  in,  185,  187,  193-196,  339  f.; 
local  regulation  of  the  grain  trade  in, 
263,  2645.;  regulation  of  the  grain 
trade  by  Colbert  and  his  subordinates, 
284-294. 

Languedoc,  Estates  of,  264  f.,  291,  292, 
347,  n.  i. 


Laon,  city  in  Northern  France,  204. 
La  Poterie,  market  town  in  Normandy, 

Si- 

Larcher,  Michel,  Intendant  in  Cham- 
pagne (1692-99),  103,  212,  n.  2,  310, 
318,  319,  320,  321. 

Large,  merchant  of  Marans,  28. 

La  Rochelle,  28. 

Laspeyres,  town,  30,  n.  4. 

Lavalle,  grain  buyer,  41,  88,  107. 

Lavour,  diocese  of,  in  Languedoc,  184, 
196,  339- 

Le  Bartz,  Francois,  munitionnaire  general 
des  vivres  de  la  marine,  201  f. 

Le  Blanc,  official,  271,  281. 

Lebret,  Pierre  Cardin,  Intendant  in  Pro- 
vence (1687-1704),  174,  175,  198,  340. 

Le  Brie,  grain  buyer,  41,  107. 

Le  Burgaud,  town,  30,  n.  4. 

Lefavre,  grain  merchant,  87. 

Legate,  the,  at  Avignon   147,  152. 

Le  Jay,  Charles,  Intendant  at  Bordeaux, 
282,  283. 

Le  Lieurre,  testimony  of,  123. 

Le-Mat-en- Verdun,  town,  30,  n.  4. 

Le  Noble,  Charles,  munitionnaire,  201, 
202,  n.  2,  333  f.,  335. 

Lentils,  216. 

Le-Port-du-Pille,  town,  25. 

Lers,  de,  grain  merchant  of  Avignon, 
147. 

Le  Sage,  grain  merchant,  35. 

Levassor,  grain  merchant,  32. 

Les  Andelys,  see  Andelys. 

Lesdiguieres,  Due  de,  letter  of,  209. 

Lestrage,  dues  of,  95. 

Lettres  de  Voiture  (way-bills),  123,  343. 

Levant,  the,  196,  339. 

Le  Vaux,  grain  merchant,  95. 

Le  Vayer,  official,  37,  96  f.,  98. 

Libourne,  market  town,  216. 

Lieutenant  Civil,  the,  at  Paris,  304. 

Limagne,  district  in  Lower  Auvergne, 
206. 

Limoges,  city  in  central  France,  205,  215, 
216. 

Limoges,  Bishop  of,  215. 

Limoges,  election  of,  206. 


INDEX 


397 


Limours,  market  town  in  the  Beauce,  91. 
Limousin,   province  in  central   France, 

205,  208,  209,  213,  215. 
Linas,  town  near  Paris,  92. 
L' Isle-en- Jourdain,  town,  30. 
Livre  des  Metiers,  the,  46,  129. 
Lizy,  market  town,  86,  122,  261. 
Lobat,  Francois,  grain  merchant,  148. 
Loches,  market  town,  18,  69. 
Lodeve,  diocese  of,  in  Languedoc,  184. 
Loire,  the,  23,  24,  25,  33,  204. 
Loire  towns,  the,  344. 
Loire  valley,  the,  grain  trade  in,  23,  24, 

29,  32  f.,  56,  61-69,  118,  200,  257,  342, 

343- 
Lorinet,  gram  merchant  of  Chalons-sur- 

Marne,  101. 
Lorraine,  duchy,  76,  101,  106,  113,  114, 

116,  141,  144,  186,  191,  248,  326,  328, 

329,  33i- 

Lorraine  merchants,  328,  329. 
Lorrainers,  114,  116,  117. 
Lorris,  town,  67. 
Loudun,  market  town,  24. 
Louhans,    market   town   in    Burgundy, 

333- 
Louis  XI,  king  of  France  (1461-83),  12, 

131- 

Louis  XIII,  king  of  France  (1610-43), 
84,  94,  237. 

Louis  XIV,  king  of  France  (1643-1715), 
84. 

Louviers,  market  town,  60. 

Louvre,  the,  at  Paris,  118. 

Low  Countries,  the,  74,  117,  323. 

Lucca,  246. 

Lucon,  town,  28. 

Lyonnais,  province  (earlier,  a  small  dis- 
trict lying  within  the  territory  of  the 
later  province),  131,  135,  138,  144, 
158,  186,  187,  244,  247,  254. 

Lyons,  5,  20,  55,  n.  2,  61,  62,  74,  206, 
n.  i,  212,  216,  217,  231,  232,  240,  241, 
243,  285,  297,  298,  339,  340,  347,  349; 
establishment  and  history  of  the 
Chambre  d' Abandonee  at,  126-179, 
232;  relation  between  the  Lyons  grain 
trade  and  dearth  in  the  producing 


regions,  180-202,  208;  complications 
attending  the  import  of  grain  from 
Burgundy,  244-255,  256,  259,  278, 

279,  300,  331-339,  357  f-,  359- 
Lyons,  Archbishop  of,  146. 

Macon,  town  on  the  Sa6ne,  131, 146, 192, 

204,  232,  247,  249,  334,  336. 
Macon,  the  Abondance  of,  188. 
Macon,  Bishop  of,  189  f. 
Maconnais,  district  in  Burgundy,   189, 

337- 

Magistere,  town,  30. 
Magnan,  parish  in  Champagne  15. 
Magny,  market  town,  20,  59,  60. 
Maguelone,  diocese  of,    in   Languedoc, 

265. 

Maillotz,  Mile,  de,  grain  hoarder,  142. 
Maison  des  Jeunes  Filles,the,  at  Paris,  84, 

n.  i. 
Maistre,  le,  commissioner  of  the  Cbltelet, 

3ii- 

Malesherbes,  market  town,  18. 
Malta,  246. 
Mandelot,  governor  of  Lyonnais,   158, 

254- 

Manosque,  in  Provence,  17. 
Mantes,  market  town,  48,  49,  60,  90, 

n.  2. 

Mantes,  election  of,  60. 
Mantouche,  town  in  Burgundy,  188. 
Marais,  le,  bread  market  in  Paris,  120, 

n.  2. 

Marans,  market  town,  26,  27,  28,  29. 
Marchand,  Pierre,  grain  factor,  86. 
Marche  Neuf ,  bread  market  in  Paris,  120, 

n.  2. 
Marechal,    Jehan,    grain    merchant    of 

Pont-de-Vaulx,  231. 
Marillac,  letter  of,  6  f. 
Marin,  Francois,  grain  merchant  of 

Meaux,  122. 

Marie,  market  town,  98. 
Marly,  market  town,  47. 
Marne,  the,  river  tributary  to  the  Seme, 

33,   48,    76,   86,   88,    118,    119,    305, 

318- 
Marne  towns,  the,  86,  n.  3. 


398 


INDEX 


Marne  valley,  the,  29,  51,  55,  71,  74,  75, 
112-118,  204,  331,  342;  demoraliza- 
tion of  the  grain  trade  in,  100-107. 

Marseilles,  17,  201,  286,  289. 

Marsilly,  market  town  in  Burgundy, 
168. 

Martin,  Louise,  41. 

Martineau  de  Brilhouet,  grain  merchant, 
28. 

Mary  (Mani),  river  port  on  the  Marne, 
72,  122. 

Mary-sur-Seine,  see  M6ry-sur-Seine. 

Mascoyer,  grain  merchant,  145. 

Massif  Central,  the,  128,  214. 

Mast,  town,  30,  n.  4. 

Mathus,  Thomas,  grain  hoarder,  142. 

Maurienne,  district  in  Dauphine,  209  f. 

Maxilly,  town  on  the  Saone,  140,  144, 
186,  188,  202,  n.  2,  248,  249,  250,  252. 

Meaux,  market  town,  77,  80,  86,  n.  3, 
119,  122,  257,  261,  262,  305. 

Medici,  Catharine  de',  254. 

Meinard,  grain  factor,  letter  of,  174  f . 

Meliand,  Claude,  Intendant  at  Caen, 
281. 

Melun,  market  town  in  the  Beauce,  18, 
80,  89,  91,  119,  225,  256,  257,  260,  262, 

315- 
Mende,  diocese  of,  in  Languedoc,  183, 

184. 
Meniole,  Valentin,  merchant  of  Noyon, 

36. 

.Mercantilism,  272,  n.  i,  282,  n.  i,  355. 
Mercier,  grain  merchant  of  Bray,  313. 
Mercier,  grain  merchant  of  Vannes,  35. 
Merville,  town,  30,  n.  4. 
Mery-sur-Seine,    market   town,   40,   87, 

3i4. 
Mesnil,  du,  commissioner  of  the  Chatelet, 

311- 

Messina,  in  Sicily,  286. 

Meteil,  78. 

Metropolitan  market,  the,  299;  local 
markets  and  metropolitan  demand, 
3-12;  market  organization  and  the 
development  of  the  new  type  of  mar- 
ket, 37-44;  the  new  type  of  market 
first  appears  at  Bray,  3^-43,  99,  108, 


109,  no,  in,  112,  118,  127,  320',  344, 
360;  Delamare's  description  of  the 
market  at  Bray  quoted,  42  f.  320; 
wholesale  market  established  at  Vitry 
(1709),  112-118,  127,  321,  325-330, 
344,  360;  Delamare's  account  of  the 
market  at  Vitry  quoted,  144,  328f.; 
the  conception  of  the  metropolitan 
area,  348  f.;  Montchretien's  conception 
of  economic  interdependence,  352;  the 
conception  of  the  metropolitan  distrib- 
utive organization,  355  f.,  360;  the 
pushing  of  the  metropolitan  market 
system  into  remote  sections  a  charac- 
teristic feature  of  the  late  nineteenth 
century,  207  f. 

Metz,  city  in  northeastern  France,  281. 

Meuse,  the,  river  in  northern  France, 
322. 

Mezieres,  border  town,  103,  117,  319. 

Mezieux,  town  in  Dauphine,  130. 

Millau,  town  on  the  Tarn,  206. 

Millet,  ordinary  food  of  the  peasants  in 
Upper  Languedoc,  290. 

Mirabel,  town  in  Burgundy,  142. 

Mirebeau,  town,  17. 

Mirepoil,  market  town  in  Languedoc,  183. 

Miromenil,  Thomas  Hue,  Marquis  de, 
Intendant  in  Champagne  (1673-89) 
and  at  Tours  (1689-1701),  25,  280, 

344- 

Moissac,  town,  30,  n.  4. 
Molle,  Nicholas,  grain  seller,  249. 
Monastere   du   Precieux   Sang,   the,   at 

Paris,  84,  n.  i. 

Monnaye,  Maltre  de  la,  at  Romans,  147. 
Mont,  Guillaume  du,  of  Seurre,  agent  of 

the  Lyons  consulate,  153. 
Montagne,  143. 
Montaigne,  town,  30,  n.  4. 
Montaigu,  town,  26. 

Montargis,  town  in  the  Beauce,  310,  343. 
Montauban,  city  in  Languedoc,  30,  205, 

213  f.,  283,  284. 

Montauban,  Archbishop  of,  213  f. 
Montauban,  diocese  of,  184,  196. 
Montauban,  ge"neralite  of,  30. 
Montbazon,  town,  18. 


INDEX 


399 


Montchretien,    Antoine    de,    writer    on 

political  economy,  273,  347,  351  ff. 
Moiitcony,  Benoit,  grain  merchant,  148. 
Mont-de-Mar$an,  town,  17,  18. 
Montdidier,  town  in  Picardy,  23,  260, 

261. 
Montelimar,  town  in  Dauphine,      204, 

219,  256,  n.  i. 
Montereau,  market  town  in  the  Beauce, 

18,  41,  80,  88,  89,  107,  262,  315. 
Montereau-sur-Yonne,  see  Montereau. 
Monteycourt,  village,  143. 
Montf errand,  town  in  Auvergne,  154. 
Montfort-l'Amaury,  market  town  in  the 

Beauce,  89. 

Montgay,  market  town,  47. 
Montgivraut,  letter  of,  172. 
Montguillon,  Jean,  grain  seller,  76  f. 
Montholon,   Charles   Francois   de,   first 

president  of  the  Parlement  of  Rouen 

(1691-1703),  59. 

Montigny,  town  near  Dijon,  143. 
Montigny,  village  near  Bray,  112. 
Montleduc,  market  town,  216. 
Montlhery,  market  town,  65,  89,  90,  92, 

94,  106,  118,  119,  344. 
Montpellier,    city   in   Languedoc,    195, 

196. 

Montreuil,  parish  in  Champagne,  16. 
Montreuil-Bellay,  market  town,  24,  69. 
Montsoreau,  market  town,  20,  23,  25,  67, 

69. 
Moreton,   grain   merchant  of  Avignon, 

147. 

Mormand,  village,  143. 
Mornier,  Andre,  grain  merchant,  148. 
Morniers,  councillor  at  Lyons,  155. 
Morocco,  185. 
Moulins,  town,  132. 
Moulins,  baillage  of,  207. 
Mouthers,  echevin  of  Paris,  308,  309. 
Mimitionnaires,  334. 
Musseau,  Etienne,  testimony  of,  109  f . 

Nancy,  city  in  Lorraine,  186. 

Nantes,  city  in  Brittany,  23,  24,  25,  26, 

33,  56,  61,  62,  199,  340,  341,  342. 
Naples,  354. 


Narbonne,  city  in  Languedoc,  183-,  184, 
185,  194,  195,  288,  290,  291,  292,  293, 

339- 

Narbonne,  diocese  of,  293. 

Narbonne,  district  of,  in  Languedoc,  184, 
265. 

National  Library,  the,  at  Paris,  325, 353. 

Nemours,  market  town,  18;  disorganiza- 
tion of  the  market,  93. 

Nepveu,  gram  buyer,  41,  88,  107. 

Nesle,  town,  36. 

Neubourg,  market  town  in  Normandy, 

i9>  50,  5i,  59,  60- 

Neubourg,    Pays   de,    district   in   Nor- 
mandy, 50,  53. 
Neuil,  abbey  of,  28. 
Neuilly-Saint-Front,  market  town,  97. 
Nice,  municipality  of,  194. 
Nimes,  city  in  Languedoc,  183,  184, 196. 
Nivernais,  province,  33,  63,  153,  158. 
Nogent-le-Roy,    market    town    in    the 

Beauce,  53,  57,  89,  90,  n.  2. 
Nogent-sur-Seine,  market  town,  40,  72, 

80,  102,  262,  310,  315. 
Noisel,  near  Lagny,  mill  at,  119. 
Normandy,  49,  50,  51,  52,  53,  56,  57,  58, 

62,   63,   69,    70,    73,    238,    258,    274, 

281;    local    regulation    of    the    grain 

trade  in,  263  f. 
Normandy,  Estates  of,  264. 
Normandy,  Lords  of  the  Exchequer  of, 

264. 

Normandy,  Parlement  of,  57,  60,  264. 
Notary,  the,  at  Bray,  no. 
Noue,  de  la,  grain  merchant  of  Bray, 

no,  in,  112,  313. 
Noyon,  market  town,  36,  37,  38,  45,  47, 

52,  78,  79,  86;  98,  99,  106,  118,  225, 

260,  261,  262,  305. 
Nutshells,  flour  made  from,  209  f. 

Oats,  189,  205,  319. 

Oise,  the,  river  tributary  to  the  Seine, 

48,  79,  261,  n.  3,  305,  307. 
Oise  valley,  the,  35  ff.,  51,  52,  53,  54,  55, 

75,  78  ff.,  94-100,  101,  118,  225,  358. 
Orient,  the,  220,  361. 
Orleannais,  province,  13. 


4oo 


INDEX 


Orleans,  14,  23,  33, 47,  62,  63,  73,  74, 133, 
199,  204,  206,  n.  i;  peculiar  situation 
of,  64,  65,  66,  67,  69,  296,  300  f.;  con- 
nection with  the  supply  of  Lyons,  148, 
157;  regulation  of  the  grain  trade  at, 
342  ff. 

Orleans,  generality  of,  211. 

Ormesson,  Antoine  Francois  de  Paule  le 
Fevre  d',  Intendant  at  Soissons  (1704- 
12),  7,98  f. 

Orne,  the,  river  in  Normandy,  19. 

Osse",  Claude  d',  surgeon,  103. 

Oudan,  market  town,  58,  261. 

Pacte  de  Famine,  the,  vii,  125;    a  fore- 
runner of,  in  1694,  315. 
Page,  le,  commissioner  of  the  Chatelet, 

311- 

Paimpol,  grain  riots  at,  35. 

Pannier,  merchant  of  Soissons,  7. 

Panthier,  Benoit,  grain  merchant  of 
Lyons,  136. 

Papillon,  grain  merchant,  132. 

Paray-le-Monial,  town  in  Burgundy,  211. 

Paris,  5,  6,  7,  8,  20,  22,  23,  24,  25,  26,  33, 
36,  37,  41,  42,  43,  44,  200,  204,  206, 
n.  i,  208,  210,  225,  226,  228,  229,  230, 
240,  241,  243,  283,  297,  298,  299,  337, 
341,  347,  349,  350,  357,  358,  360;  his- 
tory of  the  Parisian  grain  markets, 
45-125;  population,  82  f.;  grain 
trade  of,  contrasted  with  that  of 
Lyons,  126,  127,  158,  180,  331;  local 
regulation  of  the  grain  trade,  256-263; 
regulation  of  the  grain  trade  between 
Paris  and  the  towns  of  the  Seine  Basin, 
1683-1709,300-330,359,360;  relation 
between  the  Paris  grain  trade  and  that 
of  Orleans,  342  ff. 

Paris,  Parlement  of,  229,  243,  256,  258. 

Paris,  Provost  of,  258. 

Paris  bushel,  the,  205. 

Partnerships,  167;  effort  to  suppress, 
316  ff.,  360. 

Patris,  205. 

Pau,  town  in  B6arn,  213. 

Pau,  gene"ralite  of,  207. 

Pavilly,  village,  20,  n.  i. 


Pellot,    Claude,    Intendant    at    Mon- 

tauban  and  in  Guienne,  283. 
Perart,    Madame,    grain    merchant    of 

Chalons-sur-Marne,  104. 
Peraud,  Sr.,  procureur,  103  f. 
Perigord,  district  in  Guienne,  205,  209, 

214,  216. 

Perigueux,  town  in  Guienne,  216. 
Perigueux,  Bishop  of,  216. 
Peronne,  town  in  Picardy,  23,  36,  78, 

260,  261. 

Perronne,  see  Peronne. 
Perrot,  Sr.,  quoted,  85  f. 
Perthois,   district  in   Champagne,   321, 

322. 

Pertuis,  in  Provence,  17. 
Petits  Augustins,  the,  at  Paris,  84,  n.  i. 
Petons,  14. 

Philipon,  grain  merchant,  313. 
Philipon,  Pierre,  testimony  of,  108  f. 
Physiocrats,  the,  vii,  223,  227. 
Picardy,  province,  36,  37,  78,  236,  238, 

256,  259,  260,  261,  274,  280,  311. 
Piedmont,  244. 
Pinon,   Anne,   Intendant  in   Burgundy 

(1705-10),  187. 
Pinon,  Pierre,  grain  merchant  of  Paris, 

57- 

Piot,  grain  merchant,  102,  103. 
Pirattes  de  bled,  191  f. 
Place,  the,  at  Lyons,  155. 
Place  Maubert,  bread  market  in  Paris, 

120,  n.  2. 
Plaineuf,  310. 

Platt,  Claude,  grain  merchant,  148. 
Plessis-Saint- Jean,  village  near  Bray,  112. 
Plonyer,  Honnorat,  grain  merchant  of 

Lyons,  147. 
Poiret,   commissioner  of   the   Chatelet, 

?"' 

Poissy,  market  town,  47,  48,  49,  258. 

Poitiers,  city,  17. 

Poitou,  province,  17,  18,  20,  24,  26,  27, 

28,  29,  68,  215,  216,  274. 
Poix,  Sieur  du,  testimony  of,  261. 
Pomereu  de  la  Breteche,  Jean  Baptiste 

de,  Intendant  in  Champagne  (1699- 

1702),  104,  105  ff.,  113. 


INDEX 


401 


Pontaillier,  market  town  in  Burgundy, 

188,  252. 

Pont-Audemer,    market   town   in   Nor- 
mandy, 51. 

Pont-Audemer,  vicomte  of,  264. 
Pontavert,  market  town,  87,  104. 
Pontchartrain,  Louis  Phelypeaux,  Comte 

de,    Controleur    General    of    finance 

(1680-99),  68. 

Pont-de-Beauvoisin,  the,  217. 
Pont-de-1'Arche,  town  on  the  Seine,  57, 

58,  261. 

Pont-de-Vaux,  town  in  Burgundy,  208. 
Ponthieu,  county  in  Picardy,  Si,  256. 
Ponthieu,  Senechal  of,  81,  256. 
Pont-1'Eveque,  near  Noyon,  36,  37. 
Pontoise,  election  of,  60. 
Pont-Sainte-Maxence,  market  town,  36, 

40,  79- 

Pont-Saint-Esprit,  174. 
Pont-sur-Seine,  market  town,  80,  315. 
Pontz,  80. 

Poor  relief,  question  of,  213  ff. 
Pope,  the,  seeks  to  export  grain  from 

Languedoc,  265. 

Port  de  Greve,  the,  64,  74,  118,  315. 
Port  de  1'Ecole,  the,  57,  118. 
Porte  de  Nesle,  the,  at  Paris,  83. 
Porte  Saint  Antoine,  the,  at  Paris,  83. 
Porte  Saint  Denis,  the,  at  Paris,  83. 
Porte  Saint-Michel,  the,  at  Paris,  83. 
Port-Moutain,  village  near   Bray,    112, 

305- 

Port-Sainte-Marie,  town,  30. 
Port  Saint  Vincent,  the,  at  Lyons,  154. 
Portugal,  33,  61,  226,  341. 
Pettier,  grain  buyer,  186. 
Pouillot,  Charles,  grain  factor,  123. 
Pouilly,  village  near  Rheims,  324. 
Prais  de  M\)Uo,  town  in  Roussillon,  214  f. 
Prangey,  village,  143. 
Presidial,  the,  at  Tours,  18. 
Presle,  Louis,  grain  merchant,  75  f. 
Pressac,  town,  216. 
Prestreau,   Pierre,    grain    merchant    of 

Lyons,  136. 
Pronard,  14. 
Protectionism,  272  f.,  35°-355- 


Provence,  16,  17,  199;  as  a  source  of 
grain  supply  for  Lyons,  129,  136,  137, 
138,  170,  173,  174,  175,  n.  3,  182,  183, 
185,  187,  335,  337;  for  Dauphine, 
218;  and  for  Italy,  278,  289,  354; 
draws  grain  from  Burgundy,  139;  and 
from  Languedoc,  194,  195,  284,  285, 
286,  287,  288,  289,  290,  291,  292,  339; 
Colbert  expects  it  to  be  supplied  from 
Burgundy  and  Champagne,  278,  354; 
local  markets  the  basis  of  trade,  344. 

Provins,  market  town,  8,  40,  41,  48,  77, 
78,  80,  261,  262,  305,  314,  327. 

Provost  of  Merchants,  the,  at  Paris,  80, 
122,  123,  226,  257,  258,  260,  302,  303, 
304,  306,  310,  317,  319,  341. 

Provost  of  Paris,  the,  301,  306. 

Pusignan,  town  in  Dauphine,  130. 

Puy,  Le,  town  in  Auvergne,  154. 

Quai  des  Grands  Augustins,  bread  mar- 
ket in  Paris,  120,  n.  2. 

Queen  Mother,  the,  see  Medici,  Catharine 
de'. 

Quercy,  district  in  Guienne,  about 
Cahors,  205,  214. 

Quilleboeuf,  market  town  in  Normandy, 

$»• 

Quimper,  Breton  port,  33,  35,  340. 
Quimper,  bishopric  of,  35. 
Quimperle,  Breton  port,  34. 
Quinze    Vingts,   les,   bread    market    in 
Paris,  120,  n.  2. 

Rallet,  gram  buyer,  35. 

Rambouillet,  market  town  in  the  Beauce, 

89. 

Ratzenhofer,  Gustav,  writer,  359,  n.  i. 
Ravat,  Provost  of  Merchants  at  Lyons 

(1709),  187,  188,  100. 
Rebes,  market  town,  261. 
Rebigois,  grain  merchant  of  Paris,  41. 
Regnault,  Nicolle,  testimony  of,  86. 
Regnault,  see  Renault. 
Religieuses  de  Saint  Nicholas  de  Tulle, 

the,  at  Paris,  84,  n.  i. 
Renard,  Pierre,  grain  buyer  of  Lyons, 

136  f. 


402 


INDEX 


Renault,  Jean,  grain  merchant  of  El- 
boeuf,  57,  58. 

Rentiers,  142. 

Rethel,  town  on  the  Aisne,  204. 

Rethelois,  district  in  northern  France, 
104,  319. 

R6tif,  Dr.  Gilbert,  experiments  with 
herbs  as  substitutes  for  grain,  208  f. 

Reynie,  Gabriel  Nicolas  de  la,  lieu- 
tenant general  of  police  at  Paris,  315. 

Rheims,  city,  48,  116,  117,  204,  310  f., 
319,  324,  325,  329. 

Rheims,  district  of,  319. 

Rhodes,  Grand  Master  of, see  Hospitalers. 

Rhone,  the,  204,  278,  285,  287,  291,  292, 

339- 
Rhone  basin,  grain  trade  in  the,  126-202, 

358. 

Rhone  valley,  the,  70,  292,  300. 
Ribeyre,  Antoine  de,  Intendant  at  Tours, 

272,  n.  i. 

Richelieu,  town,  18. 
Riom,  town  in  Auvergne,  154,  204. 
Riom,  election  of,  206. 
Riots,  35,  186-192,  200,  260,  310,  311  f., 

325>  333 >    threatened,  at  Marseilles, 

289. 
Ris,  Charles  de  Faucon  de,  Intendant  at 

Bordeaux  (1678-86),  30,  284. 
Riviereverdieu,  election,  30. 
Rizon,  grain  buyer,  in. 
Roanne,  market  town  on  the  upper  Loire, 

61,  129,  136,  156,  157. 
Rochefort,  seaport  in  western  France, 

216. 

Rochelle,  see  La  Rochelle. 
Rodez,  town  in  southern  France,  214. 
Roger,  grain  merchant  of  Rouen,  58. 
Roger,  grain  merchant  of  Vitry,  102. 
Roger,  Jean,  grain  merchant  of  Paris,  58, 

108,  109,  no;   prosecution  of  (1694), 

314-318,330. 

Rogin,  village  near  Montargis,  310. 
Rollin,  grain  merchant  of  Lyons,   175, 

n.3- 
Romans,  market  town  on  the  Isere,  147, 

219. 
Romorantin,  town,  14,  15. 


Rouen,  33,  47,  158,  199,  225,  226,  257, 
258,  260,  264,  271,  281,  358;  market 
system  of,  19  f.;  relation  between  its 
supply  area  and  that  of  Paris,  48-60, 
81,  263. 

Rouen,  Bailli  of,  264. 

Rouenese,  the,  359. 

Rouergue,  district  in  Guienne,  184,  206, 
209,  214. 

Rouille,  Jean,  Comte  de  Meslay,  Inten- 
dant in  Provence,  286,  287,  288  f. 

Roujault,  Nicolas  Etienne,  Intendant  at 
Poitiers  (1708-12),  27  f. 

Rousseau,  the  widow,  grain  merchant, 
41,  88. 

Roussillon,  province  in  southern  France, 
214. 

Routot,  market  town,  60. 

Rouvre,  town  in^Burgundy,  142,  143. 

Royal  edicts,  often  local  in  reality  though 
general  in  form,  224  f. 

Roye,  town  in  Picardy,  260. 

Royer,  confers  with  Joubert,  196. 

Rozet,  village,  143. 

Rozoy,  market  town  in  Brie,  119. 

Ruche,  Husson,  grain  buyer,  86. 

Rye,  78,  n.  2,  205,  319,  324. 

Saint-Brieuc,  Breton  port,  33. 
Saint-Brieuc,  bishopric  of,  35. 
Saint-Christolly,  town,  30,  n.  4. 
Saint-Cloud,  market  town,  47. 
Saint-Contest,  Michel  de  Barberie  de, 
Intendant  at  Limoges  (1686-89),  205. 
Saint-Denis,  merchants  of,  36. 
Saint-Dizier,  town  in  Champagne,  319, 

329- 

Sainte-Maure,  town,  18,  25,  26. 

Sainte-Menehould,  district  of,  in  Cham- 
pagne, 319. 

Sainte-Menehould,  election  of,  324. 

Saint-Eustache,  church  in  Paris,  118. 

Saint-Flour,  election  of,  in  Upper 
Auvergne,  206. 

Saint-Foix,  market  town,  216. 

Saint-Genis,  Sieur  de,  testimony  of,  261. 

Saint-Germain-en-Laye,  near  Paris,  47, 
n.  i,  60. 


INDEX 


403 


Saint-Germain-rAuxerrois,     church     in 

Paris,  1 1 8. 
Saint-Jean-d'Angely,    town    in    western 

France,  216. 
Saint- Jean-de-Losne,  town  on  the  Saone, 

140,  144,  188,  202,  n.  2,  249,  251,  252. 
Saint-Jean-des-Jumeaux,   market   town, 

261. 

Saint  Jean  des  Vignes,  abbey  of,  95. 
Saint  John,  Knights  of,  see  Hospitalers. 
Saint- Jouin,  market  town,  24. 
Saint-L6,  town  in  Normandy,  34. 
Saint-Luc,  Francois  d'Epinay,  Marquis 

de,  lieutenant  general  in  Guienne,  282. 
Saint-Malo,  Breton  port,  33. 
Saint-Maur,  market  town,  119. 
Saint-Maurice,  village,  143. 
Saintonge,  province  in  western  France, 

20,  28,   204. 

Saint-Papoul,    market    town    in    Lan- 

guedoc,  183,  184. 
Saint-Pierre-de-Massilly,   market   town, 

140. 

Saint-Pons,  diocese  of,in  Languedoc,i84. 
Saint-Quentin,  town  in  Picardy,  36,  78, 

206,  261. 

Saint-Sardos,  town,  30,  n.  4. 
Saint-Sulpice,  parish  church  in  Paris,  84. 
Saint-Surin-de-Mortaigne,      town,      30, 

n.  4. 
Saint-Symphorien-d'Ozon,       town       in 

Dauphine,  130. 
Saint-Yalery,  coast  port  on  the  Somme, 

81,  225. 
Saladin,  grain  merchant,  174,  175,  notes 

i  and  3. 

Salinier  (  ?),  210. 
Sanson,  grain  merchant,  32. 
Sanson,    Claude   Joseph,    Intendant   in 

Beam      (1692-94),     at     Montauban 

(1694-98),    and    at    Soissons    (1698- 

1704),  213,  n.  2,  214,  n.  2,  298,  299. 
Saone  valley,  the,  29,  So,  128,  277,  331, 

357- 

Saula,  town,  30,  n.  4. 
Sansoy  of  Provins,  grain  seller,  77. 
Santerre,  district  hi  Picardy,  36,  37,  52, 

54,  78,  81,  106,  318,  350. 


Santois,  district  in  northern  France,  81, 

225,  257. 
Saone,  the,  river  in  Burgundy,  127,  128, 

139,  140,  145,  187,  192,  248,  256,  n.  i, 

278,332- 
Saone  towns,  thevi38, 144, 145,  163,  166, 

185,  189,  253,  331. 
Saulon,  town  near  Dijon,  143. 
Saulx,  Sieur  de,  governor  of  Burgundy, 

248. 
Saumur,  market  town,  20,  23,  24,  25,  26, 

56,  61,  62,  64,  67,  118,  300,  342. 
Savoy,  216,  217,  244. 
Savoy,  Duke  of,  194,  231. 
Sedan,  frontier  town  of  northern  France, 

ii7,  3X9- 

Seine,  the,  47,  n.  i,  48,  50,  51,  81,  118, 
119,  225,  257,  258,  305,  307. 

Seine  Basin,  the  (valleys  of  the  Yonne, 
Seme,  Aube,  Marne,  and  Oise),  grain 
trade  in  the,  13,  49,  126,  127,  180,  181, 
225,  226,  227,  228,  229,  268,  331,  343, 
362;  "  country  buying,"  20,  85,  87- 
91,  101-105;  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Provost  of  Merchants  of  Paris, 
55;  dearth  of  1563,  56;  the  upper 
Seine  Basin  and  problems  of  marketing, 
70-100;  increased  demands  of  Paris, 
82-100;  demoralization  of  the  old 
market  system,  88-94,  320;  estab- 
lishment of  the  first  wholesale  markets 
at  Bray  and  Vitry-le-Francois,  30-43, 
100-118,  320-330;  market  enclaves, 
204;  local  regulation  of  the  grain 
trade,  256-263;  the  administration  of 
Colbert,  296;  constructive  market 
regulation,  300-330,  344,  359  f.;  the 
Chatelet  and  the  Echevinage,  297, 

301-330,  344,  360- 

Seine  valley,  the,  24,  48,  51,  107,  108- 
112,  118,  314;  dearth  of  1662  in,  41, 

64- 

Senlis,  market  town,  47,  81,  228. 
Sennene,    Jacques,    gram   merchant   of 

Bray,  in. 
Sens,  market  town,  47,  89,  204,  311  f., 

315- 
Sentences  du  Parloir  des  Bourgeois,  47. 


404 


INDEX 


Seraucourt,  Louis  Francois  Dey  de,  In- 
tendant  in  Berry  (1683-99),  13  f. 

Sergines,  market  town  near  Sens,  315. 

Se"rignan,  seaport  in  Languedoc,  291. 

Seurre,  town  in  Burgundy,  153,  191  f., 
247,  252,  334. 

Seve,  Guillaume  de,  Intendant  at  Bor- 
deaux, 283. 

Sezanne,  market  town  in  Champagne, 
321,  327,  328. 

Sezanne,  baillage  of,  322. 

Silk  trade,  the,  at  Lyons,  128,  131. 

Simon,  H.,  grain  buyer,  80. 

Simon,  Pierre,  widow  of,  grain  merchant, 

58. 

Sisteron,  market  town,  16, 17, 18. 

Soissonnais,  district,  6,  7,  23,  100,  106, 
181,  274,  318. 

Soissons,  7,  58,  75,  79,  86,  87,  118,  260, 
261,  262,  306,  307,  314,  318;  dis- 
organization of  the  market,  95-103. 

Soissons,  Bishop  of,  7. 

Soissons,  generality  of,  72. 

Sologne,  district  in  central  France,  158. 

Somme,  the,  river  in  northern  France,  81, 
225. 

Sorbonne,  the,  83. 

Souillac,  town,  216. 

Sourdeac,  Alexandre  de  Rieux,  Marquis 
de,  210. 

Spain,  33,  61,  194,  226,  236,  284,  285, 
286,341. 

Speculative  buying,  91. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  English  philosopher, 

35i. 

Stephen,  king  of  England  (1135-54),  12. 

Substitutes  for  grain,  see  Asphodel  bread; 
Burgundy;  Chestnuts;  Daffodil  bread; 
Dog-bane;  Famine;  Ferns;  Grape- 
pips;  Lentils;  Nutshells;  Retif,  Dr. 
Gilbert;  Turnips. 

Sully ,  Due  de,  French  statesman,  236, 350. 

Swiss  debt*  the,  236. 

Taillemand,  grain  merchant,  132. 
Talemalers,  46  f. 

Talmay,  village  near  Dijon,  144, 167, 168, 
186. 


Tarantaise,  district  in  Dauphine",  209  f. 
Tarascon,  city  in  Provence,  183, 197, 198, 

340. 

Tarn,  the,  river  in  Guienne,  282,  292. 
Terrasson,  town,  216. 
Third  Estate,  the,  348. 
Thomas,  grain  merchant,  102,  103. 
Thorey,  town  near  Dijon,  143. 
Thouars,  market  town,  24,  25,  69. 
Thouet,  the,  river,  69. 
Thou-sur-Marne,  river  port,  123. 
Tipperaus,    grain   merchant   of   Lyons, 

150. 

Tirant,  Bissart,  grain  merchant,  86. 
Tisserand,   Claude,   grain  merchant  of 

Lyons,  150. 

Tixerand  senior,  merchant  and  Elu,  87. 
Touissaint,  Sebastian,  122. 
Toul,  bishopric  of,  114,  328. 
Toulon,  seaport  in  Provence,  286. 
Toulouse,  city  in  Languedoc,  195,  196, 

205. 

Toulouse,  diocese  of,  196,  339. 
Toulouse,  Parlement  of,  200,  296. 
Touraine,  province,  20,  24,  26,  56,  61,  62, 

64,  67,  106,  209,  274,  301. 
Tournois,  grain  merchant,  315. 
Tournus-sur-Saone,  town  in  Burgundy, 

202,  n.  2,  334,  336. 
Tours,  18  f.,  23,  47,  62,  63,  66,  67,  68,  69, 

204,  344. 

Toussaint,  merchant  of  Noyon,  36. 
Traite  de  la  Police,  by  Nicolas  Delamare, 

108,  in,  320. 
Treguier,  bishopric  of,  35. 
Tremblay,  Etienne,  grain  merchant,  148. 
Tremville,  188. 
Trevoux,    Pomponne    de,    governor    of 

Lyonnais  (1529),  138,  n.  i. 
Tricaut,  Robert,  grain  merchant,  148. 
Trillebardou,  market  town,  77,  119,  122. 
Troarn,  town,  19. 
Troichaud,  village,  143. 
Trouchoit,  village,  143. 
Troyes,  city  in  Champagne,  47,  48,  80, 

105,  181,  204,  319,  320,  322,  324,  327. 
Tulle,  market  town  on  the  Correze,  205. 
Turenne,  vicomte"  of,  205. 


INDEX 


405 


Turgot,  Jacques  fitienne,  Intendant  at 

Tours  (1701-09),  26. 
Turnips,  mixed  with  grain  as  food,  209. 

University  quarter,  the,  at  Paris,  83. 
Usures   (purchases  on  earnest  money), 

312. 
Uzes,  diocese  of,  in  Languedoc,  183,  184. 

Vacher,  grain  merchant  of  Auxonne,  202, 

n.  2. 

Yailly,  village  near  Soissons,  7,  99. 
Yalengay,  town,  14. 
Valence,  town  on  the  Rhone,  147,  152, 

211,  219,  256,  n.  i. 
Valentinois,  Duchess  of,  251. 
Valois,  district  in  northern  France,  311. 
Valrien,  Sr.,  grain  hoarder,  142. 
Vannes,  Breton  port,  33,  34,  35. 
Vannes,  bishopric  of,  35. 
Vary,  Humbert  de,  grain  buyer,   132, 

133- 

Vatan,  in  Orleannais,  13,  14. 
Vauldrimont,  town  near  Dijon,  143. 
Vaulx,  town  in  Dauphine,  130. 
Vaux,  Pierre  de,  grain  merchant  of  Paris, 

57  f-    ^ 
Velay,  district  in  southern  France,  about 

Le  Puy,  138,  140,  206,  245. 
Venaissin,  papal  county  on  the  Rh6ne, 

206. 

Vendres,  seaport  in  Languedoc,  291. 
Verdun,  town  in  northern  France,  324. 
Verdun,  bishopric  of,  in  northern  France, 

114. 

Verdun-sur- Garonne,    town    in    south- 
western France,  30. 
Verdun-sur-Saone,   town  in  Burgundy, 

192,  202,  n.  2. 
Verdun,  Pays  de,  162. 
Vermandois,  district  in  Picardy,  37,  47, 

78,  81,  228. 

Verneuil,  election  of,  207. 
Vernon,  market  town,  20,  57,  60. 
Versailles,  47,  n.  i. 
Vexm,  the,  territory  in  northern  France, 

50,  5i,  53,3H. 


Viard,  Thomas,  grain  merchant  of  Paris, 

109,  315- 

Vienne,  town  in  Dauphine",  204,  218. 

Vienne,  valley  of  the,  23,  25,  69. 

Viennois,  district  in  Dauphine,  245. 

Vierzon,  town,  14. 

Vige,  de,  gram  merchant  of  Chalons-sur- 
Marne,  104. 

Vige,  Sieur  de,  324. 

Villages,  characteristic  size  of,  in  the  less 
fertile  sections,  207. 

Villefranche-de-Rouergue,  town  in 
Guienne,  214. 

Villefranche-sur-Saone,  town  in  Beau- 
jolais,  211,  245. 

Villefrancon,  lieutenant  of  the  governor 
of  Burgundy,  248,  249,  250,  251,  252, 
358. 

Vil  lemur,  town,  30,  n.  4. 

Villensade,  parish  in  Champagne,  15. 

Villeroy,  Due  de,  governor  of  Lyonnais, 
172,  176. 

Vimpelles  (Vimpelle),  village  near  Bray, 
no,  in. 

Violette,  Henriette,  testimony  of,  87. 

Vitry,  baillage  of,  hi  Champagne,  314. 

Vitry,  election  of,  323. 

Vitry-le-Francois,  market  town  hi  Cham- 
pagne, 47,  76,  77,  80,  86,  87,  102,  104, 
106,  122,  260,  261,  262  f.,  308,  311, 
319,  321,  322,  325,  331;  the  granary 
trade  at,  101,  109;  the  breaking  down 
of  the  old  market  regulations,  105; 
wholesale  market  established  at  (1709), 
112-118,  127,  321,  325-330,  344,  360. 

Vivarais,  district  in  Languedoc,  138, 
184,  195. 

Vosges,  the,  mountain  range  in  eastern 
France,  331. 

Wars  of  Religion,  the,  225. 
Way-bills,  123,  343. 

Yenville,  see  Janville. 
Yonne  towns,  the,  204. 

Zanobi,  384. 


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